

Fr. Francisco Suárez, S.J.

Summa Theologiae 2

Commentaries & Disputations

Translated by Osvaldo R.

COMMENTARY AND DISPUTATIONS
ON THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

COMMENTARIES AND DISPUTATIONS

— TOME II —

ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION
AND REPROBATION

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This rendering into English of the Commentaries and Disputations upon the Summa Theologiae of the Reverend Father Francisco Suárez, S.J., the *Eximious Doctor*, of revered memory, is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of that School which bears his name, to whose enduring service this labor, undertaken across many volumes, is consecrated, that the light kindled by so great a master may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

Given the 25th day of June, in the
Year of Our Lord 2026.

TO THE FLOURISHING CULTUS OF SUÁREZ

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TREATISE TWO
ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION

— PROOEMIUM —

Although predestination and reprobation are so joined together, and in some way subordinated to each other, that one can scarcely be perfectly understood or explained without the other—and for this reason the Doctors are accustomed to treat them together—we will nonetheless speak of each separately for the sake of greater clarity, and will thereafter compare them with one another. And so we will divide this work into three principal parts. The first will be on Predestination, since it is nobler than reprobation and is per se intended by God's primary will; whence it is compared to reprobation somewhat as an end to means (for all things are for the sake of the elect, even the permission and procreation of the reprobate) and as a habit to a privation. It is therefore necessary that this first part be more copious than the others, and for this reason we will distribute it across three books: in the first we will dispute about the essence of predestination, in the second about its causes, and in the third about its effects. Then, so that the justice of divine reprobation may be better understood, we will interpose a fourth book, in which we will treat of divine supernatural providence toward those men whom God does not predestine. The fifth book will therefore explain reprobation. The sixth will compare predestination with reprobation, so that in the one divine mercy may shine forth more brightly, and in the other divine justice. And so we will comprehend the entire doctrine of this mystery in these six books, to the best of our capacity, with God's gracious assistance. And in handing down that doctrine, we will take care to maintain that manner of speaking and disputing

which exact scientific knowledge is accustomed to demand. For although this matter of predestination is most hidden, and is held by faith alone, and transcends human knowledge, yet—the principles of faith being presupposed—we must strive in explaining it to observe the method of science, so that we may more conveniently investigate something concerning so great a mystery. Not indeed by scrutinizing divine counsels as if they could be comprehended by human ingenuity, but rather by venerating the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, and by looking up with admiration at his inscrutable judgments, and—this faith being presupposed—by investigating with divine grace some reason and understanding of this mystery.

BOOK ONE
ON THE NECESSITY AND NATURE OF PREDESTINATION

In this first book, having first explained the meaning of the word and having treated the question whether predestination exists, we will inquire what it is and what essence or formal account it has. But since (as we will see) predestination consists in an act or acts of the divine mind (understanding both intellect and will under the term "mind"), and every act of the mind has an object or matter about which it is concerned, we will accordingly see what kind of act predestination is and in what matter it is concerned, whether it comprises acts of both intellect and will, what those acts are, and in which of them the principal account of predestination is located. All of these things we will comprehend in this first book.

CHAPTER I
THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO POSIT PREDESTINATION IN GOD

1. There have been those who denied that predestination exists in God, as can be gathered from Prosper in his response to the objections of the Gauls, chapter one, and from Augustine, book two of *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 14; for they thought that predestination was nothing other than fate, which, once posited, removes the freedom of the will.

2. Nonetheless, it is certain as a matter of faith that predestination belongs to God. This is taught by the aforementioned Fathers and is presupposed by the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 12 and canon 16, insofar as it defines that no one can be certain of his own predestination unless it is specially revealed to

him. And it is established from Paul, Romans 1 and 8, 1 Corinthians 2, and Ephesians 1, in which places he attributes *predestination* to God under this very word, and under the other names of *election*, *purpose*, and *foreknowledge*. The same is found in many other places, which I will mention later.

3. *The word "predestination" is explained.* — The argument from the thing itself will be clear from what will be said; for now it is declared only from the meaning of the word. For the word *predestination* is composed from the verb *destino*, which among the Latins has various meanings. However, two or three are principal for our present purpose. For sometimes it means to send, sometimes to designate for some office, but more often to propose and determine in the mind. And indeed St. Thomas, Part 1, question 23, article 1, whom Durandus follows, 1, d. 41, question 1, derives the name of predestination from the first meaning. But Alexander of Hales, Part 1, question 28, member 1, and others think it should rather be taken from the last. Yet in substance there cannot be any difference, because predestination does not signify an exterior mission or transmission into eternal life, as all acknowledge, and as is gathered from Paul, Romans 8, where he distinguishes predestination from glorification and from those actions by which a man is actually and exteriorly (so to speak) transmitted into eternal life, such as vocation and sanctification. Therefore, even if predestination signifies transmission, it does not signify transmission as carried out in act, but as conceived in the mind—as St. Thomas also noted, article two, ad 2.

4. *Whether predestination exists.* — Hence it is evidently established that predestination exists in God, because there are many who are transferred into eternal life by divine virtue and aid; but it is necessary that this happen from the will, foreknowledge, and providence of God; therefore there precedes in God the account, or conception, and will of that transmission which takes place in time —and this is what the name of predestination signifies. For it was to signify this that the particle *præ* was added to the verb *destino*. Concerning which particle it should briefly be noted that it can signify either the mere priority of eternity over time, or also some order or priority of reason among the very acts of divine knowledge and will. And it is taken in this latter sense by many theologians when they treat of predestination, and rightly so in my estimation. Nevertheless, in this sense the existence of such a mode of predestination is not a matter pertaining to faith, at least as explicitly defined. This is so, first, because this division of signs in the divine mind and of priority or order of reason among the acts of will and intellect does not pertain to the dogmas of faith but to purely theological disputation; and also because in this sense some Catholics have

understood that there is not in God an absolute predestination or preparation of grace or glory with respect to any man, prior to the absolute foreknowledge of future acts or of the future cooperation of free will. Or at least that God had no such mode of purpose or predestination with regard to all who are saved in time. These opinions have not up to now been condemned by the Church, nor do they merit any censure or note, although they are false, as we will see later.

5. Therefore, so that the thesis posited may have the certainty of faith, the particle *præ* must be taken as indicating only the priority of eternity over time; in this sense the argument made above proceeds most soundly, and is not only certain but also evident, given the dogmas concerning the glorification of the just. And Alexander of Hales explicitly explained that particle in this way at the place cited, article one, and Durandus similarly intimated as much, 1, distinction 40, question 1, saying that the account of ordination to a supernatural end pre-exists in God before things come to be, and that on account of this priority over the thing itself it is called predestination—which he took from St. Thomas, article one. Therefore only under this meaning and in this general account is it now established as certain that predestination exists in God.

6. *God alone can predestine.* — Indeed, as Durandus rightly noted, it is also concluded from this that predestination, as we are now speaking of it, can belong to God alone. For predestination signifies the account of the infallible ordination or transmission of a rational creature into eternal life; but God alone can ordain a created thing in this way to an end—both on account of the excellence of that end and on account of the infallible and efficacious pre-ordination, which requires the infinite wisdom and omnipotence of God. Therefore predestination both exists in God and can belong to him alone.

CHAPTER II
WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS AN IMMANENT ACT THAT BELONGS TO GOD FROM ETERNITY

1. There can be a ground for doubt, because predestination is defined by Augustine as *foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, etc.*, *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter fourteen. And although foreknowledge is eternal, the preparation, by which the account of predestination is completed, seems that it will be temporal. The minor is proved as to its latter part, because an architect who deliberates about building a house is not said to be preparing to build a house until he begins to gather the materials from which it is to be made, and a

king is not said to be preparing for war until he collects money, purchases weapons, and summons soldiers; therefore similarly God is not said to be preparing benefits for men until he begins to confer them; therefore preparation, and consequently predestination as well, does not signify an act that is solely immanent and eternal, but involves both an eternal and a temporal dimension.

2. *First thesis.* — It is to be said first that predestination is an immanent act in God, which intrinsically denominates the one predestining, while it extrinsically denominates as predestined the thing about which it is concerned. This thesis is that of St. Thomas, at the aforementioned question twenty-three, article two, where in this sense he maintains that predestination places nothing in the predestined, but in the one predestining. And indeed as to the former part, he means that it places nothing in the predestined formally, because it is not a form of theirs inhering in them; but effectively it does place something in them, as will be established below in explaining the effects of predestination. It remains therefore that predestination is intrinsically in God himself as the one predestining; for it must be intrinsically in something, and since it is not in the predestined thing, it must necessarily be in God. One might say that predestination formally expresses a relation of reason, because it is not intrinsically in God or in anything else. I respond that predestination is in itself something real, although it cannot be conceived or explained by us except through the mode of a relation of reason. For truly and in reality God predestines, and predestination itself is a truly real cause of many effects. Finally, in this respect the account of predestination is the same as that of the will and foreknowledge of God, as these are concerned with creatures. Whence it is also clear that predestination cannot exist in God except as an immanent act, as St. Thomas noted at the said article, ad primum: both because predestination does not signify something after the mode of a first act, but after the mode of an ultimate and vital act—like foreknowledge, election, and such things—as is clear from the very meaning of the word and from the understanding of everyone; and also because (as I will say presently) predestination signifies something free, but nothing is denominated free in God except what belongs to him through the mode of an immanent act, for all other attributes belong to him of necessity.

3. *Second thesis.* — It is to be said second that predestination is an eternal act and belongs to God from eternity according to its entire account. This is a certain matter, and is gathered from Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world*, and he adds below: *who predestined us*—namely, at that time when he chose us. Whence he adds further: *predestined according to the*

purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will; and Paul alludes to this very point in Romans 8, saying: *For those whom he foreknew he also predestined, etc.*, and those predestined he immediately calls *chosen*, saying: *Who will bring a charge against God's elect?* Predestination is therefore equally eternal as foreknowledge or election. And so too in 1 Corinthians 2, incarnate Wisdom is said to have been *predestined before the ages for our glory*. From these places all the Fathers recognize that predestination is eternal: Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter ten, and *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter fourteen; Fulgentius, book one, *To Monimus*, chapters 12 and 13.

4. *The argument for the thesis.* — It is declared by argument from what was said in chapter one. For that particle *præ* signifies the priority of divine predestination over its effect, which is the transmission into glory that takes place in time through grace. But that priority cannot be by finite duration, but only by eternity. The reason is that nothing can belong to God from time, beyond extrinsic denominations or relations of reason arising from the actual making or existence of creatures; but predestination does not express this kind of denomination, since it precedes the existence of the created effect toward which it has a relation; therefore it must necessarily belong to God before the beginning of time. Otherwise God would change, if he were now to predestine and had not before, since predestining does not belong to him from any change in a creature.

5. *Objection.—The objection is met in two ways.* — One might say: Predestination is a part of providence; but providence is not eternal but temporal, which is clear because providence is posterior to creation, since it looks after things already created, as Nemesius said in his book *On the Office of Man*, chapter forty-two; but creation is temporal; therefore. I respond first: Whatever may be the case with providence, insofar as it procures the good of things already existing, predestination nonetheless—by reason of that priority which the particle *præ* indicates—abstracts from the existence of the things that are predestined, as St. Thomas admirably said, article 2, ad 2, and consequently is eternal. It is said secondly that even providence, taken formally, is eternal, as the same St. Thomas taught, question 22, article 1, ad 2. For although the execution of providence is temporal—which is what Nemesius seems to have had in view—nonetheless the will and account existing in the mind of God, by which he governs all things in time, is eternal, and it is this that is called providence.

6. *What kind of preparation predestination is.* — To the ground for doubt raised at the beginning, it is responded that there is the same equivocation in the

word *preparing*. For there is a certain exterior preparation, such as is usually either some disposition of matter or at least the gathering of the remote material itself, as is customary in human preparation for some building; and such preparation, insofar as it can be understood in any work of God, is temporal, as the argument made proves. An example can be drawn from the creation of man: for before it God in some way prepared the matter, forming the body from the clay of the earth, which preparation was no less temporal than creation itself. There is another preparation, purely internal, in the mind of the governor or provider: as a man is said to be prepared to respond when he has foreseen the difficulties in his mind and anticipated responses to them, and someone is also said to be ready to give when he has the purpose of will to give at such a time. In this latter sense, therefore, predestination is called a preparation in the mind and will of God, for he both foreknew all the means by which he can save his elect and prepared them for them by the purpose of his will; and such preparation is eternal. This comes to the same thing as what St. Thomas said, at the said article 2, ad tertium, that there is a twofold preparation—one of the patient and one of the agent: the former is something in the matter that is prepared and is therefore temporal, while the latter is only in the agent itself; and in an agent that acts through intellect and will, it consists only in the preconceived account of what is to be done, or the purpose of will to act; and therefore this kind of preparation in God is eternal, and such is predestination.

7. Alexander of Hales adds, at the said question 28, member 1, article 3, a difference between God and created agents: that created agents need some external matter in order to act, and therefore are said to be most fully prepared for a work when they have in some way prepared or at least remotely disposed the matter. But God does not need external matter in order to act, but only his own power, by which he is in a sufficient first act and has of himself all things required for acting if he wills; and therefore he needs no other preparation than the purpose and deliberation of his will, which is eternal.

CHAPTER III
WHETHER PREDESTINATION BELONGS TO GOD FREELY OR NECESSARILY

1. *Grounds for doubt.* — There can be a ground for doubt, because in chapter one we said that predestination belongs to God of necessity; but what belongs to someone of necessity is not free for him. We also said that predestination is eternal; but what is eternal is immutable and necessary, and

therefore not free. Moreover, predestination considered in relation to the intellect pertains to the accounts of things to be done, which are of necessity in the mind of God; but considered in relation to the will, it is a certain love or will to save some men, which necessarily belongs to God—at least given the supposition that God willed to create men. For how could his goodness fail to predestine some?

2. A twofold necessity can be understood in the act of predestination: one simply, that is, without any supposition being made; another from some hypothesis. Furthermore, the former can be understood either as absolute necessity, in the way that it belongs to God to be wise and just, etc., or only as the necessity of fittingness or congruence, in the way that we say the Incarnation was necessary for the redemption of the human race.

3. *First thesis.* — It is to be said first, speaking absolutely and simply, that predestination does not belong to God necessarily but is a free act of God. And this is a matter certain as a matter of faith. It is taken from Paul, Romans 8: *We know that for those who love God all things work together for good, for those who are called according to purpose*—namely *according to the free purpose of God's will*, not from any necessity; whence he adds: *For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, etc.* — indicating the difference between the true Son and his brethren, in that he alone is such by nature and of necessity, whereas they are so by predestination and consequently by the free will of God. Whence a little further he calls the predestined the *chosen of God*, saying: *Who will bring a charge against God's elect?* But election is a free act; therefore so is predestination. The same Paul confirms this most openly in Ephesians 1, saying: *Predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will* — by which words he signified the free will of God, as I argued in my own lecture on that passage.

4. The same is taught by Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and others, saying: *God predestined those things which he himself was going to do.* Damascus speaks similarly, book 2, *On the Faith*, chapter 30. But it is certain as a matter of faith that what God does, he does freely; therefore what he predestines, he predestines freely. Likewise, God's providence is free; therefore all the more is predestination. Finally, although predestination is eternal, it nonetheless has a relation to temporal things; but this relation does not belong to God necessarily, because its terminus could simply not exist; therefore neither does predestination belong to God necessarily; therefore it belongs to him freely. Indeed, as Augustine often taught, in this act the freedom of the divine will is most clearly discerned, because not only was it free for him to predestine or not

to predestine, but also by his free will he predestined this one rather than that one. It is also for this reason that this work is called the greatest work of grace and liberality by Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 15, and often elsewhere—of which more in book 3.

5. *Predestination unknown in this life.* — And hence arises (to note this in passing) that, although it is most certain that predestination exists in God, it is entirely uncertain to us whether predestination belongs to this or that man. In this sense the Council of Trent defined, Session 6, chapter 12, and canons 15 and 16, that no one can be certain of his own predestination without a special revelation. The reason is that this depends on the free will of God, whose determination we cannot know until we either see its effect completed or have a revelation of it; but the effect of predestination is not completed until glory, and therefore in this life it cannot be known without revelation. But this revelation is not regularly made, lest either the predestined become negligent or the reprobate despair, as St. Thomas said, at the said question twenty-three, article one, ad quartum. These things, however, are to be understood of certain knowledge; for probable and conjectural knowledge of a sort can be had through various signs of predestination, which we will enumerate later when treating of its effects.

6. *Second thesis.* — It is to be said second that if we once suppose that some men will actually attain eternal life, then predestination must necessarily exist in God—such that, although it is not necessary absolutely, it is necessary with respect to such effects. This is the sense in which we spoke in the first chapter, and in which St. Thomas speaks at the said article one, and Alexander of Hales and the other Scholastics. But so that the thesis be proved by argument, it must be understood of predestination taken absolutely, abstracting from its mode and from the particular questions—namely, whether it is in some way from foreseen merits or not; and whether it presupposes an efficacious intention of giving glory that precedes the whole of predestination in the order of reason, or exists without it. For in these particular modes or properties of predestination it is more difficult to find a necessary connection between this or that mode of predestining and the ultimate effect of predestination, and the matter depends on various questions to be treated below. The thesis therefore is to be understood of predestination taken simply, as it is defined by Augustine, *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 14: that it is *foreknowledge and the operation of the benefits of God, by which most certainly those are freed who are freed*. Whence he himself concludes there: *Predestination is as necessary as foreknowledge is necessary.* But if in time it is to be the case that some men attain beatitude, it is

necessary that there precede in God an eternal foreknowledge of such an effect; therefore it is also necessary that predestination precede it. Likewise, such an effect cannot ever occur unless God has from his eternal will prepared it; therefore if the effect is to be future, the preparation of it necessarily precedes in God; therefore predestination. Finally, no thing can attain its end except through divine providence; therefore much less can men attain beatitude without the providence of God accommodated to such an end; but predestination is nothing other than this kind of providence; therefore without predestination men cannot attain such an end; therefore predestination is necessary for such an effect.

7. *Objection. — Response. — Angels from all orders are predestined.* — It is to be said third that, although speaking absolutely and without any supposition, predestination was not simply necessary, it was nonetheless in some way necessary, with the necessity of fittingness and congruence with the divine goodness and wisdom. This is proved because it was very fitting and congruent that God both create the human race and ordain it to a supernatural end; but it was also most fitting that the human species, in at least some of its individuals, attain the end for which it was created by God—lest it seem to have been created in vain, or predestined to evil, or lest God seem powerless to save it, and finally so that God be perfectly glorified by this creature of his in the state of beatitude. Therefore it was fitting and most becoming that divine goodness glorify some among men in time, and consequently predestine them from eternity. One might say: did God not ordain several species of angels to that beatitude, in which species he predestined no individual? Why then could he not do the same with the human species? I respond that he could indeed have done so, but it would not have been fitting, for the reason given. Nor does the same account apply to the angelic species (if it is true that in each of them there is only one individual), because there could have been good reason not to predestine all angels from a different angle, and given that hypothesis it is the same thing not to predestine one angel and not to predestine his entire species. Whence, according to that position, the species of angels are related to one another in this matter just as the individuals of men are. But if in the individual angelic species there are multiple individuals, it is probable that some from all the species of angels were predestined. Just as it is also more verisimilar that from all the Hierarchies and from all the orders of angels, some were predestined—for that more fully declares the wisdom, goodness, and power of God and pertains to the greater beauty of the state of beatitude.

8. *Whether predestination was necessary in the state of innocence.* — Someone will press more insistently, because God in the state of innocence predestined no man, but permitted the entire human species to fall and, insofar as lay in it, to lose beatitude; therefore we cannot say it was more fitting, in that state, to predestine some; therefore neither can it be said absolutely of the human species in relation to beatitude. I respond that it can be understood in two ways that God predestined no men in the state of innocence. First, that is, that he did not predestine them to stably obtain the very state of innocence in this life, as if by preserving them from losing that state. Second, that is, that he did not predestine men of that state to attain beatitude with effect. In the former sense, what is assumed is true: for he did not efficaciously ordain other men, apart from Adam and Eve, to have that state; nor indeed did he ordain even Adam and Eve themselves with respect to perseverance in that state, for he predestined neither of these things. For if he had predestined them, it would have infallibly come about. But from this sense no argument can be drawn against predestination taken simply, which is predestination to glory, because that state of innocence was not the terminus or ultimate end for which man was created, but was a certain way of tending toward eternal and supernatural happiness. Nor is it unfitting that the entire human species, in one of its individuals, having been placed on a shorter and easier path toward attaining eternal life, lost that path—because it was not thereby left without hope and reprobate. For God was able by another path, harsher indeed but perhaps more profitable, to lead it to happiness. The argument made, however, well proves that, given the institution of human nature for eternal happiness and the fall of the whole nature from that first state of innocence, it was very fitting that God redeem it and provide another mode of attaining beatitude for it. Indeed, God judged it more fitting (insofar as it can be understood from his works) to save it in this way than to preserve it without sin in the state of innocence.

9. Hence if it be said that God predestined no man in the state of innocence because he willed to transmit no one from that state of innocence to glory, we respond that it is sufficient that he eventually transmit some men through another state of the way to eternal happiness. But if someone presses, because even regarding this very thing God had determined nothing, at that instant of reason in which he decreed to create men in that state of innocence: it is responded first that this is uncertain, at least as regards the efficacious will to save some men, and perhaps those particular individuals who are now predestined—concerning which matter there is more to be said below. As to the means, moreover, it is no wonder that he had not in that instant decreed them;

because the means of that state were not going to be efficacious for leading men to glory. Whence even if we grant that in that instant God had not efficaciously chosen any man for glory, this bears nothing on the present case, because (according to another position) this election does not precede but follows predestination and the foreknowledge of means. And therefore, since the predestination of efficacious means could not have been consummated in that instant, neither could election have had a place in the same instant. Nor can it be inferred from this that the predestination of some was not per se most fitting, because its fittingness does not consist in its being made at this or that instant of reason, but in its being made or held in eternity.

10. But if someone should wish to infer from this that the predestination of men would not have taken place, had the state of innocence endured, and consequently that, considered per se and simply, it is not so fitting that the gentle order of divine providence and wisdom requires it: it is responded by denying the assumption. For if the state of innocence had been going to endure, without doubt some men would have attained eternal life in it. And the argument made proves this, because this is per se fitting and pertains in the highest degree to providence in every state. But for those who would then be saved, predestination would also have been necessary: because they cannot be saved without the foreknowledge and eternal will of God, and in these predestination consists. Wherefore if God through his conditional knowledge had foreknown that man created in that state would not have fallen but would have preserved it for his posterity, he would consequently have foreseen many modes of calling and aiding men in that state by which they would infallibly be saved if these were granted to them; and he would have efficaciously chosen some multitude of men for glory and would have pre-ordained the giving of those efficacious means to them. But now, because he did not have such knowledge regarding the duration of that state, he completed or ordered his predestination after the foreseen original sin. And so the argument made also proves that, given the foreknowledge of the fall of human nature, the pre-ordination of its reparation was per se most fitting, together with the predestination of some who would with ultimate effect attain the fruit of that reparation. It is established, therefore, that the predestination of men or angels, considered per se and simply, is most fitting and can in some way be called necessary, according to the congruent account of divine providence.

11. *The arguments are solved.* — The solution to the grounds for doubt is therefore clear from what has been said. For we do not say that predestination is necessary with a necessity opposed to liberty, but either from a supposition that

does not remove freedom but rather presupposes its use, or only according to fittingness. Nor does being eternal conflict with a free act, because the relation of reason by which a free act is completed (in our mode of understanding) can be eternal: for it is immutable once it exists, which suffices for eternal duration. The last argument, however, proves no more than necessity of fittingness: for the accounts of things as they are in God's knowledge, prior to the decree of will, do not have the account of predestination, as we will see later. But the will or efficacious decree to save some is not connected with the will to create some by simple necessity, but only by necessity of fittingness.

CHAPTER IV
WHAT THINGS ARE PROPERLY SAID TO BE PREDESTINED

1. Since there is no immanent act in God except that of intellect or will, it is established from what was said in chapter two that predestination is some one of these acts, or both together—which was the next thing to be inquired. But since it is common to the acts of both faculties to have an object or matter about which they are concerned, from which they usually receive their account and determination, it seemed convenient first to set out the matter with which predestination is concerned, and then what acts the will and intellect of the one predestining have with regard to that matter, and from this it will finally be more easily determined in which act predestination is located and what is, as it were, its specific account. For immanent acts usually receive this account—at least according to our mode of understanding—from the matter about which they are concerned and from the account under which they tend toward it.

2. *The divine persons are not predestined. — The matter of predestination is created.* — Furthermore, since it was said that to predestine is a free act of God, it plainly follows that the matter of predestination is not the divinity itself, nor the divine persons as such, or in relation to the properties or notions intimately belonging to them. The reason is that these do not belong to God freely, but altogether necessarily. Whence they do not belong to God through his free will, but through his nature; but things that are predestined depend on the free will of God—for it is for this reason that predestination is said to be a free act; therefore the nature of a person, or the divine properties, are not predestined. Whence Augustine, in Tractate 105 on John, near the end, treating of Christ's predestination, says: *Rightly* (he says) *is he said not to be predestined according to that which is the Word of God, God with God. For why would he have been predestined, since he already was what he was, eternal without beginning, without*

end? For that was predestined which did not yet exist, that it might in due time come to be, just as before all times it was predestined that it should come to be. And therefore I said that the divine persons as such are not predestined, because according to an assumed nature they can be predestined. Whence Augustine adds in the same place: *Whoever denies that the Son of God was predestined, denies that the same is the Son of Man*; and for the same reason I said that a divine person is not predestined in relation to the properties or notions intimately belonging to him, because in relation to an extraneous nature, something of this kind can in some way be said: as, for example, that the Word was predestined to become flesh. Although this denomination more directly falls upon the humanity, which was predestined to be united to the Word, than upon the Word itself. The proper matter of predestination, therefore, is some created thing that is to be in time—as Augustine says in the cited place and in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10, saying: *By predestination God knew what he himself was going to do.*

3. *That a thing is said to be predestined in two ways.* — Furthermore it must be known that a thing can be denominated predestined in two ways: first, only with respect to being or coming to be—in which way glory or faith can be said to be predestined; and so can be understood that passage from Acts 4: *Herod and Pilate with the Gentiles gathered to do what your hand and your counsel decreed to be done.* In the second way, one thing is said to be predestined to something other than its own being—as man is said to be predestined to grace or glory; in which way can be taken that which is said of the wisdom of the Gospel predestination in 1 Corinthians 2: *Which God predestined for our glory.* Of these two things included in such a locution under predestination, one is usually called the object, the other the terminus of predestination. For the thing that is properly and immediately said to be predestined is called the object of predestination; but the effect or end to which it is said to be predestined is called the terminus of that predestination. It must be noted, however, that between these two things, in different senses or genera of causes, there can intervene a certain reciprocity or mutual denomination: for while one thing is predestined to some terminus, the terminus itself is also predestined to exist, and in its own genus can be said to be predestined with a relation to the other thing of which it is the end. As for example, a man is said to be predestined to the beatific vision; but the vision itself can be said to be predestined for the happiness of the man, that is, to be the form that intrinsically beatifies man formally.

4. *Resolution of the question.* — Properly speaking, however, and according to received usage, the predestination of which we now speak regards as its object

—that in which it immediately falls—some person, and denominates that person as predestined to some terminus. And so, responding formally to the question proposed, it is to be said that the only proper object of the predestination of which we now speak is a created person, or the thing that is properly said to be predestined. This seems most of all to pertain to the usage of the word, and therefore is sufficiently proved from the usage and manner of speaking of theologians. A reason can moreover be given from what St. Thomas notes at the said article 1 of question 23. For predestination properly signifies the efficacious ordination of something to an ultimate end that surpasses its nature. But no thing is properly ordained to this kind of end except a created person; therefore. The major is presupposed from the usage of the word and from the fact that a thing tends naturally toward a natural end and does not need to be transmitted by another through a special providence added above nature, which predestination signifies or requires. The minor, however, will be declared in the following points.

5. *First corollary.* — For from this it follows that the denomination of predestination by which a thing is said absolutely to be predestined—namely, to being or to coming to be—is less proper and is not in the strict sense the predestination of which we now speak. This is proved, because by the fact that a thing is ordained to being or to coming to be, it is not ordained to something that surpasses its nature, since nothing is more demanded by each nature than being and consequently also coming to be. For this reason St. Thomas said, in his lecture on Romans 1, chapter 3: *To be predestined is nothing other than to dispose beforehand in the heart what is to be done about some thing. But one can dispose about a future thing or operation in one way as regards the constitution of the thing itself—as an artisan disposes to build a house—and in another way as regards the use or governance of the thing; and to this* (he says) *second predisposition predestination pertains, not to the first.* From which he first concludes that those things which pertain to the constitution of the thing itself are not properly predestined. Whence, since nothing pertains more to the constitution of a thing than existence, a thing is not properly said to be predestined on account of ordination to existence alone. But when a thing is said to be predestined absolutely, only this is said by reason of existence; that denomination is therefore not proper to predestination as we now speak of it. But since it cannot be denied that there is in God an eternal pre-ordination of a thing to existing, through the absolute decree of his will—to which in the intellect there corresponds an eternal account or idea by which such a thing exists in time—the name of predestination is extended to signify this kind of act.

To avoid verbal ambiguity in these matters, however, we will use the name of *predefinition* rather than predestination. Cajetan indicated this at 1 Corinthians 2: for he expounds those words, *Which he predestined, etc.*, as meaning, that is, he predefined and in his eternal decree proposed that it should come to be.

6. *Second corollary.* — It follows second that proper predestination, of which we are treating, is not of accidents but of substances, and consequently that substance alone is properly predestined; of accidents it is said only in a broad sense, insofar as every predefinition is called predestination. The reason is that predestination is properly said of a thing that is ordained to attaining an end; to attain an end is proper to substance, for accidents tend rather to be either means or instruments by which a substance attains its end, or at most they are the very formal attainment of the end. Therefore to be predestined simply belongs to a substantial thing, not to accidents. Likewise, although accidents are ordained to substance as to an end for the sake of which they come to be, and can therefore in their own way be said to be pre-ordained and predefined for such an end, yet that end is not above the nature of the accidents themselves—since the entire being of accidents is posited in such a relation that is intrinsic and connatural to them—and therefore that pre-ordination is not properly predestination as we now treat of it. This is so true that it holds even in supernatural accidents. For although these are supernatural to man, it is nonetheless natural to them to have an order to a supernatural end. Whence grace is not properly predestined to glory, for by the very fact that it is predefined to exist, it is ordered to glory by its own nature; but man, to whom both grace and glory are supernatural, is most properly said to be predestined to glory through grace. Predestination, therefore, is properly of substances, not of accidents.

7. *Third corollary. — Objection. — The objection is met.* — Third, it follows from what has been said that predestination does not properly belong to all substances, but only to rational or intellectual ones; for inanimate or irrational things are not capable objects of predestination, as St. Thomas noted at the said question 23, article 1, ad 3. And the reason is that substances lacking intellect are not ordained to beatitude or to a supernatural end, since they are not capable of it. One might say: sometimes an inanimate substance is ordained to an effect surpassing its nature—as, for example, water for washing the soul, etc.—therefore it will be able with full propriety to be said that water was predestined from eternity to wash the soul in the law of grace, just as priests can also be said to be predestined to consecrate the body of Christ in the new law. I respond that it is indeed true that all these things are ordained by God from eternity through

supernatural providence, but not through proper predestination as we now speak of it. First, because it is not necessary that this providence descend in each thing to individual instances through a special predefinition or election of the kind that intervenes in the predestination of a man, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, at the said question 23, article 6. Second, also because the ordination to a supernatural effect is not as to the ultimate end of that thing, but rather all of this is a certain means ordained to the beatitude of men. But predestination properly so called, as we now speak of it, signifies the efficacious ordination of the thing said to be predestined to attaining its own ultimate end, and therefore it falls only upon an intellectual substance.

8. *Predestination properly falls upon a person, not upon a nature.* — Fourth, it is concluded from what has been said that predestination of this kind properly falls upon a person alone, and not upon a nature as such, even if it be rational or intellectual. On this matter two extreme positions are to be noted. The first was that of Scotus, 3, distinction 7, where he thinks that Christ's humanity or soul was first and principally predestined to an eminent beatitude, and that the account of this was also predestined to the hypostatic union. The second is that of some Thomists, who say that nature as such, or humanity, is incapable of any predestination. But since this matter properly pertains to the material on the Incarnation, and was treated in volume 1, Part 3, disputation 50, section 3, I therefore hold briefly that a nature—for example, humanity—is properly predestined to the hypostatic union. But now we are not speaking of that predestination, but of predestination to beatitude, and therefore we exclude nature as nature from it. For a nature as such is not ordained to beatitude, but the person subsisting in it, because beatitude consists in operation, and operation is properly of the *suppositum*, not of the nature—as is more fully explained at the cited place.

9. I added in the thesis that this person must be created or capable of being created, because a divine person (as I said) according to itself is not capable of predestination, since it is essentially and of itself blessed. This is most certain in its proper nature; but in an extraneous and assumed nature it seems it can be predestined. And Augustine speaks thus of Christ in that Tractate 105 on John, at the end, where explaining those words: *Glorify me, Father, with the glory which I had with you before the world was*, he expounds them of the glory and honor of Christ as man, which he had from eternity in predestination. Some, however, do not wish to attribute even this mode of predestination to Christ, because given the assumption of humanity, all glory is connatural to him, and a thing is not said to be predestined to a natural end or property, but to a

supernatural one. This argument indeed proves that this predestination of Christ is of a higher order and is not altogether distinct from that by which he was predestined as the natural Son of God, but is conjoined with it; it does not, however, prove that it is not true predestination. It is nonetheless a matter of a different consideration, as can be seen at the cited place in the third part. Here therefore we are treating only of the predestination of created persons.

10. *Angels are predestined.* — Finally, I speak absolutely of a created person and not of a human or angelic one, because each is capable of predestination, as St. Thomas noted above, ad 1: since angels too are ordained to supernatural beatitude. It is usually objected, however, that (according to Augustine) only one who is subject to sin is predestined, for Augustine said: *Predestination is the purpose of showing mercy.* But the holy angels were never subject to sin, and those who sinned are not predestined. For this reason some distinguish a twofold predestination: one that simply ordains to good, which they say applies to angels; and another that liberates from the misery of sin, which they say is proper to men. This is roughly the view of Bonaventure in 1, distinction 40, around the letter. But this distinction is not necessary, for it is simply incidental to predestination whether the person has been in sin or not. And those words—*that predestination is the purpose of showing mercy*—are not found in Augustine, although he sometimes explains predestination through the word *liberating*; but he speaks of the predestination of men, and as St. Thomas notes, liberation can also be understood as preservation.

CHAPTER V
WHAT THING FALLS UNDER PREDESTINATION AS ITS TERMINUS

1. *Various questions.* — We have said that the matter with which predestination is concerned comprises two things: namely the person who is predestined, who is called the object of predestination, and the thing or good to which he is predestined, which is called the terminus of the same predestination. Since therefore in the preceding chapter we explained the object of predestination, it remains that in the present chapter we speak of its terminus. About this many questions are usually raised, which must here be briefly dispatched: namely, whether the terminus of predestination can be the evil of fault or of punishment, or only some good that is per se to be sought; and whether any good whatsoever, or only that which is supernatural; and among

supernatural goods, whether only beatitude or also grace; or whether other good acts can sufficiently terminate predestination.

2. *First thesis. — The evil of fault is not a terminus of predestination.* — In the first place, therefore, it is to be established as certain that the evil of fault cannot be the terminus of predestination; and so God predestines no one to the evil of fault. This is a matter of faith, defined in the Second Council of Orange, chapter 25, and is taken from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 17, and is treated at length by Fulgentius, book one, *To Monimus*. Augustine also hands it down, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter ten, where for this reason he says that foreknowledge extends more widely than predestination: *Because God predestines only those things which he himself is going to do; but he foreknows also those things which he is not going to do, and does not predestine them—such as sins.* And for this reason, in book five of *On the City of God*, chapter nine, he says: *God is the author of all powers, but not of all wills.* Because he is not the author of evil wills, and consequently neither does he predestine them, nor does his foreknowledge cause them to be future; *but because they are future he foreknows them*, as he adds in the same work, chapter ten. The reason is that whether predestination pertains to the intellect or to the will, it is certain that it involves the will in some way, such that God is not said to predestine except what he simply wills to happen. But God does not will sin to happen; therefore neither does he predestine it; therefore neither does he predestine a man to sin or to do evil; for in that case he would be predestining the sin itself. This is confirmed because a permissive will is not sufficient for predestination, but according to faith God only permits a man to sin—he does not bring it about or induce him to sin; therefore he does not predestine. Finally, it is for this reason that we showed in book two *On Aids* that God does not predefine evils of fault, and all that was adduced there confirms this truth.

3. *Second thesis.* — It is to be said second that, although in some true sense God can be said to predestine some men to the evil of punishment, yet not in the most proper and rigorous sense in which we are now speaking. The former part is posited on account of Augustine, who sometimes says absolutely that some are predestined by God to hell, as is clear in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 100, and book 15 of *On the City of God*, chapter 1, and book 21, chapter 24. And he is to be understood thus if anywhere he said absolutely that some are predestined to destruction, as Fulgentius expounded him in the said book 1, *To Monimus*. And in the same way Isidore speaks, book 2, *On the Highest Good*, chapter 6, and the Council of Valence under Lothaire, chapter 3, indicates this. But in this kind of locution it must be noted that that particle *præ* expresses the priority of

eternity over time, not of the divine will over its foreknowledge. For it is in this sense that what the Council of Orange and the Council of Trent defined is true: *God by his power has predestined no one to evil.* Which I understand to apply even to the evil of punishment and eternal misery, as I will show more fully in the second part of this material. I weigh, however, that word *by his power*, which signifies that God by power and will alone has ordained no one to the evil of eternal misery. This does not exclude that he has decreed from justice to punish some eternally. But this decree presupposes the foreknowledge of the fault on account of which a man is worthy of such a punishment. And therefore such a decree cannot be called predestination in relation to foreknowledge, but rather by reason of eternity compared to such an effect; and the said Fathers speak in this way, for they expressly declare that that predestination presupposes the said foreknowledge.

4. From these things, therefore, the former part of the thesis is clear. For the said locution is true in the former sense. And the reason for it is that God is truly said to predestine those things which he has with absolute and efficacious will ordered from eternity and decreed to do, at least in the sense in which the particle *præ* expresses the priority of eternity over time; but God by absolute will has decreed to punish those whom he foreknew would sin and would remain in sins until the end; therefore those, as impious, are rightly said to have been predestined to punishment. And this argument proceeds *a fortiori* for any other punishment whatsoever.

5. The latter part of the thesis also is declared from the same doctrine, because God is said in the most proper sense to predestine a man when from himself and from his benevolence and affection—and not merely in response to the foreknowledge of some work of the man himself—he efficaciously ordains him to some end or terminus that is fitting and advantageous for the man; but that pre-ordination to punishment is not of this kind; therefore it is not predestination in the most proper sense. The major is declared first from Scripture: for whenever in it the word of predestination is found, it is taken in a good sense, as is clear from the places often cited; and therefore this word has already been appropriated in this meaning among the Scholastics, the reason for which will be clear from what will be said. It is declared second from a certain teaching of Damascene, book 2, *On the Faith*, chapter 29, which Chrysostom indicated, homily 1 on Ephesians: that God wills something for men in two ways, namely either from himself alone and from his own inclination, or moved and as it were compelled by the men themselves. In the former way he wills goods for them; in the latter, the evils of punishment. Predestination in the most

proper sense, therefore, pertains to the former mode of will, and therefore is concerned with goods and does not fall upon the evil of punishment.

6. *Third thesis. — The decree of predestination is absolute.* — Hence therefore it is to be said third that the terminus of predestination is always some good to which a man is ordained from God's peculiar affection. This thesis is taken from Scripture. For wherever the word of predestining is placed, it is taken in a good sense. Augustine also defines predestination in this way, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10, and *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 14, and this too is the usage of the Scholastics. It is also clear from what has been said, by a sufficient enumeration of the parts, and will be clearer still from what will be said. For greater explanation it must now be added that, since the will of good can sometimes be absolute and sometimes only a simple affection that they call a velleity, predestination does not signify any affection of good whatsoever but its absolute decree, or includes it. Hence that text of Paul in Romans 8: *Those whom he predestined, these he called, justified, glorified.* Where he understands those who are said absolutely to be predestined to good and in such a way that they attain the end. Hence also that text of Augustine, chapter fourteen, *On the Good of Perseverance*: Predestination is *preparation of benefits*—it is therefore concerned with good; *by which most certainly those are freed*—it is therefore through an absolute will. Finally, even the very name of predestination carries this with it, and common usage has so established.

7. One might raise a doubt from those words of Acts 4: *What your hand and your counsel decreed to be done.* Where there is speech about the Passion of Christ, which God willed not from himself but on account of the sins of men; and yet there the word of predestining is placed. I respond that there is a certain evil of punishment that is inflicted as pure vengeance, such as hell; and to this we say the name of predestination is not properly attributed. But there is another evil of medicinal punishment, which is ordained toward a greater good to be attained with effect; and this, under this consideration, falls under predestination: for it is one of the means or remedies by which God works toward obtaining the salvation of the predestined, and in this order the Passion of Christ is contained—indeed it is the greatest and as it were universal remedy, which God from himself, from his infinite goodness alone, predestined for men already fallen in divine foreknowledge.

8. *The most proper predestination has a supernatural good as its terminus.* — It must further be added that the most proper predestination, of which we now speak, does not have just any good as its terminus, but a supernatural one.

So St. Thomas, article 1, and all the Scholastics, and this is most consonant with the manner of speaking of St. Paul. For wherever he used this word, he is treating either of the goods of the grace of union, as in Romans 1 and 1 Corinthians 2, or of the goods of sanctifying grace, as in Romans 8 and Ephesians 1. The argument of St. Thomas is also excellent: because natural goods are owed to nature, and the ordination to a natural end arises from the proper impulse and powers of nature itself, and therefore does not require a special predestination but only common providence. But a supernatural end does not arise from the inclination of nature, nor is its attainment through one's own powers; and therefore, for a man efficaciously to tend toward it, it is necessary that he be ordained and as it were transmitted by another; and this is accomplished through predestination. Predestination, therefore, is concerned with supernatural goods.

9. *Whether grace or glory is the terminus of predestination.* — Since, however, grace and glory are comprehended among these goods (for we are not now treating of the hypostatic union), there is usually a difficulty whether both or only one of them is the terminus of predestination. And on this there is a diversity of opinions.

10. *First opinion.* — The first opinion says that predestination has only glory—both as proximate and as ultimate terminus. This is the view of all who constitute predestination solely in the purpose of giving glory, such as Ockham, Gabriel, William of Rubion, in 1, distinction 40, question 1, and Catharinus, *Opuscule on Predestination*, book 1, last chapter, and book 3, chapters 2 and 3. The basis could have been that by virtue of that decree the man is sufficiently ordained to infallibly attaining glory; therefore he is already predestined.

11. *This opinion is rejected.* — This position, however, as to its exclusive part, is false and contrary to the other theologians, and not very consonant with Paul, who in Romans 8 indicated that predestination is also concerned with the means, which are vocation and justification. And in Ephesians 1 he expressly said: *He predestined us for adoption as sons of God*, which comes about through grace. It also supports this that it is said of Paul himself (Acts 22): *The God of our fathers ordained you to know his will and to see the Just One, etc.* And Augustine most openly taught this at the places often cited, when he says: *Predestination is the preparation of grace and of the benefits of God.* And in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 100, when he calls predestination *to grace*. And other passages we will cite presently, and we will give the reason.

12. *Second opinion.* — There is therefore another opinion saying that predestination is not concerned with glory but only with grace. Durandus held

this in 1, distinction 41, question 1, ad 1, and some moderns follow him, attributing it to St. Thomas, on the grounds that he says in article 4 that love or election to glory is presupposed to predestination, from which they infer that it does not pertain to it. They also adduce Augustine, who always defines predestination through ordination to grace. Finally, the argument of Durandus is that providence is not about the end but about the means; but predestination is a part of providence; therefore.

13. *The second opinion is rejected as to its denying part.* — I hold that this position too is false as to its denying part. And in the first place it is against the common position of the other theologians. Nor does St. Thomas stand in opposition, because in that article he speaks presupposing that predestination formally pertains to the intellect; but speaking of the will, which predestination necessarily either expresses or connotes, he does not deny that it has glory as its terminus. Indeed he often indicates that predestination includes the will of giving both grace and glory. For in article one he says: *The account of the transmission of a rational creature to the end of eternal life is called predestination*; and in article two he says: *Predestination is the account of ordering to eternal salvation.* And below he says that the execution of predestination extends all the way to glorification. And moreover, even if we were to grant that glory, as intended through the election or love that St. Thomas places before predestination, does not pertain to predestination but is presupposed to it, nevertheless it cannot be denied that some will of giving glory pertains to or is included in predestination. For this is plainly taken from Paul, Romans 8, where he carries predestination all the way to glorification. Whence in chapter nine he says: *That he might show the riches of his grace in vessels of mercy, which he predestined for glory*; and in Acts 13 it is said: *As many as were predestined for eternal life*; and therefore the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 12, and canon 17, calls it *predestination to life*, and Augustine, in the book *On the Predestination of God* (if it is his), chapter 3, calls it *predestination of glory*; but glory is not predestined except insofar as someone is predestined to glory. Moreover, when Augustine said predestination is *preparation of benefits*, he did not exclude glory, which is the greatest benefit; indeed he included it when he added, *by which most certainly those are freed who are freed*, because a man is not perfectly freed from misery until he obtains glory. Indeed, even when Augustine said predestination is preparation of grace, he comprehended glory, as Fulgentius elegantly expounded in the said book 1, *To Monimus*, chapters 8 and 10, where he says: *For this reason God always had in predestination all things: both the beginnings of vocation, and the increases of justification, and the rewards*

of glorification. And he gives the reason, because eternal life too, as Paul testifies, is a kind of grace. Finally, Augustine, book 15 of *On the City of God*, chapter 1, says that the city of God is predestined to the kingdom of heaven.

14. *The distinction of a twofold predestination.* — From this, however, some have taken occasion to distinguish two predestinations, one to grace and another to glory, as can be seen in Turrian, in the book *On Predestination*. This distinction, if it had been given with respect to diverse men—namely the predestined and the reprobate—could be admitted, provided that under predestination to glory, which alone is predestination simply, grace also be included. For in this way many of the reprobate can be said to be predestined to faith and to grace to be obtained in this life for some time, which can be called predestination in a qualified sense with respect to the other. But this is not the meaning of the said authors; rather they distinguish those two predestinations among the predestined themselves, in order to posit a cause of someone's predestination and not to appear to contradict Augustine's denial that predestination has a cause, as we will see below.

15. *The distinction posited is rejected.* — But the distinction is not necessary for us, and is rightly not used by the Scholastics. For although in God there is a will of giving glory and a will of giving grace, which wills can be called multiple acts distinguished by reason, yet predestination that is perfect and said simply is one, which—as considered in the will—embraces both acts; and as it pertains to the intellect—expresses one complete account of all the means by which the predestined is efficaciously led to glory, from the purpose of the divine will. The reason is that predestination is a certain transmission existing in the mind or will of the one predestining; but a perfect transmission does not regard only the ultimate terminus but also the way, and not only the way, but also attains the ultimate terminus intrinsically or inclusively, so to speak; therefore predestination embraces glory as the ultimate terminus and grace as the way. Whence that saying of Aristotle fits here: where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one. For here predestination to grace is for the sake of glory, and predestination to glory is through grace; therefore one complete predestination embraces both termini—one as ultimate, the other as proximate. Just as there is one motion to the ultimate terminus and to all intermediate ones.

16. *Several termini of grace reduced to two headings.* — From this it is understood that the terminus of glory is one, while the termini of grace are several—just as in motion there is one last terminus and several intermediate ones. But Paul in Romans 8 reduces all the termini of grace to two headings, namely vocation and justification: under vocation he comprehends all the gifts

of prevenient or exciting grace, through which God begins salvation in the predestined; under justification he comprehends all the gifts of aiding or cooperating grace, through which God perfects the sanctification of the predestined and preserves it until the end of life. Besides these, predestination is sometimes also terminated at other dignities or excellences pertaining to the order of grace: as the Blessed Virgin can be said to be predestined to the divine maternity, the Apostles are said to be chosen for the Apostolate, etc. But these gifts do not per se pertain to sanctifying grace, but either to ministries or to graces freely given. And therefore predestination to these gifts could rightly be distinguished by reason from predestination simply, which is to grace and glory. Nevertheless, since in the predestined these gifts too are certain means by which they are perfected toward eternal salvation (according to that text: *For those who love God all things work together for good*), we therefore include all these under the adequate terminus of predestination.

17. *The foundation of the first opinion is dissolved.* — The foundations of the other opinions are solved from what has been said. To the foundation of the first we say that ordination to the end, taken precisely, even if it virtually contains predestination as in a root (for we presuppose it to be absolute ordination), does not nonetheless formally contain it without the account of means approved or determined by the will.

First response to the foundation of the second opinion. — To the foundation of the other opinion it is said, first, that although the will of the end is with respect to the man who is predestined, yet with respect to God himself as the one predestining, it is the will of a certain means by which he attains his glory and the communication of his goodness, and this is sufficient for such a will to be comprehended under predestination.

Second response. — The difference between providence and predestination. — It is said second that, if we attend to the force of the words, a certain difference can be posited here between providence and predestination: that providence presupposes things destined to their ends and procures for them the attainment of those ends through appropriate means. But predestination, since it expresses the first destination in the mind of the one predestining, embraces not only the procuring of means but also the ordination to the end itself. This difference between predestination and providence will be better understood from the comparison between them, which we will more conveniently hand down at the end of this book.

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI
WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS NECESSARILY TO BE PRESUPPOSED IN GOD BEFORE EVERY DECREE OF PREDESTINATION

1. Having explained the matter with which predestination is concerned, in order to hand down its account distinctly and in particular, it is necessary that we run through all the acts of the divine intellect and will that are concerned in this matter of predestination about such material, and that can or must intervene in this work; for from this it will more clearly be established in which act predestination is located. Acts of this kind can be reduced to three orders: some precede and are presupposed to predestination; others are posterior and consequent to predestination; and others are intermediate between these, in which, or in some one of which, predestination is to be located. But so that we may say this once for the whole of this work: whenever we speak of these acts as of many, or presuppose an order of prior and posterior among them, we understand this according to reason only and our mode of understanding, with some foundation in reality—since it is established that in reality all these things are one most simple, eternal, and altogether simultaneous act. Therefore, according to reason, it is certain that intellect precedes and will follows; and therefore, if any acts of the divine mind are presupposed to the whole of predestination, they must primarily be in the intellect and pertain to knowledge, and therefore these are to be explained in this chapter; as to the will, we will see later.

2. *First thesis.* — First, therefore, it is certain that before every act of predestination some knowledge is to be presupposed in God, which either directs predestination itself or (so to speak) invites the divine will to predestine, by proposing to it the objects and things that it can predestine. This at least was indicated by Paul in Romans 8, saying: *Those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.* For these two words are not to be taken as synonyms, since in full propriety they have diverse meanings and can retain them in that passage. And likewise from the order of the text and the very manner of speaking it is established that foreknowledge is presupposed to predestination, for in the other things that Paul enumerates there, he preserves this order: he places first what is presupposed to the other—predestination before vocation, vocation before justification, justification before glorification.

Since therefore he similarly places foreknowledge before predestination, he places it as prior.

3. And this also seems to be the sense of Augustine, in the book *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 14, where he defines predestination as *foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God.* For foreknowledge is without doubt presupposed to preparation, because through foreknowledge as such nothing is prepared until will or purpose of giving supervenes, as was explained in chapter two. But in that preparation predestination formally consists, as we touched on there, and Augustine indicated when saying elsewhere: *predestination is the preparation of grace*, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10. Of which predestination he adds at once: *which cannot be without foreknowledge.* Since therefore in another place he says predestination is foreknowledge and preparation, he posits foreknowledge as a prior and necessary condition for predestination. Whence in the same book *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 17: *His gifts*, (he says) *to whomsoever God grants them, he foreknew that he was going to give them afar off, and in his foreknowledge prepared them.* But he foreknew that he was going to give them after he prepared or proposed to give—but he prepared in a prior foreknowledge, not indeed a consequent one, but clearly antecedent to the preparation. Whence he adds: *To arrange his future works in his foreknowledge, in which he cannot be deceived or changed—this and nothing else is predestination.* Therefore the arrangement in foreknowledge is predestination, and some foreknowledge is presupposed to such arrangement, and so to predestination.

4. *The argument for the thesis. — The same argument is further declared. —* The argument for the thesis must now be briefly assigned: because predestination, as we have seen, consists in some voluntary and free act of God; but before every free and voluntary act, it is necessary that some cognition precede; therefore before predestination some cognition or knowledge necessarily precedes in God. The minor is clear both from the definition of the voluntary—for it must be from an intrinsic principle with cognition—and from the account of freedom, which proceeds from the indifference of judgment and reason, and finally from the general axiom that nothing is willed unless previously known; nor can anything be free unless it is willed, for formal freedom exists in the will alone. All of which apply even to God himself, setting aside imperfections—that is, without distinction in reality, with virtual containment and eminence, and consequently with presupposition according to the order of reason grounded in reality. Finally it is declared because in general every intellectual nature is concerned about any thing or matter first through

the intellect and then through the will; and God himself first understands himself before he loves himself, and therefore the generation of the Son is prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the intellect also precedes in the matter of predestination, and consequently it is necessary that some knowledge of that same matter precede its predestination.

5. *Second thesis. — The difference between simple understanding and vision.* — It is to be said second that the knowledge of simple understanding is necessarily presupposed to predestination. I presuppose the common division of divine knowledge into simple understanding and vision. These differ, as regards what is relevant here, in two respects. First, because through simple understanding things that are possible are known, even if they will never be future—or (which is the same thing) abstracting from absolute futurity in any difference of time. But the knowledge of vision is terminated at things that will sometime be future and represents or gazes upon them as future.

The other difference. — The argument for the thesis. — The second difference, which is common among theologians, is that the knowledge of simple understanding precedes every free decree of God and is so natural that it would necessarily belong to God even if God were to will nothing freely. But the knowledge of vision presupposes the free will of God freely willing something, because without the free will of God nothing can be future. From these things the thesis is evident: because predestination consists in some free act, as has been shown; but the knowledge of simple understanding is not free for God, but is in him before every free act; therefore it is before predestination. This is confirmed, because in God natural things are prior to free ones, at least in the order of subsistence, because they can exist without them: for God cannot exist without his natural properties, but can exist without free acts as such. It is confirmed second, because before a free act cognition is presupposed; therefore that cognition cannot be free but must be natural; but such cognition in God is nothing but simple understanding; therefore this is what is necessarily presupposed to predestination.

6. *Third thesis. — The twofold mode of divine intuitive cognition.* — It is to be said third that no knowledge of things that are absolutely future in some difference of time in the person to be predestined is necessarily presupposed to the whole of his predestination. Not all admit this thesis; but it is the more common view of St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, and others whom I will presently mention, and it will be treated more fully below in treating of the cause of predestination. To prove it, I presuppose that God can foreknow something as absolutely future in such a time in two ways: either in the objective

presence of eternity, in which God gazes upon all the causes of things and all their determinations with all their circumstances, or in the decree of his will by which he wills it to happen—for what he absolutely wills is certainly going to be. These two modes of knowing, or two media of knowing, have their place especially in the case of good effects that can be predestined or predefined by God with absolute will, which is what we are now discussing. But they are related to the decree of divine will in such a way that they necessarily presuppose it: because the knowledge that is in the decree necessarily presupposes the decree, as is self-evident, since the decree is the foundation and reason of such knowledge. But intuitive knowledge of the thing in itself presupposes the decree all the more, because it presupposes the determination of all the causes by which that thing will be future—among which the first is the divine will and its decree. Whence also among those two modes of knowing such future things, the one that is in the decree precedes according to reason, because the decree is presupposed to the determination of all other causes through which the thing is to be future and can be known in the mode of presence.

7. *The conclusion is proved.* — From these things it is concluded that the thing which through the decree of predestination is ordained to exist cannot be foreknown as future before such a decree, and consequently the thesis proposed is manifest with respect to that thing—namely, that knowledge of such a thing as future is not necessarily presupposed to its predestination, nor indeed can it be prior to it, because such a thing has its absolute futurity from predestination; for by virtue of the decree of predestination—whatever that decree ultimately is—the aids and means necessary for such an effect to be future are applied; therefore the decree is presupposed to futurity as cause to effect; therefore it is also presupposed to foreknowledge of the futurity, because it is prior according to reason that a thing be absolutely future before it is foreknown as absolutely future: both because the object that determines knowledge is presupposed to it, and also because a thing is not future because it is foreknown, but rather conversely, it is foreknown because it is future. Since this foreknowledge of which we speak is not the cause of the thing's futurity, nor is it practical knowledge, but speculative or intuitive knowledge, which presupposes its object; therefore such foreknowledge is not only not prior to the decree of predestination, but is also posterior to it. Nor indeed do they simply exist simultaneously or merely concurrently, since one is the reason and foundation of the other, as has been explained.

8. I am speaking always of the decree of predestination, in order to abstract from the various opinions. For whoever says that predestination is formally in foreknowledge itself or is foreknowledge itself will not admit that the foreknowledge of future things is posterior to predestination, but will say rather that predestination itself is formally and altogether simultaneously the foreknowledge of future things. Nonetheless he will not be able to deny that such foreknowledge is posterior to that decree which is necessary for such predestination. First indeed, because as I showed, such foreknowledge is not of the thing as future as such, before that decree, but after it. Second, because such knowledge cannot have the account of predestination unless it is in some way free for God himself, according to the principles posited above; but it is not free except insofar as it presupposes a free decree of will. Whence those who say predestination is foreknowledge say it is knowledge of approbation, which is free. But the knowledge of approbation presupposes the will approving the foreseen effect, and by this reason God knows through that knowledge that the effect pleasing to him and approved through the absolute decree of his will is going to be infallibly. From the fact, however, that this absolute foreknowledge of a future effect through predestination is not prior but posterior to the decree of predestination, it follows excellently that it is not prior to predestination, and is either posterior to it—if predestination is understood to be in the will—or at least is posterior to the beginning (so to speak) of predestination; for it is beyond doubt that this beginning is taken from the will, as we will see later.

9. *It is asked whether predestination necessarily presupposes knowledge of something else. — The matter is satisfied.* — But, although these things are true with respect to the same predestined effect, it can still be asked whether the predestination of one thing or effect necessarily presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of another thing or future effect. St. Thomas seems to affirm this, Part 3, question 1, article 3, ad 4, where he says: *That predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things*; but this cannot be understood with respect to the same effect of predestination, as has been proved; therefore at least it must be understood of the foreknowledge of one thing with respect to the predestination of another. For that he is speaking of absolute foreknowledge of a future thing seems manifest, because from that principle he declares that Christ was predestined with the foreknowledge of Adam's sin as future. And this seems no unfitting thing—indeed it is morally necessary—because God can often be and is moved by the foreknowledge of one effect to predestine another: as because he foreknows that Peter will sin, he predestines that he do penance before he dies.

10. *The matter is satisfied. — A cause of predestination is given on the part of Christ, but not on the part of the one predestined.* — I respond that this question can be treated either of the whole predestination or of one or another of its effects. As to the whole predestination, this question depends on another: whether for the whole predestination there is some cause or reason on the part of future effects. For if such a cause is given, it is certainly necessary that foreknowledge of it be presupposed to the whole predestination, because it is necessary that it be presupposed to the first decree of predestination. For the future thing that is said to be the reason of predestination cannot be its reason unless as foreknown, because it cannot otherwise move the will; therefore its foreknowledge must be presupposed. But if no such reason for the whole predestination is given, then neither is any foreknowledge of a future effect necessarily presupposed to the whole predestination. For this presupposition and order of reason must be founded in some relation that one thing has per se in comparison to the other; for if they are related to one another impertinently, such foreknowledge will also be impertinent to such predestination. But a per se relation can only be one of causality (under causality we include whatever occasion or motive one thing affords for willing or predestining another). Therefore the resolution of this doubt about this order depends on another question concerning the cause of predestination, which will be treated below. Now, however, we briefly presuppose that on the part of Christ and his merits a cause of our predestination can be given, but not on the part of the predestined man himself, nor of any creature with respect to another. And consequently our predestination presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of future things pertaining to Christ the Lord, but not of those pertaining to the predestined man himself, or to other men or angels.

11. *A question.* — It can furthermore be asked in particular whether the whole predestination of some man presupposes at least the foreknowledge that such a man is going to be in the order of things. For some think this is necessary, because grace presupposes nature, and predestination is to grace—including glory under grace—and therefore it presupposes the being of nature, according to the teaching of Cajetan, Part 3, question 1, article 3. Likewise, because providence presupposes the existence of those things for which some provision is made, at least as present in eternity, since no one provides for things unless they are future; but predestination is a certain providence; therefore it necessarily presupposes the foreknowledge of the futurity—at least of the subject to be predestined.

12. *Resolution.* — It is however to be said that, even from this angle, the foreknowledge of some future thing in the one to be predestined is not necessarily presupposed to the whole predestination. St. Thomas holds this view at the said question 23, article 2, ad 2. And for this reason he says along with Origen, whom he cites: *Predestination can be of what does not exist.* This can be understood in two ways: first, that predestination is of something not yet existing in itself and in its proper nature; and in this way Alexander of Hales expounds it, Part 1, question 28, member 2, article 1, and it is self-evidently clear, because predestination is eternal and the existence of the predestined thing is temporal. Second, it can be understood of the being of the thing in God's foreknowledge; and in this way Alexander of Hales says above that predestination is of something existing in foreknowledge. But a distinction is needed here: for the very being of the thing in foreknowledge is taken either as antecedent to the decree of predestination or as consequent. In the latter way, it is true that predestination is always of something in foreknowledge, because given predestination the thing is foreknown as future by virtue of it. But in the former way, predestination is also of what simply is not, or of what is not yet future at that instant in foreknowledge—but only of what is possible, which through predestination itself is ordained to exist. For by the same will the predestined is ordained both to exist and to exist for such an end. And therefore it is not altogether the same account in the case of providence and predestination, as we will better declare below in the penultimate chapter of this book. Nor is that teaching of Cajetan necessary, as I noted more fully at the same place in the third part: because although grace presupposes nature in the genus of subject or material cause and in the order of execution, yet in the order of intention and predestination it is not necessary that it be presupposed, but it suffices if it be conjoined with it in the mode of one thing or through a certain relation—as will be explained more fully in the said penultimate chapter.

13. But if the question be treated not of the whole predestination but of one or another of its effects, then it is not unfitting that the predestination of a man to one effect, or a benefit of predestination, presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of another effect. This is proved by the ground for doubt posited above. And perhaps in this same sense St. Thomas spoke in the cited place of the third part, although it can be understood of conditional knowledge, of which we will speak in the next chapter. But how this knowledge maintains the aforesaid order with the decree of predestination and is as it were mixed with it (so to speak), will be better understood once the whole decree of predestination itself has been explained. Now only two things are to be considered. One is that this

whole order is to be viewed either between the end of the whole predestination —which is glorification—and the means to it; or between the means themselves insofar as one is closer to the end than another, as justification is closer than vocation, and consequently one is compared to the other as end to its proximate means or conversely. For setting aside this relation—to which every other can be reduced—no per se reason for order remains among the effects or termini of predestination; and so neither will there be any reason why the foreknowledge of one should be presupposed to the predestination of the other, or conversely.

14. *The twofold foreknowledge of future things.* — Beyond this, that twofold mode of foreknowing future things must be kept before one's eyes—either in the predestinating decree or in the things themselves according to the objective presence of eternity. For the foreknowledge that is in the decree has an order with the decrees themselves, according to the order which the decrees themselves, distinguished by reason, have among themselves. As, for example, in predestination there is involved a decree of giving glory and a decree of giving grace, which are also distinguished by reason. If therefore among these decrees the order of intention is preserved, so that the decree of giving glory is prior to the decree of giving grace, then also the foreknowledge of future glory by virtue of the decree precedes according to reason the decree of giving grace. But if among these decrees there is not the order of intention but only that of execution, so that the decree of grace is prior to the decree of glory, then the foreknowledge of future grace precedes, before the decree and foreknowledge of glory. And the reason is that, once a free, absolute, and efficacious decree of some effect is posited, whatever that effect may be, immediately by virtue of that decree the effect is going to be infallibly—for this pertains to the efficacy of the divine will. But as soon as that effect is going to be by virtue of its decree, God foreknows its futurity prior in reason to any other free decree being understood; both because that knowledge is now merely natural and necessary given such a decree, and natural things are prior to free ones; and also because the subsequent decree depends (to speak in our manner) on the prior and on that foreknowledge. As for example, if the decree of glory precedes as the intention of the end, it is necessary that that very intention and its efficacy be foreknown, so as to lead to the election of means. For one who intends an end is not understood to be choosing a means until he is understood to know that he has intended the end, and therefore should understand and apply means accommodated to the intention, so that the force of that intention may be voluntarily brought to effect. For how could someone voluntarily apply himself to election from the force of an intention unless he foreknew it? But with that

foreknown by God, in it is foreknown the futurity of the intended effect. For this reason, therefore, it is necessary that between the decree concerning the end and the decree concerning the means this foreknowledge be interposed. But if no efficacious decree concerning the end precedes, then the contrary order will be preserved. As for example, if God first decreed to call Peter to faith with a congruous vocation before he had an efficacious decree by which he intended his faith, he also first knew that such a vocation of Peter was going to be future by virtue of his decree, and then foreknew that faith would follow from it, and so on for the rest. For all these things apply both to all means with respect to the ultimate end, and among the means themselves insofar as one is compared to another as cause to effect, or as a proximate end to a means.

15. Therefore, speaking of the other mode of foreknowledge, which is of the effects in themselves: because this knowledge presupposes the execution and bringing about of the causes, as objectively present in eternity, it is necessary that the foreknowledge of the prior means in execution precede the foreknowledge and executive will of the subsequent means, according to the same order of execution, because no one applies a second means until he sees the effect of the prior means. And by the same account the foreknowledge of future grace is prior to the will by which perseverance in it is given, and the foreknowledge of future perseverance is prior to the will of giving glory in the mode of executing it. All of which will become clearer in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VII
HOW THE CONDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF CONTINGENT EFFECTS IS NECESSARY FOR PREDESTINATION, OR HOW IT IS RELATED TO IT

1. This question presupposes that there is in God an infallible knowledge of these effects, abstracting from their actual future existence in fact and knowing simply what a free cause would do if it were placed in such an order of things and with such circumstances. I said much about this knowledge and this presupposition in the *Opuscule on the Knowledge of God*, book two. And below, treating of the means and effects of predestination, we will add certain things that will seem necessary. Now, without other proof, we presuppose this, both because from the course of the chapter it will be clear how great is the necessity of this knowledge for predestination, and consequently how true is its assertion or presupposition; and also because by now there are practically none who dare to deny this knowledge to God—sufficiently expressed as it is in Sacred

Scripture and everywhere acknowledged by the holy Fathers—but only the medium by which God knows such future things is usually a matter of controversy, which question is no less disputed among theologians concerning absolute knowledge of future contingents. And from what will be said, some resolution of it will perhaps not be difficult to obtain.

2. *The sense of the question is proposed.* — With this presupposed, we inquire into two other things that pertain to the present matter. One is how this foreknowledge is related to predestination—that is, whether it has some per se order with it or has no bearing on it, even if it otherwise belongs to God on account of the infinite power of understanding that he has (for God knows many more things than are necessary for predestination or have a per se order with it). The other point is whether this knowledge maintains some order of prior or posterior according to reason with respect to predestination, the resolution of which depends altogether on the former.

3. *Ground for doubt.* — The ground for doubt on the former point is that this foreknowledge is neither predestination itself, nor a part or effect of it, nor a cause of it; therefore it has no per se order with it. For what other per se order can be conceived? The antecedent as to the three former parts is easily proved, because this knowledge of contingent things under a condition precedes the free decree of God and abstracts from actual real future existence in any difference of time, and thus is comprehended under the knowledge of simple understanding; therefore it cannot be predestination, which expresses a free act, nor a part of predestination, which similarly must be free or presuppose a free act. And by the same account it can much less be an effect, because an effect not only presupposes a free act of God but is also temporal; but that knowledge is eternal. The last part is clear because that knowledge would be the cause or reason of the very decree of predestination—and this it is not, because the decree is in God, and nothing that is in God has a cause. Nor can it have even the account of a reason on the part of the foreknowledge of future effects; otherwise God would predestine a man because he foreknew that he would make good use of the aids of grace—which cannot be said, as I will show below.

4. *Conclusion.* — It is to be said, however, that conditional knowledge of every contingent effect to be predestined—namely, that it would infallibly be future if God were to provide this or that aid—is altogether necessary in God for the predestination and predefinition of free effects that by virtue of predestination are going to be absolutely and infallibly. Only those who altogether deny that God knows these future things can deny this thesis. But those who have held that God knows them with certainty—even if they differ in

the mode or medium by which he knows them—have no reason not to agree on the truth of this thesis. But so that the necessity of this knowledge for predestination may be demonstrated with certainty in every opinion, it is first necessary to presuppose that the decree of predestination, as it pertains to the will, both with respect to glory and with respect to grace, is explained and affirmed in the various modes to be treated below, and that according to their diversity the reasons for the necessity of this knowledge vary, as does also the mode of explaining it—which I will declare by running through each manner of speaking.

5. *The first mode of explaining the decree of predestination. — The necessity of this knowledge for true predestination.* — Some explain the decree of predestination in the mode of a certain singular predefinition—both of the glory of each predestined person and of its quantity in particular, and also of the individual acts or goods through which such glory is to be obtained. And thereupon through a certain absolute preparation of all the aids by which such acts are to be effected, from the first vocation up to the final completion of the gift of perseverance. This manner of speaking is the one we most strongly approve, as we will say in what follows. Such a mode of predestination, therefore, can neither be understood nor conceived without that foreknowledge. The reason for this necessity is that no prudent person can by the absolute decree of his will determine that something be done, or propose to attain some end, unless he is first certain that he has the power to do what he wills, or at least knows that he has means by which he can obtain such an end. Because he cannot efficaciously intend except what he judges to be possible for himself, nor can he judge—at least prudently and without rashness—that an effect is possible for him without foreknowing the power in himself or in the means that can be applied by him.

6. But if the intention and will of the one predestining or disposing is such that what he determines and predefines by absolute decree is altogether infallibly to be fulfilled, so that for that will to be frustrated would imply a contradiction, then it is altogether necessary that the knowledge he is supposed to have of that power and efficacy of means toward such an end be altogether infallible. Because the will is blind and is led by the intellect; and therefore an intellectual agent could not by the will securely determine with respect to such an effect to be absolutely brought about, or such an end to be attained, unless through the intellect it had first judged by infallible knowledge that such an end or effect could be obtained in this or that way. This is so true that even concerning those things which God brings about through himself, he could not

have an absolute will to bring them about unless he had first known in himself a sufficient power for making them. But in this knowledge that conditional knowledge is included, or they are altogether the same. For what is it to foreknow that such means are of such a kind that through them such an end can be infallibly obtained, if not to know that if such means are applied, that effect or end will infallibly come about through them? But this is the conditional knowledge of which we are treating. Therefore all who posit that God predestines men to glory through an absolute pre-definitive decree, before the absolute foreknowledge of all future merits, must necessarily presuppose the conditional foreknowledge of those free acts or means through which such glory can be obtained and will infallibly be obtained, if such means and aids for effecting that act are provided. And the same proportionally holds if the predestination of the means themselves is constituted through the absolute predefinition of individual free acts, before all knowledge of vision, for the same reason.

7. *The difference among the various modes of this foreknowledge.* — There is, however, a notable difference among those who hold this view, concerning the mode by which God moves the will of a man to carry out the free act which God himself predefines, so that the man may perform it. For some say that God does this through a certain motion which by its intrinsic virtue has the power of physically predetermining the will of the man to that act, such that, given that motion, it is impossible, in the composite sense (as they say), for the man's will not to elicit the act to which it is moved. Whence it evidently follows that God, before he gives that motion or before he determines to give it, foreknows this conditional proposition: *If I give such a motion to such a will, it will perform that act.* And since God makes all the free means of predestination come about in the man by efficaciously moving him through such a motion, it follows that before he predefines these means, he knows them to be going to be infallibly under that condition, if he gives to the man such a motion or such aids that are of themselves efficacious. But those of us who do not admit this mode of efficacy regarding a free act (because it is neither necessary nor would it preserve freedom), but constitute the efficacy of prevenient aid only in congruous vocation, will also say that God foreknows the efficacy of such vocation as infallibly going to be, if it is given, and so that there is conditional knowledge of the act that will be future through such vocation, if it is given; which knowledge we also say is necessary for the predefinition of such an act, and therefore for the aforesaid mode of predestination.

8. *Another difference.* — From this another difference between these positions as to the mode of such knowledge can easily be understood. For those who hold the former view do not in fact posit that knowledge as being of some contingent effect as such in itself, but of an effect as necessary in some cause from which it necessarily flows if the cause is posited—namely in that prior aid that is of itself efficacious and physically predetermining. Because they hold it necessary that, given that aid, the act follows, just as the terminus of an action follows when the action is posited. But how this is consistent with true freedom and the contingency of that same effect with respect to its proximate cause, some labor to explain—and whether they achieve this, we do not now treat. Nor indeed do we treat whether they adequately explain how those who lack such a motion and do not have it in their power freely lack the act which without such a motion they cannot have. But as to that knowledge, they give its account most easily, given that principle: because it is merely natural knowledge and is in the virtue of a cause that acts naturally and draws along the inferior cause which it premoves. But we believe that knowledge to be of a contingent effect as it is contingent and truly free, and therefore that even with all the causes and conditions prerequisite for such effects to exist having been posited, they can still not come about; and nonetheless God by his infinite power of understanding foreknows infallibly what is going to be from such a cause, if it is placed with such aids or conditions. In this matter, we labor somewhat in explaining the mode of such foreknowledge; yet we overcome that difficulty both from the infinity of divine light, and from the truth of such an object considered in itself, and most of all from the example of the foreknowledge of absolutely future things, which has nearly the same difficulty. With that difficulty overcome, however, we easily compare the freedom of acts with predefinition and predestination, and show that mode of foreknowledge to be sufficient and most apt for the aforesaid predefinition and predestination to obtain. Thus therefore it is sufficiently established how this foreknowledge in both positions is to be presupposed for the aforesaid mode of predestination.

9. *Why this knowledge is required without predefinition.* — Others, however, do not think it necessary to posit in God a predefinition of any free act in particular and with all its circumstances, or of any effect that intrinsically depends on free acts. These therefore consequently deny that predestination is made through the mode of a singular predefinition, or through an absolute decree of giving glory that precedes foreseen merits. And nevertheless these authors hold conditional knowledge to be necessary for preserving true and gratuitous predestination—not indeed so that God may efficaciously pre-elect

men to glory before foreseen merits, nor so that he may predefine free acts, but so that with certain knowledge and from sheer will he may direct the man through certain and efficacious means toward eternal life, and so that there may be room for voluntary election toward such an order of calling grace and subsequent aids, in which the man is infallibly going to be justified and glorified.

10. The reason is clear: because without this foreknowledge God cannot will to give any aid as efficacious or as infallibly going to have effect, since if God does not have that knowledge, he knows no aid as efficacious or infallible before he sees its efficacy through the knowledge of vision—but that knowledge of vision presupposes the decree of giving such an aid; therefore before such a decree God knows no aid as efficacious; therefore neither does he will to give it as efficacious, since nothing is willed unless previously known. Therefore there is no true predestination before the actual foreknowledge of the good use of free will through the knowledge of vision. Nor does God on the part of his will have a greater benevolence toward the predestined than toward the reprobate, because it can happen that he gives and offers equal aids to both, and then foresees that they have effect in one and not in the other. Whence it finally comes about that the distinction of the predestined from the reprobate is not from the direct intention of God, but only from foreknowledge that is quasi-consequent upon the absolute future occurrence of the effect. And similarly it follows that a certain or such a number of those to be saved, and such or such a degree of perfection in each individual, is not in divine predefinition but only from foreknowledge and as it were a subsequent approbation and acceptance. All of which those who hold this opinion strive to avoid, and to this end they think the aforesaid foreknowledge necessary. In which they do indeed speak consistently, but they wrongly and not sufficiently consistently deny the predefinitions of free acts and the mode of predestination according to them, as I said in book three *On Aids* and as we will say in what follows.

11. *The absurdity of Catharinus's position.* — Whence Catharinus, who did not acknowledge this conditional foreknowledge, went very badly astray in the matter of predestination. For he posited that some are saved through an efficacious predestination and divine predefinition, while others are saved without it. And therefore he said the former are predestined, while the latter he said are saved without predestination, under the common providence of grace. For on the part of God's will, he did not believe there to be any distance between those who are thus saved and those who are condemned. Because to both God gives (as he thinks) prevenient sufficient aids and through antecedent will offers concomitant aids; but these aids in the former have effect unto eternal salvation

because they cooperate, while in the others they do not, because they resist. And both of these are unknown to God (so to speak) by virtue of his will, or in that instant in which he has an operative will toward the salvation of both—until through the knowledge of vision he sees the diversity and accepts it. Therefore there does not intervene there (he says) a proper predestination of those who are thus saved, in such a way that it expresses a peculiar benevolence of God, greater than toward others who are not saved, which benevolence God has from himself and anteriorly—which is what the word *predestination* sounds. Concerning the other pre-elect, he says they are truly predestined; he admits, however, that they are saved from a certain necessity. And so in that genus of necessity it is necessary that he admit conditional knowledge—not indeed of contingent effects as such, but of effects that are necessary in the cause inducing the necessity of such effects. But how he reconciles this with the freedom of such effects, or with the mode of freely obtaining eternal happiness in these men, he never adequately explains, and at times he seems to succumb, and as regards these predestined does not think rightly about their freedom. How many absurdities and inconveniences this teaching contains is sufficiently clear in itself and will be clear from what follows. Now it has only been mentioned so that it may be understood how great is the necessity of that knowledge for not going astray in the matter of predestination.

12. *Another mode of explaining the necessity of this knowledge.* — Finally, others think about predestination in such a way that they confess it is made through a certain efficacious intention of God, which from itself chose all those to be saved for glory, before all foreseen merits. Yet they deny that predestination is made through the absolute predefinition of all free acts in particular, as these are going to be future as means toward obtaining the glory for which someone was chosen. For they think this kind of predefinition removes freedom, if it is made through reference to an aid that of itself predetermines the human will to the predefined act; and setting aside this mode of predetermination, they think it is impossible for God to have conditional and infallible foreknowledge of such acts in particular, and without this they think it is impossible for an effect to be predefined. In which they plainly speak consistently and acknowledge the necessity of this foreknowledge for true predestination.

13. But if they are asked how God efficaciously provides for his elect the means to glory so that they infallibly attain it—since what he does not have in foreknowledge he cannot provide—they respond that he does not provide for them indefinitely and determinately of such or such a particular means so that

they are fully saved through it, but provides one means through an antecedent will so that, if the chosen man wills to consent, he may be saved through it. And then if God foresees that free will assents, he now knows his will is going to be infallibly fulfilled. But if he knows that free will resists, then he foresees another means; and if that does not succeed, he provides yet another, and persists in this, and continues—aiding, as it were, opportunely and inopportunely—until he finally achieves the effect. This manner of speaking is usually attributed to St. Thomas, question 6, *On Truth*, article 3, where he seems to explain predestination in this way.

14. Nevertheless, even if this mode were admitted, some conditional knowledge would be necessary for it. For this the argument made above proves: that no one efficaciously and infallibly intends an end unless he is certain of the means by which he will unfailingly attain it; therefore at that instant in which God has such an election of the predestined, he is already understood to have prepared in his foreknowledge the means by which he can most certainly save freely the one he chooses; therefore through such knowledge he foreknows that if he gives such means to that man, he will convert, persevere, and be saved; therefore he has conditional knowledge. But there is a difference in the mode: because according to that position, this foreknowledge is not of the infallibility of some particular means distinctly, but only in common and confusedly. And so according to this opinion, God does not foreknow: *If here and now I give such an aid, this person will convert or will perform such an act*; yet he knows that if he pursues this man with these aids (so to speak), he will sometime consent, and so for the others. For just as in effect this at minimum is necessary so that such an election be brought to completion, so in foreknowledge it is necessary that the divine will be able to determine itself to such an election.

15. *Critique of the preceding opinion.* — From the very explanation of this position it can easily be seen how unworthy of belief it is. For in the first place, to attribute to God that confused knowledge by which he might know that he can lead the human will to the end intended by himself through this or that aid, while not knowing determinately through which aid he will achieve it, nor through which act he will save the men—who does not see that this is very alien to divine perfection? Next, that mode of providing, as if by trying various means so that if one does not succeed another is applied, is also most imperfect and most unbecoming to God. And moreover, the certainty of that confused foreknowledge, which is not founded in the distinct cognition and intuition of the determined future effect, can scarcely be sufficiently grounded, if it must be of such a kind that the opposite implies a contradiction—which is truly

necessary for divine predefinition to obtain. Because it implies a contradiction that the will of God, predefining something absolutely, not be fulfilled; therefore it cannot rest upon any foreknowledge except one so certain that its opposite implies a contradiction. But that foreknowledge, since it is not in the effect itself and in its truth objectively present, must be only in the cause; but the cause is nothing other than a multitude of aids, none of which is posited as per se efficacious or as physically predetermining the will; whence for none of them is it repugnant not to have effect; therefore neither does it imply a contradiction that from the whole collection there does not follow, as much as is from the force of the aids—therefore knowledge in such a cause is not sufficient for the divine will to predefine absolutely something that it is going to bring about only through such means. That confused foreknowledge, therefore, is not to be admitted; rather, a particular and distinct one is necessary, so that divine pre-election, predefinition, and true predestination may obtain.

16. For this reason I could never persuade myself that St. Thomas in that question *On Truth*, in the said sense, meant to think that God proceeds in the execution of his intention in the manner of a man—either in time or in the eternal arrangement of his providence—by determining to give one means, not knowing whether it will be efficacious, with the intention that if it does not succeed, he will apply another. For this clearly cannot be said, as concerns temporal execution, according to faith: because from eternity God already foreknew through the knowledge of vision and absolute knowledge which means would be efficacious and which inefficacious. Nor should it be said even in the eternal arrangement of divine providence: because this too would be a most imperfect mode of providing, since it presupposes a certain mode of ignorance, and consequently attributes to God a blind providence concerning individual means, because he decrees to apply such a means not knowing at that instant what it will be—efficacious or inefficacious—and consequently posits God proceeding as if by trying in his providence, even in that providence by which he procures the principal effects and those principally predefined. And finally it denies to God the power of predefining and willing from himself, and efficaciously, some free act of the human will, in particular and with all its circumstances—all of which seem absurd and very contrary to Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, and in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and *On the Good of Perseverance*, and in very many other places.

17. *St. Thomas is explained. — God does not ignore the failure of an inefficacious means, but applies an inefficacious means before an efficacious one for reasons of his providence.* — I therefore hold that St. Thomas only wished to

explain how, along with the predefinition and determination of the end to be infallibly attained, there can be freedom in the means: because there can remain in those means such an indifference that even if one fails of effect, another is applied, and so on in turn, until some means brings about what is intended. This mode of providence, he says, God preserves with the man whom he has infallibly ordained to attain glory: *for he prepares so many supports for him*, (he says) *that either he does not fall, or if he has fallen, he rises again*. He did not say, however—nor did St. Thomas intimate—that in that instant in which God arranges these means in his eternal providence, he does not know whether such a means is going to be inefficacious or whether the man is going to fall, even if it is given; but he says that God conducts himself in this way for preserving freedom and for other ends of his wisdom. So that even though he foreknows this, he nonetheless permits such a means and permits the fall in his chosen one, because God himself foreknew by what other means that evil could be repaired and is going to be repaired with effect. Therefore God provides one means in case of the failure of another—not because he was ignorant of the future failure even before he decreed to give that aid, but because it is so expedient for the gentleness of his providence. And so he conducts himself in the preservation of indifference and freedom in the means, such that predestination sometimes gives an inefficacious aid—as if it did not know what the future outcome from such a means would be if it were applied—and at the opportune time provides an efficacious aid, which brings about the intended effect as infallibly as if it were a necessary cause.

18. *This knowledge is prior in the order of reason to the decree.* — Therefore from what has been said the necessity of this knowledge for proper predestination and predefinition of God is sufficiently proved. Whence it follows that this kind of knowledge, according to the order of reason, is prior to the decree of predestination: because this priority consists only in a certain order of necessary presupposition, in the way that the intellect is said to be prior to the will. But that this presupposition is necessary is proved by everything we have said.

19. *The ground for doubt is satisfied. — Predestination is said neither to be begun nor completed in knowledge prior to the decree. — This knowledge does not presuppose a decree regarding the conditional object.* — Nor does the ground for doubt to the contrary obstruct: for we acknowledge that this knowledge is not predestination itself, nor does it pertain intrinsically to it, because this knowledge on the part of God is necessary and in its own way natural, whereas predestination is a free act. Whence until God is understood to elicit, as it were,

some free decree, he is not understood to begin predestination, much less to complete it. I say, however, as much as is from God's side: because on the part of the object that knowledge has a certain contingency, insofar as its object could, absolutely speaking, not be future, and if it had not been going to be future, there would not be such knowledge in God according to that particular relation. But given the truth of the object, such knowledge is necessarily in God. Whence because it presupposes no free decree in God, we say it is natural and necessary on God's part, and therefore does not pertain intrinsically to predestination. We are aware that there are some who say that that knowledge presupposes in God some free decree regarding the conditional object; but I presuppose this to be false, as I proved elsewhere and will perhaps say again in the course of this work. And it bears nothing on the present matter: because such a decree, being conditional on the part of the object and simply positing nothing in being, does not per se pertain to divine providence, and therefore much less can it pertain to predestination; and consequently neither could that conditional foreknowledge be predestination, even if it were founded in it. Whence it is also clear that that knowledge in no way pertains to the effects or quasi-effects of predestination, since it precedes and is not free on God's part. It remains, therefore, that it is in some way a prior reason or condition for predestination.

20. *An objection of some is dissolved. — This knowledge is not a necessary condition on the part of man but of God.* — Nor does it follow from this that a cause or reason for predestination is given on the part of the merits of man, as some very forcefully object. They even note that the same argument can be made against those who admit this foreknowledge in a predetermining aid. For however that aid is imagined to be given, it must never be such as to exclude the true account of merits, as is certain from faith; therefore God, before he thus predestines such a man through such aids, foreknows that the same man will merit glory if such predetermining aids are given to him. And nevertheless it does not follow from this that God predestines the man on account of such merits, but rather predestines him through such merits; therefore neither in our position does this follow, because for the force of the inference it matters little whether that foreknowledge is in the cause or in the truth of the future event itself. That knowledge, therefore, is not prior to predestination as a necessary condition on the part of man, but on the part of God—that is, it is not necessary because it applies or proposes to the divine will some reason on the part of man, which moves God in the mode of man's merit to predestine him, because in a thing that neither exists nor is known as ever going to be future, such a motive reason cannot be founded. It is therefore necessary only so that that object be

proposed to God as predefinable, as infallibly future, and so that it can have the account of an efficacious means in the mind of God, so that under that account it be chosen, or also so that the proximate end be intended. Whence it does not follow that there is in that object another moving reason besides the final one, which is not repugnant to predestination, as I will say below: for God predestines a man not because he has or will have merits, but so that he may have them and be holy—according to that text: *He predestined us that we might be holy.*

21. *The necessity of conditional knowledge is not for the sake of the effect, but for predestination.* — Finally it must be added, and well considered, that it is one thing for this knowledge to be per se and simply necessary for the effects that are predestined, considered per se; and another thing to be necessary for predestination, and consequently for the effects themselves insofar as they come to be from predestination. For up to now we have only said the latter, from which the former does not follow; nor is it strictly true, because predestination or predefinition is not simply necessary on the part of the effect for the effects to be sometime; for evil acts are not predefined, and yet they come to be without predefinition. Therefore, as much as is from their side and from effection alone, good acts could in the same way come to be without predefinition and predestination properly taken. Therefore from the fact that that foreknowledge is necessary for predefinition, it does not follow that it is necessary for the predefined effect itself, considered in itself. The *a priori* reason is that for the effect to be future, it suffices that God will to give the created will all the principles necessary for such an act, according to the act's requirement, and that he offer from his side the concurrent activity necessary and of the same order as the act, and that he allow the will to operate while being prepared to aid it if it does not stand in the way by itself—for with these things posited, he foreknows and, without any other addition, it is established that that effect is going to be or will follow, with the free will cooperating. But all those things can be posited without the absolute predefinition of the act itself, as much as is from the side of the act considered in itself. Whence even all those things posited under a condition, without any other predefinition—whether posited or included in the condition—are sufficient for God to be able to foreknow what the will would do if such a condition were posited; therefore for the future occurrence of such an effect on its part, such foreknowledge is not necessary. Yet that foreknowledge is necessary for divine predefinition on the part of God himself, because nothing can be willed unless previously known, as has been declared. For just as in men there can be a more perfect providence and a more secure pre-ordination and

election of will, the greater the knowledge a man has of the efficacy of means (which knowledge in naturally operating means arises from a perfect knowledge of their virtue; but in contingent means is usually derived from greater experience of past things, and greater power of conjecturing future things from past ones or from other indications): so in God the supreme and singular providence, through which means are predefined by absolute decrees, presupposes of them knowledge of their future efficacy if such means are applied—and in that cognition, the aforesaid conditional knowledge is contained.

CHAPTER VIII
WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE WILL TO GIVE GLORY TO THE ELECT IS THE FIRST ACT THAT GOD HAS TOWARD THOSE HUMAN BEINGS WHO ARE SAVED

1. *State of the question.*—Having explained the knowledge that must be presupposed in the divine intellect prior to the whole of predestination, we must now speak of the acts of the will. For just as formal freedom resides in the will alone, so too it is agreed that predestination either consists in the will or takes its beginning from some act of it. Since, therefore, glory or beatitude is the end of grace and of all its gifts, and since the end tends to be loved before the means, we must ask whether the first act that the divine will has concerning those human beings who will at least effectively attain salvation is directed toward glory itself, prior in reason to being directed toward the means of divine grace. Now, to remove ambiguity in the terms, I presuppose that the discussion concerns an absolute and efficacious will, and not merely a will of simple complacency. For no one doubts that some will must be antecedent; but that will may be a simple affection or a conditioned will—the sort God also has toward those who are not saved—and this is said in a certain sense to be a will of good pleasure, because God has it from himself and through it wills a great good for a human being as much as lies within him. What we are asking, therefore, is whether God has toward those who are saved not merely such a simple affection but rather an absolute decree concerning their happiness—one so efficacious that, once posited, it is infallible that they will be saved. This decree of God is accustomed in Scripture to be called by antonomasia: *God's good will, his good pleasure, his Love, Election, and Purpose*—terms about which there is some controversy as to whether they signify different things, on which matter we shall

say a few words in chapter ten. For now, however, setting that question aside, we shall use these terms interchangeably.

2. *Reason for doubt.*—The reason for doubt is this: either this love of God is necessary for human beings to be saved, or it is not. The first cannot be said; therefore no such love should be posited in God. The minor is proved: for if such love is necessary for salvation, then those whom God does not thus love cannot be saved, since they do not have from God everything necessary for salvation without which they cannot be saved. The consequence in turn is proved: for if such an act is not necessary, it is, first of all, posited without foundation, since it is derived neither from revelation nor inferred from effects. Moreover, it is superfluous, because God necessarily has toward those who are saved another will to give them glory on account of foreseen merits—since in time he confers it on account of merits—and therefore from eternity he willed to give it on account of those same merits, already foreknown. Thus another act preceding the foreknowledge of merits is superfluous. Indeed, from this it seems one can further conclude that such an act is impossible, because no change in the creature follows from it, since whatever exists in the predestined can come about without it. Yet in the divine will no act can be free except through some change in the creature. This is clear, because from such an act some new relation arises between God and the creature, at least a relation of reason; but a new relation between two terms cannot exist without a change in one of them; yet God is not changed by such an act; therefore the creature must be changed; and therefore, if the act is not necessary for the change in the creature, neither is it possible.

3. *First opinion.*—On this matter the first opinion is the negative one, holding that God has no decree to give glory that is both absolute and, in some logical moment of reason, either precedes or follows the foreknowledge and will of merits and of other graces conferred on the predestined. Hence the authors of this opinion say that, given the knowledge of simple intelligence and the conditional knowledge of future contingents, God consummates the predestination of each human being to be saved by a single, utterly simple decree—by which decree he wills for that person a certain series of means by which, through the aforesaid knowledge, he foreknew that the person would infallibly attain glory if such means were conferred upon him. And so through this will God wills grace and glory for the predestined, yet not glory prior to the means of grace, not even according to reason.

First argument of the opinion.—Their foundation is that God wills all these things with necessary connection: for he wills glory in such a way that he does

not will it without merits, and he wills merits in such a way that he does not will them without his calling, his assistance, and our cooperation. Therefore it is impossible for an absolute will to give glory to the predestined to precede in any logical moment of reason. The consequence is clear: both because what cannot be without something else is not simply prior, and also because such a will, if conceived as prior, must necessarily be conceived as conditioned—namely, "if he will have had merits" or "if he will have cooperated until death."

4. *The opinion is rejected.*—This position neither has a firm foundation nor is suited to explaining the accounts of divine providence and predestination, which we cannot explain without some order of prior and posterior grounded in the relation or causality of the effects themselves toward one another. Either this opinion, then, denies these logical moments altogether in the will and intellect of God, or it does not. The first is against the common view of theologians, which, as I think, was sufficiently proved in the first volume of the third part, disp. 5, sect. 1. Nor do the said authors seem to intend this, for they acknowledge that Christ the Lord was predestined prior in reason to other human beings, and that among the reprobate God foresaw, and consequently also permitted, their sins prior in reason to willing their damnation. But if these logical moments are not denied in general, neither can they be denied in the present matter; for under that decree are comprehended several objects that are mutually subordinated as end and means. Therefore we must understand the end to be intended prior in reason before the means are chosen, because the end is willed for its own sake, while means are willed for the end. Hence in the order of intention the means depend on the intended end, while the end does not depend on the chosen means. Therefore the will of God as it is directed toward glory, which it regards as end, must necessarily be understood as prior to the will as it is directed toward the benefits of grace, which it has chosen as means. This is confirmed and clarified as follows: through that conditional knowledge God knew not merely one order of means by which he could infallibly lead the elect to such a degree of glory, but several and perhaps infinitely many. Therefore the decree, insofar as it is determined toward glory, is per se independent of the acceptance of this or that particular order of means; therefore it is, considered in itself, prior to the will to give those particular means.

5. *Response to the foundation of that opinion.*—Thus one can easily respond to the foundation of that opinion, which was drawn from the connection of means. We deny, namely, that the will to give glory is necessarily conjoined with the election of such particular means, for another election would suffice to fulfill

that intention. Moreover, although in that intention the will of means—that is, of merits and graces—is virtually included, it is not formally included, which is sufficient for it to be prior in reason, just as in us the intention of the end also virtually includes the will of means at least in general, and nonetheless is simply prior to the election of means and in us can be prior in time due to our imperfection. Therefore in God it will be prior according to reason. And finally, for the same reason, that decree, precisely as terminated toward glory, is not conditioned but absolute—because even though the effect of glory in actuality is to be conferred only upon the positing of such a cause or condition, yet that very condition is itself also absolutely willed, at least implicitly and virtually, through that act. Or to put it differently (which amounts to the same thing): the act concerning the end is of such a kind as to oblige the will to choose certain efficacious means by which that efficacious intention is fulfilled. But when a decree about an end is of this kind, and when the condition itself is in this manner encompassed within its object, the act cannot be called conditioned but absolute with respect to its adequate object. Just as in natural effects, when God intends rain, for instance, and therefore orders causes that raise vapors and gather clouds: that intention is absolute, in everyone's view, even though the effect is not to be produced without this or that condition—because that very intention by its power so embraces this condition as to infer infallibly of itself the providence necessary for such a condition to be posited. And this is a manifest sign of an absolute will. So therefore does that decree stand with respect to the predestined.

6. *Objection.*—But they say that between the will of the end and the will of means there is no order of prior and posterior, not even according to reason, except where between the intention and the election some inquiry into means intervenes, and then finally an election. But in God this imperfection is not found; rather, before any will of end and means, there is presupposed in him a most perfect comprehension and actual consideration of all the means by which a human being can be infallibly brought to glory if he is efficaciously chosen toward it. Just as, therefore, it is not necessary in God that love of glory be prior in reason to foreknowledge of the efficacious means, so too it is not necessary that love terminated at the end be prior in reason to love terminated at the means. This is confirmed and clarified: the end in matters of action or love stands as principles stand in speculative matters; but God, although he knows an effect through its cause, does not know the cause before the effect, since he knows the effect in the cause. Similarly, therefore, although he wills the end through the means and the means on account of the end, he does not will the

end before the means—because just as in knowledge there is no causality, not even according to reason, between knowledge of a cause and knowledge of an effect (the relation of cause and effect exists only among the objects themselves), so also between the will of the end and the will of means on the part of the divine act there is no causality, even according to reason, but the entire relation exists among the things willed themselves.

7. *Solution: An attribute that is the reason for another is prior to it.*—It is responded that it is false, first of all, that deliberation must intervene between the intention of the end and the election of means in order for there to be an order of reason between them. This is proved, first, as follows. In God, for one attribute to be prior in reason to another, it is sufficient that, by reason of eminent containment and virtual distinction of reason, one be the reason for the other—in the way that intellect is prior in reason to will, and mercy is said to be prior to justice—without anything else needing to intervene between them. Therefore, among free acts as well, for one to be prior to another, it is sufficient both that they can be distinguished in reason with a foundation in reality (on account of the distinction of objects and virtual contingency), and that one be the reason for the other, even if no third act of the same or another power intervenes between them. Now this is precisely how the intention of the end and the election of means stand, whether they are altogether efficacious and absolute or conditioned in some respect—because means as means are not chosen except on account of the intended end. And so the reason for willing the means, on the part of the one choosing, is the intention of the end; therefore the intention must necessarily be presupposed according to reason.

8. Nor does it matter that the end is willed dependently upon the means, for every end has this—that it is willed in some way dependently upon means. Therefore either the intention of the end never in us precedes in the order of nature the election of means, which cannot be said; or this does not prevent the efficacious intention of the end from being prior in reason in God. And the reason is that the dependence of the end upon the means belongs to the execution, not to the intention; and therefore it does not prevent the end, which is to be acquired only through means, from being intended in itself prior to the means being chosen or accepted for it. All the more so since those means are sometimes multiple and from the force of the intention of the end, no particular one is necessarily chosen rather than another, but freely by the will; and therefore it is rightly understood that the will is determined prior in reason efficaciously toward the end than toward certain particular means. And it is sufficient, as I said, that in that intention the will of means in general be

included virtually, without determination to these or those particular means. Hence, when it happens that there is only one means, that is accidental and does not remove the fact that the account of intention is per se independent of the will determined to that particular means—and this is entirely sufficient for the proper account of reason.

9. Second: unless we say this, we will never be able to distinguish in God that one thing is prior in reason to another solely by reason of the relation of end. Thus we shall not rightly say that God willed the glory and exaltation of Christ prior in reason to his passion—for in truth he did not will the glory and exaltation of Christ except as to be acquired through the passion. (I am speaking of the glory of the body, for he acquired it through his own merits, and therefore God also so ordained and willed it.) Similarly, it would follow that God did not will Christ to be man prior to willing the Virgin to be the Mother of God, and to sending the angel to her, and that she give her consent—because he did not will the Incarnation except as dependent upon these means as it was to be realized. And by the same reasoning we could not say that God chose the Virgin as Mother of God prior to decreeing that she be sanctified in the womb of her mother, and that she be preserved virginal, innocent, and humble—because he did not will that dignity for her except as dependent upon these means and dispositions, indeed even upon her free consent. Yet it is clear that all of these things are most rightly said, even though in them God does not proceed from intention to deliberation and thence to election. Therefore that foundation is of no moment for removing the order of reason.

10. Third, I add that even among human beings it is not necessary that deliberation intervene between intention and election in order for there to be an order not only of reason but also of causality and of nature or time between those two acts. For they are really distinct even if no deliberation intervenes between them, and they have an order per se such that one arises from the other —and therefore this is sufficient for an order of nature. I clarify this as follows. Let us suppose a man of the highest wisdom and prudence who, before he settles with himself on obtaining or pursuing some end—say, health, dignity, and so forth—knows perfectly all the means by which such an end can be pursued, and simultaneously knows which means are better or more difficult, and finally more suitable. This man, if he begins to will, settles first on the end before the means, and in him the intention of the end will precede the election of means at least in the order of nature. Indeed, it can even happen that a quasi-speculative deliberation precedes the actually conceived intention of the end, and that once judgment has been formed about the whole usefulness or suitability of the

means, the will begins its deliberation both about the end and about the means —and yet even then it begins from the end, and the intention of the end will be prior according to reason to the election of means, because even then it is the cause or reason of the election. Now such is the knowledge in God that precedes all free acts: it is formally quasi-speculative, yet sufficient on the part of the objects it proposes to elicit an effect, or to propose to the will objects toward which it may tend. Therefore reason itself, by its own nature, demands this from the objects: for the knowledge that precedes cannot impede in God the order of reason in the acts of the will, since that order neither conflicts with God in himself nor otherwise conflicts with those acts for any general reason—as has been shown in the case of human beings.

11. *Objection. It is answered.*—You will say: in God there precedes not only knowledge of the suitability or usefulness of the means, but also conditional knowledge of the future outcome from the force of such a means if applied—a knowledge that does not precede in the case of a human being. I respond: first, that this is irrelevant, because that knowledge of future things under a condition assists toward the intention or election for no other reason except insofar as it proposes such means not merely as possibly useful but also as certain, or as infallibly serving the attainment of the end. But this does not remove the fact that the end is the reason for willing such means, whatever those means are and however they are known. Therefore it does not remove the order of reason, which is founded precisely upon such a reason for willing. I add further that a similar knowledge proportionate to the human case can precede even in a human being: for if the means is a natural agent, it can be known with certainty what it will do if applied; but if it is a free or contingent cause, it can at least be prejudged through conjectural and probable cognition what such a cause would do on such an occasion—and this cognition suffices for the human being's election, because our providence is of the uncertain kind, and so the same proportion is preserved. Finally, even if it happens that in a human being there precedes this conditional that is most certainly known—*if such an end is intended, it is altogether necessary to choose such a means*—nonetheless the human will, determining itself concerning both acts, begins by intending the end, and that intention precedes according to reason the election of the means, however necessary it may be, because it is in its own way the cause of the election. And even if we suppose it not to be a proper cause but that the person then wills the end and the means in a single act, nevertheless according to reason that act is terminated first toward the end than toward the means,

because *that by reason of which each thing is such, is itself also more so*—and prior as well.

12. *In God there can be found a knowledge that intervenes between the will of the end and the will of means.*—Finally I add: even if we grant for the sake of argument that some knowledge must intervene between the will of the end and the will of means in order for there to be an order between them, yet this too is found in God in some way and without imperfection, through a mere relation and relation of reason. I clarify as follows. In God, absolute knowledge of future things comes after God's free decree, and much more does all knowledge of vision—whether of creatures existing outside God, or of the free acts of God himself as terminated toward creatures. For after God freely wills to produce something outside himself, he immediately knows that he wills it by seeing in himself the free decree which, speaking in our manner, he did not previously see as present and elicited. Thus, when he intends to give Peter glory, he sees this intention in himself; and this vision and knowledge can most fittingly and rightly be understood as mediate between that intention of the end and the will of means. Therefore there is already some knowledge intervening, which all the more establishes an order of reason between that intention and the will of means. The minor is proved: because one who wills a means is not brought to such a will of means by the force of the end considered in itself alone, but as willed—for the end does not move absolutely to willing the means for its sake except as already willed for its own sake or in itself. Therefore for election as such there must precede knowledge of the end not merely as good but also as already willed. Therefore there must precede knowledge of the very free intention by which the end is willed. Therefore that knowledge intervenes according to reason between the election and the intention.

13. From these considerations, therefore, the objection raised has been sufficiently answered. As for that example about knowledge of effects in a cause: it can first be said that knowledge of the cause is also prior in reason to knowledge of the effect in it. It is then said that the situation is not entirely the same, because effects are entirely determined in the cause, and therefore the cause as such is not known except together with its relation to the effects. But the end does not of itself determine particular means, as has been set out. One must also note that everything we have adduced proves, to be sure, that there is no reason to deny in God an order of reason between the intention of glory and the election of grace as means to glory—yet it does not prove that that intention must be efficacious. This remains now to be debated with other authors. There we shall also examine another point of this first opinion: its denial that the

decree to give glory is posterior to the foreknowledge of merits and to the will to give the predestined grace and other means to attain glory—for this is something we hold to be true, as we shall say in the following opinion.

14. *Second opinion. The will of justice is posterior to the will of mercy.*—The second opinion, then, teaches that the absolute will to give glory is not in God prior to foreseen merits, and consequently not prior to the will to give the grace from which those merits proceed; yet that after this foreknowledge and will of merits and grace, the will to give glory subsequently follows in God; and that between these wills there is an order of reason, and that in that order the will to give glory is posterior. In this latter part this opinion differs from the preceding one, and it greatly pleases me as well—namely, that we should believe God to have had some will to give glory to the elect after their foreseen merits and after the will to give grace. I hold this to be the common view and not susceptible of denial, as we shall set out below. It is shown briefly now, because we cannot deny that there is in God a will to give glory that is an act of justice, whether commutative or distributive—just as it is certain that there is in God a will to punish and inflict eternal punishment, which is an act of vindictive justice. But that will cannot be had except after foreseen merits together with final perseverance in grace, and that foreknowledge presupposes a will to give grace and merits. Therefore such a will to give glory is posterior both to that foreknowledge and to the will to give grace. And thus the will of justice is posterior to the will of mercy, as Augustine extensively pursues in the book *On Grace and Free Will*, chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. Just as in the damned the will to punish, which belongs to justice, presupposes knowledge of future sins, and this presupposes the will to permit, which belongs not to special mercy but to common providence. Whether this will to give glory owed on account of foreseen merits pertains to predestination or follows upon it is a question more of manner of speaking than of substance, about which we shall speak below.

15. The prior part of this opinion, therefore—which denies that an absolute will to give glory to the predestined precedes the absolute foreknowledge of their merits—must now be treated. For there have been ancient theologians who held it, among whom Major is listed, though unjustly, as I shall say below. Argentina held it in book 1, dist. 41, art. 2, where Saint Bonaventure also strongly favors it; and Alensis in part 1, q. 28, Memb. 2, art. 2; and some modern authors consistently defend it. These do not deny that the intention of the end in some logical moment of reason precedes the election of means, but they say that intention is not absolute, nor directed only toward the predestined, but also toward the reprobate, and equally toward all, and that the

difference between them consists in the will of means. They do, however, posit a difference between natural and free effects, or between ends to be attained through natural versus free causes: in natural things, the absolute and efficacious intention of God toward the end precedes, by the force of which the means are applied, because the connection of means with end can be necessary; but when the end is to be obtained through merits or free means, they say it conflicts for an absolute intention of the end to precede. To confirm this opinion they adduce various testimonies from Augustine, which I now omit, along with other conjectures of which I have spoken more fully elsewhere.

16. *First argument for the second opinion.*—There are therefore two fundamental arguments. The first is that such an absolute will of God, preceding the absolute foreknowledge of merits or free cooperation, would introduce necessity that conflicts with freedom. The consequence is proved: for given that will, it is impossible for the effect not to follow—therefore it follows necessarily. And it will not satisfy to say that this is only the necessity of the consequence, or in the composite sense, which does not conflict with freedom. For according to Anselm in the book *On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination*, necessity from supposition is simple necessity when the supposition is antecedent and forestalls the freedom of the human being, because it is then not within his power. For if the consequence is necessary and the antecedent is not in my power, then the consequent is also not in my power but follows necessarily and simply. Now that absolute will of God is posited as forestalling the free consent of the human being; therefore it destroys freedom.

17. *Second argument.*—The other argument is that if from eternity God had freely and without foreseen merits efficaciously willed to give glory to some, then in time he would also give it freely and without merits—since he gives in time as he decreed from eternity. But it is certain according to faith that glory is not given freely in time, especially to adults. Therefore neither was it so decreed from eternity.

18. *The second opinion is attacked.*—I shall speak of the conclusion of this opinion below. But its first foundation greatly displeases me, for it assumes this principle: *that God cannot absolutely predefine any act or effect to be produced freely or through free means in time unless he first sees according to reason that effect absolutely as future.* This is, first of all, against almost all theologians, especially the ancient ones, as I shall cite shortly. I then show by various examples that it is false. First: it is certain that in the same logical moment in which God predestined Christ as the God-man, he predestined him glorious in soul and in body, as is gathered from Augustine, tract. 105 on John, at the end—

even though in time he did not have bodily glory without his merits. Similarly, before God foresaw the death of Christ as future, he efficaciously preordained him as redeemer of the human race, although that office was to be fulfilled only through free acts. Therefore in God there is given a predefinition directed toward the use of free acts prior to the absolute foreknowledge of their futurity.

19. Second: the most Blessed Virgin was elected before the prevision of all her merits to be the Mother of God, even though she did not obtain that dignity without free consent, nor without some merit, at least of congruity. Constrained by this example, the authors of the contrary opinion acknowledge here too that that will of God was not absolute but only a simple affection, by which he desired that this woman conceive the divine Word—not a will by which he efficaciously predefined it. But in truth they conflict with the common manner of speaking of the saints, who call that will an election. Moreover, the Church says: *He chose her and pre-chose her*—and election (according to the sense commonly received in moral matters) signifies an absolute will.

20. Further: God, prior to foreknowledge of the merits or free acts of the Virgin, defined by an absolute will that the Word take flesh; and he did not predefine this only confusedly and in general, but in predetermining it also in particular—that he would take this flesh, not from nothing but from a woman, and from such a woman. This is so both because the perfect ordering of divine providence demands it, and because the benefit of the Incarnation was from the sole wisdom and charity of God, and chiefly as regards its chief circumstances, one of which is conception from such a woman. Therefore God predefined and predestined all of this from himself. For this reason I have said elsewhere that the predestination of the Virgin to divine motherhood was most closely conjoined with the predestination of Christ. Indeed it is very probable that in the same logical moment of reason Christ was predestined as man and as Son of the Virgin, and that it was simultaneously predestined that he take flesh and that he take it from the most pure blood of the Virgin—and therefore that the predestination of Christ is terminated toward the Virgin, at least secondarily, as toward the term of his relation insofar as he is Son of Man. Or at least, even if two logical moments of reason are distinguished—one in which God willed the Word to become man, another in which he willed that the humanity be taken from such a woman—it is not plausible that between those two moments the foreseen merits of the Virgin intervened, and that on account of them God absolutely decreed that particular mode of taking flesh. Rather, just as from his will alone he first decreed the one, so too the other. For just as the first was the root of all the merits of all human beings, and therefore that predestination

could not fall under human merits, so too the second is the root of all the merits and all the graces given to the Virgin, and therefore that predestination could not fall under her merits. This is finally confirmed, because God by his absolute will predefined the time and hour and moment of the Incarnation, according to Paul's word at Galatians 4: *When the fullness of time came*—predefined by God, as all understand. Therefore much more did he absolutely predefine the motherhood of the Virgin, especially because the Incarnation's taking place at that moment was no less dependent on the free consent of the Virgin than on her being the one from whom it came about.

21. *A certain evasion.*—One might respond differently: that God indeed predefined all these things and absolutely chose the Virgin as Mother of God, because these effects did not per se depend on the free consent of the Virgin, nor did God in that logical moment predefine bringing them about through such a consent, but absolutely. Hence, even if it were by a supposition impossible that the Blessed Virgin had not given her consent, the Virgin would nonetheless by the force of that decree have been made Mother of God; and then the motherhood would not have been in any way a reward of her merit as it now in fact was—but this would not have been against that decree by which the Blessed Virgin was predestined or elected to divine motherhood, because she was not elected to motherhood under the aspect of a benefit. And thus that predefinition, as such, is not about an effect per se dependent on the free use of the predestined human being. And therefore the same reason does not apply to it as applies to election to beatitude, because—as I shall say below—God never predefined giving beatitude except with per se dependence on future merits, and consequently with dependence—I say—not of the predestination itself but of the predestined effect.

22. *An argument against the response.*—But against this I object, first, as an argument against them on their own terms, by the reasoning the authors of that opinion employ: God predestines from eternity just as he confers benefits in time; but God in time conferred this benefit on the Virgin from some merit or free disposition of hers; therefore he so predestined to give it. And this reasoning proceeds more firmly and without equivocation, because we are not arguing from the effect to the act of predestination—which would be a sophistic argument, as I shall show below—but from the effect to the object of predestination. This seems an excellent inference: for under the same account under which a thing is done or given in time, under the same account was it predestined to be done or given—as regards the object itself and the accounts of the predestined thing, since all of that had to fall under predestination. Just as

therefore in time the Virgin acquired motherhood through her own free consent, so she was predestined from eternity to have motherhood as some sort of reward of her merit. And further: even if we grant that all of this was not predestined in the same logical moment, yet by the very fact that we understand God to have absolutely predefined in some logical moment that this woman should be Mother of God, we should understand that immediately in the next moment, and before the foreknowledge of all her merits, he predefined that there should be given to her dispositions worthy of the Mother of God—among which dispositions are included not only the habits of virtues but also good acts. For that mode of executing the predestined Incarnation and motherhood through the free consent of the Virgin proceeded primarily from the infinite wisdom and goodness of God. Hence it was equally predefined prior to the foreknowledge of any merit, just as were the other dispositions and circumstances—especially since there is no conflict or difficulty in this, as I shall say presently.

23. A similar argument can be drawn from the will by which God decreed to take flesh from the seed of Abraham and to choose him to be the father of many nations—an election which he indeed did not commit to execution except through the free consent and faith of Abraham, and yet it was an absolute predefinition and election prior to the foreseen future faith or will of Abraham. And in the same manner many similar cases can be adduced, as of the apostles, to whom Christ said: *It was not you who chose me, but I who chose you* (John 15). For even if we grant that he is speaking of election to the apostolate, they nonetheless did not receive it without free consent. And nonetheless Christ the Lord says: *It was not you who chose me*—that is, first—*but I chose you*, as if to say: and through my election I brought it about that you chose me. And in the same sense it is said of Paul: *He is a vessel of election for me.* And John the Baptist, or Jeremiah, says: *He placed me like a chosen arrow.*

24. *The* a priori *argument: that it belongs to the efficacy of the divine will that what it wills should infallibly come about.*—Finally the *a priori* argument is that God in his foreknowledge has means by which he can in time bring it about that what he definitively wills comes about infallibly, and nonetheless comes about freely. Therefore it does not conflict with divine power and will that, before he absolutely foreknows something as simply future, he simply and definitively wills it to be—and at the same time wills it to be freely. Moreover, and more to the point, as Saint Thomas excellently said in part 1, q. 22, art. 4, it belongs to the efficacy of the divine will that what he wills both comes about and comes about infallibly in the way he himself wills. Hence Augustine said in the

Enchiridion, ch. 98: *Who is so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot turn to good the evil wills of men, when he will, where he will, and as he will?* And in book 1 *On the Grace of Christ*, ch. 24: *Let them understand*—he says—*that God can work in the hearts of men, by a wonderful and ineffable power that is internal and hidden, not only true revelations but also good wills.* Now what God can do from his full power, he can also predefine from himself and from his sheer will—since this neither exceeds his power, nor conflicts with his goodness, as is evident per se, nor does it violate human freedom, because through such a decree God wills that the human being himself will and freely determine himself, without changing his mode of operating.

25. *Response to the first argument of the second opinion: The decree to give glory is not a simply antecedent supposition.*—Hence the first argument is easily resolved—on which I shall say more below when treating of the Harmony. For now I respond briefly: that will does not introduce necessity into the human will, because it does not move it immediately and through itself (we are speaking according to reason) but by applying congruous means through which it knows that human will shall freely consent. And for this reason such a decree of God is not a simply antecedent supposition, because it presupposes conditional knowledge of the free human consent to be given if these or those means are applied to it, and it virtually includes a regard for such means—not as a cause of the decree itself, but rather as an effect or means to be applied by the force of such a decree or will.

26. *Response to the second argument.*—Nor does the second argument have greater force; it rather commits an equivocation in the application of the term *freely*. For that term can fall either upon the object of the divine will or upon the very act of God's will as freely terminated toward such a person. We use it in this second manner; but in the argument it is taken in the first manner, so that a transition is made from one manner to the other, which is not a valid inference. I clarify briefly with a human example. When someone has a will to freely give a horse to a friend, he then wills to give freely, in such a way that the adverb falls not only upon the act of the will but also upon the object. But the will to acquire a horse is not a will to give something freely, even though that will itself can be had freely. The sign of this is that such a will is sometimes considered a great benefit and act of friendship—which is seen more clearly when, between two people who both need or desire a thing, I freely will to sell to this one rather than that one out of sheer liberty. And the favor will be greater when I will not only to sell but also to procure and assist so that the other may have the means to buy.

27. *Although God freely elects human beings for glory, he nonetheless does not give it freely but as a reward.*—In this manner, therefore, is this will of God to be understood: for God intends glory for the human being he has chosen not in any fashion, but as a crown and reward. And so, although he has this intention toward him freely, nonetheless he does not will to give the object itself freely but through merits—which he does not foresee but rather prepares, in the order of reason, as we shall see shortly. Therefore those two things are not incompatible: that God from eternity freely elects to glory in the order of intention, and yet does not give it freely in time. This can also be understood from the examples above given of the bodily glory of Christ the Lord and of the dignity of the Mother of God. And finally it is demonstrated from what has been conceded: for other scholars concede at least that by a simple affection God willed glory to the predestined before their foreseen merits. Therefore God had that affection freely toward human beings; and yet through that affection he does not will—even conditionally and in a qualified sense—that the human being have glory freely. For this God desires in no way whatsoever, as is evident even in the case of the reprobate: God wills glory for them in that antecedent manner, yet desires that they merit it, not that they have it freely. These two things are therefore plainly distinct.

28. *Third opinion.*—The third opinion holds that God had this efficacious purpose to give glory in that first logical moment with respect to some of those human beings who are saved—but not with respect to all who attain ultimate salvation. Among the scholastics, Ockham held this in book 1, d. 43, and Gabriel there, q. 1, art. 2. Catharinus expounds and defends it at length in book 1 *On Predestination*, last chapter, and book 3, from the beginning.

29. This distinction can first be established between angels and human beings—about which I shall speak in the following chapter, since here we deal only with fallen human beings. Catharinus and the other authors I cited constitute, among fallen human beings to be saved, these two orders; and they are moved to posit some human beings as pre-elected by the manner of speaking in the Scriptures, which we shall adduce below. Also by the diverse dignities and prerogatives that God conferred on some human beings and not on all to be saved, as is especially evident in the Blessed Virgin, in John the Baptist, in the apostles, and so forth. Finally, by the diverse modes of saving human beings that are known to us from experience itself: for some God forestalls in a most special way and as it were continuously confers singular aids upon them and persistently so, until he leads them to ultimate and perfect salvation. This is therefore a sign that he pre-elected them.

30. The other part of this opinion—namely, that beyond these some are saved even though they were not pre-elected—is proved chiefly from the reason for doubt set out at the beginning. For that pre-election is not simply necessary for attaining salvation; otherwise those not so pre-elected would not have from God's side everything necessary, and consequently it would not be within their power to be saved. But if that election is not necessary, there is no conflict with some being saved who were not so elected. And if there is no conflict, why will it not be so? For if the cause is sufficient to have this effect without such election, then among so great a multitude of human beings it will have it in some. Indeed, perhaps that is the *great multitude that no one could number*, seen by John in the Apocalypse. Finally, from the nature of things themselves this seems probable, since many are saved with only the common and ordinary providence of grace; therefore with respect to them that peculiar intention and love is not necessary.

31. *The opinion of Catharinus is judged erroneous by Soto and other Thomists, but is to some extent excused from error.*—From this opinion Catharinus drew two conclusions. One is that not all who are saved are predestined. The other is that the number of those to be saved is not certain until by their freedom they persevere with divine grace unto death. Both of these are refuted as erroneous by Domingo de Soto and other more recent Thomists. But Catharinus erred in both more in words than in substance, speaking consistently within his own opinion—which, while not true (as I shall say immediately), is not worthy of so grave a censure. For he called predestination only this efficacious election to glory prior to foreseen merits; and therefore he does not call those who are not so elected predestined, even though they are going to attain glory. In this manner of speaking, however—that some who are not predestined are saved—he plainly dissents from Augustine throughout the book *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, and indeed also from Paul's manner of speaking, as I shall say immediately. For this reason Saint Fulgentius, in the book *On Faith to Peter*, ch. 35, establishes as a rule of faith: *Hold most firmly and doubt not at all that no one shall attain salvation who is not predestined.* In the second conclusion, Catharinus did not hold that the number of those to be saved is uncertain from eternity until they persevere in grace in time, as his adversaries object—but he said that that number is not certain from the divine will and by divine will, but only from the foreknowledge by which God saw the cooperation of human beings. In which he acknowledges he dissents from Augustine, and indeed he attacks Augustine's opinion in most severe terms, wherein he went too far and is most worthy of rebuke. For, to say nothing of other matters, Pope Celestine in

his letter to the bishops of Gaul, especially in chapter two, greatly commends both Augustine and his teaching, especially that pertaining to the grace of God. For these reasons this opinion is to be rejected by us as well.

32. *True resolution.*—I say, therefore, that the first act of the divine will toward human beings to be saved was the love by which he willed and intended to give them glory by an absolute and efficacious will. This is the opinion of Saint Thomas, art. 4, and q. 6 *On Truth*, art. 1, and in book 1, d. 40—where it is defended by Capreolus, Hervaeus, and other Thomists—and likewise of Scotus, Durandus, and Aegidius, both there and at d. 41, q. 2; and of Major, q. 1, art. 2; of Richard, art. 2, q. 1; of Gregory, art. 2; and several other more recent authors, whom I shall add below when treating of the cause of predestination, where I shall also adduce more from Scripture and the Fathers.

33. The conclusion is proved from Sacred Scripture.—I now prove it from Paul at Ephesians 1: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him in love, having predestined us, etc., according to the purpose of his will. For that Paul there speaks of an absolute will and a firm decree is clear both from everyone's interpretation, and from the word choosing, which I examined above, and from the word predestining, which he adds, and finally from the words according to the purpose of his will. Moreover, that he speaks of a purely gratuitous election that precedes the foreknowledge of future things is most aptly gathered by Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 8 and 19, from those words: that we should be holy, etc. Not—he says—because we were going to be holy, but that we should be: because that particle that denotes the term or end, and consequently also the effect of that election, not its cause or reason.

34. *The exposition of some is rejected.*—Some say that from this very word it is gathered that Paul is speaking not of election to glory but of election to grace. But this is truly of no moment. First, because from Paul's words it is clear that he speaks of perfect and consummated holiness, which is not separated from glory, as is clear from: *that we should be holy and blameless before him*, etc. Then, because either Paul is speaking of election to any temporal grace whatsoever—and this cannot be said, because such grace does not always have predestination infallibly joined to it, which Paul immediately joins—or he is speaking of holiness with final perseverance, and this is consummated holiness, which has beatitude infallibly conjoined with it. And the same argument applies to the latter, because this grace with final perseverance in its execution or in reality is not acquired without some cooperation of free will, nor without some merit of the human being—whether of condignity or of congruity—at least with

respect to some effects of such election. Therefore the same reason applies to election to such holiness as to election to glory. Indeed, in the order of intention they are accounted the same, because a human being is neither elected to be blessed without perfect holiness, nor to have consummated holiness without beatitude, even though in the order of execution both must be acquired through other free means. And in this same manner the words of the same Paul at Romans 8 can be adduced to confirm this: *Those whom he predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.* For he speaks of those whom he predestined to be conformed to the Son in glory and not only in grace, and of them he then states the effects that God by the force of predestination worked in the elect: *that he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy which he prepared for glory*, as he immediately adds in ch. 9. Likewise in 2 Timothy 1 and Titus 3, and frequently elsewhere, he manifestly speaks of this gratuitous election of the predestined to glory.

35. That Paul in these places speaks of all who attain ultimate salvation is clear from everyone's interpretation and from the absolute manner of speaking, which we cannot limit by our own judgment or make any exception to. And the same is confirmed by other testimonies of Scripture, in which those who are to be saved are simply called *the elect*, as in Matthew 24: *So as to lead into error, if possible, even the elect*; and again: *But for the sake of the elect those days shall be shortened.* Likewise what Christ says to the apostles (John 15): *It was not you who chose me, but I who chose you*—Augustine understands this of this election in *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 1, and extends it to all the predestined in tract. 86 on John; and Christ alludes to the same (John 13), saying: *I know whom I have chosen*, indicating that this election is the root of all good things and especially of the gift of perseverance. And he seems to have indicated the same more clearly (Luke 12), saying: *Fear not, little flock, for it has pleased your Father to give you the kingdom.* For which good pleasure he gives thanks, Matthew 11, saying: *Yes, Father* (whom indeed I praise) *for so it was pleasing before you.* This election is therefore from the good pleasure of the Father and purely gratuitous —and it is the root of all the benefits by which salvation is prepared for the predestined, according to Psalm 17: *He saved me because he willed me.* Finally, from this the Church also employed that manner of speaking in a certain prayer: *God, to whom alone is known the number of the elect to be placed in heavenly happiness.* From which two things may be gathered. One is that no one is simply called elect except one elected to eternal happiness. The other is that no one is placed in eternal happiness except those who are so elected.

The mind of Augustine on the thesis is examined.

36. *From Augustine's view, election to glory was before foreseen merits.*—Second, this is without doubt the view of Augustine, as almost all authors have hitherto held, and I showed and defended it at length in book 3 *On the Aids*, ch. 16 and 17. We shall now add a few things. One testimony is from *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 7, where speaking of the predestined he says that they were chosen to reign with Christ, by God's will, prior to all foreseen merits. There he most clearly posits both the act of the will prior to foreknowledge of merits, and its absolute perfection, and the term of that act—namely, the *kingdom of heaven*. For the interpretation of some, who take the *kingdom of heaven* to mean congruous grace, is neither in keeping with the proper meaning of the word nor with the mind of Augustine. For he holds that congruous grace follows from this election, as is clear from these words: *Whoever, therefore, are separated by this lavish gift of divine grace from that original damnation, there is no doubt that both the hearing of the Gospel is arranged for them, and when they hear, they believe, and in the faith that works through love they persevere to the end*, and the rest, down to: *All these things he works in those* whom he chose *in his Son*—that is, whom he chose *by the election of grace*, that is, by gratuitous election and without merits, as he immediately clarifies. Hence he adds: *For they were not called in such a way as not to be the elect:* therefore election preceded calling, and therefore they were called *in such a way*—that is, congruously—who had been the elect. And this is what he adds: *But since they were called according to the purpose, they were certainly elected, by the election—as was said—of grace, not of preceding merits.* And finally, after treating at length of the immovability and certainty of that election, he concluded: *But the elect were chosen to reign with Christ.* This therefore was an election of grace and without merits. And finally he consistently declares that election to be of all who attain the kingdom of heaven, which he therefore calls there the *kingdom of the elect*, who say: *If God is for us, who is against us?* And: *Who will bring accusation against the elect of God?* And finally he concludes of all these that they receive the gift of perseverance, while those who do not receive it were not elected. All who are saved, therefore, are thus elected—just as according to Augustine all who are saved are predestined, as he openly teaches in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14, and as is gathered from the same book, ch. 22, where he says: *If any obey, but are not predestined to*

his kingdom and glory, they are temporal. The same is gathered from *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 17.

37. Hence also it is that wherever Augustine treats of the special providence by which God protects and governs the predestined and seeks the reason for the difference—why God acts thus toward the predestined and not toward others—he acknowledges he knows no other cause than God's purpose of election. So, in *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 8, he asks why, of two just persons, God gives the gift of perseverance to one, or takes him away before malice changes his understanding, while he preserves the other until he falls from justice, and does not give him the gift of perseverance but permits him to die in sin. To which question he responds with nothing other than that the judgments of God are inscrutable, and that everything depends on the divine election: for God, according to the counsel of his will, chose this one and not that one, and therefore prepared this gift for this one and not for that one. But some say that this is to be understood of election to grace, not of election to glory. But against this: first, because he refers this immediately to that election of which Paul speaks at Ephesians 1—*He chose us in him, etc.*—which we have shown to be election to glory. I also ask, concerning what grace is being spoken of when it is said that this difference comes from election to grace: is it grace as denoting holiness with the effect of persevering in it unto death, or grace as denoting congruous assistance toward this effect? The latter cannot be said, because it is inconsistent with Augustine's argument, who from the diverse effects and ends that God willed in these persons out of his liberality infers the diversity of gifts —otherwise his argument would be very frivolous. But if the former is said, that is what we intend. For (as I said) this sanctification unto death is not brought about without the cooperation of free will, and therefore the same or greater reason applies to it as applies to election to glory. Also, such grace includes the term and consummation, and consequently glory. Finally, the same Augustine confirms this sense wherever he speaks of the purpose of God toward the predestined, from which purpose he says proceeds that sublime and secret calling by which they receive the grace infallibly to be converted and to be led unfailingly to glory. For by that purpose he always understands the gratuitous purpose of God to lead the elect to glory, as can be seen from *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 16 and 17; *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 6, where he so understands Acts 9: *As many as were ordained to eternal life believed.* Likewise ch. 7 and following, and book 8 of the *Questions*, q. 68; Epistles 46 and 106. To this point finally tends *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 49, where he says: *That one is without sin whom God wills to be such.* For this is a

kind of election that is not fulfilled without freedom. Similar is what he cites from Ambrose in the same book, ch. 46: *And whom he wills, he has made devout.* And other places we shall adduce below when treating of the cause of predestination.

38. Moreover, it is clear from the letter of Prosper of Aquitaine to Augustine—which appears before the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*—that such was at that time the understanding of Saint Augustine's view on divine predestination and election, and that for this reason many minds were disturbed. Hence at the end of the letter, presupposing the same sense as Augustinian and true, Prosper asks Augustine to deign to clarify further: *How through this preaching of the purpose of God, by which those who are ordained to eternal life are believers, none of those who are to be exhorted is impeded, nor do they have occasion for negligence if they despair of being predestined.* And Prosper repeats this frequently in responding to various objections made against Augustine, and especially ch. 7, in response to the objections of the Gauls. He calls this election a preordination, from which flows the gift of perseverance. And in book 2 *On the Calling of the Nations*, ch. 26, Fulgentius holds the same view in book 1 *To Monimus*, ch. 8 and 13, where among other things he says: *Those whom he predestined*—that is, chose—*to glory, he predestined to righteousness.* Finally, Hugh of Saint Victor, question 223 on the Epistle to the Romans, in the mind of Augustine, understands this election to be that purpose of God which is frequently mentioned by Paul, from which proceeds that singular calling from the purpose—which Augustine says is proper to the elect in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 3, and frequently elsewhere.

39. Another indication of Augustine's mind can be drawn from the letter of Hilary of Arles to the same Augustine. For he reports there that among other objections of the Gauls against Augustine, one was that he divided all human beings, as it were, into two classes—of the elect and the rejected—and distinguished them by God's will alone, in such a way that there could be no passage from one to the other. They also objected that Augustine understood Paul's words at 1 Timothy 2—*He wills all men to be saved*—of the will of good pleasure, efficacious and therefore pertaining only to the predestined, and not of all human beings, having interpreted it variously in different places. For they presupposed—rightly—that Paul speaks there of a will that God has from himself, prior to all the merits of human beings; and they wanted this to be not particular to some but universal toward all, and therefore not efficacious and absolute but simple or conditioned. They therefore understood Augustine to have placed the separation of human beings by the sole will of God anteceding

the foreknowledge of merits, and thus to have chosen some to glory by the sole efficacious will to save them—which is plainly election to glory. Now in that objection and complaint, Hilary never indicates that they attributed anything false to Augustine; nor does Augustine in *On the Predestination of the Saints* respond by denying what they reported or presupposed about his meaning, but by confirming the truth of that view from Sacred Scripture. Hence also Gregory can be cited for this part, in book 5 *On 1 Kings*, ch. 4, toward the end, insofar as he expounds the same text of Paul of the predestined—which predestination he holds to be, primarily and per se, to eternal life, and thence to have it that he establishes certain and infallible means toward attaining such an end.

The thesis is proved by arguments.

40. *First argument: The intention of the end is prior to the will of means. Election to glory proceeds from an absolute intention.*—The first and *a priori* argument is the one Saint Thomas adduced at art. 4: the intention of the end must precede the will concerning means—in us at least in the order of nature, in God in the order of reason, as I sufficiently established against the first opinion. That such an intention in this matter is absolute and efficacious is further proved as follows. The intention must be accommodated to the election of means; or rather, the mode of election indicates the mode of intention. But God observes this in the election of means concerning those to be saved—that he gives them efficacious means, such that they are genuinely efficacious and that through them they infallibly attain glory—as even the authors of the second opinion concede, and as is the express view of Augustine in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14, and throughout *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and in infinitely many other places. Therefore it is a sign that this election of means proceeds from an absolute intention. This is excellently indicated by those words of Wisdom 4: *He was taken away lest malice change his understanding*; and by what Christ says of his sheep, John 10: *No one will snatch them from my hand*—which Augustine declares was said by reason of predestination, tract. 48 on John. And the above-cited words of Christ at Matthew 24 are consonant: *For the sake of the elect those days will be shortened.* For they indicate a special providence toward them, as Bernard excellently explains, sermon 68 on the *Canticle*, and sermon 12 on Psalm *Who dwells*, adding Paul's words: *I endure all things for the sake of the elect*—and including the whole providence of God as being in some manner ordered to the salvation of the elect.

41. *The interpretation of some regarding this passage of Romans. The better exposition of Augustine.*—Finally this is also indicated to me by those words of Paul at Romans 8: *For those who love God all things work together for good*—certainly from the special care of God for them, which arises from the fact that they *were called according to the purpose* as holy. This some—Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret there, and Cyril of Jerusalem in the preface to the *Catecheses*—interpret of the purpose of those human beings themselves. But Augustine, much better, in book 2 *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, ch. 10, and frequently elsewhere, interprets it of the purpose toward those whom he so governs—which is manifest from the words that Paul immediately adds: *For those whom he foreknew he also predestined, etc.*; and of the same purpose he says in ch. 9: *That the electing purpose of God might remain not from works but from him who calls, etc.*; and in 2 Timothy 1: *Who called us with a holy calling, not according to our merits but according to his own purpose and grace.* As Augustine also examines, who speaks best about this purpose in *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 12, saying that from it flows congruous calling, justification, and so forth. Likewise in book 2 *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, ch. 9.

42. *Second argument.*—And from this we can form a second argument: for we must acknowledge that God elected some to glory before the absolute foreknowledge of future things, and there is no reason to except any of those to be saved from this election. Therefore all who are saved are thus elected. The major is sufficiently proved by the examples adduced against the second opinion and by what the third opinion brought forward to prove its prior part. And from the effects and mode of God's providence toward some it seems most evident. For some he efficaciously forestalls from childhood, or even before the use of natural reason, and then by special care preserves them throughout the whole time of their life without grave sin; others who lived wickedly for their entire lives he converts near the end in an almost miraculous manner, so that they may die in grace—of which we have an illustrious example in the good thief, and infinitely similar cases. Who then can deny that this comes from a singular decree by which God absolutely willed to save these?

43. *Why Catharinus erred. The providence toward some of the elect may seem general, yet as it proceeds from God foreknowing, it is special. No one is saved without the gift of perseverance.*—It remains to prove the minor proposition against the third opinion, in which Catharinus erred—because he neither believed nor understood the conditional knowledge of future free acts that God has prior in reason to his election. But given that knowledge, I see no reason for doubt in that part either. First: although the supernatural providence toward

some of those to be saved appears to us to be general and common, nonetheless, as it proceeds from God under that foreknowledge, it is greatly special—since through it each one is given that assistance which will be efficacious in him unto death. This is therefore a sign that in all it proceeds from the aforesaid purpose of the will of God. Hence among human beings no one is saved without the special gift of perseverance, as Augustine extensively treats in *On the Gift of Perseverance*—openly presupposing and declaring this in ch. 1, and also in *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 12 and 13. And God provides that gift by his will without our merit. Therefore, although God's providence in some is more hidden than in others, the electing will was nonetheless universal toward all who are saved.

44. *This is proved by the example of infants who are elected without foreseen merit.*—To this pertains the argument concerning infants, which Augustine employs frequently in *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 22 and 23; *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 12; *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 9; and Epistles 105 and 106. For we see—given the same merit of the parents and the same general institution of baptism—one infant dying immediately, another for whom baptism is being prepared dying before it can be applied, and another being preserved until he is baptized. This diversity cannot, with respect to God, be from chance or altogether incidental; nor in a matter so lofty and pertaining to the salvation of human beings can it be from general providence alone without a hidden ordering and election of those who are saved. For although the differing providence is sometimes not outwardly apparent to us, it is at times evidently demonstrated, as can be shown by various examples.

45. *Third argument: The number of the elect is future from the absolute intention of God. The term tends to be the first object proposed to the will. The generations will cease when the number of the elect has been completed.*—From these considerations a third argument can be formed. In the state of glory the entire number of those to be saved is to exist from direct and absolute divine intention. Therefore God must have had this intention from himself with respect to all who were to be citizens of that kingdom. The antecedent is excellently explained by Bernard, sermon 78 on the *Canticle*: because that entire city was chosen to be the one bride of Christ, which was afterwards prepared through grace just as it was elected—and this is in keeping with the perfection of that kingdom, in which nothing should exist except from a singular divine predefinition. It is also shown *a posteriori*. For in any enterprise or governance, the outcome declares the intention of the one governing; and the term, upon whose attainment care and governance cease, tends to be the first object proposed to the will and intention of such a governor, if he governs prudently.

We see, moreover, that the whole providence of God tends to this—that that city be completed in such a number, weight, and measure. Hence all theologians say that the generation of things will then be ended, and God's governance of them, when the number of the elect has been completed. This is therefore a sign that the absolute intention of God was fixed not only in these or those particular persons of that city, but in the city as a whole, to be completed in the full number of those to be saved.

46. *The response of some that the will to give congruous grace was the first will. The response is attacked.*—This I finally confirm: for if this was not the first will God had toward the elect, I ask what that first will was. Some respond that it was the will to give congruous grace to these human beings, and those who think more correctly within those opinions say that this will infallibly distinguishes those to be saved from those not to be saved. But against this I ask again what they understand by congruous grace: for they either speak of grace congruous only for the first sanctification, or of grace congruous also for the preservation of grace until the end of life. The former will is insufficient: for God had it toward many of the reprobate, who receive congruous graces not only once but often—by which they are truly justified for some time and sometimes arrive at great holiness, yet ultimately do not persevere. Therefore from the force of such a will, the predestined cannot be distinguished from the reprobate. As for the latter will: first, it is arbitrarily separated from the will to give glory, because to will final grace for someone is to will for him ultimate salvation and eternal life. And then, final grace too is not acquired without the cooperation of free will—so the same difficulty arises with respect to it as arises with respect to glory. If that difficulty ceases in the one case, it will also cease in the other. And therefore there is no reason to deny the intention of glory, since glory is the end of the other means.

47. *Not all graces are given without our disposition.*—Some say that that will was concerning all the prevenient graces which God foresaw would be so congruous to such a person that through them in the course of life that person would infallibly attain glory—which prevenient graces, since they are bestowed by God alone, can be preceded by his will alone. But this, first of all, is merely devised to evade the difficulty, without foundation from authority or reason. Then: since all those are means, which are loved not for themselves but for another, if God had such a will, it shows much more clearly that he had an efficacious will to give glory. And moreover, the difficulty is not avoided: because although prevenient aids begin from God, and insofar as they are a touch of the heart they take place in us without us and without our free

cooperation, nonetheless not all these graces are given to us without some disposition or merit on our part. Only in the first calling is this necessary, because before it there is in us no principle of merit; yet after it a human being can already, with divine assistance, respond to prior grace, and through this obtain something else from God, or dispose himself, or merit (at least of congruity) another inspiration or assistance. And although God often confers more abundant prevenient aids without regard to the human being's disposition —even after the first calling—yet more often he does not provide them except to those praying and asking from prior grace, as I now presuppose from the tract on grace and shall say something about below when treating of the effects. Therefore the will to give all the prevenient aids necessary for an entire lifetime is not committed to execution regarding its more numerous effects except through the cooperation of free will. Therefore the same reason applies to it as applies to the will to give glory.

Answers to the reasons for doubt.

48. *God's decree is not intrinsically necessary for human beings to be able to be saved. This is proved* a posteriori. *Proved* a priori.*—To the reason for doubt set out at the beginning, the first thing to be said is that this purpose or efficacious decree of God to give glory is not per se and intrinsically and (so to speak) physically necessary in order for human beings to be able truly to attain eternal life. For this is at least shown *a posteriori* by the argument given there: otherwise those not so elected could not absolutely be saved, since such election is neither given to them nor within their power, since it depends on God's sole judgment without merit or free disposition of the human being. And therefore that applies most forcefully to it: *It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy.* The *a priori* argument, moreover, is that that decree of God, as such, neither in itself gives the human being all the principles necessary for acting well as required for attaining eternal life, nor through it as such is the concurrence necessary for such acts said or offered. Yet these alone are necessary for a human being to be able to perform such acts and consequently to be saved. The assumption will be more fully evident from what will be said below, ch. 15, and I said much about it in book 1 *On the Aids*, ch. 46, at the end. It is briefly clarified now: for those principles of acting and that concurrence, though supernatural, are given or offered through decrees of the divine will that are terminated, as to their proximate objects, to such effects or gifts and to the production or influx of them. But election to glory is not

immediately terminated to such objects, as is evident per se—and therefore from this side it is not necessary. Nor is it per se presupposed as the adequate and wholly necessary reason: both because a simple or conditional affection can suffice, and also because those objects have in themselves grounds on which they can be loved. Therefore that act is not absolutely necessary on the part of the effects themselves.

49. *God's decree toward the elect is greatly fitting for God and necessary for the ordering of the heavenly kingdom.*—Nonetheless we deny that this act is superfluous or in no way necessary. For on the part of God himself as agent and provider it is greatly fitting—or even necessary for the perfect mode of preparing and ordering all that pertains to the heavenly kingdom—as has been set out. For just as for walking, on the part of the effect itself, an intention of an honorable end is not simply necessary, yet is necessary on the part of an agent acting with purpose, in order to produce that effect in a fitting manner: so too in the effects of divine providence or predestination, it is not simply necessary that they proceed from this or that intention of God, yet it can be fitting or necessary on the part of God himself, for a fitting or perfect mode of acting and intending.

50. *The other arguments are resolved. For a free act of God a physical change in the creature is not necessary; an objective change can suffice.*—Hence the remaining arguments insinuated there are easily resolved. One is that this doctrine is not revealed. To this we respond: it has not indeed been revealed as explicitly as we have set it out, and therefore we do not say it is of faith—yet it is gathered from revealed things, and is greatly insinuated in Sacred Scripture, as has been set out. Another argument was that this act is not inferred from effects. We deny this too, for from the mode of God's providence toward the predestined this act can be gathered with sufficient probability. Another was that in God there is given an executive will through which he is understood to glorify a human being. We say that through this the prior will by mode of intention is not excluded, because these two orders—of intention and of execution—are also to be distinguished by reason in the divine will, as I shall set out below. Finally, another was that this act seems impossible because no change in the creature follows from it. This objection can be made concerning any free intention of God, even if it be conditioned or a simple affection. I say, therefore, that it is not necessary that through every free act of God some physical change come about in its object—especially immediately through such an act. But any objective change can suffice, for this is sufficient for a new relation of reason. And such a change is here present: namely, that by the force of this purpose of God, the effect so defined is infallibly going to come about in the future; and

God himself, by the force of such an act, remains immovably determined to bring it about that such an effect exists. Hence radically (so to speak) such an act brings about a change in the creature and efficaciously orders it to its end. Therefore it is neither impossible nor superfluous, but most consonant with the perfection of divine providence.

CHAPTER IX
THAT GOD HAD AN ABSOLUTE PURPOSE TO SAVE NOT ONLY HUMAN BEINGS BUT ALSO THE HOLY ANGELS, PRIOR TO EVERY OTHER ACT OF THE WILL

1. *How according to these authors God stood toward the grace and glory of the angels.*—Those who deny this purpose with respect to human beings deny it *a fortiori* with respect to angels. Some, however, even if they admit it in all or some human beings, deny it absolutely in the case of angels. This is the view of Ockham, Gabriel, and Catharinus, cited in the preceding chapter for the third opinion. For they say that God from himself, generally and (so to speak) uniformly—though with variation—willed glory to all angels by an antecedent will, merely simple or conditioned, and that he prepared sanctifying grace for them by an efficacious will for a certain instant—namely, the very instant of their creation—not equally for all, but with a certain proportion that pleased him, in accordance with the infinite accounts of his wisdom. And similarly that he offered to all sufficient aids to persevere in received grace and to grow in it through their own merits, with the same proportion. But that he willed to give glory to none of them by a definite will, until he saw the perseverance of some—just as he willed to exclude none of the angels from that kingdom of beatitude until he foreknew the fall and obstinacy of some.

2. *The foundation of this opinion is drawn from Augustine. Can angels have persevered with initial grace alone, without a special gift of perseverance? Men cannot, according to these authors gathering from Augustine. The perseverance of angels consists in a single act.*—This difference between human beings and angels can in some way be founded on Augustine in *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 10, 11, and 12, where, among other things, he constitutes a difference between human beings and angels: the angels, having received the initial grace, could persevere in it and never sin through their free will, without a special gift of perseverance; but human beings in fact are not saved without the special gift of perseverance. The reason for this difference is easy: for in angels perseverance consists in a single perfectly deliberate act of obedience or conversion to God—for having

had that act in the second instant of their creation, they are immediately confirmed in the good and remain immovable, either by the sole condition of their nature or with the addition of God's law congruous to such a nature; namely, that through such an act the way and merit of the good is consummated, and they immediately in the third instant receive the reward of beatitude. Thus it is that they need no special grace to persevere, because for deliberating perfectly once, the initial grace with the common assistance and concurrence due to that grace itself suffices. But the perseverance of a human being is lengthy, requiring much time and several good acts, or the observance of many precepts; and (what is chief) the human being is engaged amid various temptations and the greatest difficulties. Therefore he needs a greater and more special grace to persevere than the angel. Indeed, Augustine adds that the angel needs only *the assistance by which he can persevere, or by which he perseveres if he wills*; but the human being needs *the assistance by which he perseveres*, absolutely and simply—indicating that such assistance for the human being is of a kind that does not depend on that condition *if he wills*, but rather makes it be fulfilled infallibly. From this difference, then, another difference is understood, which the cited opinion intends: namely, that God efficaciously willed the salvation of human beings to be saved—from himself and before the absolute foreknowledge of future things—since by the force of such a will he prepared infallible perseverance for them; whereas toward the holy angels he had no such will, because he prepared for them no such perseverance, but only under the condition *if they willed*—and therefore under the same condition only he willed glory for them, and not absolutely. For the quality of the means shows what kind the will toward the end was, as was sufficiently set out in the preceding chapter.

3. *Human beings to be saved in the state of innocence would, according to this opinion, have to be predestined in the same manner as the angels. In the state of innocence, human beings could have persevered without a special gift of perseverance.*—From this foundation it follows consistently that the same difference would have to be constituted between human beings who would be saved during the state of innocence and those who are saved in fallen nature. For if the human being had not sinned, the distinction or election of human beings to be saved would not come from an efficacious purpose of God that is purely gratuitous and anteceding the absolute foreknowledge of future things—but from free perseverance in received grace, which would be common to all human beings and quasi-natural, that is, communicated along with nature itself through ordinary propagation. For as regards the mode of persevering, Augustine constitutes, in the cited place, the same difference between fallen and

integral human nature as existed de facto between human beings and angels. For although the way of human beings, even in the state of innocence, would have been more lengthy than the angelic way, and therefore perseverance would have had to be consummated over some time and through the observance of more precepts—in which there would have been greater difficulty than in angels—nonetheless in that state there would not have been the peculiar difficulties of perseverance that are found in the fallen human being and that arose from original guilt and the conflict of flesh and spirit. And therefore, if Adam had not sinned, human beings could have persevered through free will in the same manner in which the holy angels persevered—that is, without that special gift by which perseverance itself is now infallibly bestowed. And therefore in that state there would be no more of that pre-election of those to be saved than there was in the case of the angels. And perhaps for this reason many hold—and think it to be the view of Augustine—that God did not have that efficacious purpose to save certain particular human beings prior to his foreseeing the fall of the first human being, about which I shall speak in the following chapter.

4. *The opinion of some.*—There is, moreover, among theological writers one who judges it probable that a limitation should be added to this opinion, so that even in this matter a difference be constituted among the holy angels themselves and the blessed. For some say that God chose some angels for beatitude by that efficacious purpose—purely gratuitous and anteceding all absolute foreknowledge of future things—while ordering all the remaining angels to glory only by a conditioned will. Yet not all of these latter were damned; rather, many were foreknown as going to persevere, and therefore God also willed efficaciously to beatify them. Those who hold this opinion bring forward no argument or conjecture in its support, though some may seem apparent: lest it be thought that the angelic nature was ordained to beatitude with less providence or efficacy than the human; or at least, lest the whole angelic nature be exposed to the danger of ruin, as the whole of human nature was exposed in the first human being—which in the case of angels would have been a much graver inconvenience, since they were not to be redeemed as human beings were, nor was a restoration of the fallen as congruous to their nature as is found in human beings.

5. *The distinction in election among angels is rejected. Angels, though unequal in the perfection of nature and grace, are nonetheless equal in their mode of acting.*—Beginning with this latter opinion, this distinction among the holy angels is not to be admitted. For it has been handed down by no ancient author (so far as I know), nor does it have a foundation in Scripture or the Fathers, nor

do I see a sufficiently probable argument or conjecture on which it rests. For although angels are unequal in the perfection of nature—and therefore were also created unequal in the perfection of grace as to its degree—yet in their mode of acting, meriting, and persevering they have a certain equality or uniformity. Therefore on their part no reason can be given for such a distinction: because it cannot be drawn from mere diversity in the perfection of nature, as is evident per se—otherwise all those so elected would be from the seraphim, for instance; or, if they are to be taken from diverse orders, they would be the supreme ones of each order. But this cannot be said: both because perhaps the most perfect of all angels was not only not thus elected but was actually damned; and also because election to glory is not made according to the perfection of nature. Therefore that diversity would have had to be taken from their mode of acting—but in this no diversity is found. And thus Augustine in the doctrine reported about the mode of perseverance of angels speaks generally and in the same manner about all. Nor on the part of God can a reason for that distinction be assigned, as if God could not have ordered all in the same manner to the kingdom of heaven.

Evasion. It is met. The arguments are dissolved.—You will say: he could have made that distinction by his will alone. I respond: even granted this, if that will has not been revealed to us, is not manifested from effects, and is not shown by any other argument, it is not to be asserted—for what is asserted without grounds is also easily dismissed. There is added the further point that it is far more probable that even among human beings who in fact are saved no such diversity is to be found, as I said; and so the prior conjecture for that opinion as adduced by us is excluded. The other conjecture seems to presuppose that God does not have conditional knowledge—for given such knowledge, that danger ceases: for God already knows with certainty which angels would or would not persevere with such sufficient aids. Moreover, there would be no such danger given their infinite multitude and the facility of persevering in the good that they have. And therefore the case is not analogous to human nature constituted in a single individual. No distinction, therefore, in this part between the holy angels is to be devised, but it is to be believed that God had that purpose either toward all of them or toward none.

6. *All angels were elected by God by an efficacious will prior to foreseen merits. Grace and glory are supernatural for angels in the same way as for human beings.*—I add further that such a difference between angels and human beings is not to be admitted, and that it should be said that all the holy angels who in fact were saved were specially loved by God with that good and efficacious will

by which he willed for them eternal beatitude prior to decreeing to give them other gifts of grace or to foreknow merits in them through absolute knowledge. This is without doubt the view of Saint Thomas. For in part 1, q. 23, art. 4, ad 3, he declares that divine predestination is common to angels and human beings—which the argument of the article also establishes, if it is efficacious. For the end of eternal life is also above the capacity of angelic nature, and to it the angel is specially destined by God, and therefore is predestined, when he is efficaciously sent toward it. Then, immediately in article four, he proves absolutely and universally that the said act of love precedes with respect to all the predestined—which therefore encompasses angels as well, since he does not prove that precedence from any peculiar condition of human beings but from the intrinsic order of intention and election itself. All the more so since the same Saint Thomas, in part 1, q. 20, art. 4, ad 2, says that if human and angelic nature are compared in the order of grace and glory, an equality is found in them, since the measure of man and angel is the same, as is said in Apocalypse 21—certainly as regards the supernatural motion needed for turning to God as a supernatural end, as Saint Thomas proves in part 1, q. 62, art. 2, and much more for attaining that end. Hence also Augustine, in book 12 *On the City of God*, ch. 9, said that the angels who persevered in grace were *helped more* in order to do so.

7. *Augustine's arguments concerning the election of human beings proceed in the same way concerning the election of angels. The angel could neither believe nor act without assistance.*—For this reason, if all the testimonies of Sacred Scripture are carefully considered, and all the motives by which Augustine in various places proves the election of grace of human beings who are effectively saved, they proceed in precisely the same way for angels. For those testimonies: *God is he who works all things in all*, and *It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy*, because he himself is *who works in us both to will and to accomplish for his good will*—these, I say, and similar ones, are equally true of angels and human beings; and yet these are the testimonies from which Augustine customarily gathers predestination through election of grace—that is, of a gratuitous election to glory itself. Also that principle, which he employs most extensively throughout *On the Predestination of the Saints*—that the beginning of faith and of all good works is from God—is also most true of angels. For in them too it is true that none of them could believe except taught by God, nor come to the Son unless drawn by the Father. Hence also those questions in which Augustine so frequently lingers—*Why does he draw this one and not that one? Why is this one persuaded to be convinced, but not that other one?*—can be posed of two angels, one good and one evil; and Augustine dares

to answer these only by running to the hidden mystery of predestination and the voluntary election of God. Therefore he would respond in the same manner for angels—for no sufficient reason for the difference can be given.

8. *Those who posit predetermination in the human will must posit it in the angelic will.*—This I finally clarify as follows. For if anyone holds that for each supernatural act a prevenient assistance is necessary that is of itself efficacious to physically predetermine the will, then he must hold this of angels as well as of human beings—for the reason for that necessity is the same in both. For either this comes from the dependence of a secondary cause on the first—and this dependence is also in angels; or from the indifference of the human will, which cannot do anything determinately unless first determined by a superior principle—and this indifference is also found in the angelic will; or it comes from the supernaturality of the acts—and this supernaturality also exists with respect to the angelic will. Therefore if such an efficacious and predetermining assistance is necessary in human beings, the same is necessary in angels. Therefore, just as giving this assistance to these or those human beings and not to others depends on the sole will of God, so too giving it to these or those angels. And in human beings the voluntary conferral of such assistance—with respect to the means necessary and sufficient for attaining beatitude—manifests the gratuitous election of God to glory, from which it proceeds that he wills to give such aids. But God willed to give a similar assistance to the holy angels and not to others—therefore this also shows that he freely elected them to glory, for which he gives them such assistance, without having so elected the other angels to whom he does not give it.

9. *Congruous calling was necessary for angels.*—We can argue in a similar manner if we hold that such determination from God is not indeed necessary, nor a prevenient assistance efficacious in that mode, yet that a congruous calling is necessary—one that presupposes a conditional knowledge by which God foreknew what each will would will if called in this or that manner. For a similar congruous calling will be necessary for angels in order to act, and a similar conditional foreknowledge of their future consent will precede. Therefore, just as God by his mere will freely chooses among human beings such modes of calling as he foreknew would be congruous and prepares them for some and not for others—so too among angels. For the reason is the same: both as regards that conditional foreknowledge, since God has it concerning every will, especially created ones, as I now presuppose; and as regards the will to distribute callings, since no reason for such distribution on the part of the angels can be given, since every reason must presuppose a congruous and efficacious calling to

whatever that reason might be supposed to be; and finally as regards the connection of congruous calling with the prior intention of giving glory—for the reason adduced above concerning human beings: that the election of means is proportioned to the intention of the end and conversely. Hence when someone out of certain knowledge and (so to speak) formal will chooses a means as efficacious, as such, it is a sign that he efficaciously intended the end. Now God, in preparing for the holy angels such a calling for the second instant of their way as congruous and efficacious, chose and willed it as such—by the same reason by which he willed a similar calling for the elect among human beings. Therefore in this respect the reason is the same for both.

10. *It is shown that the reason for the election of human beings and angels is the same.*—All the arguments adduced in the preceding chapter are added to these: for they proceed equally in the case of angels as in the case of human beings. First: the heavenly kingdom is one, consisting of angels and human beings, and therefore the whole, as coalescing from all its members, was intended from the singular predefinition of God. Therefore God had such an intention from himself both toward angels and toward human beings. Then: in a most prudent governor and most wise architect, the outcome or term of the whole work or undertaking displays his definite will and intention. Therefore both in the matter of angels and of human beings the similar will of God is displayed. Finally: the holy angels too had their necessary mode of perseverance, which they could not have without greater assistance from God—as Augustine testifies, in the said book 12 *On the City of God*. That this assistance was prepared by God was necessary. Therefore such preparation displays an efficacious election in God, no less than in the case of human beings.

11. *Those who had persevered in original justice would all have been elected to glory by God's efficacious will.*—From all this it is concluded *a fortiori* that the same must be said of the state of human beings in original justice: for even if that state had endured, all in it who were to be saved would have been efficaciously pre-elected to glory from divine predefinition. For all the arguments made apply much more forcefully to human beings in that state, and will be further confirmed by what will be said in chapter eleven. Hence if that state were to have continued, God would have elected those human beings to be saved according to the foreknowledge accommodated to that state. Indeed even the perseverance itself of that state would have been from some divine predefinition; which, had God had it, he would have accommodated the calling and grace by which he forestalled Adam so as to be efficacious and congruous according to his conditional foreknowledge—and for Adam himself and for all

the other elected human beings he would have prepared the congruous assistance for persevering in grace unto the term of life, which would then have been prescribed in accordance with the condition of that state. For in that state too perseverance in grace could not have been had without the supernatural assistance of God, as the Council of Orange defines in ch. 19, and as Augustine teaches in *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 10. Therefore perseverance in every state—both of human beings and of angels—depends on the sole divine will as regards the order of intention, even though in execution, in every state of those same human beings and angels, it also depends on their own free will, as we shall say in the following sections.

12. *Response to the argument from Augustine.*—As for the argument set out at the beginning and drawn from the doctrine of Augustine: although it is not easy to declare what Augustine meant in constituting that difference, or wherein it consists, nonetheless we attempted to explain it in some way in book 3 *On the Aids*, ch. 15, n. 16. From what was said there it can be understood that the difficulty of that passage is not peculiar to our own opinion but arises in every opinion concerning efficacious grace, or the conditional knowledge of God, or the mode of explaining the gift of perseverance. For if the efficacy of grace is placed in physical predetermination, it will be just as necessary for angels as for human beings—as I proved both in the cited place and shortly before. And the same has been shown with due proportion regarding congruous calling. For this congruity, even with respect to human beings in fallen nature, does not essentially demand any greater assistance for each single act than what is per se necessary as a principle and actual influx or concurrence for eliciting such an act. For although the corruption of fallen nature increases the difficulty of performing supernatural acts, this difficulty does not always intervene in each single act, nor is it regularly so great as to remove the power of overcoming it simply speaking with the same aids by which such acts can be performed in the state of integral nature. Congruity consists, therefore—speaking per se—in God's conferring prevenient assistance at that time and occasion when he foresees it will have its effect, with the free will cooperating simultaneously. But this congruity was necessary in angels as well as in human beings in the state of integral nature, both for acting well and for persevering in grace. Therefore in this part too there is the same reason of gratuitous election to such congruous calling—as such—and consequently also to glory, in all these cases.

13. *The reason of some why pre-election is posited in human beings but not in angels. It is attacked.*—Only some difference could be constituted according to that opinion that admits neither physical predetermination nor conditional

knowledge, and consequently neither congruous calling foreknown and intended as such in the manner explained by us. For those who hold this opinion have no reason to posit in angels—or in human beings in the state of innocence—any pre-election or any difference between those to be saved and the damned on the part of an antecedent will and efficacious preordination of God prior to absolute foreknowledge, but only from such foreknowledge. But in fallen human beings they can admit such pre-election on account of the special difficulty and danger arising from the corruption of nature. However, the foundation of that opinion does not seem probable to me—especially in the teaching of Augustine, within which we are now moving and which we intend to expound. Moreover, on the part of fallen human beings that difference cannot universally hold. For why would not even in this state many be saved with only the ordinary aids of grace, since many (especially infants) are saved through a single act of baptism, and sometimes adults through a single act of contrition or confession made at the end of life—which can be had through the common assistance of grace? Such assistance could therefore be efficacious and congruous in actuality for many fallen human beings, even if God is supposed not to foreknow that congruity through conditional knowledge until he sees such efficacy through the knowledge of vision. Consequently it would be said that God did not intend antecedently that assistance as efficacious, but only accepted it consequentially after he saw it would be such. Therefore many fallen human beings could in that manner be saved even if they were not pre-elected. Therefore from this part that difference cannot be sustained according to that opinion. And furthermore, that mode of pre-election without a certain and definite foreknowledge of infallible means has the imperfections I noted above in chapter seven—because according to that opinion God must be aiming at an uncertain mark and, as it were, applying means by trial until something succeeds; which is unworthy of God, as I said. Therefore no reason for a difference in this part can be assigned in any way—whether between angels and human beings, or between human beings in different states of fallen or integral nature.

14. *Augustine's mind is opened, and the difference regarding perseverance between human beings and angels is assigned.*—You will say: what then about Augustine, or what is the difference he intended? I respond: as regards the matter of predestination or election I see none; nor as regards the mode of giving to both efficacious prevenient grace—whether for perfect conversion to God or for perseverance accommodated to each person and state—and this alone is necessary so that no difference in pre-election to glory be constituted

between them. But in the gift of perseverance itself, a difference seems to be constituted by Augustine that can be understood in two ways. One is that in fact no assistance was given to any human being for actually persevering in the state of innocence, but only for being able to persevere—whereas in the state of fallen nature such assistance is given to many human beings. But this distinction cannot be applied to angels, for to many of the angels too there was given assistance for actually persevering—though not to all. The other difference, therefore, is that the very assistance for actually persevering is given through greater aids to fallen human beings than was given to angels or would have been given to human beings in the state of innocence. Whether this difference is universally true we shall say below when treating of the gift of perseverance—for now it is not necessary for the present question.

CHAPTER X
THAT THE GRATUITOUS DECREE THAT GOD HAD CONCERNING THE ETERNAL HAPPINESS OF THE MANY ANGELS AND HUMAN BEINGS WAS DEFINITE AS TO PERSONS AND AS TO THE DEGREES OF GRACE AND GLORY

1. *First opinion.*—The opinion of some was that although God by his antecedent will—by which he from himself willed human beings and angels to be saved—absolutely defined that some would infallibly be saved, and perhaps also prescribed a certain and definite number of those to be saved such that it could not be less, nonetheless in that logical moment he did not designate particular persons individually; and therefore that will, by its own force, was not determined to these persons until through knowledge their free cooperation with antecedent grace was foreseen. So Saint Thomas reports this view at d. q. 23, art. 7.

2. *The preceding opinion is rejected.*—This opinion can in no way be proved, and therefore has been rightly abandoned and rejected by all. First, because God in his providence—and especially in its primary effects—does not predefine what is to be done confusedly and in general but altogether distinctly and perfectly. Then, because otherwise it would be true of no particular human being or angel that Paul says: *It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy.* Nor could it be said to anyone: *Who gives you precedence?* Because God by the force of his will would absolutely have distinguished no one —not even in the order of election and predestination—and so this mercy would not depend on his will alone, but the use of free will would always have to

be conjoined and presupposed as foreseen. Finally, if what was adduced in chapters 8 and 9 is carefully weighed, everything proceeds about the election of individual persons, of whom proper election and love is characteristic. If what was said about conditional foreknowledge is also considered, it will be clear that it is concerned with persons and their works in particular—and therefore the decree of the will, which presupposes it, was defined in the same manner. And from this principle the foundation of that opinion is easily resolved, as was also touched on in what preceded, and more fully in book 3 *On the Aids*, and will also be understood from the following point.

3. *Second opinion. Given conditional foreknowledge, freedom is preserved together with predestination.*—Others therefore said that that decree was indeed defined toward certain individual persons whom God resolved to save and to lead to beatitude—but that through it, as such, God did not define for each of those persons a certain term or degree of grace or glory to which each individual was to attain. This was rather subsequently ratified after foreknowledge through a will of some sort of complacency. This too seems to have been devised out of fear of destroying freedom if everything were predefined in particular. But those who so held feared where there was no cause for fear, and they seem not to have recognized the most certain and infallible conditional foreknowledge of all free effects in particular—given which, there is no difficulty in reconciling freedom concerning all means with the end predefined in particular, as to a certain degree and intensive perfection, and indeed as to all circumstances.

4. *Conclusion.*—It must therefore be said that God by that gratuitous and absolute decree willed glory to his elect not indefinitely, but also prepared it for each individual in a certain and definite degree—preordaining by the same act and manner that variety of mansions that Christ said exists in the kingdom of his Father. Augustine signified this in expounding those words of Christ, tract. 68 on John, where he asks how Christ the Lord could have said: *In my Father's house there are many mansions*—and then added: *I go to prepare a place for you.* And he responds that the mansions already exist in predestination and election, but are prepared in governance. So too Bernard, sermon 23 on the *Canticle*: *Not to all*, he says, *is it given to enjoy the grace and the hidden presence of the Bridegroom in the same place, but as it has been prepared for each by the Father. For it was not we who chose him, but he who chose us and appointed us; and wherever each one will be, there he shall be.* Saint Bonaventure asserted the same in vol. 2 of his minor works, treatise *On the Seven Journeys of Eternity*, dist. 1, sect. 2.

5. *The conclusion is proved. This mode of election does not conflict with freedom.*—The argument for this thesis is the same as for the preceding ones: for this mode of election and intention does not conflict with freedom, nor with grace or justice, and is consonant with divine perfection and providence. Therefore. The major, as to the first part concerning freedom, is clear by the same reason: for through this intention God does not change the human will by impeding its mode of acting, but rather accommodates means that move it sweetly and infallibly. Also: either God physically determines the will, preserving freedom, and thus through that means he will be able to execute that definite intention with freedom preserved as well; or he moves efficaciously through congruous grace, given conditional foreknowledge, and thus also through the same congruous calling will he infallibly attain the same degree of glory, however particularly defined. Or if neither physical predetermination nor conditional foreknowledge is acceptable, then pre-election to glory will have to be denied—not only to a definite degree, but in any manner whatsoever. Or if it is said that confused foreknowledge of means suffices—because if this means does not succeed, another will be applied—the same can be said in each mode of election, though in truth neither is satisfactory. Therefore in no manner of speaking is there a probable reason to fear that freedom is injured by election to a definite degree of glory any more than by election to glory indefinitely.

6. *Nor does it conflict with divine grace or justice.*—As for the other part concerning grace: with respect to the elect the matter is manifest, for the greatest benefit is conferred upon them; and with respect to those not elected, it will be clear below that sufficient grace is not thereby denied to them. Therefore from neither side does this election conflict with divine grace. Nor with justice either: for God is free and supreme Lord, and in conferring a benefit upon this one, he does not deny another what is owed to him. Therefore there is no injustice. Moreover, that this pertains to the perfection of divine providence is clear: first, because God in his acts does not proceed confusedly but distinctly and in particular, for the latter always seems to proceed from imperfect knowledge. Second, because God does not intend this good of the elect merely as the private good of this or that person, but as the common good of the heavenly kingdom, and therefore intends per se its various degrees and seats. Therefore all of that falls under the adequate intention of God. Third, the very variety of effects and means shows us that such was the intention of God. Fourth, because—as I said—the reason is the same for some as for all the elect. Who would deny that the most Blessed Virgin was pre-elected to the fullness of glory that she has? And

the same applies in its own manner to the apostles and other eminent saints. The same, therefore, must be said of all.

7. *This predefinition extends also to the degree of accidental glory that does not presuppose sin.*—I note only that this is to be understood chiefly of the degrees of beatitude as to its essence. It can also be extended to accidental rewards that do not necessarily presuppose sin. But if in glory there is some accidental gift that necessarily presupposes sin, that could not fall under this first intention—because the permission and prevision of such sin must necessarily be presupposed, as I shall set out more fully below.

8. *Objection. Solution.*—Someone might object that it follows that a human being sometimes arrives in this life at that state of grace in which he can no longer grow—namely, if he reaches the defined degree. Indeed it also follows that it is on God's part that a human being does not become holier than he in fact is, since however much a person strives, he will never be able to exceed the degree destined for him. But these difficulties are easy for one who considers that that will of God is fulfilled only through his wise providence—by which he so orders each person's actions and the progress of his life that life ends when its measure is fulfilled. And therefore, to the first inference, the consequence is to be denied absolutely: for as long as a human being lives in this life, he can grow in grace, and predestination does not impede this but rather assists it; and that life ends simultaneously with the term of predestination does not conflict with that principle. And in the same manner the other part is to be answered: that in execution, aids are always at hand by which a person can act and grow as much as he wills—indeed it is rare for anyone to respond adequately to the callings of God—and nonetheless these callings and aids are not given equally to all, but according to the measure of the divine will and the arrangement of each individual in more of them, though not in all, as we shall set out more fully below.

CHAPTER XI
WHETHER THIS DECREE OF GIVING GLORY TO THE PREDESTINED WAS THEIR ELECTION, OR LOVE, AND HOW THESE DIFFER

1. *It is certain that this decree is love.*—This dispute pertains almost entirely to explaining the various locutions and opinions of the authors; yet in a matter of such gravity, even this must not be passed over, lest ambiguity of terms either breed confusion or create the risk of erring. The Scholastic Doctors therefore hold it as certain that that decree is God's love, and a very great love, as is

evident from St. Thomas, loc. cit., art. 4, q. 23, and all who write there, and in bk. 1, dist. 40 and 41. Nor can anyone doubt this, because to love someone is to will good to them; but through this decree God wills the greatest good to the predestined, namely eternal glory; therefore he loves him—and so that act is a true love.

2. *Reasons for doubt.*—Rather, theologians doubt whether this love of the predestined is greater than that by which God loves the reprobate during the time when he is just, as may be seen in St. Thomas, pt. 1, q. 20, art. 4, ad 5, and Alexander of Hales, pt. 1, q. 32, Memb. 2. And in sum they respond that, simply and absolutely, the predestined is loved more, by reason of this will, or gratuitous decree of giving glory, because God simply wills him a greater good, namely eternal life; yet in a qualified sense, or for that time when the foreknown is just and the predestined is in sin, the reprobate is loved more, because he is then accepted for glory—to which, according to the present justice of that time, the predestined sinner is not accepted.

3. But against this: for through this act of love the predestined is loved even for the time in which he is not just; therefore already for that time he is loved more, simply and absolutely. The consequence is evident, because that love is in itself simply greater; therefore for every time for which it denominates a man as loved, it also denominates him as loved more. It is responded, following the mind of St. Thomas above, that God's love is the cause of the goodness of the thing loved, and therefore that God loves more, for whatever time, that person to whom he confers a greater good for that same time. But at the time when the predestined is not just and the reprobate is just, God confers a greater good on the reprobate than on the predestined, because he confers present grace on the former, which he does not confer on the predestined; and therefore for that time he simply loves more the foreknown one, whom he then makes better.

4. But I still press the point. For either it follows from this that God does not love the predestined for that time, or the difficulty is not resolved. This is evident, because if he loves him for that time, then he also loves him more for that time. The consequence is proved, because he loves him more through a greater love for the same time. Likewise, because in that very time he loves him toward a greater good. But if this is not sufficient for him to love him more, because he does not confer that greater good on him for that time—then it will not be sufficient for him to love him absolutely (with supernatural love, of which we are speaking), because by force of that will, he confers no supernatural good on him, as I presuppose. But if this is finally conceded, it follows that that decree is not a true love of God—contrary to the hypothesis that was made. The

consequence is evident, because through that decree, formally considered, either God never loves a man, or he always and continually loves him, since on God's part that act always remains unchanged; and the change that occurs in a man at different times does not proceed from that act formally considered. The sign of this is that that man at every time and in every state, both of sin and of grace, always remains predestined, or pre-ordained by force of that act to eternal life. Therefore, if this is sufficient for love, it always denominates him as loved; or if it is not sufficient, it never denominates him. And from what has been said it appears to follow further that it is not sufficient, because God loves only the good, and since his will does not presuppose goodness, he loves only by making good. But through that act, as such, God does not make man good; therefore through that act he does not love man. The minor is proved, because with that act standing, and the formal denomination of it standing, the man may not be good; therefore through that act God does not make man good.

5. *Conclusion.—The distinction of two kinds of love toward men.—* Nonetheless, it must be said that that act is a true love of God toward man, as is the common opinion, which has now been sufficiently proved. We can moreover distinguish a twofold love of God. One by which he merely ordains man toward some good; another by which he confers that good on him. Just as among men, the intention of giving some good to someone is a kind of love, even if it does not immediately move the faculty toward conferring that good. And in God himself, the conferral of some gift is not the only sign of present love—there is also the promise of a good to be conferred. Just as when God promised Abraham that Christ would in the future be born from him, by that very fact he showed a present special love toward him, even though he had not yet bestowed that good on him. Therefore in God there is a true love that pre-ordains man toward some good, which is rationally distinct from that love which consists in the actual conferral of such a good; and the former can be called love of purpose and intention, and the latter love of execution. Hence when it is said that God does not love one whom he does not make good, understood universally, this is simply false: for one whom he has decreed to make good for some time and thereafter for all eternity, he loves even during that time in which he does not make him good, because even then he ordains him toward such a good. He loves him at that time, therefore, with an ordaining love, not with a love that confers that good at that time. That purpose, therefore—that decree of saving someone —is a true love of God.

6. *The difficulty concerning the act of election, from St. Thomas.—* Concerning the act of election, however, there is some difficulty, on account of

St. Thomas, who in art. 3, q. 23, distinguishes between love and election, and says that love precedes election in God, although in man it sometimes happens that one chooses before one loves—as when someone chooses another in order to enter into friendship with him. His reason is that for one to be chosen over another, it is presupposed that he is good, indeed better than the other, since election presupposes some inequality and excess in the thing that is chosen. If this one is chosen and not another, then, it is presupposed that this one is good and the other is not. But with respect to the divine will, goodness is not presupposed to love; rather it proceeds from it. Therefore love must necessarily precede election. Cajetan, explaining this teaching, adds that even in the human will, election presupposes some love—at least of those properties or virtues on account of which something is chosen. As in the example given: when someone chooses another as a friend, it is always on account of some condition pleasing to him that he recognizes in that other person.

7. *God loves and elects the predestined by one single act.—The twofold sense of election.*—Nevertheless, I think there is one single act of the will by which God loves and elects the predestined toward the same end of glory, and that by those terms only diverse relations are connoted. To make this clear, I note that election is said in two ways: namely, of one over another—which seems to be the primary imposition of the term—and of one for the sake of another, in which sense moral philosophers call the will of a means for an end "election," even if it should happen that that means is unique. Now in both senses this love of the predestined can be called election. The first is proved, because from the infinite number of men whom God could have loved to beatitude, he loved these and not others; therefore in loving these he preferred them to others; therefore by that very act of love he intrinsically elected them. He is said to love insofar as he wills them good; and to elect insofar as he prefers them to others—which he does not do through a different act, but through the same one. This is confirmed by the example of human election. For after several means suitable to the proposed end have been set forth through deliberation, by the very fact that the will accepts one and not the others, it loves and elects that means. Nor is it necessary for election that the means not chosen should be positively and as it were directly followed by the will; it is enough that in the act exercised the will accepts this and not another. So it is in the present case. Hence, according to the common usage of Scripture, this love of the predestined is called election: *He chose us in him*, Eph. 1.

8. The second sense is also easily evident from what has been said above, because although God wills glory for the predestined as their end, he

nonetheless willed this very thing as a means for manifesting his attributes and communicating his goodness. Hence his goodness was the primary reason for loving the elect; therefore such love is intrinsically for God himself; therefore it is election in the other sense as well.

9. *Response to St. Thomas.*—Therefore I respond to St. Thomas that he never says these are several acts, even though he speaks of them as if they were several, in order to explain their various relations. Among these, the first is toward the object insofar as God's will wills good there; and from it another then results, which is a relation of preference over others—for it is under that aspect that St. Thomas speaks of election. Nor do I consider it necessary that election presuppose inequality, especially in the order of deliberation and intention; for from among equal means the will can accept one and omit all others. This is especially so in the divine will, as St. Thomas himself concedes in art. 5. Finally, I think that even in us there is no election which is not intrinsically also some love. The reason is clear, because through election the will is borne toward the thing it chooses as something good, and is united to it; therefore it loves it by the same mode. As in the example given: when someone chooses another in order to have him as an intimate friend, through that very election he begins to love him, even though he orders that love toward another greater and more intimate friendship. And likewise conversely: love, if it is of one out of many, is always election—it can only lack this denomination when just one object worthy of love in itself has been proposed.

CHAPTER XII
THAT THE ELECTION OF ALL WHO ARE TO BE SAVED WAS MADE IN THE SAME LOGICAL MOMENT

1. *First reason for doubt.*—In this chapter, the discussion is not about Christ the Lord, but about the other predestined, both angels and men. Hence the first reason for doubt is that the holy angels seem to have been elected to glory before men. This is proved, because the good angels were elected before the evil ones were foreseen to sin; but men were not elected until the sin of the evil angels had been foreseen. The major is certain, because before the foreknowledge of the sin of the angels there preceded permission of it, and before the permission there was the will to create and ordain them (namely the evil angels) toward glory by an antecedent will; but the election of the good ones was made simultaneously with the ordination of the evil ones toward glory, and therefore it undoubtedly preceded the permission and foreknowledge of angelic

sin. The minor is proved, because men were elected to fill the seats of the angels, as some gather from that text of Paul at Eph. 1: *To restore all things in Christ, which are in heaven and on earth*; and that verse of Psalm 109 is also customarily applied: *He will fill the nations, he will fill the ruins.* Hence St. Bernard, Serm. 1, *On Advent*, drew from this the reason why men were redeemed and not angels —because the ruins of the angels were restored through men, whereas the fall of human nature could not be repaired in any inferior nature. Anselm holds the same reason, bk. 1, *Why God Became Man*, chaps. 16 and 17, and finally Augustine, in the *Enchiridion*, chap. 29, says: *The sons of the Church succeed to the seats of the angels, that they may enjoy the peace which the angels lost.* Therefore the election of men presupposes the foreknowledge of the angelic fall.

2. *Second reason.*—The second reason for doubt is that even the men themselves do not seem to have been elected simultaneously and in the same logical moment. For Adam was elected before the foreknowledge of original sin. I presuppose in the major that Adam was elected, because he was saved (Wis. 10), and I have already said that all who are saved are also elected. Even before sin, Adam had several effects of his election, for the grace and justice which he received at his creation was an effect of his election, as I presuppose now and as can easily be gathered from what was said in the preceding chapter. Therefore he was elected before the foreknowledge of his own sin. The minor, however, seems to be the clear opinion of Augustine, bk. 2, *Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians*, chap. 7; *On Predestination and Grace*, chap. 3; bk. 1, *To Simplicianus*, q. 2; *Enchiridion*, chap. 49; and elsewhere often. St. Thomas also is in favor, pt. 1, q. 23, art. 1, ad 3, insofar as he says that the point of departure of human predestination was the misery of sin. This can also be shown by reason, because if man had not sinned, perhaps there would not be as many men as there are now, or perhaps not even the same ones; or if they existed, not as many would be damned as now, since human nature would be integral. Furthermore, the glory of the blessed in heaven was increased by the occasion of sin, according to that verse: *I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly.* Therefore the election as we describe it could not have been before the foreknowledge of original sin, because it was made toward a definite degree of glory, and that degree could not have been defined before original sin was foreseen, since a degree once defined would remain immutable and could not be increased afterward. This can also be shown from the mode of providence and the communication of grace that God maintained in the state of innocence, because it was as if indifferent and equally common to all men; therefore it proceeded from an equal will to give glory to all—no differentiation through absolute

election of some had yet been made. Finally, Christ himself was not predestined except with original sin foreseen, as is the opinion of many; but he was predestined before the election of other men, because in him they were elected, as Paul testifies in Eph. 1; therefore neither were the others elected before the foreknowledge of original sin.

3. *Third reason.*—A third difficulty can be raised, because not even after original sin do all the predestined seem to have been elected simultaneously. First, because no one is elected unless he is foreseen as going to exist; but not all men are foreseen as going to exist simultaneously, for they are foreseen in the order in which they are going to exist. Second, because the generations of many are not from divine predefinition but from permission alone, since they come about through sin; and yet many men so begotten are elected—therefore they are not elected until they are already foreseen as going to exist; hence not all are elected simultaneously. Third, because many are often taken up to glory on the occasion of the fall of others, as is not obscurely indicated in Rev. 3: *Hold fast what you have, lest another take your crown.* Therefore, before one is elected to receive another's crown, the fall of the other is foreseen. And this providence of God is indicated in Job, chap. 34, where it is said: *He will crush many and numberless, and will make others stand in their place.* So Matthias was substituted in place of Judas, Acts 1, and the Gentiles were called in the place of the Jews, Acts 13 and Rom. 11. Therefore the election of all who are to be saved could not have been made in the same logical moment.

4. *First conclusion.—The election of all was simultaneous.—First reason.*—Nonetheless it must be said that the election of all the predestined after Christ (about whom I am not now disputing) was simultaneous and in the same logical moment. I consider this to be the more common opinion of theologians, whom I will cite below. It is proved first, because in the acts of the divine will on God's part there is no order, for he wills all things simultaneously and in one most simple act; therefore an order of this kind can only be considered on the part of the objects. But among the elect there is no order by reason of which some would be said to be elected before others. The minor is proved, because this order can only be one of causality, and in the present case it must be one of end and of what is ordained to the end, since we are dealing with the order of intention; but one elect is not the end of the glory of another, nor vice versa—rather, all are immediately ordained toward the glory of God and of Christ. Therefore.

Second reason.—Second, from the reason often adduced, that God intends the kingdom of the elect after the manner of one body, or heavenly city;

therefore he also intends simultaneously all the members of which such a body consists, for from their multitude and variety the beauty of the whole body results.

Third reason.—Third and finally, because neither were the angels elected before men, nor some men before others; therefore all were elected simultaneously. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is established from what is to be said and from the solutions of the arguments.

5. *Second conclusion.—The election of men was before the foreseen sin of the angels.*—Second, I assert that men were elected to glory before the foreseen sin of the angels, and therefore were not elected on the occasion of that sin, but for their own sake, equally with the angels themselves. This is the view of St. Augustine, bk. 12, *City of God*, chap. 9, insofar as he judges the necessity of grace to pertain equally to angels and to men, and to be granted equally liberally, or gratuitously, by God. More clearly, bk. 11, chap. 9; bk. 12, chap. 1; and bk. 15, chap. 1—in which places he distinguishes two cities, or societies, one of the predestined and another of the reprobate, and indicates that the former is composed of angels and men without any order between them. Similarly, bk. 22, chap. 29, he says that City of God consists equally of angels and men. This can also be gathered from Anselm in the *Elucidarium*, insofar as he says that as many men are to be saved as there are blessed angels. For from this it is best inferred that men are not taken up only to the seats of the evil angels, since the angels who fell were far fewer than those who persevered. Indeed, Augustine, in the *Enchiridion*, chap. 29, considers it probable that the number of blessed men will be greater than the number of angels.

6. This is shown by reason, first, because human nature is in itself equally capable (with obediential capacity) of that supernatural beatitude as is angelic nature, and by its nature alone looks to God as its ultimate end, and rests in him alone; therefore it is ordered toward that end just as intrinsically as angelic nature; therefore men are equally primarily elected toward that end as angels. There is the further consideration that, even though angelic nature excels in perfection, yet for that very reason human nature is more apt for showing in it the power of divine grace, which is one of the chief ends of divine predestination. Therefore there is in a certain way a greater reason for men to be elected for their own sake than angels. And this reason is further strengthened from the side of Christ the Lord—whom I presuppose to have been the first elected and predestined by God as the head of all, for whose glory all others are elected. Since God ordained human nature rather than angelic nature for that mystery, it seems beyond doubt that he also elected men, as companions and

brothers of Christ, primarily for their own sake and independently of the sin of the angels: *That he might be the firstborn among many brothers.* For which reason also divine Wisdom says of him, that is, of itself: *My delight is to be with the children of men.* Therefore there is no logical order between the election of men and the sin of the angels; therefore this election does not presuppose foreknowledge of that sin; and consequently there will be no order between the election of men and of angels on this account either.

7. *Objection.—Solution.*—You will say: therefore neither will the election of men be before that foreknowledge, nor is there any order of causality between the sin of the angels and the glory of men. I respond by denying the consequence, because even if there does not immediately appear to be such an order here, yet mediately and by reason of something else it intervenes, insofar as the election of the good angels necessarily preceded that foreknowledge, and the election of men and of angels was made simultaneously. It is furthermore probable that even the permission of the angelic sin was ordered by God toward the salvation of the elected men, as I will explain below.

8. *Third conclusion. The election of men was before the foreseen sin of Adam.*—I say third that all men to be saved were elected before the foreseen sin of Adam as absolutely future—indeed, even before the will to permit it. This conclusion is taken from St. Thomas, q. 23, art. 1, ad 3, and from art. 4, if read attentively. Scotus held the same in bk. 3, d. 7, q. 3, and also indicated it, though under doubt, in bk. 1, d. 41, where Hervaeus holds the same; and in d. 40, Aegidius, Gregory, Capreolus, and Marsilius, q. 41, hold the same view. Eck, in his book *On Predestination*, century 1, no. 36, where he establishes as a rule: *No predestined person is elected on the occasion of another's sin.* This is indeed in itself most probable to me, as I said at greater length in a similar case regarding the predestination of Christ, in pt. 3, disp. 5. And from this the reason for the assertion is taken, because the election of men depends in nothing upon the permission or foreknowledge of sin, since it is understood to be made in no way, and by no reason or occasion of sin; therefore there is no reason why it should presuppose it. I also take an argument from what has been said: for the angels were not elected to glory on the occasion of anyone's sin, but for their own sake; therefore men likewise, since they are equally primarily and principally elected. Finally, in permitting the sin of Adam, God arranged for the salvation of the elect to be obtained in the best and wisest manner, and as it were prepared the way to that glory of men which he intended; therefore that intention is excellently understood as prior to this permission.

9. *Resolution.—First reason for doubt.—Response to the holy Fathers.*—To the first reason for doubt, therefore, I deny that men were elected after the foreknowledge of the sin of the angels. I also deny that the primary reason for electing men was taken from the occasion of that sin, but rather from divine goodness given the capacity of man and perhaps also from the side of the merits of Christ. To those locutions of the holy Fathers I respond that they speak rather of the effect and execution than of the primary election. For they consider beatitude as to be completed from all the angels that were created; and because some of them fell, they say that kingdom is to be completed from men. Not because God created men with only that intention, or elected them on that occasion, but because from the beginning he willed to constitute that kingdom in such a way. And in this sense Augustine explained, in *Enchiridion*, chap. 62, that word of Paul at Eph. 1, *To restore all things in Christ:* "Because," he says, "what fell among the angels is restored in men." Although Jerome and the Greeks, following the property of the Greek word, read and explain it differently: *to recapitulate all things in Christ*, that is, to bring all things to a sum, or to join all things in him as in the true and supreme head.

10. *Explanation.*—The words of Psalm 109 have a very different meaning: for *to fill the ruins* does not mean to repair or restore them, but rather to bring them to completion or increase them. For by that metaphorical expression are signified the spiritual victories that Christ won over the gentiles. And if those words are referred to the ruins of the demons, they rather signify that these were brought to completion through Christ, who conquered the demon and drove him out of the hearts of men. Finally, even granting that allegorical sense, only this is proved from it: that in the execution Christ repaired the seats of the angels by redeeming the elect men; but from that it does not follow that men were elected to glory because the evil angels lost it.

11. *Answer.—Second reason.—The sense of the words of St. Thomas and Augustine.—Response to the confirmation.—Christ is predestined before the foreknowledge of sin.*—To the second, I grant that Adam was elected to glory before the foreknowledge of original sin, and from this I take the argument that the same must be said of the other predestined, since there is no reason for any order among them. St. Thomas, however, when he indicates that the point of departure of the predestination of men was the state of sin, is speaking of predestination with respect to the means by which men are saved, not with respect to the primary intention or election of glory. And Augustine can be understood in the same way. Or, if this is referred to the election of glory, it can be understood as a kind of anticipation, because those who were in the mass of

perdition and were to be freed from it through the efficacious means of predestination were elected. To those conditionals—*if Adam had not sinned, would the same men exist, and would the same be saved, and at the same degree of grace and glory*—I respond, first, that God could even during that state have governed human affairs in such a way that finally the same men would be saved at the same degree of grace and glory as those who are now predestined; for God has in the treasures of his wisdom and power infinite ways and modes by which he could do this. Then it is said that those conditionals have no bearing on the present matter. For original sin was permitted precisely so that the divine purpose and election might be fulfilled in that manner most wisely. To the confirmation concerning the predestination of Christ, the response is given by denying the assumption, for Christ was also loved before every foreseen sin. Indeed, from this we retort the argument, because together with him and on account of him, many men ought to have been elected for their own sake and without the occasion of sin.

12. *Solution.—Third reason.—The succession of time in the future existence of men does not constitute an order of election.*—To the third it is responded by denying that there was any order among the other men. Nor does the order that exists in the succession of times bear on this; otherwise all predestined persons belonging to the written law would necessarily have been elected before those belonging to the law of grace, which is absurd. God therefore simultaneously and in the same logical moment predefines many things which he arranges to be fulfilled successively. Nor is it true that men were foreseen as going to exist before they were elected; rather, as I said above, through that very election they were pre-ordained to exist by the same divine predefinition. Nor does it stand in the way that many are begotten through sin, for God knows how to bring his predefinitions to fulfillment by means of permissions—something most easily understood once conditional knowledge is presupposed, and something that will be touched upon often in what follows.

13. *The pressing objection is rejected.*—And from this it is inferred, responding at the same time to the last objection, that no man was elected to glory or grace, in that primary order of divine intention, on the occasion of the sin or perdition of another; but that God from himself and for his own sake primarily elected those whom he willed. For God by an absolute will predefined the number of those to be saved, not only confusedly and formally (as they say) with respect to the species of the number, but also distinctly and as it were materially with respect to the particular persons who attain salvation. For this (as I said above) is what the Scriptures indicate, and this is what the perfection

of divine grace and providence demands. This could hardly stand or be understood if, in electing one person, God were to await foreknowledge of the good or bad use of grace and free will by another. Nor is there any reason to imagine an order or awaiting of this kind.

14. *The Scriptural passages cited to the contrary are explained.*—The Scriptural passages, however, admit of various explanations. That passage of Rev. 3—*Hold fast what you have, lest another take your crown*—some consider to be merely a manner of speaking and exhortation, just as a mother is accustomed to urge her young child to flee dangers by saying: hold your ground, lest I give it to your brother. So St. Thomas or whoever is the author of those commentaries reports, and he is not displeased with it. But the same St. Thomas, pt. 1, q. 23, art. 6, ad 1, observes greater propriety in those words. Two things are therefore contained in those words: one is the threat of loss of the crown. This would be simple if it only said: *Hold fast, lest you perhaps lose your crown.* For this can be said both to the foreknown—since even while he is just, he can be said to have his own crown not by possession but by right and by merit, which he loses by sinning—and to the predestined, because he is of himself capable of losing the crown, and so that this capability is not reduced to act, he is forestalled by such admonitions of God. As Peter also said to the elect: *Be diligent to make your calling and election sure through good works.* St. Thomas teaches this in the passages cited. The other thing signified in those words is that one is usually substituted in the place of another to receive the crown that another has lost. This we see in the dignities of this life: David received the crown of the kingdom which Saul lost through disobedience; and Matthias was substituted in the apostolate that Judas forfeited. And it is of these dignities that Job is chiefly speaking in the cited passage.

15. *The response of some is refuted.*—However, St. Gregory, bk. 25, *Moralia*, chaps. 7 and 8 (elsewhere 9 and 10), also understands that passage as referring to grace and glory, confirming this by another testimony from Rev. 3. Jerome holds the same view on that same passage of Job, as do Bede, Haimo, and the *Gloss* on Rev. 3. Augustine considered this so true that in his book *On Rebuke and Grace*, chap. 13, he said: *Another would not have received it, unless this one had lost it.* And from this he gathers that there is a certain number of predestined, such that it cannot be increased; for one would not receive the crown unless another lost it, lest the defined number of the elect be exceeded. This would certainly be satisfactory if the number of the predestined were only formally predefined through election. But since it is also materially defined, it is difficult to understand how one is substituted in the place of another, and how it

is true that one would not have received the crown unless another had lost it. For if someone is elected before the foreknowledge of works, he would certainly have it even if others did not fall, since his election had no regard to the fall of others, neither formally, nor virtually, nor in any other way. Nor is it satisfying in this regard to say that predestination does not impose necessity, since the predestined can absolutely lose the crown. For even granting this to be true, it still suffices to say that when the predestined perseveres through grace, he is said to be substituted in the place of another to receive the crown that the other lost. Nor is it even sufficient to truly say that God permits the reprobate to fall so that another may receive a crown that otherwise he would not receive, lest the number of the predestined exceed the defined number.

16. *A better response to the holy Fathers and the Scriptural passages.*—I say therefore that those testimonies, and all those manners of speaking, are to be understood of divine providence with respect to the admirable and most wise mode it observes in the execution of the means—not with respect to the primary election of the predestined. For this election is to be understood after the manner of a singular predefinition which God held from himself alone and from his mere good pleasure, absolutely intending such an eternal kingdom consisting of such persons and members. By force of this election, the number of those to be saved remains so certain—both formally and materially—that it cannot be diminished. Yet it does not pertain to the efficacy of that will that it cannot be increased, because God did not positively will to exclude all others from the kingdom, as I will say below. And therefore, simultaneously with that election, God had a true will to save others—not however an absolute will, but conditional, if nothing on their part stood in the way. And therefore in the execution he gives them sufficient means to be saved, which sometimes have such an effect that through them they acquire a true right to the eternal crown, even if they are foreknown as not going to preserve it to the end of their lives. And therefore when they lose it, they are said to lose their own crown, that is, the crown owed to their merits had they died in grace. And when one of these falls, another is said to be substituted in his place, because God is accustomed to govern and execute the salvation of his elect in such a way that he first calls the reprobate, and when they make bad use of divine grace, he abandons them and transfers his special protection to others—not because he loved the latter more belatedly, or only on the occasion of the sin of others, but because in this way he more admirably and wisely shows his justice toward the wicked and his grace toward the good. And from all this it is easy to interpret the other testimonies of Sacred Scripture and of the Saints.

CHAPTER XIII
HOW THE DIVINE WILL PREPARED THE MEANS BY WHICH THE ELECT ARE INFALLIBLY SAVED

1. *The twofold kind of means that God prepares for the elect.—The common means are prior and are defined first.*—We have spoken of the divine will insofar as it concerns the end of predestination; now it must be briefly explained in what way, or by what acts, it arranges the way and the means by which the elect are infallibly directed toward that term. In this regard, we can first distinguish two kinds of means of this divine providence. Some are common, prepared for the whole community. Of this kind, in the case of the angels, can be considered all the graces and helps given to them at the instant of their creation, through which (according to a probable opinion) they were so forewarned that in that instant they would not sin at all, and so moved that they infallibly turned toward God and disposed themselves for grace, were sanctified, and merited their first glory. In the case of men in the law of grace, there are such means as baptism and the other sacraments, the preaching of the Gospel, together with the preparation of internal and necessary divine assistance for obtaining faith. And these and similar means can be said to be defined and decreed first for individual ages, because these universal means are in a certain way prior; and when an end is intended for a community, the means provided for the whole community seem to present themselves first. Furthermore, these common means are in a certain way included in the particular means, since justifications are regularly brought about through the application of common means to particular persons. Finally (and I note this in passing), in this order of means can be placed original justice, given to the whole of human nature in the first parent before the fall; for through it God began to arrange, insofar as was in himself, the salvation of the elect.

2. *Objection.—Solution.*—You will say that these and similar means pertain rather to general providence of grace than to predestination, because they are not grounded in a peculiar efficacious election of some men, but in the general will to save all. Hence such means are common to all. I respond that these things are not contradictory, for means are provided for the predestined in such a way that they can also benefit others. And thus, even though the salvation of the predestined is not (if I may say so) the adequate end of such means, it is nonetheless the principal end—and this suffices for these to be counted among

the means of predestination and to be said in a special way to be for the sake of the elect. As Paul said that he endured labors for the sake of the elect, even though in practice he labored for all. Nor does anything more seem necessary to be said about these means.

3. *Some particular means are brought about by God alone, and some with the free cooperation of the will.—The question concerns means that come about with cooperation.*—Regarding particular means, again, it should be noted that there are two orders of them. Some are brought about by God alone without the cooperation of free will, such as the first calling and other prevenient helps which God confers on men without any merit or disposition on their part. And to this order belong certain effects of God's singular providence regarding his elect, such as removing some occasion of sin, or offering some occasion of meriting well, etc. Concerning this whole order of means there is no difficulty: that God could prepare them by his gratuitous efficacious will is clear. In what way and in what order he did so will be evident from what is to be said. There is therefore another order of particular means, which includes the free cooperation of the will—such as supernatural human acts, under which I include all effects that depend on them, such as the remission of sin in an adult and the like. And concerning these there is great controversy among theologians as to how they are prepared through predestination.

4. *First opinion.—Foundation of this opinion.*—The first opinion is that by force of the divine will disposing means before the foreknowledge of them as absolutely future, only these means are prepared in a certain confused manner and by an inefficacious will alone, without predefinition of such acts in particular. St. Thomas seems to have indicated this opinion, q. 6, *De Veritate*, art. 3. For he says that the certainty of predestination consists in this, that God prepares so many supports for the predestined that he either does not fall, or if he has fallen, he rises again—and so God does not predefine a certain means, but one or another, so that at length some one of them may have effect. The chief motive of this opinion seems to be that in this way freedom can be reconciled with predestination. And this can be confirmed from experience, because not every calling or prevenient grace given to the predestined has effect in him; therefore it does not proceed from an efficacious intention of his conversion or consent.

5. *The first opinion is rejected.*—This opinion was rejected above. For first, it seems to proceed by removing conditional knowledge, by which God, before the will of giving a calling, foreknew whether it would be congruous or not—that is, whether the will of man would consent to it if it were given. For if this

knowledge is presupposed, as it should be, it is useless to attribute to God that mode of providing means in a confused manner and under that distinction—that if one has not had effect, another is applied. For this is the way only one who does not know the efficacy of the first means operates; and for this reason also (as I said above) this mode of providence is not consonant with divine perfection, to which it belongs to arrange all things distinctly and in particular, from certain knowledge, according to the dignity and capacity of each thing.

6. *Response to the foundation of the opinion.*—Nor is this necessary for freedom, as must be said at length in what follows and was touched upon above; where we also explained the cited passage of St. Thomas. And the same St. Thomas clearly held this, at pt. 1–2, q. 112, art. 4, saying: *If it is from the intention of God that a called man should consent, he will infallibly consent, though freely.* Finally, in the matter of the angels it is clearly established that this mode of providence has no place; for in the second instant, in which the way of all angels was terminated, the will of the elect was so prepared that they would not fall at all—for if they had fallen, they would not rise again—and indeed also so that they would have all the merit necessary for attaining that degree of glory to which they had been elected.

7. *Second opinion.*—The second opinion therefore says that God by his absolute will arranges certain and particular means by which each of the elect infallibly attains salvation—designating, that is, such means and such acts. This opinion adds, however, that all were pre-ordained entirely simultaneously, such that not even in logical order was one defined by God before another, especially when the means depend on our free will.

The third opinion does not resolve the difficulty and is contrary to Augustine's manner of speaking.—The means preserve an order in their proximity to glory.—This opinion is similar to the one I set out first in chapter eight above, and the same judgment is to be made of it: it evades the difficulty without explaining it. It also runs contrary to the manner of speaking of Augustine and nearly all who say that God calls a man to believe, and because he wills to give faith, he also wills to give such a calling—as can be seen specifically in Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chap. 14. The reason too is manifest, because these means are not equally close to the ultimate end, but preserve among themselves an order which Paul indicated at Rom. 8. For justification is closer to glorification than calling, and calling to justification; and likewise, any free act that is a disposition toward grace is closer to it than the stirring by which a man is called to the free act. Therefore, just as the intention of the ultimate term precedes all these means, so among the means themselves the will

of that which is closer to the end precedes; for on account of it the other means that is more remote is chosen, and is therefore posterior in the order of intention, even though it is prior in the order of execution. This is briefly illustrated in the case of the good angels: because they were elected to such a degree of glory, they were also ordained to attain such a degree of grace along their whole way; and for this reason God willed that they should have such or such meritorious acts, and for the sake of those acts he prepared such a mode of illumination and inspiration for them—for they too were called with a congruous calling, which is "from purpose," as Augustine says. Finally, in no other way can it be understood that efficacious grace, as efficacious, within the range of prevenient grace, is per se intended by God—but it would only be called efficacious from its effect, that is, because the thing happened—which I now presuppose to be false.

8. *Third opinion.*—For this reason there is a third opinion, which, though it agrees with the preceding ones in that God does not prepare free acts by an absolute will until he foresees them as absolutely future, nonetheless, in order to avoid some of the difficulties mentioned, especially the last, distinguishes in the divine will various acts concerning these means. The authors of this opinion say first that God has a certain absolute and universal will to give to this man all the prevenient helps necessary and fitted for him so that through them he may infallibly attain glory in such a course of life; and they say this will bears on efficacious grace as efficacious in the character of prevenience. Then they say that God disposed in particular such helps in relation to such free acts—but in such a way that, although the intention of such acts precedes, that intention is not efficacious and absolute, but only by simple complacency including a virtual condition. And this last point alone is asserted in order to preserve human freedom unimpaired.

9. *The third opinion is refuted. God's absolute will concerning a particular act is not contrary to freedom.*—Once this foundation is destroyed, the whole opinion easily falls. And (as I think) it has been sufficiently shown in what precedes that God's absolute intention concerning a free act—even in particular and with all its circumstances—does not take away freedom, because that intention does not by itself physically change or determine the human will, but applies means which God knows to be congruous to freedom, as will be touched upon at greater length in what follows. Therefore, if it is true (as indeed it is) that in logical order the intention of such an act precedes in the divine will, there is no reason for that intention to be inefficacious—especially since from that intention there proximately and infallibly arises the application of the calling or

efficacious help, as efficacious. With this foundation in place, the first act of the will that this opinion invents is superfluous: for if that volition is understood to bear on some universal and confused object, it is not fitting to God, who (as I said) knows and arranges all things distinctly; nor is it necessary for any end, since a will concerning individual helps is sufficient. If, however, that act is understood to bear on the collection or multitude of such helps in particular, then that act, even though it is one in reality, is rationally distinguished by the diversity of objects, and is therefore not distinct from those acts of will by which God is said to arrange and will to give these helps in particular. Hence it is necessary that even such an act, insofar as it bears on prevenient helps, should presuppose the intention of those acts of the human will for the sake of which those helps are prepared. There is the further consideration that there is no reason for any order between that universal act and the other particular ones, since their objects are not compared to one another as end and means, nor have they any other order of causality.

10. *Conclusion. God prepares even the means that depend on freedom by an absolute will.*—It must therefore be said that God by an absolute act of his will prepares for the predestined even those means which are to be freely exercised or acquired by them. This is the opinion of St. Augustine, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, especially chap. 10, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chap. 9 and following; and it is without doubt that of St. Thomas, pt. 1–2, loc. cit., and pt. 1, q. 23. I proved it at length in bk. 3, *On Grace*, chap. 17. The sum of it all is that this mode of providence is not contrary to freedom, as is evident from what has been said. And it is very consonant with the perfection of divine providence and the special love with which he regards the predestined; therefore there is no reason to deny it. Furthermore, because one who efficaciously intends some end intends, in logical order, the means closer to that end before the more remote one; and we have shown that God efficaciously intends for the predestined the ultimate end of glory, to which the means that are brought about by human freedom with divine grace are closer—such as meritorious acts and proximate dispositions toward justification—than those by which God alone stirs a man. Therefore God efficaciously wills those means for the predestined, in logical order, before he wills to give them calling or other antecedent helps that are more remote. This is finally confirmed, because an act of charity is related to the stirring help by which God efficaciously moves toward such an act just as the reward of glory is related to the act of charity itself; therefore just as the intention of glory precedes the foreknowledge of the act of charity or of the meritorious act, so in God the intention of giving man the act

of charity precedes the will or absolute foreknowledge of the congruous calling that is given for the sake of such an act. Nor does any new difficulty arise against this which needs to be addressed.

11. *Good acts independent of sin God wills absolutely.—Good acts dependent on sin God does not will absolutely except after the knowledge of sin.*—I only note that among these free acts, some are entirely independent of sin, because they neither necessarily presuppose it nor include an intrinsic relation to it—such as acts of faith, hope, love, etc.—while others necessarily presuppose sin, such as the proper act of penance. In the former acts, therefore, the position stated proceeds absolutely and without qualification, because God intends those acts primarily and for their own sake, and with an antecedent will—which is also simultaneously efficacious (in the sense explained elsewhere following Chrysostom and Damascene)—he wills and intends them, because they are wholly good and presuppose no evil. The latter acts, however, God does not intend by an absolute will until he has an absolute foreknowledge of the future sin, because God can will sin neither formally nor virtually; yet he would (at least virtually) will sin if he were absolutely to predefine an act intrinsically looking to sin without sin itself being presupposed—as I will explain more fully below, when treating of the effects of predestination.

12. *The act of contrition is defined in logical order prior to the means leading to it.*—Even though this is so, nonetheless the stated position holds true in these acts or means as well, with due proportion. For although God does not will absolutely the act of contrition, for example, until he sees the sin for the removal of which it is necessary, he nonetheless first in logical order predefines and intends for the predestined the act of contrition before he wills to give him an efficacious help or other means per se ordained toward that act. For sin is not a means ordained toward contrition, but is the matter and occasion that introduces the necessity of it; whereas the means toward contrition are those that are per se ordained toward bringing about contrition. And therefore foreknowledge of sin is presupposed, and before that foreknowledge there precedes the will of permitting it; but the will of such means is not presupposed —rather, this follows in our manner of understanding from the intention of such an end.

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XIV
WHETHER GOD HAS AN EXECUTING WILL CONCERNING THE GOODS HE CONFERS ON THE PREDESTINED, BEYOND THOSE THAT BELONG TO THE ORDER OF INTENTION

1. *First reason for doubt.*—The reason for doubt is that God's absolute will is by itself efficacious of the things he so wills: *For he has done all that he willed.* Therefore if God has an absolute will by which he has decided to give glory and grace to the predestined, he confers these goods by that very same will entirely; therefore it is superfluous to invent another executing will, even rationally distinct; especially since this distinction would have to be drawn from objects—yet such a will bears on the same object.

Second reason.—Second, the difficulty touched on above and not resolved presses here, because if these two wills are necessary for men to attain salvation, those regarding whom God did not have these wills do not have from God's side all that is necessary, and consequently they cannot be saved; but if both wills are not necessary, they need not be posited or distinguished.

Third reason.—Which I confirm, third, as follows: it is impossible for God to have regarding a creature some free decree that is not necessary for some real change in the creature, but for one change or effect in the creature one will of his suffices; therefore it is impossible to multiply another or others. The minor is established from the efficacy of the divine will; the major is shown as follows. The divine will does not have a free decree regarding the creature through its own change; therefore it cannot have it except through the change of the creature, because through such a decree God has a new relation to the creature, at least of reason; but it is impossible to conceive a new relation between two extremes without a change in one of them; therefore God cannot have a free decree except insofar as it is necessary for some real change in the creature.

2. *The opinion of some.*—On account of this difficulty, some modern theologians deny these two orders of intention and execution in the divine will, and consequently deny the rational distinction between the said acts. Yet from this principle they are divided into entirely contrary positions. For some, on account of this, either deny altogether the intention of the end that in logical order precedes the choice of means in the divine will, or at least deny that that intention is efficacious. But against these there has been sufficient dispute. Others, while positing this intention in God, assert that through it God

efficaciously determines the human will to execute what God predefined by such a will, because this is the efficacy of the divine will. These authors, however, can barely reconcile freedom of will with divine predefinition—concerning which I will speak below in its proper place—and therefore I pass over these opinions.

3. *The true opinion.—It is proved.*—It must therefore be said that the will by which God executes what he had predefined in the order of intention concerning the elect is rationally distinct from the will of intention and election. This assertion follows necessarily from what has been said, because God wills glory for the predestined in the order of intention from his grace alone; but he gives that same glory not from liberality alone, but from merits; and he does not give it except through a will; therefore it is necessary to understand in God a will by which he executes the gift of glory as rationally distinct from the prior will by which he intends that same glory. The same can be seen in the order of natural causes and effects, in which God intends an end, and for its sake applies means, through which he afterward executes the intended effect—which execution he also makes through his own will; therefore it is necessary that this be distinct in some way. Finally, we cannot philosophize about divine things except from human things, preserving the proportion and attributing to God whatever there is of perfection, with imperfections removed; but in us we find these two orders —of intention or deliberation, and of execution—to be distinct and necessary for a perfect mode of operating for an end, from the agent's own intention and relation. It is, however, an imperfection in us that we do these things through acts really distinct, and through a real change of our will, and by means of discourse, deliberation, and inquiry into means; therefore, with these imperfections removed, we ought to understand both these aspects of acts in God's single and most simple act of will, since he operates most perfectly for an end. This will be more clearly established, however, by resolving the three doubts that are raised in the reasons for doubt.

4. *The first argument's difficulty is resolved.—The diversity of acts concerning the same object can in God be drawn from their proximate motives.*—The first doubt is how this distinction of acts can be understood concerning the same thing willed by God. To which I respond briefly that sometimes this diversity can be understood from the proximate motives on account of which God is understood to have acts of this will; so that, for example, in the same glory that God wills for the predestined, we understand in the first intention of it that the reason for willing is divine goodness alone; whereas with respect to the will by which God in the execution wills to give that glory, the proximate reason is the merits now seen in the predestined himself. For thus St. Augustine, comparing

various passages with one another—especially bk. 1, *To Simplicianus*, q. 2, and *On Rebuke and Grace*, chap. 7—distinguishes two elections in God: one purely gratuitous, which he has from the sole motive of mercy; another of justice, which he has from the motive of merits. From this an excellent reason is concluded for the stated assertion. For the will of intention and of execution, as they bear on the glory to be given to the predestined, are distinguished in God just as the attribute of justice is distinguished from mercy or liberality; but they are distinguished rationally; therefore so too are those wills.

5. *This distinction has no place in gifts given by God entirely from himself and through himself.*—And in this way the two wills can easily be distinguished insofar as they bear on all the gifts of grace that depend on our free cooperation. For in all of them, the first love by which God efficaciously ordains the predestined toward having such a good proceeds from liberality and mercy; whereas the will by which God actually confers such a gift always regards the cooperation of free will as a reason on account of which the man receives such a gift in some genus of cause—whether it be meritorious, or dispositive as a necessary condition, or a co-cause that cooperates only secondarily and less principally with divine grace. But in those gifts which God is going to confer entirely through himself and from himself alone, this mode of distinction does not seem to have a place, because the first calling, for example, God decreed in the order of predestination to give wholly gratuitously and absolutely, and also gives it wholly gratuitously in the execution itself—and likewise without our free cooperation.

6. *Another distinction of act is to be sought from the mode of tendency toward the object.*—And therefore I add another reason for distinguishing these two, which can be drawn from the mode in which the divine will bears on such an object, and from the diverse aspects that can be considered in it. For that gift is a certain lovable object to which the will can be joined by affection, and it is also a thing to be made by such an agent, who can apply his power toward executing such an effect. In the first way the will of God bears on such an object when it proceeds only in the order of intention; in the second way when it already begins execution. This teaching I take from St. Thomas, pt. 1–2, q. 15 and 16, especially art. 4, where he distinguishes in this way consent and election on the one hand from use on the other. For consent pertains to the order of deliberation and expresses an acceptance of such a means through affection and complacency, or even through election when compared to others, though not yet by force of such an act does the will act as an operative power *ad extra*; whereas use follows after election and begins the execution of the effect, because

it now bears on the object as actionable. We ought therefore to understand the divine will in the same way.

7. *God's executive power is rationally distinct from his intellect and will.*—Finally, this will be easier if we note that the power by which God executes external actions is rationally distinct from his intellect and will, as I presuppose now from other places. Through the will, therefore, by which God within himself predefines or accepts such a means, he is not understood to apply his power to operating, but only to love that good with respect to such a person; whereas through the executing will he applies his power to executing what he had loved. And therefore, if God is going to produce such an effect together with a secondary cause, he applies his power in a way that is either due or proportionate to such a secondary cause. Hence if that cause is only going to operate physically and not freely, he applies his power toward a concurrence determined to one thing. But if the secondary cause is going to operate freely, he applies toward a more indifferent influx. In this way, therefore, the distinction between these wills is rightly understood.

8. *Response to the second reason, with explanation of the necessity of both the will of intention and of execution.*—The second difficulty was: what is the necessity of each will, and how is the sufficiency of help preserved for those with whom God does not have both wills? To explain this, I note that this kind of will can be necessary, or at least fitting, for some work from two sources: either on the part of the effect, so that it may exist; or on the part of the agent itself, so that it may operate in a perfect manner. In the first way, the executing will of God is absolutely necessary for any effect whatever, because it is either its proximate principle or certainly immediately applies the omnipotence which is such a proximate principle. As in man, with respect to all effects and actions that proceed from powers subordinated to the will in acting, the act of will by which the will moves and applies the executive power to operating is simply necessary for such an effect. On the part of the agent, however, so that it may operate in a perfect and rational manner, intention and election—or acceptance of means for the sake of an end—are necessary, because without them it would not direct its actions through its own intrinsic relation to a determinate end, even though this is most necessary for a perfect mode of operating.

9. This teaching is illustrated in every kind of agent. First in man: to move the hand, for example, the act of will by which the motive power of the hand is applied to such an action suffices on the part of the effect; but on the part of the man himself, so that he may exercise such an act in a perfect and moral manner, another act of the will is necessary, by which he directs that external action

toward some end. Again, in natural agents—for fire to heat, for example, the faculty that proximately effects the heating suffices; yet for that action to be done in a perfect manner on the part of the efficient cause, some ordination to an end is necessary; and since the proximate agent is so imperfect as to be unable by itself to have that intention of an end, the Philosopher said that nature must be subordinated to a superior agent by which it is directed toward an end. Finally, this is shown in God himself: for God wills to offer man the concurrence necessary for an act of sin; he also wills to offer concurrence for a good act—which will of God is, as it were, executing and necessary for the effect on that side. And nonetheless, God wills concurrence for a good act on account of that act itself, and hence from the intention of it; but he does not thus will concurrence for an act of sin, because it pertains to the perfection of an agent that he intend good, not that he intend evil. The said twofold necessity is therefore rightly distinguished, as are both the order of intention and the order of execution in the divine will.

10. *Objection.—Response.*—Someone may say that this argument at most shows that an intention of some end by a simple and inefficacious act is necessary in God. I respond first that this is enough for us to distinguish the order of intention from the order of execution—for we do not contend that an absolutely absolute and efficacious intention is simply necessary. Yet from this we rightly gather further that it belongs to the perfection of an agent to be able, if it so wills, to will an end with an absolute and efficacious intention, and from it in a special and efficacious way to provide and prepare means for such an end. And thus we also briefly responded above to a similar difficulty about election to glory—namely, how God, if it is necessary, provides sufficient principles to those men whom from the beginning he did not elect in that way. For the response is clear: that election is not simply necessary on the part of the effects, but only on the part of the agent, given the special and perfect mode of providence which he willed to have with such men—even though without it he could have provided sufficient means of grace, as will be more fully evident from what is to be said concerning the reprobate.

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XV
WHETHER THE EFFICACIOUS INTENTION OF GOD AND THE EXECUTION OF THE MEANS NECESSARILY PRODUCE DIVERSE CHANGES IN THE PREDESTINED

1. *First opinion.*—This is the third difficulty that the arguments demanded, which was also touched upon above. It depends on another general question: whether a free decree of God always and necessarily brings about some real change in the creature, and consequently whether any free act in God can be understood without which every change that occurs in the creature could consist. Some authors hold this, on account of the sole foundation touched upon in the argument; and from this principle they infer many things very worthy of note in theology—namely, that God has some act of love absolutely necessary concerning possible creatures; that God cannot remit even a venial sin without producing in man a real change formally incompossible with that sin; that he cannot ordain one thing toward another as an end unless it has a natural relation to such an end from itself, or some real change occurs in it by which it receives such an ordination; and similar things, which are difficult. And therefore concerning this principle I will briefly say what I think.

2. *Conclusion.—Proved by induction.*—I assert therefore first that God can by an efficacious decree ordain one thing toward another as an extrinsic end (that is, an end not owed to or connatural with such a thing) without any special change being made in the thing so ordained toward the end, nor in the end itself toward which it is ordained. I show this first by induction through every order of effects: for God sometimes produces rain with the intention of fruit, and sometimes with the intention of punishing men. In that effect, if we consider the whole real change that occurs in the rain, it can be the same whether it is produced for this or for that end, even though those ends are very extrinsic to that effect. Then, in moral matters, by the opinion of all the Saints, God wills to permit sin with the intention of some good which God himself can bring about on that occasion, even though such a permission by its nature does not entail that good nor regards it from itself. Indeed (as we will see below), the permission of sin (according to the common opinion) is sometimes an effect of predestination, and is intended by God so that through it he prepares the way for the attainment of some man's glory. It is established that the permission itself is not really brought about differently for this end, nor does it from its intrinsic

nature require such an end. And this example can be confirmed by the fact that God sometimes wills the same permission as a punishment of sin.

3. *God could have created man with the same nature without ordaining it toward the supernatural end.*—Furthermore, faith teaches concerning the mystery of the Incarnation that it was brought about *for us men and for our salvation*; hence it is also established among theologians that that mystery is in some way ordained toward the salvation of men as an end. But it is self-evident that this end is not intrinsic to the Incarnation nor owed to it; it is likewise manifest that God could have accomplished that whole mystery, and the whole real change which he now made in human nature to complete it, without intending that end, without repairing men through Christ, but by creating and sanctifying others. Finally, in the matter at hand, it is certain that God now creates man for a supernatural end, and could have created him with the same nature without ordaining him toward such an end—which I presuppose now from the matter of grace. Therefore God had a free decree by which he willed to ordain man toward such an end, even though no change in man immediately results from this decree.

4. Furthermore, all theologians concede that, beyond the common will by which God confers means on men for attaining a supernatural end, he has a special act of intention by which he wills glory for all men, at least with an inefficacious will. I therefore ask what special real change God makes in man through that act; for if he makes none, then this is what we say concerning efficacious intention, and no special incompatibility can be assigned in it—indeed, I will show presently that it is more easily understood in it. But if some special change corresponds to that act, let it be specified what it is. I show that there can be none, because either what is brought about through this intention is some change belonging to the order of nature—and this is not the case, since the same wholly rational nature with all the properties connatural to it could be created by God without such an intention, but only so as to enjoy a natural end —or that change is supernatural: and first, it is not always brought about in every man ordained toward that end. For many men are now procreated by God in whom no real supernatural change occurs throughout the whole time of their life, as is evident in many little children; nor is it incredible that the same happens in many adult unbelievers. And then, when such a change does occur, it does not occur proximately and immediately through that intention, for that intention is of itself general and the same with respect to all, whereas the change of grace is not the same in all. It occurs therefore in each person through the will to give this or that grace, as the same authors admit—a will which would suffice

for the whole of that real change, if only the necessity of the effect itself in itself be considered. Therefore no special real change immediately resulting from it in effect corresponds to that intention.

5. *A response is countered.—God's inefficacious will to save some is not natural.*—It can be responded that that act by which the divine will inefficaciously wills some end is not free but natural (for some authors also suggest this)—because it is only a certain complacency, and God cannot but take complacency in a good end. But this (as I think) cannot be said. First, because when Paul says, *God wills all men to be saved*, he commends God's benefit and free love toward men, as all the saints understand it—yet he is speaking of an antecedent will that is not altogether efficacious. Second, because even if that intention is not absolute concerning the end, by force of it God wills to confer sufficient means for such an end, and thus insofar as he himself is concerned, he wills to give that end—therefore he wills not necessarily but freely. This will be more fully established from what is to be said below concerning the reprobate. God therefore has a free will concerning the end, from which no special change results that is distinct from what is brought about through the conferral of means; therefore he can in the same way have an efficacious intention, since the reason of the contrary opinion proceeds equally in both cases, and no special incompatibility can be assigned here.

6. *Response to the objection.*—I show this finally by reason, because it belongs to the perfection of the divine will to be able to freely and efficaciously will not only objects or effects, but also their ends and the ordination of one toward another; therefore it can do this freely without any special real change. The antecedent is evident, both because in man this pertains per se to perfection, and also because in this a greater dominion of the will over its actions or effects is shown. The consequence is proved, because the ordination of something toward an extrinsic end does not per se posit any change in such a thing, as can also be seen in human actions. You will say that although man does this through a merely extrinsic denomination or relation, God always does it through an intrinsic change, and that this is of greater perfection. I respond that it belongs to perfection to be able to do this through an intrinsic change when it is consonant with both the end and the effect; yet that such a change should be brought about through that very intention precisely conceived, and not through the executing will, makes no difference to perfection.

7. *The objection is pressed further.*—Then it is said that, although being able to produce that change when opportune belongs to perfection, yet not being able to ordain a means to an end without it when it is not necessary—this does

not pertain to perfection, but rather to a limitation of dominion and power. First, because the ordination toward an end often neither requires nor admits such a change, as is evident in the examples given and in what Scripture says: *For the sake of the elect those days will be shortened.* What special change could be made in that predefinition of time for the sake of the elect that could not be made without this end? Second, because either after that change is made the thing remains intrinsically and necessarily ordained toward such an end, or the end is still extrinsic. If the first is said, then God never proximately ordains any thing toward an extrinsic end, nor has he freedom for this. If the second is said, then a new free ordination is necessary, which does not add any special change. Third, even in those things that seem by their nature to be per se ordained—such as, for example, grace and glory—a will quasi-elicited and directly tending toward the end itself is necessary, because God is not said to intend an end merely because he wills a thing that by its nature tends toward such an end—for this is an imperfect mode of operating for an end. Therefore it is necessary that he will the end itself in itself and directly. Hence God could give grace to someone without any purpose—either efficacious or inefficacious—of giving glory, indeed with the purpose of never giving it, but only of conferring grace for the sake of acts of virtue and for its intrinsic perfection. Therefore even in those things that seem per se ordained, giving one for the sake of another is a special free will of God to which no new change corresponds.

8. *The same teaching is further confirmed.—The response of some is refuted.* —And although these things could suffice for the present purpose, yet so that they may serve many matters, I add further that in effects that are especially moral, God can freely will many things that do not bring about a special physical and real change in things. This is evident first in quasi-privative effects: for if a man is obligated to God by a vow, God can by his free will remit the obligation, from which no real change in the man results, and yet he genuinely remains free from the obligation. They respond that the man is not freed from the obligation until God reveals to him that he has remitted the vow, and thus the remission is not made without a real change. But this is not rightly said, because even if that revelation can be necessary so that the man, from an erroneous conscience, does not think himself still bound, it nonetheless does not formally remove the obligation—it presupposes it removed. This is evident both because this is the very thing that is revealed, and also because formally it is one thing to will to remit, another to will to reveal the prior will. Hence that change does not correspond to the prior will but to this posterior one; and we contend that that prior will is had without a real change in the object.

9. *Grace can be infused without the remission of venial sin, even as to its guilt.*—But I press further in the remission of temporal punishment owed for sin: for God can remit it gratuitously by his free will, and no revelation is necessary there, even to remove an erroneous conscience; hence at the end of life a man will find himself free from that debt, even if he had been unaware of it during life, and perhaps this is in fact how it happens through the election of a sacrifice or something similar. A similar argument applies to the remission of punishment made to one person on account of the satisfaction of another: for God could not accept it for another but only for the one who performed the work; but now he accepts it in such a way that it has that effect in another and not in the one who performed the work; therefore this necessarily must be referred to the free will of God with a different moral relation, without any other real change of the creature. Finally, through the infusion of such grace in such a sacrament, venial sin is now remitted; and yet the same grace could be infused with the whole change without remission of that venial guilt. For no implication of contradiction can be assigned in this, nor is there a formal incompatibility between that grace and venial sin such that it would be wholly necessary that when the former is infused, the latter is expelled; therefore that moral effect also comes about from a special free decree of God without any new real change of the creature.

10. *A second response is refuted.*—No less efficacious arguments can be taken from positive effects: for God sometimes confers a benefit on a man who asks, by reason of his asking—and this relation to the petition is free for God—and yet by reason of it no real change occurs in the effect, because God could bring about the whole of it with all its intrinsic conditions without any relation to the man's petition. You will say that, given the non-existence of the man's petition, God could absolutely give the same thing without such a relation; but if he gives it with the petition existing, he necessarily gives it on account of it, and so he does not give it in this way without some special change. But this is surely incredible, because with the petition existing, God can entirely not accept it, nor confer the benefit; therefore he can also not accept the prayer as something on account of which he gives, and nonetheless give on account of his goodness and his pure will. Similar arguments can be taken from other effects which God confers either for merit, especially *de congruo*, or for some disposition, or for permission from a certain moral obligation, or through certain causes not physical but moral—as many think sacraments to be. For in all of these, a different relation and moral mode of operating from the divine will is required, without new real changes.

11. *An escape route is blocked.*—And the reason for these things seems to be that God is not only a perfect agent in the character of a physical cause, but also in the character of a moral cause; and therefore, both on the part of affections and on the part of mode, he can exercise both kinds of causality through his free will; therefore he can bring about not only physical effects, which come about through such changes, but also moral effects, which do not always require those changes. Finally, every created will from reason and freedom has this mode of operating, which per se pertains to perfection; that it does this with imperfection and its own change is accidental and proceeds from its limitedness. Therefore this whole perfection is to be attributed to God, with every imperfection removed. For to say that this implies a contradiction is neither proved, as I will show presently, nor satisfactory. Otherwise someone could in the same way say that God is not a free agent, because it implies a contradiction to have freedom without the imperfection of mutability. Therefore, just as even though human reason does not sufficiently comprehend how those two things can together belong to God, it nonetheless neither denies nor can deny that there is no incompatibility—since each per se pertains to perfection simply—so the same must be thought in the present case. This will be more easily established by responding to the foundation of the contrary opinion.

12. *Response to the difficulty proposed in the preceding chapter.—A relation of reason is not of the intrinsic nature of a divine act.*—To that, therefore, it must first be said that God does not will through a relation of reason, nor is such a relation of the intrinsic nature of a free decree; and therefore it matters little whether we can or cannot conceive such a relation, for God to be able to will this or that freely—for God does not depend in his free decrees on our manner of conceiving. This assumption was treated at length in Disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, sect. 9, and is manifest in itself. For God truly and really loves what he freely wills, but he does not have such a relation truly and really. Likewise, it is impossible that what we confect and does not exist in reality should be of the intrinsic nature of divine love. Finally, God himself knows his own free decrees as they are in themselves, without inventing any relation of reason—for this proceeds from our imperfect mode of conceiving; but the nature of such a decree is rather to be judged from the way in which it is known by God than by us. Therefore whatever may be said about relations of reason, free decrees are not to be denied to God when they per se pertain to perfection. Not that being terminated to this or that object freely adds perfection to God, but that it pertains to the infinite perfection of that most simple act to be able to be terminated to all these objects without any change or variation in itself.

13. Because, however, we cannot will anything without our own change—from which change the object is denominated as willed—we do not understand God as freely willing except by analogy to ourselves, and thus by conceiving as it were a new immanent act in God or a new mode of the same act. Not that we objectively understand a new real mode there—for then we would conceive something false—but that we apprehend God's free love after the fashion of such a mode. And this would suffice for understanding a relation of reason in the divine will, because truly from that real act which is in the divine will, the creature is extrinsically denominated as loved, and God himself is intrinsically denominated as loving—which suffices for understanding a relation of reason between those extremes, whatever may be said of real change. For when it results, it does not constitute God as really loving, but rather presupposes divine love from which it is born, according to that verse of John 3: *God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son*, and that of Eph. 2: *On account of his great charity by which God loved us, he brought us to life together in Christ.* In that very free charity and love, therefore, a relation of reason is understood prior to the understanding of the real change flowing from it.

14. *An objective or moral change in the creature suffices for founding a relation of reason in God's intention.—Proof concerning the objective.*—Second, it is said that for conceiving that relation of reason it suffices that on the side of the object, or creatures, some change—either objective according to the relation to future existence, or moral—can be understood by us. I explain the first part: for through that very will of creating which God has from eternity, a real change in the creature does not immediately occur from that same eternity; but because it is to be effected in its proper time, in that object a certain change is understood to have been made—for what was merely possible is now future. This I call an objective change, which we can find in all the free decrees of God that are terminated in some way toward the real being of the creature. For given any absolute and predefinitory decree of God, by force of it it is true to say that that object is going to be—though not in the same way, nor as proximately, as through the executing will; but because God by force of such a decree infallibly applies the means and causes through which what was predefined will come to be. Those authors who posit two free decrees regarding the predestined cannot deny this in a similar case: one universal, by which God wills to give all the congruous helps necessary for glory; another by which in particular he disposes that this or that help is to be given. For by force of each decree the same helps are going to be—and this is considered sufficient for each to be posited, since the mode of influencing toward that future existence of the thing is understood

by them as rationally diverse. Therefore they must admit the same in other acts. The same must be philosophized concerning a free, non-efficacious, and antecedent decree by which God wills an effect not absolutely, but under a condition depending on the free cooperation of the creature. For even if by force of that decree it is not simply true to say that the thing will be, nonetheless the thing is truly said to be going to be if the man wills it—which before that decree it did not—and the man himself is said simply to be able to will it, which he could not without such a decree. The same is manifest in the indifference of freedom, through proximate and ready power, for doing or omitting various acts. For it could not be of this kind unless God by his free will had offered sufficient concurrence for each of those acts, by reason of which the will is now simply able to do all of them—even though in fact it will do not all but only one of them. This mode of change therefore without doubt suffices for conceiving those relations of reason, and we will easily find it in the physical and real objects of such decrees.

15. *The moral change is shown.*—The other part concerning moral change was posited on account of moral objects—such as remission of punishment, of obligation, etc.—and is sufficiently clear in itself. For that change is such that according to prudent moral estimation, the man is now no longer a debtor, for example, as he was before; therefore this too suffices for understanding a different relation of reason. For just as that relation is not in reality, so it is not necessary that something physically real be posited or removed in its term; it suffices if something moral intervenes in this manner.

CHAPTER XVI
WHETHER AN ACT OF COMMAND, RATIONALLY DISTINCT FROM ALL THOSE ENUMERATED, IS NECESSARY FOR PREDESTINATION

1. *Reason for doubt.*—We have explained all the acts of intellect and will that seem necessary for divine predestination; it remains to see whether those suffice, or whether some other is necessary, in the intellect or in the will. The entire reason for doubt arose from the act of command, which moral philosophers—as can be gathered from St. Thomas and his interpreters at pt. 1–2, q. 17—place in human deliberation and prudence as necessary for the execution of the means that were approved and chosen after deliberation. A similar act therefore seems to be posited in divine providence and predestination, with due proportion and with every imperfection of distinction

or composition removed. For with these and similar imperfections removed, command per se indicates perfection and the power of one who governs. Hence in Scripture we read that God made all his works by commanding, Gen. 1: *God said, let there be light, etc.*, Ps. 148: *He spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created.* Therefore such an act exists in God as necessary, as the proximate reason for operating *ad extra*; therefore with the same proportion it is necessary for the works of grace, and consequently also for predestination, through which they are prepared. That it is rationally distinct from all those enumerated is shown as follows. Because command is a free act, and is therefore distinct from every act of knowledge that precedes the will. Again, it is not an act of the will, but comes after it, because command is a kind of intimation of the will—for the one who has willed something to be done, through command intimates that it is to be done. Finally, it is a practical act that moves and impels, in which it is distinguished from every act of knowledge of future things that follows the will. It is therefore an act rationally distinct from all those that have been explained by us so far.

2. *Some admit a rationally distinct act of command.*—Some theologians therefore think that another act is to be added to all the superior acts—an act they call command—and they place it in the intellect, after every act of knowledge and judgment, and after every act of the will, as necessary for external operation or effect. For they want external action to proceed more immediately from an act of the intellect than from an act of the will—which act of the intellect (as they say) is not knowledge or judgment (for this precedes the will), but a certain practical impulse expressed by these words: *Do this*, by which the executing or ministering power is applied to the work. They therefore require this act also in the divine mind operating *ad extra*, and consequently say that this act also pertains to the eternal predestination by which God prepares for his elect the benefits to be bestowed on them in time. Indeed, in this act they place especially the nature of predestination, because it is as it were its complement and the proximate reason for causing the effects of predestination.

3. *Foundation.*—The foundation of this opinion was indicated above. Because concerning divine things we can judge only from human things, with imperfections removed; but human prudence requires this act and is, as it were, completed and terminated through it; therefore so too does divine providence; therefore much more so predestination, which is most efficacious, and this act of command is required for the efficacy of the effect. It is then argued secondly, because predestination is a practical act of the divine intellect from which the whole effect of predestination follows infallibly and efficaciously; therefore that

act presupposes in the will an absolute decree or election of such an effect; therefore it can only be that practical act called command, because after the will no other can follow in the intellect.

4. *Conclusion.—An act of command distinct from the rest is not necessary for predestination.*—I consider, first, that there is no act in the intellect insofar as it operates *ad extra* that is not after the manner of knowledge, cognition, or judgment. From which I consequently infer that it is without foundation to invent in the intellect an act of the intellect that is purely impulsive of another power or person, beyond all judgment or cognition—because such an act is superfluous and can hardly be conceived by the mind. From these things I conclude that no such act is necessary for predestination; and accordingly, no other act is required in the will beyond those explained above, and in the intellect—beyond the knowledge that is necessary before the will—there does not intervene that impulsive act, but only judgment about things to be done, following the will's election already made and the cognition of it, which naturally and immediately follows in the order of reason.

5. *Foundation.—The twofold mode of commanding in man. The first is command.—This command in the one commanding is an intimation of will by which he obliges another.*—The first two parts of this assertion are general. Their fundamental reason is that the intellect is essentially and adequately a cognitive power, and therefore cannot have any act of its own that is not knowledge—either apprehension or judgment. Likewise, because that act is immanent, it must have some formal effect in the intellect itself—and what is that, if not cognition? Since those parts are common to every intellect, it will be worthwhile to explain them in the human intellect and then to ascend to the divine intellect. In man, therefore, a twofold mode of commanding can be understood. One is when he commands another to do this or that; another is when a man is accustomed to command himself, as it were, the execution of the means he has chosen. The first mode is proper and without metaphor, and consists in laws or precepts, and properly can only be referred to another person. For inanimate things are not capable of this command, as is evident in itself; indeed, not even brute animals, because even if they sometimes seem to be moved by man's command, it is not because they perceive the nature of command, but because either by natural instinct or by a certain custom they apprehend something as suitable to pursue, or as an evil to flee, when they are stirred, invited, or frightened in such a manner. This command therefore in the one who commands is in reality nothing other than a declaration or intimation of his will, by which he can oblige another to do what he commands. For (by the

opinion of all) the entire motive force of this command consists in the obligation it imposes, and therefore its motion is called moral. This obligation, however, arises from a will that can and does will to impose obligation; and therefore it can only be that of a superior toward an inferior—otherwise the power of commanding would be lacking, without which there cannot be a proper precept, only a usurped one that is of itself inefficacious; there can only be petition or entreaty. Beyond power and will, moreover, the intimation of this will is required, through which intimation the nature of command or law is completed. Hence such a command can pertain to the intellect only insofar as it is necessary for the one commanding himself to know his own will, and to indicate it to the inferior through some speech or sign. In which nothing intervenes of the intellect's act that is not after the manner of cognition and judgment; nor is any other impulsive act necessary. Indeed, it cannot even be understood what such an act is or what kind it is, or what formal effect it has in the one commanding—whose act it is as immanent—or what it also effects in the one commanded, since that one is moved only by the will of the commanding person intimated through speech.

6. *The second mode of command.—Freedom of will is taken away if this distinct command is posited in the intellect.*—The second mode of command, by which a man commands himself, is only with respect to his own actions and those powers that are subject to the free motion of the will. And in this mode of commanding as well, beyond the act of will by which it efficaciously wills the use of a power subject to it, and the cognition or judgment that precedes or follows such a volition, no other impulsive act on the part of the intellect can be conceived. Because before intention and election, a practical judgment about the goodness of the end and the utility of the means suffices. Hence some Thomists who posit a command distinct from judgment prior to election, in order efficaciously to determine the will toward the election of one means over others, plainly contradict St. Thomas, as can be seen in the cited q. 17. And they posit something superfluous which they cannot explain what it is—or they even take away freedom of will: because if that command efficaciously determines the will, it does so either by its own force, and then the intellect will be free in commanding, not the will in obeying, since given such a command the will obeys of necessity; or it does so by virtue of some prior will, and we will ask concerning that will whether it requires another similar command—and if it is not necessary there (lest we proceed to infinity), neither will it be necessary for the election itself, and judgment will suffice.

7. Again, we can argue in the same way about the motion of the inferior powers after election has been made. For in order that the election be committed to execution, an active use follows in the will—which is nothing other than the volition of applying here and now the executing power to the work—which volition needs the direction of the intellect, which also comes about through practical judgment. And that judgment, beyond what preceded the election, only adds the knowledge of the election already made and of all the circumstances concurrent for the due execution of that election. And perhaps it was that judgment proceeding from such knowledge that St. Thomas called command, because by force of the election already made it has a certain special efficacy. Yet in reality it is nothing other than a certain practical knowledge or prudential cognition, and it does not move the will except by reason of the object proposed. Hence from the intellect there is only motion with respect to specification; for with respect to exercise, the will rather moves itself by force of the prior election. A manifest sign of this is that if it wills to desist from the election, the command will be rendered inefficacious; therefore, whatever else beyond this is invented is nothing. Because another impulsive command is not necessary either for the will itself, as the argument shows, nor for the executing power, since the latter is immediately applied by force of the appetite or will, and does not require another impulse.

8. *Some Doctors place command in the will.—How St. Thomas and others place this command in the intellect.*—It is customary sometimes for a man, in order to rouse himself to action, to speak to himself and to command himself: *do this, get up*, etc. Yet if someone attentively reflects on his own acts, he will understand first that such a command, if it is efficacious, presupposes an efficacious will of that commanded action, which the man recognizes in himself, and through that command he proposes it to himself more expressly, in order to rouse himself more; but if it is an inefficacious command, it is not properly command but rather a kind of exhortation of the man to himself, to remember that it is expedient for him, or something similar. Then, this whole kind of command in us comes about through the intellect—not however through that practical impulse that is not cognition, but through mental utterances and intellectual concepts, not the ultimate concepts of some language or certain words. A clear sign of this is that no one exercises this interior act except through the mental words of the language he knows. But those concepts are nothing other than certain cognitions of such words and of their meaning; and that locution tends only toward further rousing the will through a more efficacious proposal of the object, or through the recollection of some resolution

already made. Hence this command in reality is not directed directly and immediately toward the will or the inferior powers, but toward the intellect—for when a man speaks to himself, just as he speaks through the intellect, so he hears through the intellect; and so whatever impulse this command has comes about through cognition. And finally, this mode of commanding oneself is extraordinary and accidental, and is not per se necessary for operation, as is self-evident; and therefore the authors make almost no mention of this command. And therefore the Doctors who do not recognize or admit that impulsive intellectual act place command in the will and not in the intellect. Toward this opinion incline St. Bonaventure, bk. 3, dist. 17, art. 1, q. 1; Scotus, bk. 1, d. 38, q. 4, and bk. 2, d. 6, and *Quodlibet* 17; Ockham holds it in bk. 3, q. 16; Henry, *Quodlibet* 9, q. 6; Almain, *Treatise on Morals*, bk. 3, chap. 2; Medina, *Code on Prayer*, q. 2. Those who fittingly defend the opinion of St. Thomas—which is believed to be Aristotle's—who places command in the intellect, consider command to be nothing other than practical judgment, which precedes the election or active use of the will, as is discussed at greater length at pt. 1–2, q. 17.

9. *Resolution of the question concerning the divine act of command toward himself.*—From these things it is easy to demonstrate this in God himself, using the same distinction concerning command toward himself or toward others. For concerning the former, if it is referred to the will of God, it is clear it can be nothing other than that executing will which we have already explained. This seems rather able to be called command toward the created thing, insofar as God through it wills something to be done, than toward God himself—although, insofar as through such a will the executive power of God remains as it were applied to the work for such a time, it can under that aspect be called in some way command toward himself, for that external execution is a free act of God, not elicited but commanded. About this manner of speaking there is no need to contend, when the matter is clear. But if that act is referred to the intellect of God, it is most evident that it either does not exist in God, or is nothing other than either the practical judgment by which he is moved to will or freely choose something, or that knowledge by which he knows the decree established by himself, or the election made by himself, and therefore judges it necessary to execute what he himself has defined. This is further clarified: for either this command toward himself is necessary in the divine intellect on account of the will, or on account of the action of the executive power; but in neither way is anything beyond knowledge and judgment necessary. The major is proved, because command is ordered toward a free action, which in God is nothing other than either the determination of the will itself or the execution

that arises from it; therefore command can only be wanted for one of these parts.

10. *Command toward himself is not required for the determination of the divine will.—This command is not required for the decree of predestination.*—That such a command is neither useful nor necessary for the very determination of the divine will is proved, because the divine will is not determined by the intellect to its free election or volition—but either entirely by itself, as regards the first free decree, or from that first it is determined to the second, and so on up to the last executing will—otherwise the free will of God would not be free, and consequently God himself would not be free, because the intellect would not be formally free; indeed in God it has no act properly and formally, or even denominatively, free—only at most objectively, as I explained above. For the divine will to determine itself, only the natural knowledge of simple intelligence, such as was explained by us in chapter six, precedes in the intellect. To which belongs judgment about the suitability of objects or the utility of means, from which God chooses according to the counsel of his will. No other therefore can be understood in the divine intellect with respect to the divine will. For either that impulse determines it—and this is contrary to its freedom, as I said—and furthermore it can be asked concerning that impulse whether it is free or necessary: if free, by what is it determined, or by what power is it freely elicited or commanded? If necessary, then the determination that follows from it is also necessary, and divine freedom perishes. But if that impulse does not determine the divine will, what use is it? For it cannot move the will in any other way, since it is not cognition or judgment, as is presupposed. Therefore in the present matter, for all the acts of the will and the whole decree of predestination, no such command is necessary, but only that knowledge which we taught above should be presupposed.

11. But after some free decree of the divine will, there immediately follows in God (as I also said above) the knowledge of vision concerning that decree, in which it is consequently known that what was predefined by that absolute will is going to be. Concerning this kind of knowledge, it is most certain that the knowledge of one decree which in logical order is prior must necessarily be presupposed before the subsequent decree. As, for example, the knowledge of the intention of the end must be presupposed for the election of means, because the will cannot choose means without a prior judgment, and the intellect does not practically judge that means are to be chosen until it knows that the end is already intended—for it is intention that moves toward election, and it does not move unless known, because the connection of the election with the intention

already had must be known, so that by force of the intention the will is moved toward election. As in the intellect, to be moved toward a conclusion, it is not enough to already have assent to the principles unless it also knows the connection of the conclusion with the principles. There is, however, this difference: the will knows nothing, and therefore the intellect knows for both itself and the will. If therefore that judgment which God has after knowing the first decree about the end—concerning eliciting another concerning the means—if this judgment (I say) is called command, I do not dispute about the word, and I grant that such an act is necessary. But this command is not an act rationally distinct from those set out above in chapter six, as is sufficiently clear from what was said there.

12. And in this manner is to be philosophized about all the decrees of the divine will up to the executing will—before which we have already spoken enough in these and other chapters. After the executing will, however, there immediately follows on the part of the intellect the knowledge of that execution already made, together with which the judgment is conjoined that such execution is necessary, given such an election—which is a practical judgment and can be called command in that sense. Yet beyond this, no other rationally distinct act is necessary by which the will is impelled toward positing such an execution; indeed, no such act can even be conceived or explained as to what it is, as was said about the other acts of the will—for the reason is the same for all. And in the same way, given the executing will, the external action follows by a certain natural necessity, at the time and in the manner in which it was willed. And it follows from the force of the will itself immediately—immediately, I say, with respect to the intellect and the other acts of the will—whether the will does this immediately through itself, or through the executive power that is rationally distinct. For the latter remains applied to acting by force of such a will, and so applied, and with the same will persevering, it acts naturally and obeys the will as it were despotically—just as the power of local motion in animals naturally obeys the appetite.

13. From which it is sufficiently clear that that intellectual command, after the manner of an impulse, is not necessary for proximately applying or driving the executive power to act *ad extra*. But it can be doubted whether the proper cognition of the will—which has now willed execution—is per se necessary in God, or in any one who operates freely, so that the executive power may obey the will. It is indeed necessary that, given that will in God, God immediately intuits it and knows that he wills such an execution, since he cannot be ignorant of anything within or outside himself, of whatever kind it be. But this necessity

arises from the infinity of God's actual knowledge. Whether, however, such knowledge is per se necessary for the execution of that will, can not unreasonably be doubted, because the executive power is not like the will—which is moved by a known object—but is like an organ or instrument that is necessarily applied and effects what the principal agent wills. Hence without any command or intermediate judgment, by a natural sympathy of the powers, given the executing will, the action of the executing power seems naturally to follow. As in an animal, from the appetite the movement of the body naturally follows, even if the animal does not know its own appetite. This is indeed probable; and given it, it is clear that no kind of command is per se and immediately necessary in God for the application of his executive power to the work—even if command is taken not as impulse but as practical judgment; for this judgment will only be necessary remotely or mediately, insofar as it is necessary for the will; but given the will, nothing else is necessary. It can, however, probably also be defended that that cognition of one's own will and determination toward the execution itself is necessary for the perfect subordination of the executive and appetitive power, because in this way the operation is understood to be done more voluntarily and more vitally (if I may say so) while the agent, by knowing its own will, straightway executes by reason of it what it wills. As it is likewise necessary that knowledge should precede, directing the execution itself; for the executive power of an intellectual agent does not operate except insofar as knowledge itself represents it as to be done. Nonetheless, even if all these things are granted, there is never posited in the divine intellect an act rationally distinct from natural and necessary knowledge—either simply, or from the supposition of a free act—which is what we intend here.

14. *Concerning God's command toward others.*—It remains to speak of the command of God insofar as it is referred to the creatures themselves. Now in the present context we are speaking not of God's preceptive command—by which he imposes laws on rational creatures—but of his operative command, by which he operates both inanimate things and intellectual things physically and efficiently. For the former command does not pertain to the present matter, because we are not dealing with the precepts or laws which God imposes on his predestined—which are regularly the same as those he imposes on the reprobate—but with the command by which God efficaciously moves his predestined toward fulfilling his laws. Although even concerning law properly taken, as it posits or is understood to preexist in the lawgiver himself, it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that it can be nothing other than either the will to oblige subjects to do this or that, together with the will to manifest this will to

them and as it were to promulgate the law; or the dictate of the intellect by which the lawgiver judges this to be necessary for the integrity of morals of his subjects, to whom he therefore wills it to be proposed as a rule for their actions. On which matter more is to be said in the treatise on laws.

15. *What is to be thought about God's operative command.*—Omitting therefore this kind of precept or law, the command by which God is said to bring about things *ad extra*, referred to the things themselves, cannot be a proper command but must be metaphorical; and in reality it can be nothing other than the executing will, by which he determinately wills to make or move such a thing. This is proved, because a proper command can only be referred to an understanding thing, as such—which is evident from its proximate effect and quasi-correlative, which is to obey; for this properly belongs only to agents through intellect. But this command of which we are speaking is not in order to intellectual things as such, but to all effects of God; for it is posited on account of the efficacy of the divine operation *ad extra*, and the testimonies of Scripture adduced above proceed in this way. Therefore such a command in that proper sense cannot be posited as being in the intellect. This is confirmed and clarified, because to a proper moral command there corresponds a moral motion, mediated by an obligation imposed on another and manifested through such a command; but this is irrelevant to predestination, as I said—only what pertains here is that by which God efficaciously confers the effects of predestination, also with physical efficacy necessary on God's part. Therefore a proper and moral command of this kind is not necessary for this kind of providence. And the same reason proves the same concerning the work of creation and any other work of God. This reasoning also clarifies that those locutions of Scripture are not to be understood in that propriety in which command signifies law and precept, but that through them the efficacy of divine power is metaphorically declared—to which, without resistance, all effects obey; for they straightway receive existence, as he wills, or also perform what he wills, or are contained where he wills, according to Prov. 14: *And he set a law for the waters, that they should not pass their bounds*—which law is had in Job 38, where God speaks to the sea: *Thus far you shall come, and no farther*, etc. For these things cannot hear, that God should speak to them properly. It is therefore a metaphorical locution, for thereby is signified an efficacy—as also is that locution of Paul at Rom. 4: *He calls those things that are not, as things that are.*

16. *How the cited Scriptural passages are to be interpreted.*—From these things the response to the reason for doubt set forth at the beginning is easy. For we have now explained what kind of command is required for human action,

and how proportionately we are to speak about divine things. We have also explained how the testimonies of Scripture are to be understood. For those words—*Let there be light*—either only explain the efficacious will of God, which elsewhere is signified by the name of command; or they can also signify the practical judgment about creating light, which is not distinct from God's knowledge, and through it God does not speak to the creature he is going to make, but speaks to himself, leading his will to make it—driving it by no other means than by judging and knowing.

17. *Response to the objection.—When and how this command in God is necessary or free.*—When, however, it is objected that command is a free act, etc.: if by the name of command the executing will itself is understood, then the assumption is true and no difficulty remains. For those who speak this way say consequently that the intimation of the will is rather a notification of the command than the substantial command. And what pertains to the matter: that intimation, if it is with respect to himself, is only cognition of it; if with respect to others, it is a certain locution, as was explained. But if by command is meant the practical judgment of the intellect, which seems to impose law on the will and for this reason is called command—then it must be said that this judgment, or command, insofar as it precedes every will of God, is necessary: for he naturally judges what is fitting, what it is expedient to do, what is consonant with divine goodness, etc. Yet this judgment is not a necessitating command, but only proposing; nor does it by itself induce obligation with respect to the divine will, but only shows what befits it. Insofar, however, as this judgment sometimes presupposes one free decree by virtue of which it dictates about another decree to be had—which has a necessary connection with the other—if it can be said to be in some way free, that is, dependent on the prior free act, then also only in this way does such a command act as moving by way of proposing and representing. But if it has some greater force of driving, or sometimes even necessitating, toward the subsequent volition, it has this by virtue of the prior volition, which imposes necessity on the will itself, such that if it wills one thing it must also will another that is necessarily connected with the prior. And so command and its impulse never goes beyond the limits of judgment and will; hence it cannot be understood as some intellectual act that drives and is distinct from cognition and volition—either rationally in God or really in us.

17. The remaining matters that are touched upon in the foundation of the prior opinion will be dealt with in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVII
WHAT ACT FINALLY OF THE INTELLECT OR WILL OF GOD IS PREDESTINATION

1. It is manifest from the foregoing that predestination must be in the intellect, or in the will, or in both faculties simultaneously, because in God there are no immanent acts of another power, since he is purely intellectual. It is furthermore clear that predestination must be constituted in some act or acts from those we have explained, because through them—and not through others—God is constituted as predestining, to speak in our manner. Given these points, the dispute appears to be more about a name than about a thing—to which of those acts the word "predestination" will properly be assigned. Yet because theologians think variously about this, it must be briefly dealt with.

2. *First opinion: constituting predestination in the intellect.*—The first opinion therefore constitutes predestination in the divine intellect. St. Thomas holds this, pt. 1, q. 23, art. 1, ad 2, saying: *Predestination is a reason existing in the mind of God*, etc. He has the same for providence, q. 22, art. 1 in the body, and more clearly, art. 3. Capreolus follows in bk. 1, d. 40, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 1, and art. 2, concl. 2, and the remaining Thomists; Durandus, bk. 1, d. 41; and Richard, art. 1, q. 1.

3. *First reason.*—This can be founded first on the manner of speaking of Scripture, which indicates predestination through acts of the intellect, at Rom. 8: *Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined.* Where one word seems to be explained through the other. More clearly, at ch. 11: *God has not rejected his people whom he foreknew*—that is, predestined—as Augustine explains, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 18, as the context of the letter seems to require. Acts 2: *This man, delivered by the foreknowledge and counsel of God*—and yet in ch. 4, the same is expressed by the name of *predestination*, as I will say below. Finally, Eph. 1: *Predestined* (says Paul) *according to counsel*—but counsel pertains to the intellect.

4. *Second reason.*—Second, Augustine is in favor in a similar way, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14, where he defines predestination thus: *It is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whoever is freed is most certainly freed.* And in the course of the argument up to ch. 17, he proves that predestination exists in no other way than because in God there is

foreknowledge of the benefits to be conferred on those who are saved. And Fulgentius proceeds in the same way, bk. 1, *To Monimus*, ch. 8 and 11.

5. *Third reason.*—Third, because providence is an act of the mind, as Boethius testifies in bk. 4, *On the Consolation*, pros. 6, since providence is an act of prudence and reason; but predestination is a certain special providence; therefore. And the reason of each, according to St. Thomas, is that providence and predestination have the task of ordaining a thing or a man through fitting means toward its end. Hence also in Scripture predestination seems to be signified by the name of preordination: Acts 13: *As many as were preordained to eternal life believed.* But to ordain one thing toward another is an act of reason and intellect; therefore.

6. *Various explanations of the act of the intellect that is predestination.*—The said authors do not agree, however, in explaining the act of the intellect that is predestination. For Durandus wants it to be the act of knowledge that precedes the will; the Thomists want it to be the act of command that follows the will and is as it were the proximate principle by which God executes his will; others say it is a certain practical judgment by which God pronounced, as it were, a definitive sentence about the eternal happiness of those to be saved; others say that the knowledge of God itself is predestination—not however as it precedes God's free decree, but as approved through the decree.

7. *Second opinion: constituting predestination in the will.*—The second opinion constitutes predestination in the will. Bonaventure holds it, d. 40, art. 1, q. 2; Scotus, q. 1; Gregory, q. 1; Aureolus, q. 4; Gabriel, q. 1, art. 1; and at length Eck, in the book *On Predestination*, century 1, no. 17. This opinion can also be founded in Scripture, which more often declares predestination through acts of the will. Eph. 1: *He chose us in him*, and below: *Predestined according to his purpose.* But it is clear that election and purpose signify an act of the will; and at Acts 4, it is signified by the name of decree: *Which your hand and your counsel decreed to be done.* Where the Greek has Προώρισε, which means to predestine.

First reason of the second opinion.—And so reads Prosper, *To the Gauls*, ch. 13: "predestination of God is a decree of God"; but a decree belongs to the will, according to Esther 13: *There is no one who can resist your will, if you decree to save us.* Hence Isa. 14, where we read: *The Lord of hosts has decreed, and who can make it void*, the Greek has *The Lord willed.* Finally, that passage at Rom. 8 is relevant: *Those whom he foreknew he also predestined*, where he distinguishes predestination from foreknowledge—namely as will or purpose, according to what is added there: *Those who are called saints according to purpose.*

8. *Second reason.*—Second, we can confirm the same opinion in a similar way from Augustine, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 10, where he distinguishes predestination from foreknowledge, saying: *Predestination cannot be without foreknowledge, but foreknowledge can exist without predestination.* And he adds that predestination is the *preparation of grace*—which we explained above together with St. Thomas as preparation on the part of the agent, not on the part of the patient. And although St. Thomas, art. 2, ad 3, refers that preparation to the intellect, it seems to pertain more to the will, because a voluntary agent is proximately prepared to act through its purpose and will—especially when it does not need inquiry into means through the intellect, because it naturally foreknows all things. In such an agent, therefore, no preparation on the part of the intellect is necessary, but only on the part of the will. For preparation seems to signify a voluntary act, beyond natural knowledge or power. Hence St. Thomas, Alexander, and nearly all the Scholastics cite from Augustine, from the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, that predestination is the *purpose of mercy.* Yet these words are not formally found in Augustine, but seem to be taken from the fact that preparation and purpose seem to be the same. And Fulgentius seems to have understood it in the same way, in the said book, ch. 7, where he refers predestination to the will—which he continues in ch. 12 and following. Also Prosper, in the said book, ch. 8. Damascene also, bk. 2, ch. 30, distinguishes predestination from foreknowledge; and in ch. 26, defines providence through will—as Nemesius also did, in the book *On the Nature of Man*, ch. 43.

9. *Confirmation.*—Hence the reason of the prior opinion can be retorted in favor of this one, because providence pertains to the will; therefore much more does predestination. The antecedent is evident, because providence does not signify cognition but care and solicitude for those for whom provision is to be made; but this care pertains to the will; therefore. Also because, even though to know the order or proportion of means to an end pertains to the intellect, yet to efficaciously ordain so that means may come about for the sake of the end pertains to the will, for this comes about through election by force of intention. But providence consists in this practical and efficacious ordination. And for this reason Scotus said, in bk. 1, d. 6, q. 1, and *Quodlibet* 17, that the practical order pertains to the will.

10. *Third reason.*—There is the further consideration that predestination, from the side of the one predestining, expresses a determination so efficacious that, given it, it cannot but be the case that the predestined effect follows. For which reason Augustine, cited above, said it is the *preparation of benefits by*

which we are most certainly freed. But this whole efficacy and determination is from the will—hence once it is posited, the effect is already predestined; and until it is posited, he is not yet predestined. Therefore this is a sign that predestination consists in this will.

Fourth reason.—Confirmation.—Hence, however, an argument is concluded, because no act in the intellect appears to which the nature of predestination can fittingly belong. For either it is the act of knowledge that precedes the will—and this is not the case; both because that knowledge, as such, is not free but natural; and also because it is not of itself determined toward saving these rather than those. Or it is the practical command that follows the will—and of this act it has already been said that it is either not in the intellect, or can only be some judgment; which in God cannot have the nature of predestination, because it can be nothing other than the cognition of the free decree that God had, or of the future effect by force of it—but this cognition presupposes predestination already made, for by it a man is known as going to be saved, and is therefore known as predestined. Hence that sentence which is understood as written from eternity in the divine intellect—about giving the reward of glory to the predestined—seems both to presuppose predestination, and to be nothing other than a dictate about giving a reward to foreseen merits. Finally, predestination does not seem rightly to be constituted in the intellect on account of the knowledge of approbation, because beyond knowledge it adds only a denomination from the act of the will accepting such means or such persons toward glory; therefore much more is predestination to be placed in this act of the will, because through it means are chosen and efficaciously ordered toward the end.

11. *Various modes of explaining the second opinion.*—Within this opinion there can also be diversity in the mode of explaining it. For some call the act of election to glory itself predestination, because through it the man is efficaciously and altogether antecedently destined to glory; others want only the preparation of means to be predestination, because providence bears on means. Others finally say that predestination is constituted from all the acts of the will enumerated above.

12. *Third, middle opinion.—Cicero constitutes providence as part of prudence.*—The third opinion is that predestination simultaneously embraces an act of intellect and of will, and is therefore sometimes named from one and sometimes from the other. Alexander of Hales holds this concerning providence, pt. 1, q. 26; and if read attentively, he has the same for predestination, q. 28, Memb. 1, art. 2 and 3; and Marsilius, bk. 1, q. 41, art. 1,

note 2—although in the article at chap. 2, he joins to the intellect and will also a power that pertains more to execution than to predestination. Peter of Tarentaise holds the same opinion, d. 40, q. 2. This opinion is supported by the arguments of both opinions set out, and by the testimonies of Scripture and the Saints; for Paul conjoins counsel with election and with decree. And perhaps these words of Acts 4 signify this: *What your hand and your counsel decreed to be done*—for by the hand, metaphorically, the will seems to be signified, as the principle of action; and counsel is added because a prudent and efficacious decree seems intrinsically to require it. The same is true of perfect providence, which requires prudence, and therefore is also placed by Cicero as part of prudence; but a will is also necessary to apply and exercise prudence—indeed, in a way to demand it, insofar as perfect prudence requires a will well disposed toward the end. Since predestination therefore signifies the most perfect and efficacious providence for the attainment of such an end, it seems to include an act of both faculties.

13. *Judgment on these opinions.*—This controversy, as I said, has much to do with the use of words, or with names; and therefore we leave it to each person to speak as he pleases, for all the opinions set out are probable. It is only necessary to take care that certain opinions not be combined with others, from which—if taken together—some proposition may rightly be inferred that could offend the ears. As, for example, if someone says that election to glory alone, or the will to give glory, is predestination, and then holds that there is no pre-election to glory before foreseen merits—it is necessary that he consequently assert that there is a cause of predestination on the part of man. Which proposition, however, stated absolutely, today offends the ears and is to be avoided, as we will treat in the following book. Setting aside this inconvenience, therefore, it matters little whether predestination is attributed to the intellect, the will, or both. But so that we may prescribe for ourselves a certain form of speaking, I briefly assert two things.

14. *First assertion.*—First, if predestination is referred to the intellect, it is to be placed not in an act of command that is not knowledge or judgment, but an impulse or insinuation—for no such act exists in the intellect, as I showed—but either in practical judgment about the means through which the man elected by God to glory is to be infallibly led to it; in this judgment (I say), as approved and accepted by the will—and thus also including that knowledge of approbation from the will—so that that knowledge of approbation may add not only a denomination from the act of the will accepting, but also something from the intellect, beyond the knowledge antecedent to that will.

15. *Second assertion.*—Second, I assert that if predestination is attributed to the will, it is to be placed in the whole preparation of grace and glory that is understood in God from the first decree of election to glory, up through every will of the means and of the ultimate effect, which is glory itself as to be committed to execution. For all these things are included in or required of the perfect providence that predestination signifies, on the part of the will, as was sufficiently explained in what precedes. And to tell the truth, considering the propriety of the term, this manner of speaking is best accommodated to it, because *destination* properly signifies intention or purpose, as I said above. And whatever may be said about the signification of the term, in order to explain the difficulty of this matter we must speak principally about the acts of the will, for in them is the primary source of all the benefits that are conferred on the predestined; and in them it is especially to be considered whether predestination is gratuitous or not, and how it is the cause of the effects of the predestined in such a way as not to impede human freedom. And therefore by the name of predestination we will always understand the decree of the divine will to give grace and glory—whether that term can also be adapted to the intellect or not.

CHAPTER XVIII
WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS A PART OF PROVIDENCE, AND IN WHAT OTHER WAYS IT DIFFERS FROM IT

1. *The reason for doubting.* — It is the common manner of speaking among theologians that predestination is a part of providence, as is found in St. Thomas, *1 p.*, q. 28, art. 1, and q. 6, *de Verit.*, art. 1, and *in 1*, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 2, Capreolus there, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 2, Durandus, q. 1, num. 6, Marsilius, q. 41. This expression contains some difficulty, because both providence and predestination are an act of the divine will or intellect, and each is most simple: how, then, can the reason of whole and part be found in it? I ask also of what kind and mode of part this is to be understood. For it is either an integral part—and this is not the case, since there is no quantity there to which this reason of part could pertain—or it is a subjective part, and this too is not the case, since there is no common reason there, but the providence of God is unique and most singular. Much less can the other reasons of part and whole be applied here.

2. *The first manner of speaking.* — Two manners of speaking are possible here, for providence and predestination can be considered either on the side of their objects, or the matter with which they are concerned, or on the side of the divine act itself; and from either heading that relation can be explained. The first

manner of speaking, then, is that predestination is a subjective part of providence. For providence is conceived by us as a kind of genus or common, abstract reason, of which predestination is a particular species. For just as we distinguish in God several acts distinct by reason, so we can abstract from them a common reason, and conceive under it subjective parts. Thus we distinguish several ideas, from which we abstract the common reason of idea, and under that concept distinguish, as it were by species, the idea of man, of lion, etc. So too in the present case we can distinguish several providences distinct by reason —natural and supernatural—and among the supernatural, one sufficient providence for the non-elect, another efficacious providence for the elect, which is predestination. And thus predestination is called a part of providence, as it were a species of it, for species is a subjective part of genus. This manner of speaking is probable and can easily be maintained, because these expressions of ours concerning God are always understood with imperfections set aside, and so a distinction of reason between the acts of God suffices for it.

3. *The second manner.* — The other manner of speaking, which St. Thomas indicates and Cajetan explains more fully, is that predestination is, as it were, an integral part of providence—not indeed on the side of the divine act, on account of its simplicity, but on the side of the objects, in which a certain extension, multitude, and variety is found, and so the reason of integral part and whole can easily be conceived in them. Predestination, then, differs from providence in that the matter of providence extends more widely, for it embraces all things rational and irrational, natural and supernatural, and it embraces both sufficient and efficacious means. Predestination, however, concerns only a certain part of this matter, as is clear from what has been said, because it looks only to the supernatural end as infallibly to be attained by certain intellectual creatures through efficacious means. Rightly, then, on the side of matter it is said to be, as it were, an integral part of providence. This manner of speaking too is both true and easy. And in this respect it is the better proven that in providence one beholds, not a common reason, but a single, singular, and comprehensive reason, to which all those objects are compared, as parts of the matter with which providence itself is concerned. And the reason for this unity can be given: because providence regards all those things as connected and ordered among themselves, by reason of which connection one providence cannot be distinguished with respect to one part of the matter without including in some way a relation to the others; and so the whole collection of all those things, or matters, having connection among themselves, is as it were a single object of one most simple providence. For it is in this way—from the union of an object

embracing several matters—that we are accustomed to derive the unity of a habit or act of mind. And although it cannot be denied that through inadequate concepts we can divide that providence in relation to diverse parts of the material objects, nevertheless we do not conceive those reasons as several providences, but as parts of one providence—parts which, however, we find real only in the objects or matter, not in the act of God itself. And according to this reason of part, predestination is said to be a part of providence on the side of the objects, not on the side of the act.

4. *How predestination includes all providence.* — From this we can further add and infer that predestination, speaking more generally of predestination so as to include the predestination of Christ, in a certain way includes all providence. For although the inadequate object of providence seems directly to include more than the object of predestination, nevertheless the object of predestination is the principal and primary one, and as it were the end to which all the others are referred in some way. Hence, just as in the sciences the primary object, if it is such that the rest are referred to it, is also accustomed to be reckoned in a certain way adequate—if not, as they say, *in recto* and directly, at least *in obliquo* and reductively—so here the object of predestination can in some way be called adequate to the whole of providence, and consequently predestination can be said to include in itself the whole of providence. This is favored by that saying of Paul, *1 Cor.* 3: *All things are yours, but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's.* For it signifies that all providence tends toward the salvation of the elect, and these toward the glory of Christ, and finally that all the elect, together with Christ himself, are ordered to the glory of God. So in *Matt.* 24, that effect of providence—the shortening, namely, of the days of the persecution of the Antichrist—is said to be for the sake of the elect. And Augustine, on Psalm 54, says of the wicked: *that they live for this, that they may be corrected, or that the good may be exercised through them.* But living is an effect of providence, which Augustine reduces to predestination. And therefore theologians say that the world will last until the number of the predestined is fulfilled. Thus, then, predestination in a certain way embraces all of providence, although, simply speaking and according to direct objects, providence extends more widely, and so predestination is a part of it.

5. *Two other differences.* — *The first.* — Besides this difference, two others can be noted between predestination and providence, which will explain their reasons more fully. The first is that predestination has the infallible attainment of the particular end of the very person predestined; providence, however, does not include the infallible attainment of the particular end of any creature whatsoever

to which it is beneficial. Not that providence necessarily excludes this attainment, but that it does not necessarily include it: for sometimes it attains the end, sometimes it does not. St. Thomas establishes this difference expressly, q. 6, *de Veritate*, art. 2, and *in 1*, dist. 40, q. 1; and let it be read attentively—*1 p.*, q. 23, art. 3 teaches the same. Likewise Giles, *in 1*, d. 39, q. 2, where also Durandus, q. 3, and d. 40, q. 1, where also Capreolus and Marsilius, *in 1*, q. 40, and Sylvester in the *Conflatum*, q. 22, art. 2.

The first difference is proven as to its first part. — And the first part indeed is most certain, as is clear from all that has been said and from Paul, *Rom.* 8, and from that word of Augustine, *de Bono persever.*, c. 14, *by whom they are most certainly freed*, with countless similar passages. From what source, however, this certainty and infallibility of predestination arises must be discussed at length in the course of this matter. For now it is said briefly that the absolute certainty of a future event arises formally from the absolute purpose of the divine will, but presupposes the infallible conditioned knowledge of future contingents, of which we have already spoken.

6. *As to the second part, Cajetan is not satisfied.* — Before I prove the other part, let me report the opinion of Cajetan, who, *1 p.*, q. 22, art. 1, denies that providence differs from predestination in this respect. For he holds that it pertains to the perfection of divine providence that it infallibly attain the particular end to which it orders any creature whatsoever. And it is said that St. Thomas retracted his view, because there he had said that God provides for all things, and that what he provides is provided in the manner in which it is infallibly brought about by him. His reason is that otherwise divine providence would fail and be frustrated, which would belong to imperfection. For in every craftsman or governor, it is an imperfection not to attain the end he intends, and not to apply means efficacious for this very purpose. This is proven because either this comes from ignorance of such means, or from inability to apply them if he knows them; for if knowledge and power are present, will cannot be lacking, if the end is truly intended. Therefore, if God intends the end of his providence, either he infallibly attains it, or he is powerless, or he is ignorant of the means—neither of which can rightly be attributed to him.

7. *But it must be admitted as certain, as is proven by induction.* — Nevertheless, the difference stated seems to me certain, and is proven first of all by a certain induction. For it cannot be denied that God has a supernatural providence concerning men who are not saved, which he affords them so that they may attain the supernatural end for which he created and ordained them; and yet in them such providence does not have this effect, that is, the attainment

of the particular end. Therefore this is not of the essence of providence. The inference is evident. The antecedent, moreover, is most certain, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 23, art. 3, and as is established by common passages of Scripture: *He wills all men to be saved*, and *he enlightens every man*, etc. And we shall speak of this at length below in Book Four, when treating of supernatural providence concerning men who are not elect. The same may be seen in natural agents. For they often fail to attain their particular ends; hence arise those monstrous effects which are called the sins of nature, and which are accidental with respect to the particular agent, since they fall outside its intention. Yet these natural agents tend toward their ends as ordered by the first agent, and from him they have a providence accommodated to the attainment of those same ends. Therefore in them too providence does not have the infallible attainment of the particular end.

8. *The a priori reason why providence is not said to include infallibility.* — The a priori reason, however, is this: as I was saying, there are two sources from which infallibility can arise. The first is the intention of such an end existing in the will of God. The second is the will to give the means which God foreknows will be most efficacious for such attainment. From neither heading, however, does providence have the said infallibility in its full extent. The first part is proven because God does not always intend the end by absolute will, but sometimes by a simple affection, or by a will including some condition which God does not absolutely will, and which depends on a created cause and can be impeded. Such an intention of the end does not have an infallible connection with its attainment, for this is proper to the absolute will alone. All this may be seen in the example of the reprobate, insofar as God intends glory for them; and the same holds proportionately in natural agents. The reason for this is that God is free and can intend particular ends as he wills. Add to this that nothing more is owed to particular agents themselves, if they are considered in relation to their connatural ends. For with respect to the supernatural end, not even the very tendency toward such an end is owed, but is added to nature out of God's liberality; therefore God could, at his discretion, not confer such an ordination on all by an absolute decree, but only by a simple affection, without an altogether absolute and efficacious intention.

9. And from this the other part is easily clear, because God does not always will to give those means which he foreknows to be efficacious. For a means is rendered ineffective in two ways. First, from the intrinsic condition of the particular agent, which is free and can resist—a freedom which God wills to preserve, nor is he bound always to forestall it in such a way that it is infallibly

brought to one side, for he provides sufficiently for it if he grants sufficiency. In another way a means becomes ineffective on account of some other extrinsic impeding cause, as happens in natural things—an impediment which God does not always will or owe to remove, since he is the universal provider. On account of which Dionysius rightly said, c. 4, *de Divinis nominibus*, that it does not pertain to the end of providence to do away with nature, but to come to the aid of each thing according to the requirement of its own nature, and to allow each thing to operate in a manner suited to its own nature. Therefore on no count does providence have that infallible attainment.

10. *To Cajetan's foundation it is responded.* — Hence the response to Cajetan's foundation is easy, for this does not arise from impotence or ignorance, but from the freedom of the divine will, and because this is also more consonant with the things themselves and with the office of universal governor. Nor does it follow from this that God in no way intends such an end, but only that he does not intend it efficaciously, which is true. Nor must it therefore be said that divine providence is frustrated; for what fails from one order of divine providence falls into another. As the sinner who fails of reward falls into punishment. In this way Augustine said, in the *Enchiridion*, c. 11, that God does not permit evils except in order to draw forth goods from them, which Damascene also treats at length, *lib.* 2, *de Fide*, c. 29.

11. *Providence never fails altogether of the universal end.* — Hence it must finally be observed that, although providence sometimes does not attain the particular end, it never altogether fails of the universal end of providence itself, because, as the Church says: *God is not deceived in his providence.* For whenever a particular cause is not going to attain its end, God does not fail to know this, nor does it happen without his permission—a permission which he refers to another end pertaining either to the end of the whole universe, or to the manifestation of some divine attribute. And finally he refers all things to his own praise and glory, which is the universal end of providence, and which is always intended efficaciously. This alone, then, was necessary for perfect providence, and it is altogether sufficient. And thus it comes about that divine providence, simply speaking, is never frustrated. And in this same sense it is true what St. Thomas said: *All things happen just as they are provided by God*; for those things which are provided efficaciously and from the absolute divine will come about in the same manner in which they were provided; but those which are intended only antecedently, or inefficaciously, are provided proportionately, as regards the sufficiency of the means and as far as is on God's part; but as regards the effect, according to the cooperation of the creature.

12. *The second difference between providence and predestination. — Providence concerns things that are presupposed.* — The second difference is that providence presupposes, in the order of reason in the mind or will of God, the existence of the thing for which it provides; predestination, however, does not in itself presuppose it, but brings it with itself, or includes it. I explain the first part. For just as we said that in predestination there are two things on the side of matter—namely, the object which is predestined, and the term to which it is predestined—so in providence there are two things: the subject for which provision is made, and the good which is provided, or procured, for it. This second is not presupposed as future, but is ordained to be through providence itself; the first, however, is presupposed as future, or, as others say, as existing in the presence of eternity. This Nemesius rightly taught, above, c. 42. For just as in time the execution of providence, which is governance, is related to the thing existing in itself, so in eternity the reason of providence is related to the future thing; but governance does not exist except of things already existing; therefore providence does not exist except of things which, according to the order of reason, are presupposed as future. And this is confirmed, because providence concerns means; it therefore presupposes the institution of the thing for such an end; therefore it also presupposes the will to create such a thing for the sake of such an end; and this is to presuppose, in eternity, that thing as future.

13. *Predestination presupposes its term, and its object, only as possible.* — From this the other part, which we touched on above and deferred to this point, is easily made clear—namely, that predestination presupposes neither its term nor its object as future, but only as possible, and through predestination itself it is ordained to be. This I take from St. Thomas, q. 6, *de Veritate*, a. 1. And it is best illustrated in the predestination of Christ, who is the exemplar of our whole predestination, as Augustine attests, *lib. de Praedestin. Sanctor.*, c. 15; for Christ was predestined, as man, to be the natural Son of God, before this man Christ as such is presupposed as existing, or as future in the mind of God, but through predestination itself he was ordained to be, and to be such, that he might at the same time be the natural Son of God. Therefore it is not of the essence of predestination that it presuppose the existence of its object. This is also made clear in our own case from what has been said: for predestination does not presuppose, but intrinsically includes, the destination to the end preconceived in the mind of the one predestining; but the ordination to the end does not presuppose that the thing which is ordered to the end already exists, since it is through the same will by which it is ordained to exist for the sake of such an end. Hence, since the end is first in intention, the thing cannot be in intention

prior to its being destined to such an end; for we are dealing with the end for the sake of which the thing itself is first instituted, and with the first agent, who orders the thing to the end not only according to accidental being, but also according to its first, substantial being.

14. *An objection is dissolved. — Another objection. — Solution.* — And therefore it is no obstacle if someone should object that a thing is sometimes instituted for one end and afterward ordered to another. This is true of a secondary end, but not of the primary; eternal beatitude, however—for the sake of which the predestined were created—is their primary and proper end. And therefore they were not first ordained to existence by the will of creating them before they were ordained to be blessed by the will of glorifying them. You will say that for a thing to be created for such an end, ordination to it by a simple will suffices, and an efficacious destination is not required. I respond that with respect to men in common this is true, and is clear in the case of the reprobate; but in the predestined there is not given a twofold intention and ordination to that end, one efficacious and the other inefficacious, but only an absolute destination. And therefore by this very destination they are ordained to beatitude, in the same sign in which they are ordained to existence.

15. *The will to create and to elect the predestined is a single will. — And to elect the predestined is a single will. — The objection is satisfied.* — It must, however, be observed that just as the will predestining to the end does not presuppose the will to create the predestined, so neither, conversely, does the will to create the predestined presuppose the will to give him glory, but by a single, simple will such a person is ordained to be for the sake of such an end. The reason is that glory or beatitude is not predestined in the abstract, or, as others say, *ut quod*, but is predestined to someone, of whom it is the form and perfection—which does not happen except insofar as some person is predestined to it. But no one can be predestined to be blessed without being intrinsically predestined to be. Therefore that will cannot be prior to the other in reason.

16. *Objection.* — You will say: whatever is later in execution is prior in intention, and conversely, what is prior in intention is later in execution; but for the thing to be created and to exist is, in execution, prior to its being beatified; therefore in intention it was later; therefore God willed to beatify man before he willed to create him. I respond that that maxim holds true between an end and means, which do not intrinsically constitute the end itself, but are extrinsic or efficient causes of its attainment. It does not hold, however, between a subject and a formal end, for from both, in their own way, the total end is intrinsically

constituted. Now in this manner are the person who is predestined and the glory to which he is predestined related: for glory is the end *cuius gratia* (for the sake of which), while the person is the end *cui* (for whom) that glory is procured. And therefore, although in time the person comes to be before the glory, nevertheless in eternity glory is not loved prior to the loving of such a person, and therefore it is not loved prior to that person also being loved and ordained to be blessed forever.

CHAPTER XIX
HOW PREDESTINATION IS COMPARED TO GRACE AND TO SUPERNATURAL GOVERNANCE

1. *Predestination seems to be compared to grace as cause to effect. — How these two differ from each other. — Another difference.* — This comparison seemed necessary for an exact and proper understanding of predestination, and it will contribute not a little to understanding what we shall say about the causes and effects of predestination. Augustine, then, in the book *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 10, and *de Bono persever.*, c. 14, touching on this comparison, says that predestination and grace are compared as cause and effect. *Because predestination* (he says) *is the preparation for grace, while grace itself is the actual giving.* Hence below he says: *Wherefore the predestination of God, which is grace with respect to the good, is the preparation of it, while grace is the effect of that very predestination.* From this teaching of Augustine we can gather a twofold difference between predestination and grace. One is that they differ as the eternal and the temporal, for predestination is eternal, grace temporal, as is creation. Hence Augustine says in the same place: *What the Apostle says—"we are his handiwork, created in Christ Jesus unto good works"—is grace; but what follows—"which God has prepared, that we should walk in them"—is predestination, which cannot exist without foreknowledge.* And it can be explained by analogy, for predestination is related to grace, or to the supernatural governance proper to the predestined, just as providence is related to governance in general—as the temporal to the eternal—as St. Thomas attests, *1 p.*, q. 22, art. 1, ad 2, because providence denotes the cause, governance the effect: the former denotes the eternal reason by which God governs, the latter its execution, which takes place in time. Therefore predestination is related to glory in the same way: for as whole to whole, so part to part. Hence the same St. Thomas, q. 23, art. 2, said that predestination formally posits nothing in the predestined, but causally posits grace—which indeed it does in time, through

supernatural governance. And from this difference another seems to follow, namely that predestination is uncreated, as being eternal, while grace is created, as being something temporal and made. Each difference, however, contains some difficulty, which must be set forth and briefly resolved for a fuller explanation of this comparison.

2. *The first difficulty concerning the first difference. — The second difficulty.* — Concerning the first difference, then, there is first of all a difficulty, because predestination itself is a certain grace: for it is a kind of natural benefit conferred gratuitously on man, and this is grace. For here grace is not called only the sanctifying form, but every supernatural gift and benefit by which glory is procured. Hence not only is grace that which intrinsically inheres in man, but also many extrinsic goods, if they conduce to supernatural happiness. For thus Augustine reckoned among the gifts of grace the having of persuaders to good and the not having of persuaders to evil, in the commentary on Psalm 87, and *lib.* 50, homily 13. Therefore, although predestination does not inhere, predestination is true grace, because it is a great supernatural good, gratuitously conferred. Predestination and grace, then, do not universally differ as cause and effect, but also as two graces, which can be cause and effect to each other; thus predestination can be compared with respect to subsequent graces. Hence grace too will not always be temporal, but there will be some eternal grace. Then there is another difficulty concerning the same part, especially when comparing predestination with the governance of the elect: because governance is twofold, as is gathered from St. Thomas above, one active, the other passive. I ask, then, of which of these is that difference to be understood? For of the passive it is self-evident both that it is temporal and that it exists in those who are governed, for it is, as it were, a passion received in the one undergoing it; but this is not relevant to the matter we are treating, for we are dealing with governance as it stands on God's side, and so with active governance. But active governance seems to be eternal: for it is not distinguished from providence, as St. Thomas holds, *1 p.*, q. 103, art. 6, 7, and 8, and it is clear, because by the same eternal act by which God from eternity prepares benefits for the elect, he governs them in time. For God does not have within himself any other reason of governing in time besides that which he conceived or decreed from eternity; that reason of governing, then, and active governance, is therefore eternal, and does not differ, even in reason, from predestination and providence, taken proportionately.

The third difficulty concerning the other difference. — Third, a difficulty arises here concerning the other difference, because not every grace is created; for predestination itself is a certain uncreated grace, and the grace of union is

uncreated, and the Holy Spirit himself, insofar as he is conferred on the just in his own person, can be called a certain grace, just as the divine essence, as given to the blessed in the manner of an intelligible species, is truly called an uncreated gift.

3. *Grace signifies three things.* — The first difficulty seems to arise from the multiple meaning of this word "grace," which St. Thomas treats, *1, 2*, q. 110, art. 1, where he says grace signifies three things: either love and benevolence, or a gift gratuitously given, distinct from that love and proceeding from it—such that the former may be called grace remaining in the one conferring grace, the latter grace passing into the one on whom grace is bestowed when grace comes to be —or the recompense of a benefit received, when we say we render thanks (*gratiam*) for it. Setting aside for now this third meaning, which will perhaps be of use to us in the following book, the first two serve to resolve the present difficulty. For in the first meaning it must be granted that predestination is a certain grace—which St. Thomas himself taught in the same place, saying: *Sometimes God's own eternal love is called the grace of God, according as it is also called the grace of predestination, insofar as God gratuitously, and not from merits, predestined or elected some.* For it is said, *Eph.* 1: *He predestined us unto the adoption of sons, unto the praise of the glory of his grace.* Hence, in citing this testimony, St. Thomas seems to interpret it in the same sense, such that the word "grace" in those words signifies the gratuitous beneficence which God singularly displays through predestination as through the greatest grace.

4. *In what sense Augustine used the term "grace" in the place cited.* — Augustine, however, in his definition of predestination, and in the difference he establishes between it and grace, takes this word in the second meaning—not, indeed, in its full breadth, since there are many gratuitous gifts that do not pertain to predestination, but insofar as it signifies the gratuitous gifts *by which whoever are freed are most certainly freed.* And grace taken in this way is rightly distinguished from predestination, as effect from cause, and as the temporal from the eternal. For such grace is transient, not immanent in God, and nothing transient outside God is eternal, but necessarily proceeds from eternal reasons and from eternal love. And St. Thomas, in the cited question 23, art. 2, ad 4, must also be understood in this way.

Grace is also said to be a gift consisting in something intrinsic. — I note in passing, however, that although this grace is said to be transient, it is not necessary that it always and universally pass over into the one predestined in such a way as to be intrinsically received in him. For although the grace intended through predestination is principally that which intrinsically inheres in

the predestined, according to that saying, *he chose us in him, that we might be holy*, and that saying, *Eph.* 1, *he predestined us unto the adoption of sons*—for this adoption, and true sanctification, comes about through intrinsic grace, as also that conformity with Christ of which it is said, *Rom.* 8: *Whom he predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son*—nevertheless the grace which is the effect of predestination, and is called temporal, extends more widely, and sometimes consists in external gifts, or causes, or circumstances, sometimes in the removal of evils or occasions—all of which Augustine excellently comprehends under the name of "benefits," by which the elect are most certainly saved.

5. And from this it is clear that predestination is related to the singular governance of the predestined man just as general providence is related to general governance. For just as governance includes all the actions and effects by which God confers on creatures the means necessary or fitting to their ends, so that singular governance includes every action of God by which he effectively brings the elect to the end of predestination. And it can be called *singular beneficence*, because it embraces all the benefits by which whoever are freed are freed. Hence, just as that governance is the adequate effect of providence, so this beneficence is the effect of predestination; and just as governance is temporal and providence eternal, so this beneficence is temporal and predestination eternal.

6. *The second difficulty is resolved. — The active governance of God is also distinguished from predestination. — The transient action by which God governs is created and temporal.* — Now since in the second difficulty it is asked of which governance the discourse is—active or passive?—it could be answered in one word that the discourse is of the passive, and of that which passes outside of God, as was said of grace. For just as Augustine spoke of this grace when he distinguished it from predestination, so we can speak of the beneficence and governance which is said to be God's, not intrinsically (so to speak), but emanatively, that is, not because it is in God, but because it is from God. And this is what St. Thomas seems to have held, in the cited q. 23, art. 2, ad 3, distinguishing in this way between predestination and governance, or grace, as between preparation, active and passive. We add, however, that even speaking of active governance, some difference must be established between it and predestination—at least this one, that the one is simply eternal, as we said of predestination, the other simply temporal, as we shall explain of governance. To make this more distinct, I note that in active governance three things can be considered: first is the transient action by which the effects of governance are

brought about in creatures. Second is the art of the divine intellect which directs that action. Third is the act of the will moving toward that action. Concerning the first, it is a matter of controversy whether that action is in the creatures or in God himself. I, however, judge it to be in the creatures. Hence, if active governance is taken for this action, it is manifest that it is distinguished from predestination and providence not only by reason but also really, and as the created from the uncreated, and as the temporal from the eternal. St. Thomas, however, in the cited q. 23, art. 2, says that governance is the execution of providence, and nevertheless adds that it exists passively in those governed, but actively in the one governing. Hence either he is speaking of active governance in this sense, or he certainly does not place this action in God the agent himself. And yet even in this way, although active governance is uncreated, as existing within God (and hence in this respect not differing from providence and governance), it can nevertheless be distinguished in reason by relation to creatures. Because predestination, or providence, does not denote the relation of one actually influencing, which active governance does denote. And by reason of this diverse relation, they can also be distinguished as the temporal and the eternal: because that relation of reason to the creature, as of one actually influencing it, is temporal. Just as active creation, under that denomination, is temporal, even though the real action itself is constituted in God himself.

7. *The art of the divine intellect directing governance is the active governance itself, and they differ only by reason of what is connoted.* — Concerning the second, namely the art, or reason, existing in the divine intellect, directive of this action, it must without doubt be said that the art of the divine intellect which is providence and that which is active governance are altogether the same, and they differ only in that governance seems to connote the actual relation of an influencing cause, which providence does not denote. Just as it is the same art by which a man knows how he ought to write, and by which he actually directs his hand when he writes, and they can differ only in us as habit and act—a distinction which has no place in God. But those who place, besides the art, a command of execution in the intellect, will perhaps in that respect distinguish active governance from providence; we, however, do not acknowledge such an act as distinct from the practical judgment of art or prudence. And therefore we do not distinguish those two as two attributes, or two acts, in the mind of God. This is plainly what St. Thomas held, *1 p.*, q. 103, art. 6, saying in the body of the article, and ad 1: *Providence is the very reason of governance*—at least as regards the internal act, which he places in God. For by relation to an actual cause, or

action, they can be distinguished by reason, indeed as the eternal and the temporal, just as was said of active creation and of every act of God *ad extra*.

8. *Predestination differs by reason from governance insofar as governance denotes the executive will.* — Concerning the last member, on the divine will, insofar as it either constitutes or enters into predestination, or is the principle of execution and of governance *ad extra*, two orders of acts can be distinguished within the divine will, according to what was said above. One is the order of intention, the other the order of execution; and the former can be said to pertain to predestination, the latter to execution and governance. And thus predestination and the singular active governance, both existing within the divine will, are distinguished from each other by reason, yet not as the created from the uncreated, since each is within God; nor as the temporal from the eternal, for each is eternal—but only as preparation and proximate principle of execution. Now that very executive will can be considered both in itself, as eternal without any respect or temporal denomination, and as actually influencing, or denominated under the aspect of actually governing and benefiting, from the action itself, or the relation, which exists in the creature. And thus it can be said, under the former aspect, to pertain to predestination, because considered in this way it also pertains to the eternal preparation on God's part; under the latter aspect, however, to belong to governance and beneficence, or grace. And thus also active governance is distinguished by reason from predestination, or providence—not indeed as the created from the uncreated, since the act of God's will itself is always uncreated—but by our relation or denomination, by reason of which they also differ as the temporal and the eternal: temporal, I say, as to denomination, or relation of reason, not as to the entity itself, as has already been sufficiently explained.

9. *The third difficulty is resolved. — The opinion of some. — Grace can be called both uncreated and created. — Uncreated grace is given joined to a created gift.* — As to the third difficulty concerning the second difference—that grace differs from predestination as the created from the uncreated—some contend altogether that there can be no uncreated grace, on account of the manner of speaking of Augustine in the cited book *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 10. I, however, first of all assert that, speaking of grace in its full generality, and as it abstracts from those two meanings which we noted above from St. Thomas, some uncreated grace can in this way be given. For St. Thomas expressly, in the cited q. 110, art. 1, *in 1, 2*, calls God's own eternal love "grace." And Gaspar Casalius speaks in the same way, *lib. de Quadripartita justitia*, c. 4. Nor does Augustine's testimony stand against this position, because he is not speaking of

grace in its full breadth, but in a more limited meaning, distinguishing it from predestination and eternal love, as is clear from the text. I add further that even grace, as a gratuitous gift, can in some way, or in some part, be uncreated—not only in the grace of union, where the matter is clear, but also in the grace of justification. For it is certain among theologians that the very person of the Holy Spirit is the gift which is given to the just in a special way when they are justified, such that not only created gifts are given to them, but also an uncreated gift, as we shall show at the end of the following treatise. And in the homeland, the divine essence itself is given to the blessed, not only as the terminative object of the vision, but also as a co-principle aiding the vision in the manner of a species. And in this life the assisting grace can sometimes be God himself, as aiding and strengthening our faculty through himself. It is indeed true that this uncreated grace is never given to us except as joined to some created gift, or through the mediation of it; this, however, is no obstacle to the uncreated gift itself receiving the denomination of grace, since it is truly given, and given gratuitously, and given out of supernatural love. For thus the Son of God himself, insofar as he was given to us out of God's singular love, *John* 3, is called by that same John, c. 1, *grace for which*—that is, on account of which we receive every other grace—for thus I interpret: *and grace for grace*. I admit, then, that not every grace, even one distinct from predestination, is a created gift; nor did Augustine ever say the contrary. Nevertheless, that which is uncreated always receives the denomination of grace under some relation, or temporal denomination, with respect to which it always differs from predestination as the temporal from the eternal—at most, this is what can be gathered from Augustine's teaching. Hence it can also be said that nothing is denominated grace in this way unless it is either created, or joined to some created gift. This, however, is not necessary for predestination as such.

CHAPTER XX
HOW PREDESTINATION IS COMPARED TO THE BOOK OF LIFE

1. St. Augustine, *lib.* 10, *de Civitate*, c. 15, signifies that predestination is the very book of life, of which frequent mention is made in Scripture, saying: *That book does not bring God to remembrance, lest he be deceived by forgetfulness, but it signifies the predestination of those to whom eternal life will be given.* St. Thomas, however, *1 p.*, q. 24, art. 1, ad 4, holds that predestination is distinguished by reason from the book of life, because predestination is presupposed to the book of life by way of object, or matter concerning which—

because in the book of life, that is, in knowledge, *are written*, that is, are known, *those who are already predestined.* For, as Augustine says in the cited place: *God does not fail to know, and he does not read in this book in order to know, but rather his very foreknowledge of them*—that is, of the predestined—*which cannot be deceived, is the book of life.* For this reason, then, for the completion of this book, it seemed necessary also to make this comparison, and at the same time, in passing, to explain that whole question 24 of St. Thomas, and that metaphor of the book of life, and some manners of speaking of divine Scripture concerning it.

2. *The book of life signifies the knowledge and foreknowledge of the mind. — The book of life is used in Scripture both with an addition and without one.* — To begin, then, with the metaphor of the book of life, it is certain that it signifies the knowledge, or foreknowledge, of the mind. To explain this, I note that this word "book," metaphorically taken, is sometimes found in Scripture placed absolutely and without addition, as *Daniel* 12: *At that time your people shall be saved, every one that shall be found written in the book. Exod.* 32: *If you do not, blot me out of the book which you have written.* More often, however, it is placed with the addition "of life," as *Apoc.* 20: *Whoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire.* Sometimes a double determination is added, as *Apoc.* 21: *None shall enter into it, but he that is written in the book of life of the Lamb.* Sometimes too we find in sacred Scripture "the book of the just," as *Josh.* 10. Likewise this word is sometimes placed in the singular, as in the places cited and others to be adduced below; sometimes in the plural—and whenever it is placed in the plural, it is placed absolutely and without determination, as *Daniel* 7: *Judgment sat, and the books were opened*, and *Apoc.* 20: *I saw a great white throne, and one sitting upon it, and all the dead standing before the face of the Lamb, and I saw the books opened*, etc., and below: *And the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books.*

3. *The first opinion concerning the book of life — not satisfactory.* — Hence a variety of opinion has arisen in expounding the meaning, or metaphor, of that word, which it seems necessary to report here briefly, and to set forth the true exposition, for the resolution of our question. First, then, some have held that in such passages of sacred Scripture the word "book" is not always taken metaphorically, but sometimes properly, for a material written book. Bede, on *Apoc.* 20, understands by the books to be opened on the day of judgment the books of sacred Scripture, because then it will be evident that what the Scriptures had taught about that day is most true. This exposition, as far as it pertains to that passage, does not seem fitting, for it is added: *And the dead were*

judged out of those things which were written in the book according to their works. For they do not seem to be judged out of what is written in sacred Scripture, since not all the works of those to be judged are written there, nor the punishments corresponding to each work—both of which are written in the mind of God.

4. *The second exposition.* — Differently, Burgensis, on the passage *Exod.* 32, thinks that the discourse there is of a book, not by metaphor, but properly—that is, of a certain book in which the notable deeds of the illustrious persons of the people of Israel were written. Hilary seems to favor this, on *Psalm* 68: *Let them be blotted out of the book of the living.* And some think this is the "book of the just" mentioned in the books of Joshua and Kings.

5. *This is rejected.* — But the propriety of that word does not seem sufficiently fitting even to that passage, both because it is said there *of the book which you have written*—but that book of illustrious men does not seem to have been peculiarly written by God; indeed, at that time there was no material book singularly written by God, since the Scriptures did not yet exist—and also because God immediately adds: *Whoever has sinned against me, I will blot him out of my book.* Where also that particle "my" has the same force and indicates that the book is something higher, and is, in a peculiar manner, divine, and called, as it were by antonomasia, "the book of God"—all of which cannot be fitted to a material book.

The third exposition. — Likewise it is signified by those words that no one is blotted out of that book except by sin, which best suits the book of the just written in the mind of God. One could indeed say that book is to be understood metaphorically, yet not as the book pertaining to predestination, or to righteousness before God—because thus Moses would seem to have exceeded too much in his petition—but as the book in which God had, as it were, recorded for himself the leaders and princes of that people, at the head of whom he had placed Moses, so that the sense is: either do this, or take away from me this office in which you have placed me—the removal of which would blot him out of that book. This is a fairly probable exposition.

The fourth exposition, of Augustine. — Yet Augustine's exposition, in *Question* 247 *on Exodus*, is not to be despised—namely, that this is to be understood also of the book of spiritual life, and by way of exaggeration: as if Moses had said, *either do this, or do not count me among your friends*—not that he willed this, or truly chose it, but in order to signify that it was as impossible that God would not spare what he was asking as it would be for him to fear being deprived of God's friendship without fault.

6. *A fifth interpretation, also of Augustine. — Not satisfactory. — A sixth exposition. — Not proven. — The truer exposition.* — We suppose, then, as the truer view, that that expression is metaphorical. The metaphor itself, however, is also variously explained. And first, concerning the books spoken of in the plural, Augustine, *20*, *de Civitate*, c. 14, explains that the books to be opened on the day of judgment are the saints themselves and the elect, who will come to judgment with Christ. They are called books because in their life and conduct the observance of God's commandments will be made known, and it will be established that it was possible for men, and so by comparison with them others will be judged and condemned. But although the metaphor is ingenious, it does not seem fitting to the passages of sacred Scripture in which it is found: for in *Apoc.* 20, it is immediately added: *And the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works.* The discourse, then, is of books in which such works are written. Hence others understand by the books the consciences of all who are to be judged, in which the works of each, whether good or evil, will be shown. This metaphor too is probable, and is not disapproved by Jerome, *Daniel* 7, but it is not altogether proven either, because in fact in the consciences of men all their works do not remain written, but are easily given over to forgetfulness. And although God will then, by his omnipotent power, give to each one actual and evident knowledge of all that he did in this life, according to that saying of Paul, *Rom.* 2: *Their conscience bearing witness to them*, etc., *on the day when the Lord shall judge the secrets of men*—yet that will not so much be the opening of books already written, as the writing of them anew, or, as it were, transcribing them in the knowledge of each. Rightly, then, by the name of books are understood those things which remain indelibly inscribed in the knowledge and mind of God.

7. *Why the books are spoken of in the plural, and what is written in them. — The first view of Jerome.* — But why are the books called by a plural name, when God's knowledge is one and most simple? And again, what things, or persons, are described in those books? As to the first question, it can easily and generally be answered that the book is in reality one, on account of the most simple knowledge of God, which is signified when it is named absolutely in the singular, as in *Psalm* 130: *In your book all shall be written.* By virtue and reason, however, they are several, insofar as they contain the deeds of many men, or even of orders both of angels and of men. As to the particular question, answering at the same time the other question, Jerome says, on *Daniel* 7, that those books are two—one of the good, with their good works, the other of the wicked, with their sins—and he says the former is the book of life, and

consequently indicates that the latter is the book of death. But because Scripture does not attribute to God a book of death (as we shall say below with St. Thomas), St. Jerome adds that the book of the good is in God, but the book of death is in the devil, as their accuser, *Apoc.* 12, and for this reason the names of the good are said to be written in heaven, *Luke* 10; but of the wicked it is said: *They who depart from you shall be written in the earth*, *Jer.* 17. But because in the Apocalypse it is said that the dead were judged out of what is written in the books, it is indeed likely that all those books are in God, because, as I reported above from Augustine, God does not read in some book outside himself in order to pass judgment; therefore the books by which he judges are not outside his knowledge.

8. *The second view.* — And therefore others simply admit that there is in God a book of the wicked as well as of the good, and of death as well as of life. This Basil seems to signify, *Isai.* 4, where, having said that there is in the heavenly Jerusalem a book in which the elect are spiritually written unto life, he adds that it is necessary to know *whether there are some who are written, indeed, but not unto life, but, according to the saying of Jeremiah, "deserters shall be written on earth." According to this sense, then, two writings must be understood: one of those who are written unto life, the other of those who are written unto perdition.* It is true that Basil does not sufficiently express that both writings are in God, for rather, in alleging Jeremiah, he says that the wicked are described on earth. Nazianzen also, *Orat.* 9, *ad Julianum*, num. 41, mentions a book of the living and one of the perishing, which, according to what has been said above, can easily be distinguished by reason, and consequently called by their proper names. And to the same effect is what Euthymius says, on *Psalm* 68: *In your book all shall be written*—namely, that the metaphor of the book, placed absolutely in sacred Scripture, is accustomed to signify the general foreknowledge in which both the good and the wicked are written. Hence the same foreknowledge is sometimes signified by way of one book in the singular, on account of its simplicity and unity; sometimes by way of several, on account of the diversity of the objects and persons. It is also urged by reason, because there is no doubt that the reprobate are foreknown by God. Why, then, should their foreknowledge, and clear knowledge, not rightly be called, by metaphor, a book? If this is so, surely the "book of death" will rightly be so called, because those who are written in it are foreknown only unto the second death. St. Thomas responds that the metaphor of the book is not so fitted to this foreknowledge as it is to that of the elect, because, although it is customary to write in such a book those who are admitted to military service, or to a society,

or to public office, it is not customary, however, to make a book in which are written those who are expelled from military service, the commonwealth, or the society. But against this it may be objected that in right governance there is not only a catalogue of those who are worthy of reward, but also of those who are to be punished, and especially with death.

9. *Resolution.* — Nevertheless, although there can be no controversy about the thing signified—since it is established that there is in God a foreknowledge of the elect and of the reprobate, and that one is, by reason, distinct from the other—nor, speaking of what is possible (so to speak), can it be denied that the metaphor of the book, or books, could be accommodated to either foreknowledge; nevertheless, speaking of the usage of Scripture, it is more probable that in it this metaphor is not used to signify specifically a book of the reprobate existing in the mind, or knowledge, of God. We do indeed find in Scripture the whole foreknowledge of God called a book absolutely and without any addition, as appears clearly in those words of *Psalm* 68: *And in your book all shall be written.* Of this book is to be understood what the Church says in the prose for the dead: *A written book shall be brought forth, in which all is contained, from which the world shall be judged.* For in that book not only are the persons to be judged described, but also all their works, by which they are to be judged. Nevertheless, sometimes also "book," said absolutely, signifies the foreknowledge of the elect, as is evidently clear from the words of Daniel 12: *At that time your people shall be saved, every one that is found written in the book.* For if "book" there were taken in that generality, it would not be true to say that all who were described in that book would be saved; but more often that metaphorical word is applied to the predestined alone, by some added qualification, as *Phil.* 4: *Whose names are in the book of life*, which Paul uses as a special prerogative of those saints of whom he was speaking—a prerogative which would not exist if all, even the reprobate, were written in that book. And the same is the sense of other passages in which the same particle is added.

10. Hence I gather, in passing, that that particle "of life" does not signify, so to speak, the paper, or material, on which the writing of that book is made, but the object, or term, of the writing of such a book, so that it is not called "book of life" because it is written in life itself by essence. This sense is forced, and may better suit those words of *Luke* 10: *Rejoice, because your names are written in heaven.* For by the name of "heavens" seems to be signified the very essence of God, which is heaven by essence—naming the content from the container, or the located from the place, and designating the paper of that writing. But when it is said "book of life," this is not what is signified, but the object—that is, who

are described in that book, namely those who attain life and salvation. For if "book of life" were so named from the fact that it is in God, who is life itself, the reprobate too would be written in the book of life. Augustine, however, *20*, *de Civit.*, c. 14, says: *the book of life reads the life of each one*, and thus thinks that life means that life which we lead here, that is, the works of this life. But that particle "of each one" is not in the text, and therefore does not compel this, nor can it even be sustained—both because in that way the reprobate too would be written "in the book of life of each one," against that saying, *They shall not enter into it* (that is, the heavenly Jerusalem) *who are not written in the book of life*, *Apoc.* 20 and 21, and also because we shall presently teach that there are other books, of consciences, or of the works of this life, distinct from the book of immortal and eternal life. Therefore the book of life is named from its term, which is the book of those predestined to eternal life.

11. When, however, it is added "in the book of life of the Lamb," perhaps someone may suppose this is done to restrict the discourse to predestined men alone, since the life of men is specially attributed to the Lamb, because through the Lamb they have attained it. But I think that angels too are saved and predestined through Christ, and that therefore their names too are written in the book of life of the Lamb. And indeed John's discourse, in that whole chapter 21 of the Apocalypse, concerns the whole heavenly city of Jerusalem, which is composed of angels and men, and he calls it the bride of the Lamb, and concludes of it that none belong to it except those who are written in the book of life of the Lamb. Therefore that second addition is added for the singular glory of Christ, since all life, and the whole glory of the blessed, belongs to him by a peculiar title, because it is procured through his merits.

12. But we will never find in Scripture either the name "book" placed absolutely taken specifically for the foreknowledge of the reprobate, or, with some peculiar addition, placed to signify a special book of death, or of the wicked. And this alone is what St. Thomas wished to signify when he said that there is no book of the dead. And his reason for this is sufficiently fitting, because it is not customary to write in a special book those who are excluded from military service, but only those who are admitted. When it is objected that it is also customary to describe in a book those who are punished, certainly this does not seem very customary either. And if it sometimes occurs among men, it is for this reason: that they need that record in order to provide for something in the future, or to use that record as an example for punishing similar persons. This reason ceases in God, and so also ceases the foundation of that metaphor in this respect. It is also added, moreover, that according to the phrase of Scripture,

God is said to know his elect in a peculiar way: *The Lord knows who are his*, *2 Tim.* 2, to which also pertains that saying of *Psalm* 1: *The Lord knows the way of the just*, and that of *Rom.* 11: *God has not cast off his people, whom he foreknew.* But the reprobate are rather said to be unknown and not known, according to that saying, *I know you not.* Hence of the reprobate it is said, *Psalm* 68: *Let them not be written with the just.* For God knows the elect with a knowledge of approbation, and describes them, as peculiarly beloved by him, in his own special book, in order to show that he has a peculiar care for them also. The reprobate, however, although they cannot fail to be in the knowledge of God, on account of his infinity, are nevertheless not granted a peculiar book, because their knowledge is a knowledge of reprobation; hence they are rather said to be blotted out of the book. Finally, for this reason the names of the elect are said to be "written in heaven," *Luke* 10. But of the reprobate it is rather said that they are blotted out, and "written on earth," *Jer.* 17. Hence Jerome, above, calls their book earthly, and places it in the hand of the accuser rather than of God.

13. *Objection. — Response.* — Only in that passage, *Apoc.* 20, do the book, indeed even the books in the plural, seem to be attributed to the reprobate alone, who there seem to be signified under the name "the dead." For it is said: *And the books were opened, and another book was opened, which is the book of life*; therefore the book of life is distinct from the other books; therefore in those other books the elect are not described, otherwise they would include in themselves the book of life; therefore those books contain only the reprobate; there is given, then, in Scripture not only a book, but also proper and special books of the reprobate. I respond, first of all, that it is false that by the name "the dead" there are understood the reprobate; for the discourse there is not of those dead spiritually, but of those dead bodily and resurrected, whether to life or to punishment, as is established from those words: *I saw the dead, great and small, standing before the throne of God*; and below: *And the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books*, etc. For not only the reprobate but also the predestined are to be judged. Likewise it is added below: *And the sea gave up the dead that were in it, and death and hell gave up their dead.* By these words the resurrection of dead bodies is described, as is self-evident, and as Augustine explains at length, *20*, *de Civit.*, c. 14 and 15, and the commentators on that passage. Therefore those books too, by which the dead are judged, pertain both to the predestined and to the reprobate; for all are judged according to their works.

14. *Another response.* — But notwithstanding this, it must be granted that those "books" are in some way distinct from the "book" which is said to be "of

life." How, however, they are themselves several and are distinguished from the book of life, I explain thus. For one is the book of persons, another of actions or works: the book of life is of persons, in which the elect and predestined are written, insofar as they are such; and therefore it is called, by antonomasia, either absolutely "the book," or "the book of God," or "the heavenly book," or "the book of life." In this book we can understand the elect to be described before, in another book, their merits are described, because by force of gratuitous election alone to glory, and to fitting grace, they remain described in God's foreknowledge in the number of those to be saved—hence, just as election is not from merits, neither is this description. But because that election is not to be fulfilled except through merits, since glory in effect is not to be given except on account of merits, therefore another book is necessary in which works are described, in which also demerits must necessarily be written, because for the exact judgment of all works knowledge and comparison are necessary. Thus, then, is the book of life distinguished from the books by which judgment is made. These too can be called one book, with respect to the unity and simplicity of God's knowledge; nevertheless, on account of various relations, they are named in the plural, because they are "books of consciences," as Jerome says, at the beginning of *Psalm* 88. And although he himself signifies (as I also reported above of Augustine) that the conscience of each is his own book, and so those books are not so much in God as in the minds of those to be judged, nevertheless we can rightly understand that the knowledge which God has of the consciences of each is the books by which he judges—which are called several with respect to several consciences, just as several ideas are spoken of. Another reason also occurs, namely, that with respect to the works to be judged, two books are required, one of which contains the deeds, the other the law: for God, in his eternity, first, according to reason, wrote the law, assessing rewards and punishments for works, so that, namely, whoever sins thus shall be punished thus, whoever sins otherwise shall be afflicted with such a punishment, and proportionately concerning merits and rewards. Then, in another sign, he had beforehand in his knowledge the works and future deeds of each. These two books, then, are to be opened at the judgment, so that the deed may be proved from one, the law pronounced from the other. Gregory explains it differently, *24, Moral.*, c. 6, elsewhere 9, and Augustine differently, *20*, *de Civit.*, c. 14 and 15.

15. *Resolution of the whole question.* — It remains, then, from all this, that the book of life signifies metaphorically the eternal knowledge which God has of all who are going to attain eternal life. From this it is easy to determine the

question we have proposed, and to compare the book of life with predestination. They are so similar to each other, and so conjoined, that Augustine could not unreasonably have spoken of them as one and the same attribute; yet, strictly speaking, St. Thomas rightly said that they differ by reason. Both points, moreover, will not be difficult to establish, by explaining the respects in which they seem to agree or differ with each other. They agree, then, first, because all the persons who are written in the book of life are predestined, and no more and no fewer; and conversely, however many are predestined, are written in that book. This is clear from the words of Daniel 12: *Everyone shall be saved who shall be found written in the book.* The exclusive is added, *Apoc.* 13 and 17, where it is said that all worshipped the beast *whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb.* And more clearly, c. 20: *Whoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire.* And c. 21, it is said of the heavenly Jerusalem: *None shall enter into it but those who are written in the book of life of the Lamb.* Whoever, then, is written in that book is saved; and whoever is not saved is not written there; but whoever is not saved is not predestined, and all who are saved are predestined, as we said above against Catharinus. Therefore, in this respect, predestination and the book of life are convertible with each other; whence further they also agree in this, that, just as we said of predestination, so too the book of life is an eternal act, immanent in God, and altogether free—that is, not necessary, but dependent on God's discretion; hence either it is predestination itself, or it follows proximately upon it according to reason.

16. And indeed, if predestination is attributed to the will alone, the distinction of reason is clear. For the metaphor of the book clearly signifies something pertaining to the intellect. For just as speaking, so too writing, is the office of the intellect; hence Aristotle also said that man's intellect is like a blank tablet, on which nothing is depicted or written; hence it begins to be depicted in it when the images of things begin to be imprinted in it—and it begins to write in itself when it begins to know. Thus, then, the book attributed to God is in his intellect, and is nothing other than a catalogue of all who are to be saved, inscribed in the mind, or knowledge, of God. Thus, then, just as the intellect is distinguished by reason from the will, so the book of life from predestination; and just as the absolute foreknowledge of future things predefined by God follows, according to reason, upon the electing or predefining will, so too the book follows from predestination, and is necessarily conjoined with it. For by the very fact that God has chosen these to beatitude, he has inscribed them in his knowledge as infallibly to be saved. If, however, predestination is referred to

the intellect, the distinction does not appear so necessary, nor so easy. But because St. Thomas, although he places predestination in the intellect, nevertheless distinguishes the book of life from it by reason, it can be explained in this way: because the book denotes only, as it were, a speculative knowledge, or intuition, of those to be saved—for it is (as I said) a kind of catalogue of such persons—whereas predestination denotes a practical judgment, dictating and directing the execution of the infallible means which have been approved by the will for the salvation of the elect. And thus the book of life, perfect and complete (so to speak), presupposes predestination as constituting its object. Thus, then, strictly speaking, predestination and the book of life are compared; although, on account of their utmost conjunction, they are sometimes reckoned as the same.

17. *A difficulty.* — One difficulty remains, however, because the book of life does not seem to be as firm and certain as predestination, and therefore they do not seem to be as connected as we have said. The antecedent is shown thus: because from predestination no one can be removed—*for those whom he foreknew in such a way as also to predestine, he will infallibly glorify*, from *Rom.* 8 —and therefore by way of exaggeration it is said, *Matt.* 14: *So that they may be led into error, if it be possible, even the elect*—but because most certainly this will not happen, it is added: *Nevertheless, for the sake of the elect, those days shall be shortened*—hence that saying of *1 John* 2: *They were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us.* But from the book of life those who are written in it can be blotted out, as seems to be supposed in *Exod.* 32, *Psalm* 68, and *Apoc.* 3.

18. *This is answered.* — This doubt is easily resolved by saying that it is a manner of speaking of Scripture to express a negation by way of an affirmation, just as God is said to hate one whom he does not love in a peculiar way. Thus, then, Ansbert and Haymo say, on *Apoc.* 3, that to be "blotted out of the book of life" is nothing other than not to be written in it. For thus it seems to be explained in that same *Psalm* 68, when it is said: *Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with the just.* For the latter words seem to interpret the former. Therefore the word "blot out" is not taken with that propriety by which it signifies the removal of what was once written, but as it signifies the negation of writing; and so in this it does not differ from predestination, for one too can be said to be excluded from predestination. Hence, in this sense, what is said in *Apoc.* 3—*He who shall overcome shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot out his name from the book of life*—is the same as if it were said: *He has, in consequence, attained the life to which he*

was predestined. And this opinion is very similar to that of *2 Peter* 1: *Be diligent that by good works you may make sure your calling and election.*

19. *Another response.* — Differently, St. Augustine, on *Psalm* 68, understands the word "blot out" positively (so to speak), or as signifying the deletion of that which was once written; he says, however, that in this way nothing is blotted out from the book of life that was in fact written there, but only according to the hope, or opinion, of men, such that those are said to be blotted out who hoped, or thought, that they were written in the book of life, and afterward will understand that they were not written there—and so they are blotted out rather from the book written in their own mind than from the knowledge of God. And in much the same way is interpreted that expression of Ambrose, on *Apoc.* 3, and of Rupert, *lib.* 4 *in Exod.*, c. 29. Nor is this foreign to another usage of Scripture, which sometimes speaks of things not as they are in themselves, but as they are in the opinion of men, as *John* 5, Christ says: *If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true*—namely, in your opinion. And in this sense too there is no difference between predestination and the book of life, because one can also be said to be "blotted out" of predestination, which he falsely promised himself, by mistaken faith, opinion, or hope, without works; hence, when in the Apocalypse God promises, *he who shall overcome, I will not blot him out*, it is the same as if he said: not only in his own hope, or in the opinion of men, but truly and in fact, he will be written in the book of life. Nor by such a promise or threat is any uncertainty signified, either of predestination or of the book of life, but it is only signified that the execution of each depends on our works done with the grace of God. And so this exposition is probable, although it explains that blotting-out too metaphorically.

20. For this reason St. Thomas, in the cited question 24, art. 3, says that some are written in the book of life in two ways: either only as to the life of temporal grace, or also as to the life of glory, or of perpetual grace. Of those who are written in this latter way, it is established that they cannot be blotted out of the book of life; of the former, however, they can be. Hence he consequently signifies that "the book of life" is sometimes taken for the book of eternal life alone, and so does not admit of blotting-out; sometimes for the book of the life of grace, whether temporal, or abstracting from temporal and eternal, and thus does admit of blotting-out—not a change of the book itself, but a change of those inscribed in it, in the manner in which God is said now not to know what he formerly knew, because the thing has changed—that is, he now does not know him to be just whom he formerly knew to be just, because that man, by sinning, lost his justice. And thus some distinguish "the book of life" from the

book "of the just," such that the former is only of the predestined, the latter of all who are at some time just. Hence it must consequently be said either that predestination is conjoined only with the book of life simply so called—that is, of the life of glory and eternity—or, at any rate, that predestination itself is also twofold: one, simply, which has conjoined to it the book of life simply; the other in a qualified sense, that is, with respect to grace, or temporary faith—and from this latter too a man can fall, just as he can be blotted out of the book of life. And thus there will be no discrepancy between these, in this respect, if they are taken proportionately. This exposition too is probable, and is followed by Anselm and Lyranus, on *Apoc.* 3.

21. This exposition has, however, some difficulty as to the phrase and usage of Scripture, in which it is absolutely stated that all are saved who are written in the book of life; and accordingly it seems that "the book of life" is never taken except for the book of eternal life—as can be established from the places cited above, *Daniel* 12, *Apoc.* 20 and 21, and *Phil.* 4. This also seems to be presupposed by Augustine, Ambrose, Rupert, and the other saints cited. But St. Thomas, in the cited art. 3, extends the description of the book of life so as to say: "the inscription of those ordained to eternal life," which is broader than the inscription of the predestined, by which, in art. 1, he had defined the book of life. To this, however, St. Thomas tacitly responds that the book of life is indeed only of eternal life, as art. 1 also makes clear. Nevertheless, in it someone can be described either simply—that is, according to predestination—or in a qualified sense—that is, according to the ordination of grace. This teaching, in itself, is indeed true, and as to what is possible does not conflict with the metaphor of the book of life; nevertheless, in fact, and according to the usage of Scripture, the book of life seems to be the inscription of the predestined, as the same St. Thomas had defined it in art. 1, in the body of the article and ad 4; and so it will be necessary to hold to one or the other of the two first expositions.

THE END OF BOOK ONE

BOOK TWO
ON THE CAUSES OF PREDESTINATION

Having explained the nature and, as it were, the essence of predestination, it follows that we should speak of its causes, effects, and properties; and the order of the doctrine requires that we begin with the causes. On this matter all the treatise-writers on this subject dispute most extensively, since on this point concerning the cause of predestination the principal hinge of this disputation has hitherto turned, both between Catholics and heretics, and among Catholics themselves; and Augustine deals with it especially in the several books which he wrote on this subject—books in which the disputation on the cause of predestination is so joined with the disputation on grace that they can scarcely be separated. We shall, however, take care, so far as it can be done, to distinguish them, and to refer to the treatise on grace those things which pertain to that subject, though it will sometimes be necessary to touch on something of it. First, then, with a certain division set forth beforehand, we shall lay open the state of the controversy and its various members, and afterward we shall run through them one by one, disputing both with the heretics and then with the Catholics.

CHAPTER I
THE STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY, AND THE MULTIPLE SENSE OF THE DISPUTATION, IS LAID OPEN

1. Nearly all the doctors who dispute on this matter first lay down that the cause of predestination can be investigated either as regards the act itself of God, in which we said it formally consists, or as regards the effects which predestination posits, or produces, in the predestined. And they say that in the present matter there cannot be a question about predestination considered in the former way, as regards the act itself of God, because, since it is something uncreated and eternal, it cannot have a cause; and that consequently the whole controversy must be referred to the effects of predestination, which, since they are created, require a cause, which is what is investigated in this part. So, more or less, St. Thomas, *1 p.*, q. 23, art. 5 and 8, and similarly *3 p.*, q. 24, art. 3, and q. 19, art. 5; Bonaventure, *1*, d. 41, art. 1, q. 2; Richard, art. 2, q. 1, and others commonly there, and in *3*, d. 7, whom Driedo follows, *lib. de Concord.*, cap. 3, at the beginning, and cap. 4, *ad 4*. Hence, since (on the testimony of Augustine, *de*

Bono persev., cap. 14, and *de Praed. Sanctor.*, cap. 10) the effect of predestination is grace itself, or the donation of grace, it follows that to seek the cause of predestination is nothing other than to seek the cause of grace, or of the donation of grace. This is evident, because (as they say) the cause of predestination is sought only as regards its effects, and these effects are all contained in some way under the name of grace; therefore.

2. *The sense of the controversy.*—I, however, hold that this controversy must be disputed, and was indeed disputed by the Fathers, not only concerning the cause on the part of the effects of predestination, but also on the part of the divine act itself which is predestination. Otherwise this disputation would have to be left entirely to the treatise on grace, where, since grace itself is not treated there, neither should its causes be treated. But because the effects themselves of predestination can be considered in two ways—either as they are given in time, or as they are prepared in eternity—it is not unreasonably inquired whether they have a cause not only in the former respect but also in the latter, and this is what properly pertains to this subject; nevertheless, because of their connection, we cannot omit discussing something of both. We shall therefore speak first of the causes of predestination on the part of its effects, and then on the part of the divine act itself.

3. *A twofold cause, both physical and moral.*—But in order to set this forth better, and, while comprehending the whole subject, to separate the certain from the uncertain, let us distinguish a twofold cause, physical and moral. A cause is called physical which, of itself and through a real influence proportioned to itself, gives being to the effect. A cause is called moral, however, for a twofold reason: namely, either simply because it acts freely, and in this sense it is not distinguished from a physical cause but adds to it the condition of liberty; or because it does not itself influence the effect immediately, but morally applies a physical cause, or induces it to do something. Hence, a moral cause in this latter sense presupposes a principal cause acting of itself through intellect and will, which is induced or inclined to do something by a moral reason, such as that of merit, petition, satisfaction, or some similar reason. In the present matter, therefore, we investigate both of these causes with respect to predestination, but especially the moral cause; for the physical cause either pertains more to the treatise on grace, or in the present subject presents no difficulty. But in order that this very point may be made more certain, and for the completion of the subject, we shall say a few things about it.

4. Finally, it must be observed that there are four heads from which the cause of predestination can be investigated or conceived: namely, either on the

part of God predestining, or on the part of the very man predestined, or on the part of Christ the Lord, in whom and through whom we are all chosen and predestined, or finally on the part of any other third person whatsoever, who is not the head of all men, as Christ is, but a fellow-member of the same body. Here we treat principally of the cause of predestination on the part of the man predestined himself, and this question has been treated most extensively by Augustine and by the Scholastics, for the consideration of the remaining causes either presents no difficulty—as the first, concerning the causality of God, and the last, concerning the causality of some third private person—or pertains to another subject, as is the question about Christ the Lord, which belongs to the treatise on the Incarnation, where, regarding the first question, and the nineteenth, of St. Thomas, it has been treated at length by us. Here, then, we shall treat ex professo according to that question; the remaining matters that seem necessary we shall touch upon. And first we shall speak of all that pertains to predestination on the part of its effects, and afterward of what can pertain to it on the part of the divine act.

CHAPTER II
WHAT PHYSICAL CAUSES PREDESTINATION HAS AS REGARDS ITS EFFECTS

1. *That there is given a physical cause of the effects of predestination.*—Since to seek the causes of predestination on the part of its effects is nothing other than to seek the causes of the effects themselves, it is established first of all that some physical cause must necessarily be assigned to all the effects of predestination. This is proved, because all the effects of predestination are something created; therefore they require an efficient physical cause, from which they receive their being. Likewise, predestination itself is the cause of such effects, as Augustine teaches, and as we shall say ex professo in the following book; but it is, as it were, a first cause, or the reason of acting for the first cause itself, which does not operate all these effects immediately but through secondary causes; therefore.

2. *That God is the end and the principal efficient cause of such effects.*—Hence, second, it is certain that the principal efficient and final cause of all these effects is God himself. This is certain as a matter of faith, because God himself is the first and principal author of grace and of glory, according to that saying: *The Lord will give grace and glory.* And since he operates all things for his own sake, as for an end (according to that saying: *The Lord has worked all things for his*

own sake), with much greater and higher reason has he worked for his own sake those things which pertain to the carrying out of the predestination of the elect. For he chose them for the manifestation of his own glory and grace, and that he might be perpetually praised and glorified by them. Material and formal causality, however, have no place in God, and therefore we say nothing of them.

3. *On the necessary or possible cause, which it is.*—Third, it must be said that outside God and the man himself who is predestined, no other physical cause of such effects is required of itself, intrinsically, and from the nature of the case—though it is not repugnant that God should use one. When and how he uses one for all or some of the effects of predestination does not pertain to the present subject, and involves various questions belonging to other matters. This assertion, then, is laid down chiefly concerning the efficient cause, and consequently the final cause. For concerning the material cause I shall speak presently, while concerning the formal cause there is no question at all, as I shall say shortly. As to the efficient cause, then, I explain it briefly: of itself, God alone is the author of grace, not only as the first cause but also as the proximate, connatural, and principal cause, because he alone can communicate that proper participation of his own divinity which comes about through grace; the other gifts of grace are, and dispose toward, or accompany, that participation, and therefore have the same cause of themselves. God, moreover, of himself needs no instrument for his own proper effects, nor the cooperation of any other extrinsic cause, especially since there is nothing outside God himself which, by its own nature, can have these effects; therefore, from the nature of the case, no physical cause of such effects is necessary outside God. Only as regards certain effects which are vital can the influence of the man himself who is predestined be required, as I shall say presently; every other extrinsic cause, therefore, is not necessary of itself and, as it were, from the nature of the case. That God can, however, use such a cause as an instrument is not in doubt, where a question at once arises: whether the humanity of Christ the Lord is the physical cause of all these effects, at least from the time the Incarnation took place, or from the time the Passion was consummated. Likewise, whether the sacraments of the new law are the physical cause of certain such effects which depend on them. These questions and similar ones are not to be treated here, especially since they have nothing special with respect to the predestined. God also uses the ministry of angels and men to bring about these effects in the predestined, concerning whose causality it can also be doubted whether it is physical or only moral; but it matters little, for it is certain that it is only per accidens in the physical genus and in true real influence. For thus I understand universally that saying of Paul:

Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. It remains, therefore, only to explain what physical causality is required of itself for effects of this kind on the part of the man himself who is predestined, which we shall briefly establish by running through the several genera of causes.

4. *How man is the cause of such effects.*—Fourth, then, it must be said that man has a physical material causality with respect to all the effects of predestination which come about in him, whether they be habits, or acts, or other interior helps of grace; for all these are received in the soul, or in its faculties, and are drawn out of its capacity, although an obediential one, since they depend on it both in their being and in their coming-to-be. In this sense Augustine said, *de Praedest. Sanct.*: *to be able to have faith belongs to the nature of men; but actually to have it belongs to the faithful, by grace*; and Bernard, *lib. de Grat. et lib. Arbitr.*: *It is God who gives grace; free will, however, is capable of it*; and similar things are found in Prosper, *lib. 2, de Vocat. Gent.*, cap. 3, and Fulgentius, *lib. de Incarnat. et Grat.*, cap. 22, 23, and 24. It must only be noted that this capacity is such that from it there arises no debt (so to speak) for the whole order of grace, or for all the gifts of grace—that is, that notwithstanding such capacity, it is not owed to human nature to be elevated to the order of grace, or to be made a partaker of its gifts. It is not (I say) owed, not only by proper justice or merit, which is self-evident, but neither by a debt of proportion, or of connatural exigency, in the way in which the connatural properties of an essence, or the general concourse of a secondary cause, are said to be owed. The reason is that even this debt is repugnant to the perfection of grace, because otherwise grace would no longer be grace, but a gift owed by nature.

5. The root of this excellence of grace, however, must be taken from the end to which the whole providence of grace tends; for that end is supernatural and not owed to nature, and therefore the means also to that end are supernatural and not owed to nature. These means, moreover, are the aforesaid gifts of grace. Hence it follows a fortiori that much less can the congruous and efficacious help, infallibly leading to such an end—which is proper to the predestined—be owed to nature; for if the sufficient gifts themselves are not owed, much less will the efficacious ones be. Likewise, because if they were owed, they would be given to all; for God does not deny, without a special miracle, what is owed to nature—but this is manifestly false. There is, however, a certain difference to be noted, because sufficient grace, although not owed to nature considered in itself, and much less as affected by original guilt, is

nevertheless in some way owed to nature ordained to the supernatural end, with the duty of procuring that end. Efficacious grace, on the other hand, is owed to no one, not only by reason of nature considered in itself, but also not as ordained and elevated to the supernatural end, since it is not given in this way even to all men or angels. And the reason *a priori* is that ordination to such an end of itself only demands sufficient means, while the rest depend on the divine will, which accommodates the means according to its own foreknowledge and will, and this can by no title be owed to nature. And therefore this material causality has no bearing on the cause of predestination with which we are concerned.

6. Fifth, predestination also has a physical efficient cause on our part with respect to many of its effects—namely, those which consist in the vital acts of man himself and are usually comprehended under the name of actual grace. For habitual grace is infused by God alone, although it requires a disposition on the part of the adult man; that disposition, however (as is the more probable opinion), does not physically effect the habits themselves, apart from the causality of the sacraments. Vital acts, however, cannot come about in us without us, according to true philosophy; and therefore, although they are principally given by God, man also has, with respect to them, his own physical efficiency, secondary and less principal. Only a distinction must be noted among these acts: for some are human and free acts, such as acts of faith, charity, and the rest; others, however, precede human consent and deliberation, such as divine inspiration and the touch of the heart, and similar movements, in which operating, preventing, and exciting grace consists, when it is intrinsic. With respect to the former, then, man has not only physical efficiency but also moral efficiency, which consists in free cooperation, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, session 6. With respect to the latter, however, man does not concur morally, and therefore he is said rather to be acted upon than to act; he does, however, concur physically, according to the truer opinion, because such movements are truly vital, and that physical influence of a vital faculty belongs to the intrinsic reason of such an act, inasmuch as it is vital. Thus, then, there can be in man an effective causality with respect to predestination as regards its effects, even as regards the first effect, which is given in execution; for this can be some interior inspiration or illumination.

7. From this effective causality, however, or even from the faculty possessing it, no debt follows with respect to such gifts. For neither does a debt of connaturality follow, because that whole efficiency is supernatural, in such a way that human faculties do not concur except as elevated, and (as I myself

hold) through an active obediential potency, of which more elsewhere. Nor does a debt of justice, or of merit, or any moral debt whatsoever follow, because if the efficiency is merely physical and not free, and consequently not moral either, it cannot be the foundation of such a debt; and if it is also free, this always presupposes some grace given without such a debt, as we shall say. Therefore this physical mode of causing, precisely considered, does not pertain to the cause of predestination which we are investigating.

8. *What the final cause is.*—Sixth, it is certain also that, as regards the final cause, it is given in predestination with respect to many of its effects, as St. Thomas admits, the article cited, in the body and *ad 1*. Indeed, Durandus, in *1*, d. 44, q. 2, said that a final cause of all the effects of predestination is given in us, namely the beatitude of the predestined—for he himself does not count that among the effects of predestination. And it is without doubt true that all the other effects are ordered to that as to an end; nevertheless, because it is truer that beatitude itself is comprehended among the effects of predestination, as we shall see in the third book, it is therefore truer that no final cause of the whole of predestination, insofar as it embraces all its effects, is given in us, but that this is the divine glory, to which the very beatitude of the predestined is also ordered. Comparing these effects among themselves, however, one is for the sake of another, as for an end—as the calling is for the sake of free disposition, this for the sake of justification, and this for the sake of the fruits of justice up to glory.

9. It must be considered, moreover, that this end of predestination—whether it be the ultimate end with respect to all the means, or the proximate end in one means with respect to another—is always a supernatural end. Hence, although it comes about in man, it is nevertheless not principally from man himself, but from divine grace, and properly does not cause finally in the way it would if it came from man; for as such it would rather have the character of an effect, but it is as it is intended by God through a certain love not owed to nature, but from the mere gratuitous will of God. This is especially true in the case of the predestined, with respect to whom such an intention is absolute and efficacious, as we have said; and therefore, by virtue of this final causality, predestination does not have its foundation or origin in man, but in God.

10. And these things suffice concerning these physical causes; for as to the formal cause, nothing need be added, because these effects of predestination, which are received intrinsically in the predestined himself, are certain forms or acts of the soul, or of its faculties, and therefore do not properly require other physical forms, for they themselves are forms adorning and formally perfecting man. Sometimes, however, one effect of predestination, according to some

moral consideration, and as it were by metaphor, is said to be the form of others —as charity is said to be the form of faith and of the other virtues, and the intention of the end is in a certain way the form of the choice—but these expressions have no bearing on the present controversy.

CHAPTER III
WHETHER A MORAL CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION AS REGARDS ITS EFFECTS CAN BE GIVEN ON THE PART OF THE MAN PREDESTINED

1. *How God is a moral cause.*—We restrict our discussion to the cause on the part of the man predestined, because we deal here only with that moral cause which is distinguished from a physical cause, as being that which merits, which obtains by petition, which satisfies, and which disposes itself morally—all of which modes of causing do not fall upon God himself, as God, because (setting aside the mystery of the Incarnation) they presuppose some imperfection in the person acting according to this mode of causing, since the person ought to be subject and inferior, etc. And so, although God can be said to be a moral cause of such effects, because he produces them freely, nevertheless he is a proper and physical cause, and that condition of liberty is common to all the works of God which he produces outside himself. Whether, however, that liberty in the effects of predestination is so great as to exclude all debt, and therefore has a certain morality by which the effect is denominated gratuitous, depends on what is to be said about the moral causality of man himself with respect to such effects, and therefore we refer the whole disputation to that mode. Whether, however, on the part of Christ or of some other third person, a cause of this kind can intervene in this matter, we shall say afterward.

2. *Aristotle reduces a moral cause to an efficient cause.*—It must further be noted that all this moral causality, of which we now treat, is reduced to an efficient cause. For thus Aristotle numbered among efficient causes the counseling and asking cause. For although the final cause seems in its own way to be moral, insofar as it metaphorically moves the agent and induces it to act, nevertheless it has its own proper mode of causality, on account of which it is numbered among the physical causes. And as far as the present matter is concerned, the final cause differs from the moral cause we are investigating chiefly in this: that the end is not supposed to exist in order that it may move in its own way, but rather moves and attracts so that something may be brought into existence; whereas the moral cause, which is reduced to an efficient cause, is

supposed to exist in some way, for it must move not so that it itself may come to be or be desired, but so that, by reason of itself already existing, something else may come to be—on account of which it stands as a reason for acting to the agent itself, and thus is referred back to the efficient cause. There seem to be four kinds of such a cause: namely, meritorious—either of strict right [*de condigno*] or even of fittingness [*de congruo*]—which causes morally insofar as it induces some obligation; satisfactory, which is of nearly the same genus, but regards the special effect of remitting faults or punishments; impetratory, which moves by asking and praying; and finally dispositive—for although disposition is usually referred to a physical material cause, nevertheless in the present case it is a moral disposition, and therefore is properly the moral cause of that form which is given by reason of such a disposition. And besides, in order that such a disposition be had, it requires on the part of man a moral causality, insofar as it must come about not merely efficiently in any way, but freely, on the part of the man himself who disposes himself—not that this suffices without a higher influence of grace, but that it is necessary according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 7; and therefore this causality of disposition is not separated from some moral causality, as it were effective by way of merit, at least of congruity, or of impetration. We therefore investigate all these causes in the present matter, and comprehend them under the name of moral cause, which either of itself or by divine law induces a necessity or obligation of conferring that effect of which it is called the cause; and under this general description it can be called a meritorious cause.

3. *The conditions necessary in such a cause.*—From this we can understand what conditions are necessary for something, on the part of man, to be in this way a cause of predestination as regards some of its effects. First, it is required that it be a free act of the predestined himself, because it must be a moral cause, and morality is founded on liberty. Second, it must be a good act, because the effects of predestination are divine benefits, and a bad act does not provoke nor obligate God to confer a benefit; therefore the act must be good. Third, it is necessary that it be proportioned to the effect, both because this in general belongs to the notion of a cause as compared to its effect, and also because such a cause must induce some debt of such an effect, which it could not do unless it had a proportion with it.

4. Fourth, it is required that such a cause be in some way prior to its effect, for this too belongs to the common notion of a cause; what kind of priority this must be, however—whether, namely, it suffices that it be in reality and in execution, or in the mind of God—we shall see afterward. One thing worthy of

note, however, is gathered from this condition: namely, that that act which is the cause of some effect of predestination cannot be the cause of all of them unless it is itself outside the effects of predestination. This is shown thus: for if it were the cause of all the effects of predestination, it would also be the cause of the first one, since that is one among all of them; therefore it itself cannot be an effect, because it cannot be the cause of itself. But if it is the cause of some, or of one, it is necessary that, although it itself also be an effect of predestination, it be prior to its own effects, at least in the divine foreknowledge, since it is necessary that a cause be prior to its effect. This is especially so because this cause is not final, but is referred back to the efficient, since it concurs morally, as a cooperating reason toward producing the effect.

5. *The resolution of the question.*—From these things, then, it is certain that, as regards some of the effects of predestination, insofar as they are given in execution, a cause can in this way be given on the part of an adult man. I add "adult" in order to exclude infants, who are not capable of this causality, apart from a special privilege, because they do not have the use of liberty, as is self-evident, and as we shall explain further in what follows. This assertion, thus explained, is therefore constant among all theologians, and in accordance with the doctrine of the faith. And this is clear, because one of these effects is glory, the cause of which is the merits of man. Likewise, the remission of sin is another effect which has at least a dispositive cause on the part of man, and so on for the others. Nor does it matter to the present point that such a cause is not in man from himself, but from the grace of God, for it is enough that it is not in him without himself morally concurring. Although it is also certain, according to Catholic doctrine, that man has from this very fact that such an act can be the cause of a further effect of predestination, because it itself is from divine grace, at least exciting and helping. It remains only to be disputed whether in man there can be given any cause of this kind which is the reason for predestination as regards all its effects. This question, however, is referred by theologians to the first effect which is conferred on man from predestination, since from that effect the rest flow, or can flow; and therefore whoever is the cause of that first effect is reckoned to be the cause of the rest.

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV
WHETHER, BEFORE THIS LIFE, SOME ACTION OF THE MAN PREDESTINED PRECEDED, WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF HIS PREDESTINATION AS REGARDS ITS EFFECTS

1. Since concerning this cause there have been various opinions and views, among which some are heretical, others erroneous, and others disputed among Catholics, in order that the doctrine may be clearer, we shall speak of each separately, beginning with those which are more absurd and consequently more outdated—which it is not expedient to pass over in silence, for the completion of the doctrine, but which we judge it more useful to dispatch briefly.

2. *The error concerning chance, which removes liberty.*—Since, then, our present question concerns a moral cause on the part of man, it necessarily presupposes liberty in man, because liberty is the reason or foundation of the whole of moral being, and consequently is necessary for moral causality. Hence all the heretics who took away liberty could posit no moral cause either of predestination or of the salvation of men. The Manichaeans, then, and the Priscillianists, since they denied free will, assigned the cause of the predestination and reprobation of men to the different temperament of our bodies, by which we are necessarily drawn to these or those acts; and they referred the variety of temperaments back to different constellations, as we understand from Leo I, *Epistola 91*, to Turibius, cap. 11, and Gregory, *hom. 40, in Evangelia*, Jerome, *Epist. 8*, Augustine, *libro de Haeresibus*, cap. 70, Prosper, *lib. 1, de Vocatione gent.*, cap. 14, among others who, as Fathers, condemn this error, and the Council of Braga I, cap. 8. But these heretics were not assigning a moral cause, but a physical, natural one, nor were they seeking the cause of predestination in order to show that salvation or damnation depends on the will of man, but rather in order to excuse those who are condemned, since they are condemned by a certain necessity, and to take away from those who are saved every occasion for self-glorification.

3. *It is refuted.*—In this error, however, there was great variety: for some referred the whole course of human life to an extrinsic, celestial cause; others to God himself, as it were compelling the will—an error which is still in vogue even now; others to an intrinsic nature of certain men, which is of itself determined to good or evil. But as far as the present matter is concerned, it is formally (so to speak) the same error whether the use of liberty is denied

through the action of the stars, or through any other extrinsic or intrinsic cause, as Origen well noted, *libro 3, Periarchon*, cap. 1. There can only be a difference, since those heretics who say that God alone, by his own motion, takes away from men the free use of their actions, refer the diversity and the various outcomes of human actions to the divine will alone, and thus do not refer to any creature a cause of predestination—in which point, precisely, they do not err, but rather in the mode of causality, as we shall say in its place. Those, however, who refer the diversity of human actions to a created cause, extrinsic or intrinsic, seem indeed to attribute to that same cause the primary reason for predestination. In reality, however, it is necessary either that they take away predestination altogether, or that they ultimately have recourse to the will of God. For when they say that a good natural temperament is the cause that necessarily brings about salvation, and that the cause of that temperament is the constellation under which a man is born, I ask further: why is such a man born under such a constellation? I know they will respond that this very thing is forestalled by the necessary course of fate and the concurrence of the stars. But again I inquire whence this course of the stars has been so constituted that it both is induced into, and induces, this necessity. For either it had this of itself, without any other cause—or, as some have said, by chance—and thus predestination is removed, and no cause is rendered of it, but only of those effects which we attribute to predestination or to liberty. Or else God is the cause of this order of the stars, from which the rest of the variety necessarily follows. And I ask again, who impelled or determined God to fix this order rather than another upon the stars? For either God also did this by a natural and, as it were, fatal necessity, and thus predestination, which must be a free act, is likewise removed; or he does it by his own liberty, and thus the whole variety, and the reason for predestination, must necessarily be referred to the divine will. And in this way this error is sufficiently refuted, as far as the present matter is concerned, for against fate, and against an intrinsic necessity of the human will in its good or bad actions, it has been disputed elsewhere. Against those heretics, however, who refer the cause of predestination to the will of God alone in such a way that he carries it out by necessitating the will, we must discuss below, in the following book.

4. *The error concerning the merit of souls before this life.*—Others, in order to avoid these errors, thought that the whole cause of the felicity of the predestined must be referred to their liberty, and consequently must be founded on some good merit of theirs. But because they could not find merits which had preceded in them in this mortal life, they invented the idea that the souls of all

men had existed previously, before they were united to bodies in this life, and that in that state they had good or bad merits. They say, then, that those men who received souls in which good merits had preceded are predestined on the basis of those preceding merits. This error, without naming Origen, Jerome reports, *Epistol. 8 and 139*, and *in Jeremiam*, cap. 24 and 18; but in the *Apology against Rufinus* he attributes it to Origen, as does Epiphanius in the *Panarion*, and in the *Epistle to John of Jerusalem*, which is also found among the Epistles of Jerome, as letter 60. Nazianzen also touched on it, *Orat. 31*, as did Theophilus, *lib. 1, Paschalis*. And indeed this error is found in Origen, *lib. 1, Periarchon*, cap. 7, 8, and 9, and more fully *lib. 3*, cap. 10, where he says: *That the providence of God governs immortal souls according to the merits and causes of each one: since the dispensation of human life is not confined within the span of this age, etc. And further on: The cause of what each one has previously done precedes, etc.* And further on: *From the preceding causes each vessel is prepared either for honor or for reproach.* And further on he calls these same things: *the older and preceding causes, according to which these are prepared for glory, etc.* And finally, he repeats often in those passages that the whole variety of bodies which exists in the world arose from the variety and diversity of merits which preceded in rational creatures.

5. *It is refuted.—That souls did not exist before bodies.*—In this opinion of Origen, indeed, I find great obscurity and an infinite multitude of errors. For, in the first place, he himself never sufficiently explains whether those merits preceded in souls or spirits that were pure and separated from bodies, or not. From this, indeed, the logical sequence of his discourse and opinion seems to demand this. And thus Origen is commonly understood, for he is chiefly attacked on the ground that he believed and supposed that souls were created previously, outside of bodies, and that in that state they had merits, by reason of which they were afterward, when united to bodies, either loved or held in hatred. That foundation, however, is heretical, for the faith teaches that the souls of men are created at the very time when they are first infused into bodies, and not before, as is defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, Session 8, and in the unique Clementine *de Summa Trinit.*, and the Council of Braga I, cap. 6, and Leo I, *Epistola 91*, to Turibius, cap. 10, where he says: *the Catholic faith condemns that opinion.* Jerome holds the same, *Epist. ad Pamachium, contra Joannem Hierosolym.*, and Augustine, *lib. de Ecclesiast. dogm.*, cap. 13. Gregory of Nyssa most excellently, *lib. de Opificio hom.*, cap. 28 and 29, and in the disputation *de Resurrectione et anima*, after the middle. Moreover, joined with this error, thus understood, is another which Origen indicates in the passages

cited—namely, that bodies were not created by God from a primary intention, but only as prisons and dungeons for sinning spirits. This the Catholic faith condemns, in the chapter *Firmiter*, *de Summa Trinit.*, and Augustine treats it at length, *lib. 11, de Civit.*, cap. 23, and Cyril of Alexandria, *lib. 4, in Joannem*, cap. 9, and St. Thomas, *1 p.*, q. 65.

6. Elsewhere, however, the same Origen, *lib. 2, Periarchon*, cap. 2, contends that no created spirit has ever existed without a body, indeed nor can it so exist. How, then, could he have held that souls were first created separated from bodies, since he admits them to be rational and spiritual, indeed of the same nature as the angels, as he more frequently indicates? Unless perhaps he held that no created spirit is such that it cannot be united to a body—not, however, that it is necessarily united, but rather that it receives this from some demerit. But in the passage cited he certainly indicates more than this. Moreover, he does not seem to have been able to hold that spirits are united to bodies only as to prisons, on account of evil merits, for in the passages cited he expressly says that Jacob was loved by God before he had done, in this life (for thus he understands Paul), anything good or evil—yet not without prior merits, lest God seem unjust in gratuitously loving one and hating another without fault. Then again, he places the cause of the election of predestined men in merits preceding these bodies; therefore he could not have held that their souls were united to their bodies on account of preceding demerits.

7. *Various errors of Origen.*—Origen, then, seems to have held (as far as can be understood from the passages cited) that all spirits were always created together with some bodies, but that all undergo a transition from bodies into bodies. For thus he there teaches that there were several and various worlds before this one, and before its beginning, and after the end of this one another, and others yet to be; in which the same souls, or rational spirits, migrate through different bodies according to the diversity of their merits. And perhaps he believed that, before these coarser bodies, souls had other more subtle and, as it were, spiritual ones, and that, according to the merits of that state, they received mortal bodies—not always as a punishment for sins, but sometimes in order to acquire, in these bodies, higher goods to which they are predestined; for this seems to follow from his teachings, as the argument made above proves. In this manner of explaining this opinion, moreover, several errors are found. One is that no spirits are created purely incorporeal. Another is that human souls cannot exist outside every body. The third is that there is a transmigration of souls, and that these same souls which are now infused into our bodies previously existed in other bodies—of which elsewhere.

8. The fourth error of Origen, then, and the one directly pertinent to the present matter, is that merits or demerits preceded in our souls before we were begotten—contrary to that saying of Paul, *to the Romans*, 9: *Before they had done anything good or evil.* For although Origen adds the qualification "before they had done good or evil in these mortal bodies," Paul nevertheless spoke absolutely, because he supposes as certain that there are no merits of man, or of his soul, before the beginning of this life. Hence he adds absolutely, *not from works, but from him who calls.* This would have been said neither truly nor consequently if works had at least preceded in a prior life, for it would be absolutely false to say that Jacob was not loved on account of works. The phrase that immediately follows would also have been ill-inferred, *but from him who calls*, since between the works of this life and the grace of him who calls, the works of another life would have intervened.

9. Fifth, we can number another error—namely, that God punishes men, or grants them rewards, in this life on account of their own merits, which they performed before this life. Christ indicated the contrary, John 9, when, asked about the man born blind, he answered: *Neither did this man sin, nor his parents, but that the works of God might be made manifest in him.* And Paul, *to the Romans*, 5, says that the original stain passed *even to those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression*, that is, by their own will. Much more absurd, however, is it to say that predestination itself is the reward of merits of another life which preceded this one, since Paul says, *to the Romans*, 9: *Not of works, but of him who calls.* And *1 Timothy*, 2: *He called us not according to our works.* But if Origen should say that the works of a prior life are not called "ours," he is easily refuted, because Paul immediately adds, *but according to his own purpose and grace*, teaching that there is no middle ground between a gift given without merit of this life—which is called "ours"—and a gratuitous donation. This is openly proved by *2 Corinthians*, 1, and *to the Romans*, 14: *We must all be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive according to what he has done in the body.* Hence the Fathers gather that, although God does not reward or punish in man only those acts which he performs through the body—for he also judges the interior desires of the will—nevertheless he does not judge men except from the acts which they perform in this mortal body, and therefore not from the works of a preceding life. But if God does not regard those merits for the conferring of glory, much less for predestining to that same glory. For something can be a merit of glory which is not a merit of predestination to glory; but, conversely, nothing can be a cause of predestination to glory which is

not also a cause of glory itself, since predestination is the most certain cause of glory itself.

10. *Origen is refuted, since he denies an immutable state which is the term of merits.*—Sixth, it is to be much observed in Origen, in the passages cited, that he posits no firm and stable term of human merits. For he held that souls condemned on account of the demerits of the present life are sometimes restored through repentance and good works, and that in beatitude itself he does not believe there is security—indeed, he holds that it would be contrary to the liberty of the created will for rational creatures to become impeccable through beatitude. Hence he attributes to them innumerable vicissitudes of states, so that now from being miserable, by means of repentance, they become blessed, through works of another life which follow after this one. This (besides the most absurd errors which it includes, which are attacked elsewhere) involves a repugnance in the present matter. For if things were so, there would be left no place for predestination, simply and properly speaking, of predestination, which is to a life that cannot be lost. Whence I ask, does that vicissitude at length have a term, or not? If it has none, then although a man is about to pass in this life into beatitude, he is not for that reason predestined, for from there he can fall again, and be damned. And although it may be said that some predestination precedes that beatitude, however losable, it cannot be attributed to the merits of a life which preceded this one, because not one life only but many preceded, and some were good, some bad; and although in execution the term of one (so to speak) can be the reason for another, nevertheless no cause, on the part of man, can be assigned for the whole succession which predestination regards. Just as in the course of time of this life the same man is now just, now a sinner, now just again, and always either acquires or loses justice through the intervention of his own free works, yet no reason can be given, on the part of man, for the whole succession and course of life thus pre-ordained by God.

11. This is better proved by pressing the argument from the side of the beginning of those vicissitudes. For since Origen places another life before this one, and another before that, and so on, I ask whether this proceeds to infinity through all eternity, or whether one arrives at a first world in which souls were created and began to act well or badly. If he says the former, he errs first of all in faith, by positing created things from eternity. For it is necessary that that vicissitude not rest in any beginning. He errs, then, also in philosophy and in natural reason, which shows that a vicissitude, or a multitude of things or of worlds succeeding one another, cannot be from eternity, without some thing, or some particular, definite, and designatable world among them having been

created from eternity, and consequently having endured through an infinite duration, and consequently that world would be the first, and the rest, created after it, would necessarily be finite in number. If, therefore, Origen should choose the other part, and admit a first world in which souls began to exist and to act, and from those works wishes to take the reason for predestination, we recall the whole question concerning the cause of predestination to that world, and to the works done in it. And we shall ask whether those good works were done without grace, or with it. If without grace, how could they be the cause of predestination to glory? If with grace, why were some souls chosen to perform those works and to receive efficacious grace for them, and not others? For now he cannot have recourse to the works of an earlier life, since it has been posited that none other preceded. This position of Origen, then, both teems with errors and is useless for resolving the question we are treating.

12. *Origen's foundation is overturned.*—Origen's foundation, however, was only this: that otherwise God would not preserve justice in his predestination and distribution of his goods. Concerning this foundation many things must be treated in what follows. For now it is briefly said that that consequence, *he would not preserve justice*, can be taken in two ways: namely, either contrarily, or privatively, or else contradictorily, or merely negatively. In the former sense, the meaning is that God would act unjustly if, without a prior diversity of merits, he were to predestine these and not those—and thus the consequence is denied, because since the thing is owed to neither, no injustice is committed, even though it is given to one and not to the other. In the latter sense, however, the meaning will be that that act of predestining in this manner is not an act of justice—and this we not only concede, but maintain most strongly throughout this whole disputation, and judge it to pertain to the excellence of grace. Nor is that text of Psalm 24 opposed to this: *All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*, that is, justice—both because, although this is true in its own way of all the works of God *ad extra*, it need not be extended to his interior acts of love, or of election, or of predestination; and also because that justice which is found in all the works of God does not always regard a debt of the creature, but is often spoken of in consideration of what God owes to himself and to his own goodness, or what is consonant with it. In this way, then, justice is also found in predestination, insofar as it is consonant with the goodness and wisdom of God to predestine some. When, however, it has been granted that predestination is not an act of justice, this is understood with respect to the man predestined.

CHAPTER V

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WHETHER, FROM THE WORKS WHICH A MAN WOULD HAVE DONE IF HE HAD BEEN PLACED IN ANOTHER STATE, THE REASON FOR PRESENT PREDESTINATION CAN BE TAKEN, EVEN THOUGH SUCH WORKS ARE ABSOLUTELY NEVER GOING TO EXIST. HERE THE PREDESTINATION OF INFANTS IS ESPECIALLY DISCUSSED

1. *The occasion of the question, from the case of infants.*—One of the chief arguments which Augustine is accustomed to use to exclude every cause of predestination on the part of the man predestined is taken from the case of infants. For we see in them a remarkable diversity: not only because many are saved while others are not saved, without their own merits, but also because for some a remedy of salvation is procured by a singular providence of God, while they are kept alive in this life until they are baptized—even if it be necessary either to preserve them miraculously, or by a special providence to bring ministers of the sacraments to them, or to prepare water, or something similar. Others, however, seem so destitute that they are snatched away prematurely, before they are baptized, or before they can be baptized. This diversity, moreover, could not but be foreseen and in some way predestined, or permitted, by God—that is, predestined on the part of those who are saved, permitted on the part of those who are condemned—and yet in them no diversity is found of merits of a past life, since there was none, as we have seen; nor even of the present life, since in it they will never use reason so as to be able to merit; nor, finally, of a future life after this one, since the state of that life is not one of meriting, but of obtaining the reward of merits. Hence the future actions in that life of the predestined saints are not the cause but rather the fruit and, as it were, the ultimate effect of their predestination. From this, then, Augustine concludes that in infants there is the clearest gratuitous predestination, without any moral cause on their part, as may be seen in the books *de Praedest. Sanct.* and *de Bono persever.*, and elsewhere against the Pelagians.

2. *The error of the Semipelagians.*—In order to escape the force of this argument, the Semipelagians said that God knows not only what infants are going to do in this mortal life, in the short time they live, but also what they would have done if they had lived longer and had come to adult age. From those works, then, they rendered the cause of their predestination—the works on

account of which the remedies of salvation are applied to them. For God foreknew that they would have had the best merits, if they had lived, and predestined them on account of those merits. So Prosper and Hilary report in the letters to Augustine, which are found before the book *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*. And Augustine himself supposes the same, *libro de Praedestin. Sanctor.*, cap. 12 and 13, and *libro de Bono persever.*, cap. 9 and 10, and *Epist.* 105 and 106, and again Prosper, *lib. 1, de Vocat. Gent.*, cap. 7, otherwise 22. There are also those who assert that Pelagius had earlier held the same view, but this is not certain, nor is it reported by the said Fathers. Rather, Augustine, *de Praedestin. Sanctor.*, cap. 13 and 14, expressly denies that Pelagius held this, or that it is a consequence of his teaching. He repeats the same, *lib. 1, de Anim. et ejus origine*, cap. 12. Whoever, however, was the author of this opinion, he seems in this to have agreed with Origen, in that he thought it belonged to the justice of God that this diversity not come about from God by his sole will alone, but that some diversity of merits must necessarily be presupposed on the part of infants, so that God might be freed from the charge of favoring persons. Hence, because they could find in fact no merits in infants, they took refuge in those which they would have had, if they had lived longer.

3. Nor only in infants, but also in many adults, did they refer the reason and cause of predestination back to similar conditioned merits. For although the Semipelagians erred also in another way, by positing the cause of all the proper effects of predestination on the part of free will, in some act of it, future at some time, and absolutely foreseen by God before the whole of predestination, as we shall see below—nevertheless, they also posited that merit, conditionally foreseen, as concurring in some way toward the cause of predestination. For a twofold difference between men who are saved and those who are damned can be considered—not that both intervene between all, but one in these, another in those. One is that to some the Gospel, or faith, is preached, while to others it is not preached, nor are they sufficiently excited externally even to faith itself. The other is that, of those to whom faith is announced, some believe, others do not believe; and to this also pertains the fact that, of those who believe, some do penance, others do not, and of those who do penance, some persevere to the end, others do not persevere. As to this whole latter diversity, then, they posited the cause in some good affection, or effort, of free will, which in reality precedes in time or in nature, and is foreseen in eternity by God with the knowledge of vision before the beginning of predestination—concerning which part of this error we shall speak afterward.

4. The first diversity, however, they could not universally refer back to a good use [of free will] antecedent to the preaching itself of the Gospel. For although this could sometimes precede, as they thought, and as others held concerning Cornelius the Centurion, Acts 10, nevertheless this is not necessary, nor did the Pelagians themselves dare to say it. For it is evident that the Gospel has very often been preached to the impious and the wicked, according to that saying: *I have been found by those who were not seeking me.* And among various nations, equally unbelieving and wicked, it is preached to some sooner, to others later, to others never. This diversity, then, they attributed to the works of such men—not works which would precede the preaching of the Gospel, but works which would follow upon it, if it were given; for they said it was not preached to these, because they would not have believed even if it had been preached; while to those it was preached, because they were foreseen as going to believe; and to these sooner, because at this time they would have believed, to others at another time. Hence it is necessary that such foreknowledge was only conditional, because at that sign God had not yet decreed that the Gospel should be preached to such men. Therefore he could not, by absolute knowledge, foresee the good use, or effect, of such preaching as already present in eternity, since this foreknowledge presupposes that decree; therefore it could only be conditional foreknowledge, by which God foreknew that, if he were to give the preaching to such men, they would receive it with good disposition. Hence it is incidentally understood that a good natural movement toward the doctrine of faith, proposed through external preaching, was posited by these men as a cause of predestination in two ways. First, with respect to the antecedent preaching of the Gospel, as conditionally foreseen; second, with respect to the subsequent grace, which they made to follow upon free will, by reason of this prior good affection, or effort. All this is sufficiently gathered from Augustine, in the places cited; for although it is not reported there so clearly and distinctly, nevertheless this was truly their opinion, and from the same foundation, because they thought that the acceptance of persons in God could not otherwise be avoided.

5. *The error of the Semipelagians is resolved.*—In this opinion of the Semipelagians, three or four points can be noted. The first is that they attributed to God that conditioned knowledge of the future acts of free will before the whole decree of predestination. And among other things, this too some modern writers have not hesitated to reprove in the Semipelagians. Indeed, they have even said that this was an invention of Pelagius or of his followers, in order to attribute to free will the cause of all good. Nevertheless, neither Augustine, nor Prosper, nor Hilary, nor St. Thomas, nor any of the ancient theologians, reproves

the Semipelagians on this head—that they attributed this knowledge to God—but rather on the ground that they used it badly, as we shall say presently. This knowledge, then, was not invented by the Semipelagians, but is taught in Sacred Scripture, and recognized by the holy Fathers, as has been shown elsewhere. Hence, just as heretics do not bring infamy upon Sacred Scripture by the fact that they abuse it to found their errors, so neither does it redound to the infamy of that knowledge that the Semipelagians acknowledged and believed it, even if they used it badly—which remains to be seen.

6. Second, then, it can be noted in that opinion that those works, which they posited under foreseen condition as the cause of predestination to all grace and glory, they said to be works which would have come about from free will by its own powers and without the help of operating grace. This, as far as this part is concerned, coincides with the Pelagian heresy, and with another part of the same Semipelagian error—namely, that a good moral disposition toward externally preached faith is the beginning of salvation and the cause of the first assisting grace, which is granted to man. This error must be treated and refuted ex professo below, and what will be said there will proceed a fortiori against this part of the present error; therefore it is not necessary to say more about it here.

7. *That God judges no one by merits which are future only under condition.* —Third, then, it is noted in the Semipelagians that they attributed a true character of merit and of moral causality to actions never going to occur, or going to occur only under condition; and this is the error which properly pertains to this place, and which Augustine especially marvels at and reproves in these heretics. The sum of his arguments is this. First, because if God judged man from works which he would never commit—because he would have committed them if he had been permitted—the Apostle would have spoken falsely: *Each one will receive according to what he has done in his body.* For it would also have to be said "according to what he did not do, but would have done, if he had remained in the body." Second, that weighing of Paul would carry little force: *Before they had done anything good or evil... it is not of works, but of him who calls*—because the distinction could have been founded on works which they would have done, if they had been permitted to do this or that. Third, it would have been in vain that, for the sake of the elect, the days of the persecution of Antichrist should be shortened, as is said in Matthew 24, since they would not for that reason have to be punished any less, on account of the sins they would have committed if the persecution had continued—and yet Christ says that the days are to be shortened for the sake of the elect, indeed so that they may be saved: *for unless they had been shortened, not all flesh would be*

saved. Fourth, because otherwise a premature death, by which a man is taken by divine providence at a time when he is just, lest he fall from grace, would not be a divine benefit, since he would nonetheless have to be punished on account of the sins he would have committed, if he had lived. But this consequence is against that saying of Wisdom 4: *He was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding.* Augustine often uses this testimony for this matter: *de Corruption. et Grat.*, cap. 8, *lib. 2, contra duas Epistolas Pelagian.*, cap. 7, *de Anim. et ejus origine*, cap. 12, and in the book *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, cap. 14, he shows specially that it is canonical and authentic, and that Cyprian used it for the same purpose, *lib. de Mortalit.*, near the end. It can also be gathered from Jerome, *dialogue three, against the Pelagians*, Gregory, *27 Moral.*, chapter two, Nyssen, *oration on infants who are snatched away prematurely*, Prosper, the book cited, the first, *de Vocatione Gent.*, chapter twenty-one.

8. *An evasion. It is refuted.*—The adversaries, however, might perhaps say that works of this kind, which are foreseen only as future if the man were to live, are not indeed a sufficient cause to oblige divine justice to render to man a reward, or a condign punishment, which would be due for such works if they were done—but that they can nevertheless be a sufficient reason to deny some grace, and conversely, if the works are good, can be a cause not compelling, so to speak, but in some way inducing the conferring of grace. Now if these men meant only that such works, thus conditionally foreknown, could move by way of an end—either toward giving the grace by which they become good, or toward removing the occasion, and, if necessary, the life, lest they become evil—there would be no dispute between us and them, for Paul also said, *he chose us, that we might be holy*, and the Wise Man said: *He was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding.* And both show that this is the proximate end intended by God through this kind of providence. And in this sense the Fathers sometimes use the consideration of those works in order to render a reason for divine providence toward infants, as may be seen above in Nyssen. And Augustine sometimes took from them a reason for the Advent of Christ the Lord at this time rather than another, as in the book *de Sex quaestionibus, contra Paganos*, question 2—a reason which he does not entirely reject, *libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, cap. 9, but says is not the primary reason, but must be referred back to the gratuitous election of God. This is to be observed in Nyssen and the other Fathers.

9. But the Semipelagians could not speak in this sense, especially in the case of infants, because such works are never going to occur in them; therefore they were also in no way intended by God by way of an end. The consequence is

proved from their own opinion, for they said that God snatches an infant away before adult age—an infant who would have done good things if he had reached that age—on account of those things, justifying him; yet not preparing grace for him so that he might do what he is never going to do; therefore those works are not the end of some grace conferred, but a merit. Similarly, the one whom he foresaw would act badly, he snatched away not so that he would not do bad works, but rather denied him grace, because he would have done bad things if he had lived. Hence they wanted altogether this conferring or denying of grace to be a retribution for works thus foreseen under condition, even though they are never going to occur, nor did they think that the reason for just providence toward infants could be rendered otherwise. They are rightly attacked, then, by Augustine, from that principle that God does not judge men, nor punish or reward them, on the basis of such works. This is first openly gathered from the Scriptures cited. The reason *a priori*, moreover, is that a conditional, as they say, posits nothing in being; but these works are only conditionally foreseen as future; therefore they posit nothing in man; therefore they do not render him worthy of punishment or reward. For it would be unjust to impose an absolute (so to speak), or real and existing, punishment on account of works that are conditioned and conceived, or possible, rather than existing or future. Hence Augustine also reports of Pelagius that, when asked why God created a man, or an angel, whom he foreknew would sin, he answered that it would seem unjust to punish them on account of works never going to occur—for such would those sins be, foreseen under condition, if God had decreed not to create either the man or the angel; which answer Augustine praises. By the same reasoning, then, good works never going to occur are not worthy of any retribution. It is added that, of any man whatsoever, God foreknows that he would act well under these circumstances and badly under others; therefore, as to these conditionals, there is a certain equality among men themselves; therefore from them cannot be taken the reason for a different providence toward them, but it was a divine benefit to give to this one a grace accommodated so that he would efficaciously attain salvation, but not to the other. In which no injustice is discerned, because with respect to the predestined it is a great grace and benefit, while with respect to the other there is no injury, because nothing owed is denied him. Indeed, if original sin had already been foreseen (as the Massilians granted), from that a sufficient reason of justice is taken, especially with respect to little ones who are not predestined, as we shall say below in its place.

10. *The reason for the different providence toward infants.*—And from these things this error is sufficiently disproved, and its foundation resolved, as far as

concerns infants. From which it is rightly inferred that this question, concerning the cause of predestination on the part of the man predestined, or of election on the part of the one elected, has no place at all in those infants who do not come to adult age. And thus Augustine is accustomed to conclude from this argument that, in the case of these little ones, there can be no doubt about the gratuitous and purely free election of God, by which some are chosen before others to glory and efficacious grace. Because it can have no foundation in their works—whether antecedent to their conception, since there were none; or future under condition, since they really are not going to occur; or absolutely future at some time, since these are only future after this life, where there is no merit. But there were not lacking heretics (as the same Augustine testifies, *Epistola 116*) who asserted that infants in their mothers' wombs have some good acts, on account of which they can be predestined. And they brought forward the example of Jacob and Esau struggling in their mother's womb, and could have brought forward, even more fittingly, the example of John the Baptist leaping for joy in the womb of Elizabeth. And this error, it is said, has even now stirred up the heretics of our own time.

11. *Infants do not have free acts.*—This subterfuge, however, is easily refuted by the same Augustine in the same place, because it is quite absurd to attribute to all little ones, at that age, free and human acts, since they lack the use of reason, without which a free and human act cannot be exercised. To say, however, that the use of reason is supernaturally accelerated in all of them, and that faith is preached to them interiorly, without an external preacher, is not only arbitrary, but also contrary to the doctrine of the faith and to the common sense of the Church, and to the Apostle who says of Jacob and Esau: *When they had not yet done anything good or evil.* Hence Augustine rightly said of them, above: *their struggle in their mother's womb was not a free act, but a prodigy.* As for John the Baptist, we piously believe, with Ambrose and the other Fathers, that his exultation was indeed a free act, but not without a prodigy and a special privilege—yet in such a way that the whole of it was rather the singular and extraordinary effect of predestination than its cause, as we shall say below concerning adults. Wherefore, even if we were to grant that infants have good acts in their mothers' wombs, if such acts were such as is required for Christian piety and justice, they would be effects of predestination, not its cause; and if they are not such, and are most ignorantly invented, against all natural reason, and without divine testimony—indeed, against it—still such acts could not be the cause of predestination, for the same reason that they cannot be such even in

adults, as we shall show below, for the reasoning is evidently the same in both cases.

12. Although the case of infants, as far as concerns themselves, is thus sufficiently concluded, there still remains a difficulty: whether, on the part of those under whose care they are born and die—whether parents, or guardians, or in general friends or benefactors—any cause of their predestination is given. For it is certain, as to the end, that these little ones are not saved except through the merit of Christ applied to them. It is likewise certain that this application must come about through some human and free action of someone who has, or undertakes, the care of the child. From this it likewise follows that the will, or free cooperation, of such an adult man is in some way the cause of the salvation of the infant—whether it be called a meritorious cause of congruity, which is not necessary, although it is not repugnant, as will be said below; or whether it be called a ministerial cause, as it indeed is, and is established from the treatise on the Sacraments; or whether it be called a condition without which not, which suffices for the present, since it cannot be denied that, in the way in which it concurs, it is a moral cause and contributes greatly. Concerning this cause of salvation, then, it remains to be explained whether it is also the cause of the predestination or election of such a little one, who is in fact saved, or rather is itself an effect of his election and predestination. And as to this part, this question, in the case of little ones, has the same difficulty and the same reason for doubting and deciding which it has in the case of adults, and does not pertain to the present question concerning conditioned merits never going to occur, but to the question concerning the merit of predestination through certain actions of this life, and therefore will be more conveniently treated below.

13. *The last error of the Semipelagians is refuted.*—It remains for us to say a few things concerning the other member pertaining to adults, or concerning the fourth point which can be noted in this opinion of the Semipelagians. For they also asserted that, in adults, a cause of predestination could in some way be given from their merits foreseen under condition, at least as regards the external preaching of the faith, or of supernatural doctrine—to which cause they attributed the fact that the Gospel is preached to one province or nation and not to another. In this, besides the error already noted above in the second point—that they spoke of a good disposition proceeding from the natural powers alone of free will (against which we must dispute below)—they also exceeded in this, that they attributed to the same work a twofold reward. One, an antecedent absolute foreknowledge of such a work, which is predestination to having the

preaching of the Gospel; the other, a subsequent absolute foreknowledge, which is faith itself, or corroboration in it, so that it is held as it ought to be. For because God foreknew that these men would receive the Gospel with good disposition, if it were preached to them, he decreed that it should be preached to them, and thus that effect, thus foreseen, was the meritorious reason for that exterior effect of grace. After God decreed, however, that the Gospel should be preached to them, he saw in them, through the knowledge of vision and absolute knowledge, a good disposition toward sacred doctrine, or even some natural faith, and therefore decreed to give grace for believing as it ought to be believed. This, however, is without doubt beyond the measure of justice, which these men professed especially to uphold. And besides, they posited a reward preceding merit, not only in actual existence, but even in God's absolute foreknowledge—which is contrary to the true notion of merit, as we shall show below.

14. Finally, that no meritorious reason for distinguishing the elect from the non-elect can be taken from such works is easily proved from what has been said in the preceding point. For with respect to those who are not going to believe, that unbelief, at least as voluntary and culpable, is never going to occur —because the Gospel is in fact not to be preached to them (for it is posited in the hypothesis that God so decreed); therefore, according to what has been said, such a work cannot be the demeritorious reason for such an effect. With respect, however, to those who are going to believe, although faith will in fact occur, if God willed the Gospel to be preached to them—nevertheless, as foreseen before this [divine] will, it could not be the meritorious reason for such preaching, because, in order for it to be such, it was not yet presupposed as absolutely future; therefore it is only a final reason. For God gives the preaching so that it may be believed; yet this very fact presupposes the will and decree of God concerning such an end, which could not be founded on that very end itself as on a meritorious reason.

15. Besides all this, this opinion is contrary to the Scriptures: for we read often that the Gospel is preached to those who are not going to believe, as Christ foretold, Matthew 10 and Luke 9, and as we read happened in Acts 13 and 18, and in the very preaching of Christ himself made to the Jews, as he himself laments, Matthew 11. On the other hand, we see that it is not preached to those who would have believed if it had been proposed to them, according to that saying of Ezekiel 3: *If you were sent to them, they would hear you*, and Matthew 11: *If in Tyre and Sidon*, etc.—a passage which Augustine examines at length in the places cited. Someone might perhaps say that those works of the Tyrians and

Sidonians were never going to occur, whereas here we are speaking of works that are going to occur at some time. But this is no obstacle: both because, although we treat, as it were, materially (so to speak) of future works, we do not treat them formally as absolutely future, since at that sign they are not yet foreseen as such, but only as future under condition, and it is in them, considered precisely thus, that the reason of merit must, according to the Semipelagians, be considered; and also because, if God had willed that the Gospel be preached to the Tyrians and Sidonians, by that very fact those works, which were supposed only under condition, would have become future and would have been foreseen as absolutely future—therefore the reasoning is the same concerning them.

16. But Rupert, there, *lib. 9, de Gloria et honore filii hominis*, says that the Tyrians and Sidonians were not going to do true penance, but only a human one, to avoid temporal punishment, and that therefore God did not deny them such helps. *Which*, he says, *Christ would altogether have given, if they were going to do true penance; otherwise it would not be truly said that he wished to save them.* But, in the first place, this exposition is foreign to the words of the text, and to the common exposition; indeed, Christ said, *in sackcloth and ashes*, in order to emphasize the penance. Hence Augustine, *libro de Bono persever.*, cap. 6, says of the Tyrians and Sidonians that they would have been saved by God, if works never going to occur, and foreseen under condition, were worthy of retribution. And further on he says, *it cannot be doubted that they were going to believe, since the Lord attests that they were going to do penance of great humility.* That word also in Ezekiel, *they would hear you*, usually signifies true faith in Scripture. Then, too, it is false that such helps would necessarily have had to be given, if they were going to use them well. For, as Abulensis there rightly noted, question 83, those helps were not merely sufficient, but more abundant—helps which God does not give to all, however well they would use them. Nor does this pertain to the general will by which God wills all men to be saved; for from that will only sufficient helps arise, while the others presuppose a special will and love which cannot be founded on such works, as has been shown.

17. But Augustine reports, in the book cited, *de Bono persever.*, cap. 9, that a certain Catholic disputant answered, concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians, that God did not decree that the Gospel should be preached to them—although he foresaw that, if it were preached, they would believe—because he likewise foresaw that they would not have persevered in the faith, but would afterward have fallen more shamefully. This opinion I find nearly the same in Origen, *lib. 3, Periarchon*, cap. 1. Augustine, however, refutes it as inconsistent and self-contradictory. For if the Gospel was not preached to those who were going to

believe, lest they fall more gravely afterward by sinning, then that kind of providence was rather a favor than a punishment; therefore God does not punish sins foreseen under condition, but rather excuses them by it; therefore neither does he render reward for good works thus foreseen. Then, too, if God, foreseeing that the Tyrians would fall after the faith, wished to avoid their greater ruin, would he not have dealt better with them by drawing them to the faith through the preaching of the Gospel, and immediately snatching them away, lest wickedness change their understanding? Or why should they not rather have merited this through the faith they would actually have shown, the Gospel having been preached, rather than that they could have demerited the preaching of the Gospel through an inconstancy in faith foreseen only under condition? This is especially so, because, according to their own teaching, the same faith foreseen under condition can be the reason for obtaining the preaching of the Gospel, and afterward, when shown, or absolutely foreseen, can be the merit of other subsequent gifts.

18. Hence there also appears in that manner of speaking a certain contradiction: for the same sin of apostasy from the faith, or of relapse after penance, foreseen under condition, is said to be the demeritorious cause of the preaching of the Gospel, which the faith itself, in the future, would have merited; and at the same time it is said to be the cause on account of which God does not give such men a greater occasion of ruin. Moreover, since faith is no less meritorious than inconstancy in faith is demeritorious, how can an inconstancy, which is foreseen as going to occur later, impede faith, which is foreseen as going to occur earlier, from obtaining its reward? Finally, it can be said, by the same reasoning, that God foresaw at the same time that, after that fall and falling away from the faith once embraced, they would do penance again, and persevere in it—and thus we could proceed to infinity, if license is given to invent causes of this kind without foundation. This kind of cause, then, is altogether absurd, rashly invented, and openly contrary to Catholic doctrine.

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI
THAT NO HUMAN ACTION PROCEEDING FROM THE POWERS OF FREE WILL ALONE, BY ITS OWN VIRTUE AND MERIT, CAN BE THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION AS REGARDS ITS EFFECTS. SHOWN AGAINST THE PELAGIANS AND SEMIPELAGIANS

1. *The sense of the question.* — Already in this chapter the discussion concerns the human acts which the predestined man performs in this mortal life — acts which must be good and upright, since by evil acts a man does not merit grace or predestination, but rather indignation or reprobation, of which we shall speak later. Now such acts can be, or be understood to be, of two kinds: some proceed from the natural powers of human free will, which we call natural — not as "natural" is distinguished from "free," but as it is distinguished from "supernatural"; these, however (as I said above), we shall call *moral*, for the sake of brevity and clarity. Others proceed from the powers of grace, with the cooperation of free will, and these are both free and supernatural: of these latter we shall speak afterward; for now we are dealing with the former. We do not distinguish, however, between acts of this order that precede or that follow the effects of predestination themselves, because the point of the present difficulty does not consist in these respects of prior or posterior, but in the condition of such acts — namely, that they are natural. For if it follows from this condition that such acts cannot be the cause of the effects of predestination, then even if they precede such effects, they will not be able to be their cause, and much less so if they are posterior to the effects themselves. We are speaking, therefore, of antecedent acts, for once the truth has been established concerning these, it will hold *a fortiori* for the subsequent ones — especially since, in Chapter Seven, we shall show that no subsequent act can be the cause of an antecedent effect of predestination in the same predestined man.

2. *The error of Pelagius.* — On the question thus set out, then, there occurs first the error of Pelagius, which Augustine relates at length, *Haer.* 88, and *Epist.* 89, and in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*; Jerome, in the *Letter to Ctesiphon* on this matter, and in the *Dialogue against the Pelagians*; Vincent of Lérins, in the *Against the Profane Novelties*, chapter 34; and Prosper, in the *Letter to Rufinus*. Setting aside his other errors, he asserted in the present matter that the grace of God is not necessary either for acting well, or

for a man to dispose himself to obtain the remission of sin, or to persevere without sin until death, or to merit glory by justice. And although he said that the grace of God was useful, and therefore sometimes conferred, he nevertheless said that it was given to each according to the good merits of free will. Hence he either did away with predestination altogether, or placed it solely in the will to give glory on the basis of merits foreseen in free will; and to some he would admit that grace was given, at least for acting more easily, while still granting that the cause of it, as regards each and every one of its effects, came from the side of human free will. But if perchance he were asked about infants, he denied, first of all, original sin in them; and so on his view they had no need of predestination or grace in order to attain eternal life. He distinguished, moreover, eternal life from the kingdom of heaven, as may be seen in Augustine, *On the Merits of Sins*, book 1, chapters 18 and 20, and *Epist.* 106 — a distinction also taken from the Council of Mileve and the Council of Orange, at the beginning — and accordingly he granted that infants needed baptism in order to attain the kingdom of heaven. But the cause why certain infants attain the kingdom of heaven through baptism and others do not, he never explained satisfactorily, since in infants he could find no works of free will to which he might attribute it. Perhaps, however, he would have referred it either to the good merit of the parents, or to the human diligence of whatever minister baptizes the infant, by reason of some general providence of God, apart from any other predestination or special providence.

3. *The error of Pelagius is refuted.* — This error of Pelagius is reported quite differently by certain moderns, who place efficacious grace in physical predetermination; but that matter must be treated more fully by us in another, special work, or book, devoted to it. For now it suffices for us to take that error as Augustine relates it, and as it was condemned in the Council of Mileve, together with the letters of Innocent to him and his to Innocent, which are the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth among the letters of Innocent, and afterward more fully at Trent, session 6. And against it Augustine wrote the greater part of his seventh volume, and it is refuted point by point, as regards each error, in the material on original sin and on grace. For the present, however, the testimonies adduced in the preceding chapter suffice, in which Paul teaches that the predestination and election of God are not from our works — testimonies which are to be examined more fully below.

4. *The position of Cassian, Faustus, and the Gauls.* — After Pelagius had been defeated, many Catholic men rose up in Gaul against Augustine, among whom the chief were Cassian and Faustus, who, against Pelagius, admitted that

the grace of God is necessary for performing works of holiness and for meriting and obtaining glory, and for obtaining a disposition suitable for the remission of sin; yet they reserved some beginning of salvation to free will, so that one's own salvation might be constituted within the power of man. And so they said it was necessary that a man begin by some good movement, which God afterward promotes and perfects; and thus in this good movement they placed the first cause of salvation on our side, and they called it the merit of every supernatural grace, and free will alone they called grace freely granted, after the manner of Pelagius, as is clear from Prosper's letter. Now as to what this good movement might be, they explained variously. Some said it was faith, or the will to believe, which they distinguished from works, and they made use, against Augustine, of his own testimony in certain propositions on the Epistle to the Romans, proposition sixty and the following. To these he himself responds plainly by retracting that view, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 13. Others said this beginning was a kind of desire for salvation; others, a prayer made to God out of one's own freedom, or something similar — as may be seen in Prosper and Hilary, in the letters often cited, to Augustine. And this error Faustus of Riez insinuates in book 1 of *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 12, and more explicitly in book 2, chapter 9; and likewise Cassian, *Conference* 13, from chapter 8 on. The foundation of this position has already been sufficiently indicated, and will be treated more fully below.

5. *See Prosper, in the* Excerpts against the Genoese, *chapter 6, and against Cassian.* — To this error the Semipelagians joined another, which Augustine judges to pertain to the present matter as well. For they said not only that man could, by his will alone, choose to believe, but also that, once faith was conceived, he could always persevere in it. So Prosper and Hilary report, in the letters mentioned, and Augustine expressly, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, speaking of the Semipelagians, says: *They contend that to have begun to have this faith, and to remain in it to the end, is — as though we did not receive it from the Lord — our own doing*; and below: *In saying this, they are unwilling that it be preached to men that it is God's gift to come to faith and to remain in faith.* The same point is taken from the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapters 1, 2, 17, and following, and *Epist.* 105 and 106.

6. It may be doubted, however, of which faith Augustine speaks — namely, whether of faith formed by charity, or of faith considered in itself, even dead. For in the former sense it is clear that perseverance is a gift of God, and one especially proper to the predestined. But in the latter sense it does not seem so certain, nor does it seem to pertain to the present matter, since this perseverance

in faith alone is quite frequent even among the reprobate. Indeed, Augustine himself seems to vary, for in the said chapter seventeen of *On the Gift of Perseverance*, he says this gift is given to men *that they may remain believing and faithful.* But chapter twenty-three of the same book indicates that this perseverance in faith is not found in those *who linger in the delight of damnable sins.* Indeed, as far as the Semipelagians are concerned, I judge that they erred not only regarding perseverance in living faith, but also in faith taken as mere belief, considered in itself or even dead. For just as they attributed the beginning of faith, or the very substance of faith, to the will alone, so too they seem to have ascribed perseverance in that same belief to that same will alone. But just as it is certain that faith and the beginning of faith are from grace, so too, *a fortiori*, is perseverance in faith — even considered in itself without charity, that is, as not committing some sin of heresy or unbelief by which faith would be excluded. But whether the gift of grace required for this perseverance alone is simply the gift of faith itself continued, together with the supernatural helps owed to it, so to speak, and ordinary — or whether it includes, beyond this, some other special gift — this seems to be a question that can be debated among Catholics without danger of the Semipelagian error; we refer that question to the treatise on grace, since for the present business of predestination, and for contradicting the Semipelagians, it suffices that we show this to be a gift of supernatural grace.

7. There remains, besides, another doubt in this error: in what sense did these men understand that the gift of actual perseverance is not given to the predestined from God's will alone, but from their merit? For Prosper reports of them: *They are unwilling that perseverance be preached as something that cannot be either humbly merited or contemptuously spurned.* Now they spoke chiefly of perseverance in grace and without damnable sin, for as to perseverance in faith alone there was no difficulty, given their error already supposed. One may understand in two ways, however, that the gift of perseverance is not given without one's own merit. First, without the merit of free will alone; second, without merit already founded in acts of grace. In this latter sense, that dogma does not seem able to be marked as erroneous, since we can, through grace, merit perseverance *de congruo* — which suffices for the present matter — nor does this merit conflict with gratuitous predestination, as we shall see below. Hence, if this was all the Gauls were asserting, they had in this no new error pertaining to the present subject. But the other sense is indeed erroneous; yet it does not seem possible, with any foundation, to attribute it to the Semipelagians, since they, after the beginning of faith — which they attributed to nature — said that grace was necessary for the good works of piety needed for salvation, as

Augustine relates above, and as other Fathers report. How, then, could they have attributed perseverance in justice to free will alone?

8. *See the Council of Orange.* — I respond: as far as I can gather from Prosper, Hilary, and Augustine, they did not attribute the whole of perseverance to the powers of free will, but rather the merit of the *beginning* of the whole of perseverance. For they asserted not only that men merit faith, or its strengthening unto permanence in faith, through the will to believe, but also that they merit perseverance through a natural will, or affection, desire, or petition to persevere. For just as they said, *To those willing and knocking, faith is given*, and so on, so too they said perseverance is given. And in this sense Hilary says they affirmed: *The gift of perseverance is given to those who will it, by a preceding free choice of their own, which they assert to be free to this extent: that it may will or not will to receive the medicine.* And in this sense this error pertains very much to the present matter, for since the chief means of predestination is this perseverance in justice, in attributing the cause of that gift to free will alone, they were consequently placing the cause of the whole of predestination on the side of its effects. For they did not merely give a cause of predestination as regards the first effect and gift of grace, founded in moral acts, but they likewise gave the same cause as regards the subsequent gifts of grace necessary for perseverance. And thus this error of the Semipelagians about the beginning of salvation is to be understood — not only as regards the beginning of faith, but also as regards the beginning of hope, charity, repentance, continence, and the other virtues, by whose acts one perseveres in grace. This is to be carefully noted in order to understand various passages of Augustine and other theologians.

9. There are, however, theologians who attribute to the Semipelagians a third error in this matter, and under this title make a certain other Catholic position into a Semipelagian one. They say, then, that the Semipelagians erred also in this, that they attributed to the freedom of the will the efficacy of grace with respect to the supernatural acts themselves — what others call *the beginning of the efficacy of grace.* For by this too they would be attributing to free will the cause of predestination and of the discrimination between the elect and the non-elect. Yet neither Augustine, nor Prosper, nor Hilary, as regards this point, attribute this particular error to the Semipelagians. For that free will cooperates with these acts, and in its own genus is a cause of them, and influences them — both as to their determination toward them, and as to their proximate beginning, as regards their very being (whatever that beginning may be) — as to all these points (I say), this position is Catholic and entirely in accord with the faith. It would, however, be an error to say that free will alone,

without grace, does all these things, or any one of them. But this the Semipelagians did not say, as Augustine expressly teaches, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 21, and often elsewhere. Nor do we read that, from that chapter, one could conclude that they placed the cause of predestination as regards the whole of it, or as regards those means which efficaciously move free will. But if any doctors have fallen into error on this point, they were certain Scholastics, as we shall see below in Chapter Seven. There is no need, therefore, to impose anything more on the Semipelagians beyond what Augustine and the other Fathers attribute to them; on this point we shall dispute *ex professo* elsewhere.

10. Finally, there might be joined to this position of the Semipelagians another, held by certain Scholastics, who assign the cause of predestination, as regards all its effects, to good moral works that precede the whole of justification and are done from the natural powers of free will alone. Nevertheless, lest we seem to entangle the Catholic position with errors condemned by the Church, and because we truly believe that this position is not entirely the same as that of the Semipelagians, and contains a difficulty of its own, and consequently calls for its own lengthy disputation, we therefore put it off to the following chapter.

11. In this place, then, we are dealing only with the Semipelagians. For of the Pelagians there is no need to say more — either because their error is most manifest, or because they erred more concerning the whole order of grace than concerning predestination alone, and so must be refuted *ex professo* in the treatise on grace; or because from what we shall say against the remnants of Pelagius, the whole machine of Pelagius will be destroyed *a fortiori*. But in order that we may deal solidly, and without ambiguity of words, with the people of Marseille, or the remnants of the Pelagians, two things must be explained by us regarding their position. The first is what they themselves understood by the beginning of faith, of good work, of grace, or of salvation, and what we ourselves must understand by it, so that we may attack the very thing they were asserting. The second is concerning what kind of moral cause they were speaking — and especially whether of meritorious cause *de condigno*, or, abstractly, whether *de condigno* or *de congruo*, or in the sense of "commanding" [*imperatorie*], and so forth. For to know this too matters greatly for the manifestation of the truth, and for the force of the arguments, and for distinguishing erroneous opinions from non-erroneous ones. And it is relevant here also to know whether this cause is so necessary and infallible that without it no one attains the effects of predestination, and no one who employs it fails to be infallibly predestined; for this distinction will contribute much to understanding the point of truth.

12. *What the beginning of salvation is, and how many kinds there are.* — To explain the first point, I distinguish in this matter a twofold beginning. One intrinsic, the other extrinsic. I call intrinsic that which is, as it were, the internal foundation, or the first part, of that thing of which it is said to be the principle; extrinsic, then, will be that which precedes this first foundation, and is the cause on account of which it begins to be posited. Hence the former may also be called the formal principle, the latter the causal. For example, the Council of Orange, chapter 5, speaks of the beginning of faith and explains it to be the very affection of belief — which can be understood of a proximate and efficacious affection, that is, of an efficacious will to believe, capable of moving the intellect to believe as it ought; and this beginning I call the intrinsic beginning of faith, because it morally makes one act together with faith itself, and, considering that act as composed of will and intellect, the volition is, as it were, the first part and foundation of that composite. But if by the affection of belief is meant only a certain simple, inefficacious affection by which faith begins to please and to be desired — willing (so to speak) while not yet willing — it is clear that this is not the formal or intrinsic beginning of faith, because by virtue of it nothing pertaining to the formal constitution of faith is yet posited. But if such an affection, whatever it be, is in some way a cause by reason of which faith itself, or some internal beginning of it, begins to exist in man, it is rightly called a principle of faith — though more an extrinsic one, or rather causal, than formal. For every cause is a principle, and if it is not the kind of cause that intrinsically constitutes the effect, it can in some way be called extrinsic. Similarly, the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 8, *calls faith the beginning of justice.* If this is understood of integral, formal justice, it must also be understood of the intrinsic beginning. Hence it likewise calls it *the foundation and root of all* (that is, of the whole of) *justification.* And in chapter seven it had said that the justice which is the formal cause of our justification embraces faith, hope, and charity. In this justice, then, faith is called the beginning, because the rest are founded on it, although faith itself, too, by itself and formally, pertains to the integrity and, as it were, the composition of this justice. But if by "justice" we understood sanctifying grace alone, then faith would not be its intrinsic beginning, since it neither intrinsically composes it, nor indeed founds it in such a way that the same grace could not remain without faith — as it remains, consummated, in glory, and as it was in the soul of Christ together with infused knowledge, without faith. This also appears evidently in the acts themselves: for faith is the foundation of hope, not in the sense of internally composing hope itself, but as being its cause and basis; and in the same way it is the foundation of charity. For

just as matter is the foundation of form and is not a part of it, but from both together arises one essence, so faith is the foundation of hope and charity, etc., existing outside their proper account, yet from all of them together one justice is completed, in which the internal beginning is faith.

13. *Concerning which beginning of faith the Semipelagians were speaking.* — As for the Semipelagians, I am not sufficiently certain about which beginning they are speaking. For, in the first place, when they treat of the beginning of faith and attribute it to free will, they seem to be speaking of faith itself, which is the internal beginning of justice in the manner already explained, so that to say "the beginning of faith" is the same as to say "the beginning that is faith." And in this sense this error seems to be refuted by Augustine throughout the whole book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, by showing that faith is a work of God and a gift of grace; nor is there need to say more here to refute this error in this sense — both because in this respect it coincides with Pelagianism, and because what Augustine amasses is more than enough, and if more is wanted, it must be supplied in the treatise on grace and on faith.

14. Yet, this error having been rejected in this sense alone, it is not sufficiently overthrown as regards the business of predestination, because there still remains the question whether predestination, as regards that beginning of faith (however much it may be an effect of grace), has an antecedent cause on our side. I add, too, that it is not sufficiently established that the Semipelagians held the error that Christian faith is not from grace. For they carefully distinguished faith from the beginning of faith, and as to faith, they do not seem to have denied that it is a work of grace, but only as to the beginning of faith. For this reason the Council of Orange, chapter 5, distinctly defined: *Not only the increase of faith, but also the beginning of faith — that is, the very affection of belief* — is from grace. For as to the increase of faith, the people of Marseille admitted this, as Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, book 1, chapters 1 and 2, reports from Prosper and Hilary. But when the Council expounds *the beginning of faith*, that is, *the affection of believing*, it indicates that the increase of faith is not the intensification of faith, but the bringing about of the very act of believing with a greater perfection than it could have from the motion of the natural affection of believing alone. And thus the Gauls seem to have held that the will to believe is natural, yet not of itself sufficient to generate perfect faith in the intellect, except insofar as it obtains the grace necessary for this — and so they called that will the beginning of faith. In this sense, too, this error is condemned in the said Council of Orange, according to its true and Catholic sense. For there were not lacking Catholics who, in this respect, favored the

Semipelagians and twisted that canon to false senses; but against these one must proceed *ex professo* in the treatise on grace and on faith — although the matter is clear enough already from the testimonies and arguments that Augustine adduces on behalf of faith. For when Paul says that faith is a gift of God, he is not speaking of faith precisely as an act of the intellect, but of the whole of faith as a certain human act, by which we voluntarily bring the intellect into captivity to the obedience of God. And so elsewhere it is said that all believed *whose hearts God opened* — for to *open the heart* is nothing other than to incline the will and make it willing. Finally, the general testimonies which we shall presently point out, used to prove that all works of piety are from grace, prove this also of that will to believe, which is very necessary for piety.

15. For these reasons it can scarcely be believed that the Semipelagians, by the beginning of faith which they attributed to nature, understood that will which proximately commands the act of infused faith and moves the intellect to believe as it ought. For, as I shall presently say, in all works of piety they recognized grace to be necessary, even as regards their proximate and, as it were, intrinsic beginning. They could scarcely have failed to know that this will is itself a work of piety, nor could they give a reason why the will to repent, or to hope, should begin from grace, and not the will to believe. They seem, then, to have posited, prior to the whole act of believing as one ought (which includes both intellect and will), another, natural affection of belief, and perhaps also at the same time another, imperfect faith of a lower order, which would be not the intrinsic, but the extrinsic beginning of perfect faith, and consequently of the whole of salvation, insofar as it has the power of obtaining from God the grace for a higher faith. And it is of this increase that Augustine seems to speak, in the said book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 2, when he reports that the Semipelagians said: *That we have faith itself from ourselves, but its increase from God.* For this increase does not seem to be by intensification, or by some other greater perfection of the same act, but by elevation to a higher act of faith. But if this perhaps was the position of the Semipelagians, the business of predestination is not sufficiently overthrown by proving that the act of believing as one ought, and the will proportioned to it, cannot come about without grace; because there still remains the difficulty whether that grace, which is given for believing thus and for willing to believe thus, has, on our part, some prior cause — namely, that faith of whatever kind, and affection of belief, which the Semipelagians wanted us to be able to bring about of ourselves.

16. *The opinion of certain authors regarding the error of the Semipelagians.* — Perhaps for this reason, some are accustomed to attack the Semipelagians on

this point — namely, that they asserted that free will, by its own powers, could have an act of faith, even an imperfect and natural one, regarding the matters of faith proposed to it from outside, together with an affection likewise natural and imperfect, proportioned to such faith; or even that it could have some velleity, or imperfect desire of believing, in the manner and to the degree necessary. And on this point some attack, and say to agree with the Semipelagians, those who teach that free will, without grace, can have these imperfect affections and acts — not only of faith, but also of hope, charity, repentance, and so on. And against this position, as though it were that of the Semipelagians, they are accustomed to object passages of Scripture in which all good works are attributed to grace — passages which are common, and so I shall touch on only three, briefly. The first is that of John 15: *Without me you can do nothing*; for that faith and affection is something good, and therefore it cannot come about without Christ — that is, without the grace of Christ and his influence, as the Fathers and Councils expound, and Trent elegantly, chapter 6. The second is 1 Corinthians 4: *What do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?* For man would have much in which to boast, if of himself and without the grace of God he could in any way believe or love. Let Augustine be read, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapters 4 and 5. The third is 2 Corinthians 3: *We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.* For, as Augustine often considers, the beginning of every good is holy thought, which must necessarily precede every good and free movement of the will; therefore, if that thought cannot be from us, but from God, that faith cannot be from us either; and so the same Paul says elsewhere: *He who began a good work in you, may he himself perfect it*, to the Philippians, 1 and 2.

17. *Imperfect faith can exist without grace.* — But these authors did not distinguish two things which must be distinguished in this matter, lest one err gravely in it and, under the shadow of the Semipelagians, attack Catholic and most learned men. It is one thing, then, for free will to be able, by its own powers, to have an imperfect affection or act of faith; it is another thing for it to be able, through an act of this kind, to be for itself the cause of the grace and help necessary for believing perfectly, as one ought. Now the Semipelagians asserted both of these; yet in the first they did not err, except insofar as they joined it to the second — indeed, because of this latter point, they thought the former to be necessary. But if the first is separated from the second, as it is separated by Catholics, it pertains not only not to the error of the Semipelagians, but is the common opinion of theologians, and is itself known by experience.

For the heretic believes many mysteries of faith, not through grace, but through his own will, because he believes imperfectly and only in a human manner. And we ourselves often perform similar acts — otherwise, whenever we believe or love, we would be certain that we believe or love as we ought, which is plainly false. But if such imperfect acts are found in us, certainly they are not such as they ought to be for piety and justice before God; therefore it does not pertain to the error of the Semipelagians to say that grace is not necessary for these imperfect acts, since the Councils define only that it is necessary for bringing about such affections as one ought. Nor, indeed, can any reason be given why free will should not be able to bring about such imperfect acts, since of themselves they do not exceed the order of nature — a point which we shall treat more fully below regarding good moral works, for the reasoning is the same for all of them, as far as individual acts are concerned, for that is how we are now speaking. But how great the perfection of such acts can be, or what their imperfection consists in, must be carefully observed, lest more be attributed to free will than is fitting; this, however, must be treated in the matter on grace, for at present it suffices that they do not attain that degree of perfection which the Councils require when they add that phrase, *as one ought.* Which Augustine explained in these words, in the book *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 2: *When they do this as it ought to be done — that is, with the love and delight of justice — let them rejoice that they have received the sweetness which the Lord gave, that his land might yield its fruit.*

18. Wherefore those testimonies of Scripture, if they are brought forward to conclude from them that such imperfect acts cannot come about without grace, prove nothing. For in those passages the discussion concerns works of piety which lead to eternal life; for whatever is not of this kind is reckoned as nothing, as Augustine expressly declared, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 2, and in other passages which we shall cite below. Otherwise, by the same testimonies it would be proved that free will cannot, without the help of grace, perform even one good moral work — which I shall show below to be false. But those testimonies, brought forward to refute the Semipelagian position, which constitutes in these acts a principle of faith, at least extrinsic and causal, so to speak, are most valid, and Augustine uses them, in the passages cited, as we shall presently conclude and declare.

19. *What the Semipelagians held regarding the beginning of good works.* — What we have said about the beginning of faith can be applied, proportionately, to the beginning of any work of piety whatsoever, and consequently, much more, to the beginning of the whole of salvation, or even of perseverance. For it

may also be doubted whether the Semipelagians attributed to free will the beginning of each individual work of piety, or only of faith. For this latter is indicated by Hilary in his letter, saying: *Moreover, they agree that no one is sufficient of himself either to begin or yet to complete anything.* These words are almost repeated by Augustine, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 1, restating points on which they already agreed with him, so as to persuade them of other things: *They have come*, he says, *to confess that the will of men is preceded by the grace of God, and they agree that no one is sufficient of himself either to begin or to complete any good work.* And in chapter two he repeats the same point, and from it argues *ad hominem*, that if free will is not sufficient of itself for the beginning of other works of piety, neither should it suffice for the beginning of faith, since the work of faith is not the lowest of all, but more difficult, more arduous, and more perfect than many of the rest. From elsewhere, however, it appears that the Semipelagians attributed to free will the beginning of all works of piety, and to God, or to grace, only the progress and perfection of that beginning. For, as I noted above, they attributed even perseverance itself in justice to free will — not because they denied that help, and the true spirit of grace, were necessary for persevering, but because they thought that this very thing had some beginning from us; perseverance, however, is not given to us except insofar as the collection of those works by which one perseveres is conferred on us; nor is the collection itself granted except insofar as the individual works of the whole collection are given to us, since the collection is nothing apart from the works, nor does it come about except insofar as the works themselves come about. Therefore, in the way in which perseverance is from us, the good works of piety themselves are from us; but perseverance was held by the Semipelagians to be from us, at least as to its beginning; therefore so too are the individual works of piety. Hence Cassian, *On the Institutes of the Renunciants*, book 2, chapter 13, among the good works by which we ourselves obtain the grace of God, lists fasts, vigils, readings, and so on, and in chapter 14 says that perfection cannot be consummated by these alone, without the help of God's grace, yet that those works are necessary for obtaining it. *Because it is given only to those who desire, labor, ask, will, and run*, and he concludes: *For it is ready at hand, once only the occasion of a good will has been offered to it by us, to bestow all these things.* Here it seems sufficiently clear that, for all the works of virtue for which grace is necessary, some prior beginning is required on our part.

20. These statements, then, can be reconciled in two ways. First, by asserting that the people of Marseille did not attribute to free will the proximate

beginning of grace except as regards faith, or the will to believe; yet that this very thing could be a remote principle of the other helps for any other acts whatsoever, because faith commands all of these. And consequently it was not necessary for them to posit a new beginning, from free will alone, for the other good acts, but rather from faith — not just any faith, but faith already perfectly conceived through the help of grace. And this itself sufficed for them to place the cause of the whole of predestination, as regards all its effects and the helps of grace, in man — because at least remotely that beginning of faith would be the cause of all subsequent effects.

21. In a second way these statements can be reconciled — and, I think, more in keeping with their intent — through the distinction given above of a twofold beginning, intrinsic or extrinsic. For it seems that what Augustine and Hilary report them as saying — that free will, without grace, does not avail to begin the works of piety — is to be understood of the intrinsic beginning; for they admitted (as Augustine himself says) *that our will is preceded by the grace of God* with respect to these works, which preceding grace is, in that order, as it were the first principle of the works of piety. But before this they posited another principle, extrinsic or causal, which is outside grace and prior to grace, and is the cause of the whole of subsequent grace; and this they seem to have posited also for the help that precedes hope, charity, and repentance, and so for each work individually. This both because there is the same reason and proportion in these matters as in faith and the will to believe, as I argued above; and also because their own words sound this way, as is clear from the passages cited above from Cassian, and from others reported by Hilary. For when he had said that the people of Marseille agreed that grace is required not only to complete, but also to begin, these works, he adds: *For they do not think it should be counted among the works of healing that a sick man, terrified by the will to be punished, should wish to be healed. And below: Nor do they think grace is denied, if such a will — which seeks such a physician but is not itself yet of any avail — is said to precede.* They placed, then, the beginning of the whole of salvation in this — namely, *to will to be healed* — under which is included not only *to will to believe*, but also *to will to repent*, and under this *willing* they included any affection, or imperfect desire, and petition, or any other effort or moral diligence, for obtaining any help of grace whatsoever. Whence it finally came about that they placed such a cause of predestination, not only as regards the collection of effects by reason of the first one, but even as regards each individually, insofar as in each that *willing*, or *striving*, could precede — not only from supernatural

faith, but also from natural faith, and from human effort, which they judged sufficient for this causality.

22. *The position of the Semipelagians is refuted.* — From the explanation of this beginning, then, this position is effectively refuted by the general testimonies adduced above, and the argument can be concluded in this way. Free will, of itself and without the grace of God, can bring about nothing that of itself contributes, or is useful, to eternal life and true justice; but the beginning of salvation, whether intrinsic and formal, or extrinsic and causal, contributes much of itself, and is something of great moment in that order; therefore it cannot come about without grace; therefore, conversely, whatever can come about without grace cannot have the force and causality of such a beginning. The major premise is sufficiently proved by those testimonies: *Without me you can do nothing. We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves*, etc., and the like. For although these testimonies are expounded of works of piety, no one can deny that a work which can bring as much good to the soul as predestination, as regards all its effects, pertains very much to piety, and of itself contributes to eternal life, and is useful. And from this the minor is easily proved, because the intrinsic principle is supernatural and of the same order, as was proved above, and the Pelagians themselves seem to have acknowledged this. As for the other beginning, called extrinsic — if it is such as to bring with it all the effects of predestination, it is assuredly of great moment, and contributes much to salvation. Wherefore of him who does such a work we cannot say that he does nothing that contributes to salvation. But of every work which is something of this kind, Christ says: *Without me you can do nothing*; and Paul: *We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves.* Therefore such a beginning, too, cannot come about without the grace of God.

23. And this is what the Synod of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, teaches against this error, and *declares that the beginning of justification itself in adults is to be taken from the prevenient grace of God through Christ Jesus, that is, from his calling.* By these words it teaches that one is not to think of any other beginning of justification outside this starting point, because either it could come about without grace — which is not in accord with the teaching of Christ and Paul — or, if grace is necessary for it, it cannot come before the calling, since before the prevenient grace (the first, certainly, for the discussion concerns its starting point) there is no grace. And in the same sense the Council of Orange defines, chapter 3: *If anyone says that the grace of God is conferred upon human invocation, but not rather that grace itself brings it about that we invoke him, he contradicts Isaiah and the Apostle, who say: I was found by those who did not seek*

me. From this canon we understand that, although *invocation, petition, or desire* may be called the extrinsic principle of the help, or of the work for which we invoke God, etc., nevertheless such a principle, in order to be a true beginning of some grace, cannot have this unless it is itself also, *a priori*, grace. And in the same sense canon 4 defines that God does not wait for our will, that we should will to be cleansed from sin, because if this willing is such as to provoke God to give the cleansing from sins, or the proximate disposition to it, it must itself also proceed from grace, since without grace we can do nothing in that order. And the other canons of that Council, assembled specially against this error, proceed in much the same way. This, then, is the first and solid foundation against this position.

24. *That merit of grace destroys it.* — I come now to the other point set out above, concerning the kind of cause, or merit, which the Semipelagians attributed to this beginning, which they said was from free will alone. For from this side Augustine takes another principal foundation, which he uses repeatedly against this error — namely, that it destroys the very notion of grace, in asserting that it is given on account of our merits; for, as Paul testifies, to the Romans, 11: *If it is from works, it is no longer grace.* The efficacy of this foundation, however, depends on the point already mentioned. For, in the first place, no kind of moral causality that can be conceived in our works excludes the notion of grace, except merit — as will be easily evident by running through the rest. For only three modes of moral causality can intervene here: disposition, impetration, or merit; for although within the breadth of these modes a variety can be found, all of it is nonetheless reduced to those three heads, nor has anything else been devised up to now. Now of these, disposition, if nothing else is added, does not remove the notion of grace, for grace is infused into the sinner according to his disposition, as the Council of Trent says, session six, chapter seven; and yet it is infused gratuitously, according to sound and Catholic doctrine, and thus, notwithstanding the disposition, grace retains the true notion of grace. And if this is true even of the last disposition, which can precede in the sinner, it will be much more true of a remote disposition, or one less proportioned, or one which has a lesser causality in that genus — namely, by giving occasion, or something similar. Likewise, impetration does not remove the notion of grace, as is self-evident, because petition does not introduce the notion of a debt, and its efficacy, considered in itself, does not rest on the justice of the petitioner, but on the liberality of him from whom it is sought. Hence when a sinner asks grace from God, he asks for true grace, nor does he, by

asking for some gift, destroy in it the notion of grace, if it is given on account of the asking.

25. *Merit* de condigno *is incompatible with grace.* — The whole force of that foundation, then, turns on causality by way of merit. Now this merit is distinguished by theologians into two kinds: one *de condigno*, the other *de congruo*. As to the former, all admit that it introduces the notion of justice, and therefore, as far as it goes in itself, excludes the notion of grace. I say *as far as it goes in itself*, because that which is given on account of such merit, formally and as such, does not have the notion of grace; but if that merit is founded in a prior grace, without which it could not come about, the merit itself can be called grace, and under this consideration even its reward retains the notion of grace. In this way, too, eternal life was called grace by the Apostle, to the Romans, chapter six, and by the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, because although it is from merit, the merit itself is from grace. But if the merit were *de condigno* and did not presuppose a prior grace, but were had from the pure powers of free will alone, then plainly whatever was rendered for such merit would have no notion of grace, but only of wages. Merit *de congruo*, however, does not seem to exclude the notion of grace, because it does not introduce the notion of justice, but of fittingness, or propriety, and herein lies the point of the difficulty.

26. *Of which merit the Semipelagians were speaking.* — For this reason, then, it seems necessary to some to say that the Semipelagians placed in that beginning of theirs, of faith or of salvation, a merit *de condigno*. For they do not think the argument can otherwise have the force with which Augustine and the other Fathers, to be cited below, use it against them — namely, that they destroyed the notion of grace. Hence Augustine often, on this point, makes the Semipelagians equal to, and worse than, the Pelagians. For he infers against them that it follows, from their position, that the grace of God is given according to our merits — a conclusion Pelagius was forced to retract, and which, lest he himself be condemned, he retracted, or condemned, with cunning. And in the same way John Maxentius most sharply attacks Faustus, in his response to Hormisdas, in volume 4 of the *Library*. But the Pelagians placed a merit *de condigno* in the works of free will with respect to grace, as is established. And without doubt it seems in this sense that the proposition was condemned in the Council of Palestine; for that sense the very word "merit," said simply, carries with it. Finally, it seems necessarily to be understood in this sense also what Paul, in chapter 11 to the Romans, infers: *But if by grace, then no longer of works.* For the inference to be valid, it must be understood of merit *de condigno*. And thus Cardinal Toledo expounds it there, where he understood the

position of the Semipelagians, and its condemnation, in the same way. Nor does he think it pertains to that error that some merit *de congruo* of divine grace, even as regards its first help, be posited in the good works of free will. In this opinion is also Vega, *On Trent*, book 8, chapter 5, and it seems to have been that of many Scholastics, as we shall see in the following chapters — who wrote after the Council of Orange, and after the whole disputation of Augustine, Prosper, and others against the Semipelagians. For it is not likely that they either were ignorant of the definition of such great Fathers, or held an opinion against it; therefore they understood it to aim solely at excluding merit *de condigno* from the moral works of free will, which the Semipelagians attributed to them.

27. But indeed it is difficult to attribute this sense to the Semipelagians merely so that Augustine's argument against them may be effective. First, because nowhere do Augustine himself, or Prosper, explain this sense in them, but they either spoke absolutely, or, if they add anything, it is rather to extend the statement to every kind of merit. Such is that statement of Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 20: *See whether anything else is being done in this way except that grace should be given according to our merits, in whatever manner, and so grace should not be grace.* Here I weigh that phrase, *in whatever manner*, for it extends merit to every mode of merit. Second, because Cassian seems expressly to exclude merit *de condigno*, *Conference* 13, chapter 9, and *On the Institutes of the Renunciants*, book 12, chapters 11 and 14. Among other things he says: *For we say, according to the Savior's own statement, that it is given to those who ask, and opened to those who knock, and found by those who seek; but that our asking, knocking, and seeking is not worthy* [*condigna*] *unless the mercy of God gives what we ask, etc.* Here he quite expressly excludes worthiness on the part of our beginning — indeed, immediately afterward he seems to attribute to it only a certain occasion, saying: *It is ready at hand, the occasion of a good will alone having been offered by us, to bestow all these things.* Hence Hilary, in the said letter, reports that the Gauls were accustomed to respond thus on their own behalf: *Nor is grace denied, if such a will, which only seeks such a physician but is not itself yet of any avail, is said to precede.* Third, because there is no sufficient reason to presume that the people of Marseille placed a merit *de condigno* in this beginning. For the principal error of Pelagius was placed in this very point, while they themselves dissented from Pelagius in all other respects — only, in order to free God from the acceptance of persons, and to establish salvation within the power of any adult man, they sought this distinction of whatever kind on the part of men — for which, indeed, a merit *de condigno* is not necessary, but anything else suffices.

28. *Even imperfect merit is against grace, if it is not from grace.* — Wherefore, whether we suppose this latter part to be the truer one, or indeed abstract from that controversy altogether, it must be said that Augustine's foundation against them is effective, because it would indeed destroy the notion of grace, once a merit of the first grace from the powers of free will alone is posited — of whatever kind they posited it, even *de congruo*. This is proved, in the first place, by the authority of that same Augustine, and of the other Fathers who followed him. For that this is Augustine's sense is established, because he denies merit of the first, helping grace in just the same way as he admits that a sinner can merit, through faith, the helps for performing repentance or obtaining charity. And of this same merit he says that, through it, the notion of grace is destroyed in the gift given by reason of it, if faith is from nature, and not from grace. But it is most certain that that merit is only *de congruo*, even in the act of infused faith, or in any other act which a man performs while existing in the state of mortal sin, by the supernatural help of God; therefore he holds the same view about works of nature, if any merit of grace, even *de congruo* only, is placed in them. This is established especially from the said book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, and from the letters 105 and 106, and *Retractations* 1, chapter 9; and even before the Semipelagians arose, he had attacked this same position in the same way, in book 1, *To Simplician*, question 2, and in book 2, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, chapter 17, book 4, *Against Julian*, chapter 3, and book 2, *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, chapter 17.

29. Second, in this position and foundation almost all the later Fathers followed Augustine: Prosper, *Against the Collator* — that is, against Cassian — especially against his thirteenth Conference, chapters 11 and 12, and against the objections of the Gauls, especially the fourth; Fulgentius, book 1, *To Monimus*, and more explicitly in the book *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapter 18; Peter the Deacon, in the book *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapter 8; Isidore, in the book *On the Supreme Good*, chapter 3; Anselm, in the book *On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination*, and on Paul, in passages to be cited below; most excellently Gregory, *Morals*, book 33, chapter 20 (elsewhere 25), on those words of Job, chapter 45: *Who first gave to me, that I should repay him?* — where, without naming them, he attacks the position of the people of Marseille. He seems, however, to make more use of the first argument set out above, and of the testimonies of sacred Scripture which confirm it, although he also indicates this latter point, saying: *If we have given anything of good action, that we might merit his grace, where then is what the Apostle says: By grace you have been saved, etc.*

And the same point can be applied to what he had said in *Morals*, book 17, chapter 10 (elsewhere 11), in explaining those words of Job, *Whose helpers*, and joining them with the words of Paul, 1 Corinthians 3: *We are God's fellow-workers.* For this latter statement, due order being observed, is true; the former, however, is said on account of those who attribute more to themselves than is just; whence Gregory says: *Those who think highly of themselves according to their own understanding are unwilling to be humbly helpers of God, because while they esteem themselves useful to God, they cut themselves off from the fruit of that usefulness.* One may also see book 24, chapter 6, toward the end (elsewhere chapter 12), and Homily 9 on Ezekiel, and *Dialogues*, book 1, chapter 4. Finally, Bernard excellently indicated the force of this argument, Sermon 67 on the Canticle, saying: *There is no room for grace to enter where merit has already taken possession. For if anything belongs to one's own, to that extent it is necessary that grace yield to it; whatever is allotted to merits is taken from grace.* As if he were saying: merit, of itself, excludes grace, considering the proper accounts of each according to itself; yet because merit can be manifold, to the extent that it is present, to that extent it diminishes the notion of grace. Again, Sermon 74, after a commendation of grace, he adds: *But if anyone should say, "By the grace of God I am what I am," and yet should strive to seize glory for himself in place of the grace he has received, is he not a thief and a robber?* Here he seems to allude to that passage of 1 Corinthians 3: *Why do you boast as though you had not received?* By that diminutive, *gloriola* ["a little glory"], he indicates that even if someone does not attribute to himself the merit of justice, but some merit of whatever kind, he is, in that very thing, a thief and a robber, in failing to recognize grace as grace.

30. Third, the Council of Orange, chapter 6, not only defines against the position of the Semipelagians, but also supports the foundation taken from the incompatibility of merit and grace, whether the merit be called de condigno or de congruo, if it is attributed to the powers of nature. For the Council made no such distinction, and it is not likely that it left this loophole to the Semipelagians. Thus it says in the said sixth chapter: If anyone says that mercy is conferred upon us — believing, willing, desiring, striving, laboring, watching, studying, asking, seeking, knocking — without the grace of God, but does not confess that it comes about in us, divinely, through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, that we believe, will, and are able to do all these things as we ought; or who subordinates the help of grace to humility or human obedience, and does not agree that it is, in being obedient with greater humility, itself the gift of that same grace, resists the Apostle who says: What do you have that you

have not received? (1 Corinthians 4), and: By the grace of God I am what I am (1 Corinthians 15). Of these two testimonies, the first pertains more to the first point, yet it also confirms the foundation set against the people of Marseille, insofar as Paul adds: But if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it? For the sense is: why do you boast as though you had not received it as a free gift — as the Council also indicates. Otherwise the Semipelagians would not be contradicting Paul, for they admitted that they received all the gifts of grace from God, and so they were not subtracting anything from God's gift, or from receiving from God; yet because they said they received it by I-know-not-what merit of their own, which they had not through grace but through nature, they consequently boasted of those gifts as though not received — at any rate, not received as a free gift — and consequently they were doing away with true grace. The other testimony is more evident still, for even the Semipelagians contend that man is, through grace, what he is — that is, just and holy; and yet the Council says they contradict Paul, in attributing to themselves the merit of that grace; therefore it holds that they contradict him precisely in this, that they posit a merit which involves a contradiction with grace.

31. And this same point the same Council confirms in the following chapters, especially chapter 17, when it says: *Christian fortitude is wrought by charity, which is poured out in our hearts not through the choice of the will, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, no merits preceding grace.* And chapter 18: *A reward is owed to good works, if they are done; but the grace which is not owed precedes, so that they may be done.* So too the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, teaches that the starting point of justification is taken from prevenient grace, that is, from the calling by which *they are called, no merits of theirs existing.* Here it readily suggests that, for the calling to have the notion of grace, it is necessary that it be given with no merits existing; and when it says *no*, it excludes all merits, whether *de condigno* or *de congruo*. To this is usually also adduced chapter eight of the same session, in which the Council expounds Paul as saying that man is justified gratuitously, *because nothing* (it says) *of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the very grace of justification.* Here it seems necessary to understand that every merit, even *de congruo*, is excluded, by that phrase *gratis* — both because this is the true sense of Paul, as we shall presently see, and also because it distinctly and absolutely denies every merit. But this passage has a special difficulty, which we shall treat at the end of the chapter, lest we be diverted from our purpose.

32. Fourth, from these Fathers and Councils is taken the principal foundation of this truth and its proof, which must be drawn from Scripture. For of this word "grace" we can speak either absolutely and according to its whole breadth, or as Scripture speaks of it and predicates the grace of God in the salvation of men. In the former manner we cannot deny that, in some proper and rigorous signification, "grace" is said of a gift given without a debt of justice, even if it is given to one who asks and seeks, or even to one who merits well in some fitting way. This is clear from the frequent use of that word and from the common understanding of men: for all understand that a favor is being done to them whenever something is given which is not owed by justice — and much more so if it is given by a superior to an inferior, because a superior seems all the more free of such a debt. And the reason is that "grace" is named from "giving freely," as Paul understands it, to the Romans, chapters 4 and 11; and a thing is said to be given freely whenever it is not given from a debt absolutely speaking, and an absolute debt is above all the debt of justice; therefore whatever is given without such a debt can not unreasonably be said to be given freely, and consequently also to be grace. And in this way every gift conferred on us by God freely — that is, without merit of such justice — can be called grace, as St. Thomas indicated, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 110, article 1; and the Scholastics commonly, on book 2, distinction 4. And thus even creation, or other natural gifts, can be called grace — a signification of which Pelagius made abusive use in the Council of Palestine, in order to deceive the Fathers of that Council, as Augustine testifies, *Epist.* 105, and in the book *On the Grace of Christ*, and often elsewhere.

33. Nevertheless, in Scripture this name "grace" has a more proper and strict signification. Hence Augustine, together with four other bishops, in the letter to Innocent (which is found before the twenty-seventh letter of Innocent, and is the ninety-fifth among Augustine's letters), say that *although the gift of creation could, not unreasonably, be called grace, it is nonetheless remarkable that we read it so called in no canonical, prophetic, evangelical, or apostolic writings; but rather, that which Scripture simply calls grace is that by which we, predestined, are called and glorified.* And Jerome holds the same view, in the first dialogue against the Pelagians, and in letter 159, to Cyprian; and this can be accounted for by reason, because, when the property of grace is weighed, insofar as it denotes not only love and extrinsic benevolence (for we are not now dealing with this signification) but a gift given to us freely by God, it most properly applies, in the first place, to these supernatural gifts and not to natural ones — and hence grace is usually distinguished from nature by Augustine and the

Scholastics. Hence creation is not properly called grace, because although things were created altogether freely by God, and so being itself can be said to be a gift conferred freely by God, nevertheless, because creation does not presuppose a person to whom the gift is made, it is therefore reckoned not so much grace as something prior to grace. In this way too St. Thomas indicates, Part I, question 11, article 4, reply to 4, that proper mercy is not found in the work of creation, but only in a certain manner, by a certain proportion, because, since it does not presuppose any thing, it does not properly presuppose misery either. Thus, then, proper grace presupposes some capacity, and hence the very thing to which it can be given. And so, when grace is said to be given gratuitously, that "gratuitously" signifies not a pure negation, but, so to speak, a kind of privation, because it presupposes in the one to whom the favor is shown some capacity of right or debt, such that "gratuitously" expresses the negation of a debt with respect to a capable subject — a capacity which presupposes existence, and consequently creation. Moreover, proper grace presupposes a rational nature, and therefore grace is not properly said to come about in brutes, but in rational creatures. Creation, then, which does not presuppose but produces the rational creature, is not properly called grace. And hence it also follows that, once creation is presupposed, whatever is owed to nature itself by a certain natural consequence is not properly called grace — such as conservation, concurrence with the operations of nature, and the like — because he who gives the form gives what follows upon the form, whence this is not reckoned a new liberality distinct from creation; and so, just as creation as such is not comprehended under grace, neither is everything that follows upon it.

34. From which we further understand that the grace of God, so called theologically or dogmatically, excludes not only the debt of justice, but also that debt of connaturality by which those things are said to be owed to nature which are connatural to it, or which it naturally demands, as it were by its own right. For even that which is thus owed is not given altogether as grace, considered in itself and formally. Indeed, speaking morally, natural goods seem not so much to be given of themselves as to be given along with something else; whence, if that other thing is not grace, neither are the rest reckoned as grace. From which we can further understand that, if anything is owed to nature by virtue of works which it performs by its own, purely natural powers, it is not true grace, as Scripture speaks of grace — whether that debt be called one of justice, or of moral fittingness, or of mere connaturality — because all of this does not transcend the notion of a gift owed to nature. This is illustrated in physical actions: for when a man generates a man, although he cannot complete the

generation unless God creates the soul of the child, nevertheless, because that creation is owed connaturally, given that the man disposes the matter of the human body in the way that he can through natural action, it is not therefore reckoned a special liberality of God, or grace. Similarly in moral matters: when a man, by the powers of nature, performs acts of virtue or of knowledge, a habit follows — not without a new and free action of God — and yet the habit cannot be called grace, because its production, insofar as it is from God, is owed to the natural action of man. Even natural beatitude itself would be owed to a man who acts well by nature — not by a debt of justice (as I suppose, because justice with God is not natural to man) but from a certain general providence, owed by the author of nature, not only as creator but also as moral governor; and this suffices for it not to be grace, because it is not so much a new liberality as something naturally consequent upon another, prior thing, which was not true grace, as we have declared. So, then, under this title it is incompatible with true grace, of which Scripture speaks, that it be a debt by virtue of works done by the powers of nature alone — whether the discussion is of a debt of justice, or of some lesser one — because, whatever it may be, it suffices that there be a certain connection and natural consequence between such a gift and the first condition of nature, with other naturally owed concurrences intervening. In this way, then, it is sufficiently deduced that it is incompatible with grace that it come about from the works of free will alone, because either the gift that is given has a natural connection with those works, or it does not: if it does not, then it is in no way given on their account; if it does, then it is no longer grace, but a gift of nature. And it is perhaps in this sense that Paul says, to the Romans, chapters three and four, and to the Galatians, chapters two and three, that men are not justified by works — works, that is, elicited by the powers of nature — although that statement also admits other expositions, as we shall presently say.

35. *The conditions of a perfect gift.* — It must further be added that it is peculiarly incompatible with the notion of grace that it come about as a recompense for a work, even if such recompense is not owed from justice, but from some title of obeisance or gratitude. This can be explained from what the civil laws hand down concerning a pure donation. For in *Digest*, *On Donations*, law 1, three things are required for a proper donation. One is that the thing given immediately become the recipient's, otherwise it will rather be a promise. Another is that the thing given not afterward be revoked by the donor, because if it is revocable, it will not be a donation simply, but in a qualified sense, or conditional. The third is that the donor be moved to give for no other cause than to exercise munificence and liberality — that is, that he not give it on account of

some recompense, even one of mere acknowledgment or gratification, as Bartolus explains there, and Panormitanus, in the rubric *On Donation* — taken from the law *Aquilias* (elsewhere *Atilius*), *Digest*, *On Donations*, and from the chapter *Per duas*, in the *Decretals*, under the same title. Now grace is the singular and perfect donation of God's benefits pertaining to salvation, as Augustine taught, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10: *Between grace and predestination there is only this difference, that predestination is the preparation of grace, while grace is the donation itself.* And so sacred Scripture speaks of it as of a perfect donation: *To you it has been granted, for the sake of Christ, not only that you should believe in him* — to the Philippians, chapter one. *And the charity of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us*, and the like. In the gifts of grace, then, those three conditions are found most perfectly and exactly.

36. *Grace has the conditions of a perfect gift.* — The first is clear, because grace denotes a gift bestowed on us in such a way that, by that very act, it becomes the recipient's — and so much his that it lies in his power and dominion to cast it away or to keep it; on account of which Paul said, 2 Corinthians 6: *We exhort you not to receive the grace of God in vain.* The second condition, likewise, is most certain, because God, as far as it is from himself, gives sanctifying grace and the gifts necessary for it irrevocably. For although he sometimes gives gratuitous graces for a time and takes them away at his own will, and does the same with certain gifts of supererogation and extraordinary gifts, nevertheless, in the gifts or helps of sanctifying grace, he forsakes no one, especially a just man, unless first forsaken by him, as the Council of Trent taught. Thus, then, the donation of such grace is irrevocable, and consequently a perfect donation. And perhaps Paul insinuated this condition, to the Romans 11, saying: *The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance.* For although Paul seems to be speaking specially of gifts proceeding from election and predestination, which God, once formed, cannot change — as the immediately preceding words indicate: *According to election, they are most dear on account of the fathers* — nevertheless, regarding the justifying gifts of grace universally, that statement is true: not because man cannot lose grace once obtained, but because (as St. Thomas says there) *even a temporal gift and a temporal calling is not annulled by a change in God, as though he repented, but by a change in the man who casts away the grace of God*, according to that text of Hebrews 12: *Take care lest anyone fall short of the grace of God.*

37. The third condition, which bears most upon our purpose, and which is preserved in this donation of grace, can be gathered, in the first place, from the

perfect notion of donation, which must be found in it, since sacred Scripture everywhere signifies that in this above all God shows his supreme liberality and most free will in the distribution of his gifts. In which sense Paul says, to the Ephesians 1: *That God predestined us unto the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace.* For by these words he signifies that God willed this to be the greatest glory and commendation of his glory: that, according to the purpose of his will, to show his munificence, liberality, and freedom in giving, he should bestow it, and not from some cause on the side of the recipients. And therefore in other passages he is careful that men should not, in this respect, usurp to themselves any little glory (as Bernard said), but should attribute the whole to God. And this is what he immediately adds, chapter 2 of the same Epistle: *That he might make us sit together in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus, that he might show, in the ages to come, the abundant riches of his grace, in his goodness toward us in Christ Jesus.* And showing how liberal this grace is, he adds: *For by grace you have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God; not of works, that no one may boast.* Here, first, that phrase must be weighed: *and that not of yourselves* — it excludes not just any cause on the part of the recipients, but every cause, and in this consists the perfection of this grace. And in this sense he says it is the gift of God, as it were by antonomasia, and finally *not of works* — a negation which is more universal than it would be to say "not of merits *de condigno*." Now that whole breadth was necessary, that what he adds might hold: *that no one may boast.* For by whatever reasoning grace might be from works of nature alone, that would not exclude everything from which man might boast.

38. The same force is found in those words, 1 Corinthians 4: *For who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received? But if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?* This must necessarily be understood of receiving by a perfect, supremely liberal donation, surpassing, above all, every debt of nature. For no one could ever boast of having something not received from God, at least as the author of nature, nor of being able to bring about a moral good without God, at least as influencing it as the author of nature. But when Paul speaks of the goods by which the faithful are distinguished from the unbeliever, or the just from the unjust, he signifies that such goods must be recognized as received by a singular gift, beyond every debt of nature. And consequently, men ought to claim no glory to themselves in receiving them — though they would claim no small glory if by their own powers they could in any way merit them; and they would take away just as much from the glory owed to divine liberality, and to a perfect donation, as

Bernard said, and at length, Augustine, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 4 and following. Finally, for this reason Paul, to the Romans 9, traces the whole root and origin of the distribution of grace back to the divine will, saying: *For he says to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy* — certainly as to the root and first origin. In this sense he concludes: *So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.* Paul, therefore, makes the ultimate resolution of grace rest in the will and mercy of God alone, because the first grace is a pure donation, and so made from the sole liberality of the giver, without any cause on the part of the one to whom it is given.

39. *That merit* de congruo *of the first grace is against the notion of grace.* — From these principles and testimonies, then, it is sufficiently manifest that even merit *de congruo* excludes grace, as Scripture speaks of it, for it says it is given so freely as to exclude every regard to any merit of the recipient whatsoever, and to arise solely from the free munificence of the giver. This must at least be true by reason of the first grace, or calling, which is the root of the other graces, as Augustine excellently noted, book 1, *To Simplician*, question 2, where, among other things, he holds this view: *It must not be thought that it is said, "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy," because we cannot, without God's help, attain what we will; but rather because, unless prevented by his calling, we do not will well.* And book 83 of *Questions*, question 68, where he has these singular words: *Although one may attribute to himself that he comes when called, he cannot attribute to himself the fact of having been called.* And in harmony with this true understanding of grace, and of that word "freely," is that statement of Paul: *Who has first given to him, that it should be repaid to him?* For if a man, by his own powers, offers some service to God, on account of which he merits in any way a recompense of grace, then he would already be giving first to God, and would be repaid by him. And, leaving Scripture aside, this is also sufficiently consonant with reason in itself, because every merit, even *de congruo*, requires some proportion founded either in the condition or dignity of the person acting, or at least of the work itself — to which, if one wishes, a promise of God may also be added. But none of these is found in acts elicited by the powers of nature, when compared to supernatural grace; therefore the minor is proved, because the person is supposed to be infected with original sin (for we are dealing with a man not yet justified); indeed, even man in pure nature is, of himself, sufficiently disproportioned to such merit, since of himself he has no order to a supernatural end. Likewise, the work too is altogether disproportioned, because in itself it is of an inferior order, and is elevated or

referred to a higher order, or end, by no other act. Finally, there exists no promise — as will appear more clearly from what follows; therefore there is no ground, or condition, even of the least merit.

40. *That impetratory merit is incompatible with the first grace.* — And from these considerations it is finally concluded that not even impetratory merit is to be admitted in any work elicited by the powers of nature, with respect to the effects of predestination. This is proved from the two foundations treated thus far, because impetratory merit is something good, useful and greatly conducive to eternal life; therefore it is impossible for it to come about without the grace of Christ, by the powers of nature alone, Christ himself saying: *Without me you can do nothing.* And in particular this can be proved as follows: impetratory merit, or impetration (for we are now taking them as the same), comes about only through prayer; and prayer is not impetratory unless it is at least founded on faith; therefore, in order to be impetratory, it necessarily presupposes some grace; the first grace, then, cannot be obtained through a petition made by the powers of nature. This is what the Council of Orange defines in almost the same words, canon 3, saying: *If anyone shall say that grace is given upon human invocation, and not rather that grace itself brings it about that we worthily invoke, let him be anathema.* And it is taken also from that text of Paul to the Romans 10: *How shall they invoke him in whom they have not believed?* — as Augustine considers, *Against Julian*, book 4, chapter 8. Likewise from that text of John 15: *If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, whatever you ask shall be done for you* — on which Chrysostom rightly comments, Homily 75. It also bears on this that text of Hebrews 11: *Without faith it is impossible to please God*; and that of Romans 8: *We do not know what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit makes intercession for us.* From these the argument is concluded, because prayer, in order to be impetratory, must first of all be acceptable to God; and therefore, as regards the object, or the thing asked for, it must be fitting; as regards the manner, it must be made with confidence, and must also be founded in some way on Christ; but it cannot have all these unless it is from faith and grace; therefore.

41. Second, it is proved from the other foundation, because such impetration would exclude the notion of grace, since God would then not give grace from his own magnificence and liberality, but in view of human invocation. You will say: among men, a benefit conferred on one who asks, because he asks, does not on that account fail to be entirely gratuitous. I respond, first, by denying the assumption — because, although it does not remove the fact that it is gratuitous in the sense that excludes a debt of justice or

of gratitude, nevertheless it diminishes the notion of a most free donation, because it is not from the sole will and, so to speak, internal disposition of the giver, but from some cause on the part of the petitioner. Hence it is commonly said, even among men, that what is asked for is "bought dearly." Second, I respond by denying the parity of reasoning. For among men, he who asks (speaking ordinarily) is not reckoned to be rendering a service to him from whom he asks, but only to be manifesting his desire, or his need. With respect to God, however, prayer is a true act of worship and service, and under that aspect prayer has the power of impetration; and so what is obtained from God by impetration partakes of the nature of a kind of repayment. And consequently it is necessary that it be founded in grace, because no one can give to God first, in order to be repaid by him. Finally, even the Pelagians themselves called this an impetratory merit, and although they minimized it, saying it was the very least, nevertheless, however much it is, by that much it diminishes the perfection and truth of grace, as Bernard said, following Augustine; and therefore it is not to be admitted.

42. We can add a third proof, because either this impetratory merit infallibly has the effect of obtaining from God, or it has it only at God's discretion, and when it pleases him. The Pelagians could not say the latter, both because they founded this impetratory merit on that promise, *Ask, and you shall receive*, and also because it conflicts with their own foundation. For they would fall into the same straits: why does God hear this man praying thus, and not that one? For if he gives, or does not give, the effect thus requested, at his own discretion, then he can, at his own discretion, give it to one and not give it to another, even if they ask equally — and so the same acceptance of persons follows which they themselves urged against Augustine. And in the end, the reason and cause of the discrimination is not traced back to a work of man, but to the will of God alone — which they themselves denied. But if the former is said, then a great deal indeed is being attributed to the works of nature: for why would God be bound infallibly to hear such a petition? For either this is from the very nature of the thing and the force of such a work — and this is vain, since there is no proportion between such a petition and grace, nor can any power be imagined which would make God infallibly give what is thus requested; or it arises from a divine promise, and then it must be shown — for the promises of Scripture speak of petition founded in faith and in Christ, as has been shown, and as we shall show again in the following chapter. A similar argument and dilemma can be made: either such impetratory merit is a necessary condition, without which God calls no adult supernaturally, or it is

not. The first conflicts with the plain texts of Scripture: *I was found by those who did not seek me*, and the like. Hence not even the people of Marseille themselves said this, as we shall say and prove in the following chapter concerning dispositive cause, for the reasoning is the same for both. But if the second is said, then the reason for predestination, or for the discrimination between the elect and the non-elect, can no longer be given from such a cause, as we shall say more fully concerning dispositive cause; for, as I have said, the reasoning is the same for both.

43. *Whether the Semipelagian opinion is a condemned error.* — From these considerations, then, the position of the people of Marseille is, I think, sufficiently refuted. Their foundation, too, is overturned, because in matters that are purely gratuitous there is no room for acceptance of persons, even if an unequal distribution is made with no cause whatsoever on the part of the recipients. Yet one might still inquire in what degree of condemnation this Semipelagian position stands, as regards that part concerning impetratory merit, or merit *de congruo*, or the least merit, as they themselves spoke of it. For as to merit *de condigno*, it is certain that this assertion is heretical, and all the Scholastics condemn it without controversy, since it pertains more to the errors of Pelagius than to his remnants. And it is evidently against the testimonies of Scripture adduced above, and it was condemned in many Councils: first in that of Palestine, as Augustine reports, *Epist.* 106; then in that of Mileve, in the time of Innocent I, whose decrees were transcribed, for the most part, on this point, by the Council of Africa, received throughout the whole world, as Prosper says in response to the objection of the Gauls, chapter 9. And the same truth was confirmed in the Council of Orange, and afterward at Trent.

44. But as to the other part, concerning merit *de congruo*, it seems difficult to condemn that position as heretical. First, because many Scholastics plainly followed it, whom we shall cite in the following chapter. Second, because it is not clearly gathered from sacred Scripture, nor is it openly handed down in the Councils under that particular understanding or declaration, nor is it gathered by evident inference. Third, because by this no manifest injury is done to the grace of God, since a good moral work is also a benefit of God — granted that it does not pertain to the benefits of grace — and when it is from a man who can do no more, it has that general fittingness which has a place in every prudent governance: that he who uses well the benefits received, as far as he can, to the extent that it lies in him, deserves to be helped further, so that he may be able to do more — a fittingness which does not prevent this latter benefit from being true grace. I add, finally, that it is worthy of great consideration that the Council

of Trent did not clearly touch on this point. Hence it does not seem to be judged to pertain to the dogmas of the faith, since there it hands down everything necessary for the doctrine on grace and free will, to be defended against the Pelagians and the Lutherans. As for the Council of Orange, it is not established that it spoke in that sense, and some doubt whether its definitions produce certainty of faith, since it is a provincial council.

45. *The authority of the Council of Orange.* — In order to begin my response with this last point, I judge it must be asserted absolutely that this assertion of the Semipelagians, in the sense intended by them, pertains to condemned dogmas. For without doubt this was the mind of the Council of Orange, which was convened specially against the remnants of the Pelagians that had arisen after the condemnation of Pelagius. That these remnants too had deviated from the true faith is sufficiently signified in the first chapter of the same Council, in these words: *It has come to our attention that there are some who wish to think less cautiously about grace and free will, and not according to the rules of the Catholic faith.* And therefore, against that position, it hands down canons as rules of faith, and as definitions. As to the authority of that Council, one may not doubt it. First, because it has been received by the common consent of the Church, nor has any Catholic doctor dared to contradict it; but if any seem to dissent from its teaching, they either were ignorant of it, since they make no mention of it, or understood it in another sense, as we shall presently see. Second, because in the first chapter of the same Council, it is said thus: *Whence it has also seemed to us just and reasonable, according to the authority and admonition of the Apostolic See, that we should bring forth a few chapters sent to us from the Apostolic See, which were gathered by the ancient Fathers from certain volumes of Scripture, especially for this cause, in order to instruct those who think otherwise than they ought, to be observed by all, and that we should subscribe them with our own hands.* From these words it is established that no new confirmation needed to be added to that Council after it had defined the truth, because it had already had it antecedently, so to speak, through a particular instruction of the Apostolic See. Hence at the end of the same Council the Fathers say that they subscribe to the definition both of the ancient Fathers and of their own. From which Pontiff, however, those chapters were sent, and whether they are the very same, to the letter, as are contained in that Council, is not established for us. It seems certain, however, that they were sent either by Leo, under whom that Council was celebrated, or by Celestine, in whose time the Semipelagians arose, as may be understood from the first letter of Celestine to the bishops of Gaul. For Celestine wrote that letter, Augustine

being already dead, in his defense, against the people of Marseille; whence he also approves, sufficiently, at least insofar as it is contrary to the Marseillians, Augustine's doctrine. Moreover, in chapters 8, 9, and 11 of the same letter, this same Semipelagian position is sufficiently condemned, and there, in substance, the whole doctrine of the Council of Orange is contained. It is true, however, that there is some doubt about the authority of those chapters, because, as far as can be gathered from the context and the style, they seem rather to have been appended to Celestine's letter after the second chapter, since the letter seems to conclude at the end of that chapter, as is noted there in the margin. Nevertheless, Peter the Deacon, in the book *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapter 11, reports those chapters as Celestine's; and they have already obtained great authority, and are believed, at the very least, to have been Prosper's, and to have been appended there not without consultation of the Pontiff. Besides, many of them are also reported by other pontiffs. Pope Hormisdas too, in his letter to Possessor, at the end, volume 4 of the *Library of the Saints*, makes mention of chapters of the Apostolic See, which were kept in the archives, and contained the doctrine on grace against the Semipelagians. These were perhaps those of Celestine, or others sent to the Fathers of the Council of Orange (although that letter of Hormisdas is also uncertain). Whoever, however, the Pontiff was who sent that instruction to the Council of Orange, there can be no doubt that the doctrine of that Council, as far as concerns what it intends, is certain as a matter of faith; and what it intends is to condemn the Semipelagian doctrine, especially as regards positing the beginning of faith, of salvation, or of perseverance on the part of man. It is to be added that this definition has been plainly confirmed by the authority of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5.

46. Nevertheless, I do not dare to say that it is of faith that the definition of this Council, or of Trent, is to be understood in such a way that, when they say the beginning of justification is conferred on us without merits, they intend to exclude not only merit *de condigno*, but also every merit *de congruo*. For after that Council, many grave doctors, and without doubt great theologians, who were not ignorant of it but examined it diligently, do not condemn that position as heretical — indeed, not even as erroneous, or worthy of censure. And Vega, *On Trent*, book 8, chapters 4 and following, contends that the phrase "gratis," when we are said to be justified gratuitously, or grace is said to be given gratuitously, excludes merits *de condigno*, not *de congruo*, and so understands the doctrine of the Council of Trent, in chapter 8, session 6. The same is indicated by Toledo, in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 8, annotation 31: for he says that only the merit which is from justice is opposed to

grace, and therefore those who place some cause of it on the part of man do not remove the notion of grace, provided they do not posit a merit of justice. But merit *de congruo*, although it is a certain kind of cause, does not in fact introduce the notion of justice. The ancient Scholastics, too, do not hesitate to attribute merit *de congruo* to these morally good works. It is difficult, therefore, to condemn that position, in that sense, as heretical, since it has not been condemned in those precise terms, and the inferences are not evident.

47. *Censure of the Semipelagian doctrine.* — Granted, then, that that position, concerning the merit *de congruo* of the first calling, founded on a work done by the natural powers alone, is not open heresy, or an error in faith, I judge it to be an altogether false and to-be-avoided doctrine, and one which at the present time offends the ears of many — and not without great foundation. First, because the two foundations adduced against that position, in the sense thus explained, and the testimonies of Scripture on which they are all founded, are most forceful. Second, because the Council of Orange absolutely condemns those who place the origin of grace in our merits, and that of Trent says, with its careful distribution of language, "no merits preceding." And indeed they would be speaking very confusedly, in defining so indiscriminately, if some kind of merit could be admitted. This is all the more so since it is highly probable that those against whom they were defining had not posited a perfect merit. Third, because the same argument is taken from the Fathers, especially Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and Bernard, in the passages cited above. And from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 112, articles 2 and 3, *Summa contra Gentiles*, chapter 159, and from the other Scholastics, whom we shall cite in the following chapters.

48. Fourth, because I ask: does a moral work elicited by the powers of nature have this merit of grace (whatever it may be) by its own nature, or by divine ordination? The first is contrary to reason and dissonant with Paul. For how could an act of an inferior order, of itself, merit a gift of a superior order? Or how would it not have, from this, much from which it might boast, as though it had not received? But if the second is said, in the first place it cannot be understood how an act, not of itself meritorious, should become meritorious by divine ordination alone, with no change in the moral quality or dignity of the work, or of the worker. For although the ordination, or promise, of God can contribute to inducing a debt of justice or of fidelity, nevertheless, to give the value necessary for merit, it cannot suffice unless the act is also morally changed. And, furthermore, such an ordination of God is asserted without foundation, as will appear more clearly from the following chapters. Let it stand,

then, as settled and certain that no meritorious cause of predestination is given from the side of its effects, at least as regards the first grace, on which the rest depend. The arguments, however, which have been, or could be, raised above against this truth, are resolved partly in the course of this chapter, and partly will be dealt with in what follows.

49. *The passage of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 8, is treated.* — One doubt, however, cannot be passed over here, which arises from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 8, where it expounds the Apostle's statement that men are justified gratuitously, in this manner: *We are, however, said to be justified gratuitously, because none of the things which precede justification — whether faith or works — merits the very grace of justification.* For I ask in what sense the Council speaks there of justification. For just as generation is taken by philosophers in two ways, either precisely for the introduction of the substantial form, or collectively, as it begins from the dispositions and includes the whole preceding alteration, so too justification can be taken either for the sole infusion of justifying grace — since indeed by that a man is made just, and not before — and this acceptation is the most usual among theologians, especially the Scholastics, and in this sense it also seems to be taken in the description of justification which the Council of Trent gives, chapter five. Yet justification is also commonly taken for the whole supernatural change which precedes the infusion of habitual grace — in which way the same Council seems to speak of justification when it describes its progress, chapter seven, and so on. In that eighth chapter, then, it does not seem possible to be speaking of justification in this latter, broader sense; for the beginning of justification, taken in this way, is faith, or the calling that precedes faith; but the Council there supposes that faith precedes justification, since it says that *nothing of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works*, merits it — therefore it is not speaking of justification in that breadth. But if it speaks, in the former sense, of formal or substantial justification (so to speak), when it says that faith does not merit it, it must be understood of merit *de condigno*, because through faith we can merit justification *de congruo*, or impetratorily, as Augustine testifies, *Epist.* 105 and 106, and *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapters three and four. Therefore, by the doctrine and interpretation of the Council, when Paul says that man is justified gratuitously, he only means: not by merit *de condigno*. Therefore it will not be contrary to Paul to say that man is justified, or predestined, by a merit *de congruo*, founded in moral works, because this will not conflict with grace as such, nor with that phrase, "gratis."

50. I respond that it is, indeed, probable, on account of the argument made, that the Council there takes justification for the whole change of the sinner, as it includes even the remote dispositions to justice, and thus excludes every merit, both *de condigno* and *de congruo* — and that it speaks only of merit founded in works of free will, done without grace. For it is of these that Paul speaks, when he says that man is not justified by works, and is justified gratuitously. Hence, when the Council, among the things that precede justification, numbers faith, it will not be speaking of infused and supernatural faith, since this is, as it were, a part of justification itself, as has rightly been objected. Hence that phrase, "or faith," seems to have been placed by the Council on account of the Semipelagians, who said that faith is from us, and that through it we obtain the rest — and so they were speaking of a natural and acquired faith; but the Council, against them, says that such faith, whether it is possible or not (for of this it affirms nothing), does not merit justification. Second, however, it is said to seem more likely that the Council speaks of proper and formal justification, because it had defined it, chapter 4, and canons 5, 6, and 7; it distinguishes the disposition to justification from justification itself — which has no place except with respect to formal justification. Likewise, canons 3 and 4, in the same way, take *the grace of justification*, when it defines that *man cannot believe without grace*, etc., *as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred on him*, and yet freely disposes himself toward that same grace of justification. The same may be considered in canon 7, 9, and finally in the whole of that doctrine and its definitions. It is hard, then, to make an exception of that one passage alone, chapter eight, especially since it would also be quite forced to restrict that faith to a human or acquired one, when in that same chapter, and in the rest, the Council always speaks of true faith.

51. *The sense of the Council is explained.* — Nevertheless, in response to the objection raised, it must be said that the sense of the Council is that, by the word "gratis," every merit founded in the powers of nature alone, and not in grace, is excluded; nor would I distinguish here at all between merit *de congruo* and *de condigno*, but would understand it in the same way in which Paul really spoke, and in which the earlier Councils of Mileve and Orange had handed it down. Indeed, it had itself taught, in chapter three, saying that the starting point of justification begins in us *with no merits preceding.* And so Andrés de Vega, throughout the whole eighth book *On Justification*, where he comments on that chapter, always understands it of formal justification; and although he sometimes seems to say that the Council excludes only merit simply so called — which is *de condigno* — nevertheless at the end of chapter fifteen he admits that

the Council excludes all and every kind of merit of justification founded in the natural powers of free will alone. When the Council says, then, that *justification is given gratuitously, because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merit it*, it either understands this of those things which precede in such a way that man, of himself and without grace, can have them. For although he cannot have either the works of piety, or faith such as it ought to be, in this way, nevertheless, because the Pelagians and their remnants posited that either works, or faith, or both — even as they ought to be — precede justification from the powers of free will alone, and therefore merit it, the Council, for this reason, denied every merit of justification in such faith and such works. Or, certainly, if under "faith" it also comprehends true and sufficient faith, it considered it precisely as a work of free will, performed by a man not yet justified — for, taken thus, it has no power of meriting (even *de congruo*) formal and perfect justification, but at most has it from that dignity which it has from the assisting divine grace. For the phrase "gratis" excludes every merit that can be considered on the side of man, but not that which can arise from the grace of God, at least an assisting grace, since that itself is given altogether gratuitously.

52. You will say: therefore, from Paul's testimony that we are justified gratuitously, together with the Council's exposition, it is not certain as a matter of faith that the sinner does not merit *de condigno* the first infusion of justifying grace through works done by grace, by which he prepares himself for that justice. The inference is proved. Both because the Council does not exclude the merit of such works — otherwise it would exclude every merit, even *de congruo* — since (as I have said) it absolutely excludes every merit of justification founded in those works of which it speaks; and also because that phrase "gratis," which the Council expounds, just as it excludes every merit, whether *de condigno* or *de congruo*, not founded in grace, so it does not exclude merit founded in assisting grace; therefore, just as by force of those words a merit *de congruo* of the grace of justification, founded in the grace of calling and in a work done from it, with the help of grace, is not excluded — so too a merit *de condigno* of the same justification, founded in the same work, is not excluded. The consequence seems a great inconvenience, because a most certain dogma seems to be undermined. And also because, otherwise, the first justification would not be a greater, or more proper, grace than the increase of grace, or glorification — that is, in root only, and not in itself, and formally.

53. I respond, first, that whether or not that dogma is established from this testimony of the Council, it is nevertheless most certain in itself — namely, that the sinner does not merit *de condigno* the remission of mortal sin, because he

cannot satisfy *de condigno* for it, as I proved at length in the first volume, third part. And consequently, neither can he merit *de condigno* the infusion of sanctifying grace, since that is the formal cause of the remission of sins. For from the unworthiness of the person acting, and from the debt of eternal punishment which he has in himself, it is sufficiently established that a sinner cannot, *de condigno*, merit the divine friendship, nor oblige God by justice to confer on him any benefit, much less sanctifying grace itself. Wherefore it is necessary that formal sanctification come about gratuitously, not only remotely and in root — as glory is sometimes called grace — but proximately and formally, at least insofar as the word "gratis" excludes a proper retribution of justice. Hence in Scripture the infusion of the first grace is never called a wage, as glory is called — which is a sign that grace is different from glory in this respect, and consequently not only in root, but in itself, because no merit *de condigno* precedes it, as it does glory. And the same Council of Trent indicated this sufficiently in the following chapters of the same session, teaching that man can merit glory and the increase of grace, but not sanctifying grace itself, as regards its first infusion.

54. I add further that this is also sufficiently gathered from the phrase "gratis," placed by Paul in that statement, "justified gratuitously." For although this was perhaps said primarily in order to exclude every merit of the whole of justification, from its starting point to its consummation, and consequently to exclude every merit founded in works of nature and not in grace — from this very fact it is excellently inferred that there can be no merit of grace in man, considering the condition and dignity of man in himself; and consequently, as long as he is understood to be in the state of sin, he can merit nothing *de condigno* before God. And consequently, whatever grace is conferred on him, that he may be snatched from that state, is conferred altogether gratuitously and formally, and not only in the root of some prior grace. For although, through works done with the help of grace, or through supernatural faith, a man is said to merit something *de congruo*, nevertheless that merit is not from the intrinsic condition of the person, but only from the dignity of that grace proceeding from the extrinsic motion of the Holy Spirit. Hence this difference can be established between merit *de congruo* founded in nature alone, and that founded in the motion of grace: that the latter does not prevent the subsequent gift from being given altogether gratuitously to the man himself, whereas the former does prevent the gift from being perfectly and in every way gratuitous with respect to man. Because the merit that would be from nature would proceed from the man himself, and from his labor, or his dignity, and so would demand a retribution

with respect to the man himself; whereas merit founded only in the fittingness or dignity of the work, and of grace participated in, rests not on the person himself, but on grace alone. This is not the same in merit founded in grace that intrinsically sanctifies the person himself, because then the merit also rests on the eternal dignity of the person acting, and induces a debt from justice.

55. Finally, we can add another explanation regarding the Council of Trent — namely, that it does indeed speak of justification proper and formal, and excludes every merit of it, both *de congruo* and *de condigno*, through any works whatsoever antecedent to justification itself, whether they be natural or supernatural and of faith — provided they precede justification in time. For through an act of faith, hope, fear, imperfect sorrow, almsgiving, or the like — however much they be done with the help of grace, and as they ought — man never merits *de congruo* justification itself; indeed, not even the efficacious help for the final disposition to it, but he merits, at most, through one more remote disposition, the help toward another nearer one, and through this further, the help toward a still better one, and so on, until he receives the help for the final disposition. And thus it is true that, through no act preceding justification in time, whether faith or works, does man merit, even *de congruo*, justification, but something less than it. And this suffices for justification itself to be given altogether gratuitously with respect to such acts. How it is given gratuitously, however, with respect to the final disposition, which precedes not in time but in nature, the Council did not explain — perhaps because it comprehended that final disposition under justification itself. Yet about this too it must be certain that the infusion of sanctifying grace is not merited *de condigno*, as I touched on in the cited passage of the third part, and in the fourth volume, treating of justification, and as will be treated more fully in the matter on grace. Wherefore, with respect to the final disposition, recourse must necessarily be had to the doctrine given in the preceding paragraph: that, with respect to it, the habit of grace is infused gratuitously, excluding both a debt of justice and every merit that rests on the condition and dignity of such a person — which alone is incompatible with perfect grace, which is conferred altogether gratuitously. And let this suffice concerning the force and property of that word "gratis," as used in this matter by Scripture and the Councils — knowledge of which is most necessary for the whole treatise on grace and on predestination.

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VII
WHETHER MAN, THROUGH MORAL WORKS OF FREE WILL ALONE, CAN BE THE CAUSE, AT LEAST DISPOSITIVE, OF HIS OWN PREDESTINATION, AS REGARDS ITS EFFECTS

1. I suppose that man can, by the powers of nature, perform good moral works in various acts: for although the discussion concerns fallen man as wayfarer, nevertheless within that very man there can be various states, or degrees, in which the question proposed has some bearing in some way. It can therefore be understood either of a man not yet supernaturally illumined, but, say, born and raised among the gentiles, using natural reason alone; or of a man already illumined, and called exteriorly, yet not yet touched interiorly; or of one who has already been moved even interiorly, yet does not yet believe; or of one already believing, yet not yet justified; or of one justified, but not yet operating formally as justified, nor as one who believes supernaturally—for we use habits when we will, and so although a man may already be affected by supernatural gifts, he can, through natural reason alone and his own free will, operate morally and naturally. Indeed, at times he can have infused habitual justice and through it be able to do nothing, but operate only through the light of reason—as, for example, if someone baptized in infancy is taken among the gentiles and there begins to use reason without anyone proposing supernatural objects to him: for although such a one has the habit and the faculty in first act, yet, owing to the lack of another co-cause, or necessary condition, he cannot operate supernaturally.

2. *The various senses of the question are distinguished.* — Hence it follows that the question proposed can be understood either of all the effects of predestination, or only of some. Likewise, of all of them in two ways: namely, either of all taken collectively, or also distributively and one by one; or, in another way, of all by reason of one only, or also by reason of each individually —that is, of one immediately, and of the rest mediately, and only by reason of that first one, or of all immediately as well. For we can understand the effects of predestination as subordinated among themselves, such that among them there is one first, another second, another third, and so consequently, and the second presupposes the first and arises from it, and the third likewise from the second, and so consequently. Paul signified this order between calling, justification, and glorification, in Romans 8, saying: *Whom he predestined, these he also called, and*

whom he called, these he also justified, and whom he justified, these he also glorified, or magnified. If, then, man's moral works are the cause of the first of these effects, even if they are not immediately the cause of the subsequent effects, they will at least be mediately the cause of them—because what is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused by that cause. And although this causality is only remote, and physically accidental, it suffices for the moral causality with which we are dealing. And given a cause posited in this manner, someone is said to be the cause of the whole collection of such effects by reason of the first alone, not, however, immediately by reason of each. But this causality can also be understood in another way, on the part of free will, namely, that it may be immediate, or at least could be, with respect to all and each of the effects of predestination—at least those that can be obtained in this life: for as to glorification, it is certain that it presupposes proximately some supernatural disposition, such as the light of glory, which no moral disposition by the powers of free will can immediately precede. But as to the effects of this life, someone might say that through moral works man can not only dispose himself, by the powers of nature, to the first supernatural calling, but can also proximately and immediately dispose himself to the second calling and to the third, and to all and each of the prevenient helps, indeed even to the very infusion of the supernatural habits. For on all of these matters there have been certain opinions, as we shall soon see. And further, it can be inquired, granted that such a cause of all the effects of predestination is not given—neither immediately nor mediately —whether at least such a cause is given, or can be given, of some one true and proper effect of predestination.

3. *Various dispositions are distinguished according to the various effects of predestination.* — Finally, it must be supposed that the question concerns a dispositive cause, which in its own way positively contributes to the effect of which it is said to be the cause: for concerning a merely negative cause, concurring only by removing an obstacle, we shall speak below. But in order that it may become clearer what sort of cause, or disposition, this can be, it will be necessary to distinguish the effects of predestination, for according to their variety they can require a different kind of disposition. Of the said effects, then, some are internal, that is, received within the soul of the one predestined himself, and these properly belong to the species of grace, and on them the chief dispute turns. Others, however, are extrinsic effects, which it is also necessary to touch upon. Again, of the former effects, some are infused by God alone, without the active and immediate concurrence of the recipient, as are the infused habits. Others are such as are brought about by God without the

immediate concurrence of our free will, although they do not occur in us without the immediate concurrence of our will or intellect—such as illumination, inspiration, and the other vital movements of prevenient grace, which are all usually comprehended under the name of calling. Others, finally, are such as are brought about by God with the simultaneous cooperation of free will, as are the supernatural human acts. Under the external effects are comprehended, first of all, those which positively contribute in some way to man's conversion, at least by externally applying objects, or by exciting, counseling, or correcting—which are more frequently done by men, sometimes by angels, but rarely immediately by God, who regularly works through second causes, if it can be done. Then there are certain negative or privative effects, such as taking away the occasion of sinning, restraining demons, and the like.

4. From this enumeration it is clear that many of these effects, by their very nature, require no moral or free disposition on man's part. For those that are extrinsic and negative require none at all, but can be brought about with regard to a man even while asleep, or thinking nothing whatever about such an effect; the other positive external effects require only a rational capacity (so to speak) implanted by nature and not impeded. And therefore Catholic authors scarcely treat anything in this controversy concerning these effects; we shall touch upon what seems opportune. The chief question, then, concerns the internal effects of grace. And here we are not now dealing with a moral disposition proceeding from a prior grace, but only with that which is brought about by the powers of free will alone. This can be required either as necessary—such that without it the effect of predestination never occurs—or as something which of itself moves and is sometimes expected by God, although it is not simply necessary. Likewise, when it is expected, it can be conceived either as infallibly attaining the effect, or as only of itself moving and being a sufficient reason for the effect to be given, although it is not always nor infallibly given, but according to God's will. Finally, this disposition is usually, and rightly, distinguished into proximate and remote; but what is remote with respect to one effect is always proximate with respect to another, by means of which it contributes in some way to the remote effect—since one cannot proceed to infinity in this mediation, and so one must stop at some proximate effect of such a disposition. And it is this proximate effect that pertains to the present consideration, for once this is explained, the matter will be settled as to the other, remote effects, since such a disposition has no new influence with regard to them. But if some other disposition is necessary or possible, that will then be the proximate disposition to its own effect, and the same reasoning will apply to it.

5. *The first opinion of the Scholastics concerning the dispositive cause.* — These points being established, and heretics set aside (who held no new or peculiar error regarding this question), the Scholastic theologians, in various ways, posited some cause of predestination, as to its effects, by way of disposition. Among these, the one who seems to speak most expressly and broadly is Gabriel, in I, dist. 41, q. unic., art. 3, dub. 1, where he openly says that, predestination being taken as it concerns the means, a congruous disposition is given on the part of free will, and this does not take away the character of grace, because it is not merit of condignity. And in II, dist. 27, q. 1, art. 2, near the end, and art. 3, dub. 4, he openly declares that he speaks both of the unbeliever and of the believer, and of the former he says that he disposes himself when he conforms his will to reason, and with his whole heart seeks and asks to be illumined concerning justice and truth. And by this movement (he says) he disposes himself, indeed merits of congruity, the first grace—by which he seems to mean the first help of grace, at least with respect to the believer. Of the believer, however, he says that he disposes himself if, according to the rules of faith, he detests sin. There, however, he does not declare what sort of detestation this must be, or by what powers it can be brought about. Yet in III, dist. 17, q. unic., art. 3, dub. 2, he openly declares that man can love God above all things from purely natural powers, both on the part of reason and on the part of the will, and through that disposition infallibly obtain grace—not only the first auxiliary grace, but also justifying grace, and charity, and the remission of sin. As to how he escapes the condemnation of Pelagius, he says that that act is neither meritorious, nor sufficient to fulfill God's law without grace; and he cites for that opinion Scotus, Ockham, Peter of Ailly, and others. And similarly in IV, dist. 14, q. 1, art. 2, after the fifth conclusion, he says that the sinner can sufficiently dispose himself to justice and the remission of sin, through detestation of sin, conceived naturally, together with God's common influence. This view he learned from Scotus, in the same distinction 14, q. 2, §*De secundo*. Scotus also held that such a disposition is merit of congruity for the deletion of mortal sin. He adds that it is difficult to maintain that there is no acceptance of persons before God, unless such a disposition is posited. From this it is clear that he posits this disposition as an adequate and necessary cause in its genus—that is, such that, once it is posited, the effect infallibly follows, and, if removed, and if no other better disposition exists, the effect is not posited. Scotus does not, however, openly declare whether he speaks of a man already having faith, or even of an unbeliever; yet he sufficiently declares that it is not necessary for such an act to be founded on faith, but that it can arise from natural reason.

6. In support of this view Durandus may be cited, in II, dist. 28, q. 5, insofar as he says that man can prepare himself for grace, without any special internal motion of the will from God, through an act naturally good which nature can elicit by its own powers; whence on this point he posits a natural dispositive cause toward predestination, as regards some of its effects, having a certain and infallible connection with them, or with some of them. Nevertheless he denies that it is the cause of the whole of predestination, because he thinks that this good moral act is itself an effect of predestination, since it proceeds from the special providence that God has concerning the predestined. Yet, even if by this latter precaution he in some way preserves gratuitous predestination—of which I shall speak below—nevertheless he does not absolutely preserve true and gratuitous grace in the remission of sin and the justification of the sinner, and he inclines strongly toward the error not only of the Semipelagians, but even of Pelagius himself, who in that sense did not deny grace in the remission of sins, but made it entirely dependent on the disposition of free will alone. Against this error were directed canons 1 and 2 of the Council of Trent, and canons 3 and 4 of the Council of Mileve, and canons 4 and 6 of the Council of Orange.

7. Cajetan also came very close to this opinion, in tome 1 of the *Opuscula*, tract 4, q. 1, where he likewise posits that natural contrition is at least a non-ultimate disposition for grace, and becomes the ultimate disposition by this alone, that God makes use of it—not indeed by intrinsically perfecting it otherwise, but only extrinsically, through the infusion of a habit, or some special motion. Cajetan does not there declare whether such a natural disposition has some effect of grace infallibly, or is raised, or not raised, to be the ultimate disposition by God's mere will; and he rather suggests the latter. For he teaches that justification does not infallibly follow from such a disposition, as it exists in the man, since otherwise a man could be certain of his own justification; and he holds, in some sense, that such a disposition, as it is attrition or non-ultimate disposition, does not pass over into being contrition, that is, the ultimate disposition, through a greater perfection than it has as coming from man, but only as it is extrinsically perfected by God.

8. *Against this opinion of Cajetan, Soto, etc., may be seen.* — But if this is so, Cajetan really does not posit a cause on man's part as to why this man rather is justified rather than every other man equal to him in that disposition. For it remains the case that, of two equally disposed by free will alone, one is justified and the other not, owing to the sole will of God accepting or perfecting the disposition of the one and not of the other. Yet, absolutely, and without

comparison, Cajetan does assign a cause on the part of free will alone—either simply efficacious, or at least sufficient and true in the genus of moral disposition—indeed even efficacious, as far as it can be on man's part, for him to be justified, since he himself can offer nothing more toward this. This Cajetan also seems to admit in I-II, q. 109, art. 6, ad *Neque obstat*. Wherefore, with respect to many who did not have such a disposition, that disposition will be the true cause why this man is justified, and not another. And this surely is enough for such a man to be said to inchoate his own salvation by his own virtue, and to have something which he has not received, in which he could glory not a little, and distinguish himself at least from those who did not have such a disposition. On the other hand, Cajetan also leaves intact the difficulty about predestination—indeed he greatly aggravates it with respect to those who, having a similar disposition, are not saved nor justified. For why would God do this, since he requires nothing else of man except that he dispose himself as much as he can? Nor is it in man's hand whether God adds his extrinsic grace, or acceptance. From this it further follows that, comparing those two men, one would have to say that the loss of the one is from God alone—for the man has already done what was his part, but God was unwilling to accept it, nor to add what was necessary on his side—while the other's salvation is not from God but is begun by man and perfected by God. Moreover, I do not even understand what Cajetan means when, in that *Opusculum*, he said: *From this alone, that God by gratuitous love makes use of our acquired contrition as the ultimate disposition for charity, our contrition is transferred into being nearly the ultimate disposition for habitual grace.* For if God presupposes in me the whole of that act as coming from the powers of free will, in what sense is it useful as the ultimate disposition through gratuitous love? For either this gratuitous love is only that which God freely has toward that man, accepting extrinsically his acquired disposition—and thus he falls into the opinion of Durandus, which in the *Prima Secundae*, at the place cited, he himself attacks, differing from it only in that he does not wish that acceptance to be certain and infallible (in which, although he seems to attribute something to grace, he increases the difficulty and casts back upon God the damnation of the other, as I have said)—or by gratuitous love he means a new infused love which God infuses into the sinner thus contrite from natural powers. And this does not agree with what he has said: for he presupposes in that man that the love of God above all things has been acquired by natural powers alone, and he requires nothing further. Indeed, he does not even posit an extrinsic change in the act itself, and therefore he says that attrition becomes contrition, not through a change, nor through an intensification of the act, but

through God's gratuitous love. And besides, even if he said this, he would not escape the other untoward consequences drawn concerning the beginning of salvation on man's part, and the rest, which we shall repeat a little below against other opinions.

9. *The twofold meaning of "grace" according to St. Thomas.* — Further, St. Thomas himself at one time seems to have held this view: for in II, dist. 28, art. 4, asking whether man can prepare himself for grace without any grace, he answers that grace is taken in two ways: either for whatever excitative is exhibited to the will by divine providence, which freely confers on all things what suits them, or for an infused habit. *If, then* (he says) *grace be taken in the first way, there is no doubt that it is necessary, since the will cannot operate without something exciting it.* And he adds that any kind of excitative suffices. *Whatever it be* (he says), *whether it be a man's admonition, or bodily sickness, or something of this kind, all of which are evidently subject to divine providence and ordered to the good of the elect.* From these words it is clear that he is not speaking of true and internal supernatural grace, but very broadly. For if anyone should expound St. Thomas as enumerating these because they are the ordinary instruments which God uses to bestow supernatural internal excitation, besides the fact that the generality of his words scarcely allows this, the following words stand in the way, by which he proves that the habitual light of grace is not necessary for this preparation: *Because it is not necessary that the acts by which man prepares himself to have grace exceed human nature; for just as human nature stands in material potency to grace, so the acts of the natural virtues stand as material dispositions to it.* From which he finally concludes: *That man can prepare himself, by free will alone, to have sanctifying grace*; and in the solution to the fourth objection he adds: *That man can also prepare himself to have faith, through something that lies within natural reason.*

10. Moreover, there is a difficult passage of the same St. Thomas in II, dist. 5, q. 2, art. 1, where he reports an opinion saying that for meritorious conversion to God a twofold grace is required—habitual, informing grace, and another freely given grace, from which the substance of the act is elicited. From which it seems that opinion requires this latter grace, without the former, for non-meritorious conversion—though St. Thomas does not express this, but adds: *But it does not seem necessary to posit this grace (namely, the freely given one), unless the very freedom of the will be called grace, or certain occasions which are sometimes given to men by God for conversion—such as instruction in the law, chastisement unto humility, and other things of this kind—without which, however, it is impossible to obtain grace. For if a man does what is in him, God*

gives him grace. From which he concludes: *It must be said that, for eliciting the act of conversion, free will suffices, which by this act prepares and disposes itself to have grace.* And he speaks evidently of sanctifying grace and of the proximate disposition to it, as is clear from the course of the article. And from the solution to the first objection, in which he responds: *That although free will can of itself attain to the substance of the act, it cannot attain to its form, by which it is meritorious.* Wherefore there is no need to dwell on expounding these passages of St. Thomas here, but it may be said, with Cajetan, that he changed his view in I-II, q. 109, art. 6. Hence what he says in the same I-II, q. 89, art. 6, about the boy raised in the woods who reaches the use of reason, must necessarily be understood as meaning that he will be justified by means of a supernatural illumination of God, cooperating with it, as he himself explains in *De Veritate*, q. 14, art. 11, ad 1 and 2, and as we shall declare more fully below.

11. *A natural act of the intellect or of the will is not a sufficient proximate disposition for obtaining the first justifying grace.* Nor have there been lacking Catholic theologians who have said that, although disposition by moral and natural acts of free will does not regularly suffice for obtaining the first grace, nevertheless in a rare case, one of quasi-extreme necessity, it suffices not only for auxiliary grace, but even for sanctifying grace and the remission of mortal or original sin. So Vega holds, in book 6, *In Trident.*, ch. 17, ad 20, where he also says that without supernatural faith a man can, in a case of ignorance, be justified and saved; and in book 13, ch. 25, he says that, in the same case, a man can be justified by sorrow for sins alone, insofar as they are against natural reason. Javelli seems to have held the same opinion, *Tract. de Praedest.*, on St. Thomas, I, q. 23, ch. 5, where he says that a disposition arising from natural knowledge and the powers of nature is sometimes enough for justification—which he also affirms to be meritorious de congruo, differing from Pelagius in that he does not posit in it merit of condignity. And although he says that it is from a special help, he is not speaking of supernatural help, but of special providence in the natural order, as we noted above in Durandus—and he himself expressly declares this. For the same opinion Cordoba is also usually cited, in q. lib. 1, q. 2, but undeservedly, for he expressly reproves Vega, in dub. 4, after the fourth opinion. Soto, too, who once held that error about the justification of some adult without supernatural faith, retracted it at the end of book 4. And he holds similarly about natural sorrow, that it never suffices for justification outside the sacrament; yet with the sacrament of Baptism or Penance he thinks it can sometimes be a sufficient disposition—which he teaches in IV, dist. 18, q. 3, art. 3, and 2, *De Nat. et Gratia*, ch. 3, at the end, and

Cano holds the same in his relection *De Poenitentia*. However, it is not our task here to dispute against these opinions, but to suppose as certain that a natural act, whether of the intellect or of the will, is never a sufficient proximate disposition for obtaining the first justifying grace, but that faith and repentance, or actual supernatural or infused charity, are always necessary—as is plainly defined in the Council of Trent, sess. 6 and 14, following the Councils of Mileve and Orange, and as is established a fortiori from what is to be said, and as we have professedly disputed in tome 4, part 3, disp. 8, sess. 6, and disp. 2, sect. 2.

12. Finally, other theologians, although they do not admit that, with respect to justifying grace, a disposition conceived from the powers of free will alone—even on the part of the will only and faith already supposed in the intellect—can be a proximate and sufficient one, nevertheless think that, for obtaining God's exciting help, or calling, or for faith (if a good act precedes it), or for salutary repentance (if faith is already supposed), a disposition can be given on the part of free will operating well morally by its own powers. So thinks Richard, in II, dist. 28, and Gerson, *Alphab.* 24, lib. M, and *Alphab.* 61, in the first treatise *De Vita spirituali*, lectio 1, near the beginning, whose words we shall report below. Also cited are Antonius Pantusa, *De Praedestinatione et Gratia*, ch. 6, after the middle, and Soto, *De Nat. et Grat.*, book 2, ch. 3, where he plainly admits that good moral works performed by the powers of nature, although they are not necessary nor sufficient dispositions for sanctifying grace, are nevertheless a remote disposition: *Because these works*, he says, *insofar as they are of some quality of virtue, cannot but pave the way in some manner to charity—especially if they are done with the intention of bending God, so that he may soften the heart unto repentance*; and he adds difficult words: *Which end, like other honest ends, he can naturally set for himself.* There, however, he says nothing about the preparation of the unbeliever for faith. Yet, in ch. 12, last doubt, he says that if an unbeliever, having invincible ignorance of the faith, were to keep the law of nature, he would at once receive God's help; and below he says that those who are not illumined are abandoned through their own fault: *because if they kept the law of nature lawfully, God would have shone upon them with the light of faith.* Moreover, the same Soto, *De Nat. et Grat.*, book 1, ch. 20, says that these good moral works are not effects of predestination, from which he concludes that, through such works, a dispositive cause can be given on man's part for the whole of predestination, as regards its effects. Soto does not, however, affirm that it is so necessary a cause that without it no one is predestined—rather he indicates the opposite in that third chapter—but only

that it can be some reason for it in many of the predestined, and a sufficient one for rendering the reason why the reprobate are not predestined.

13. *The chief foundation of this doctrine.* — Among these theologians there are various foundations for this doctrine, according to their various statements. Omitting others, which do not bear on the present matter, the chief foundation must be this: that such a disposition does not exceed the powers of nature and natural providence, nor does it do an injury to grace, and besides it is consonant with divine equity—therefore it is not to be denied. The first part of the antecedent seems clear, because to perform some good moral work does not exceed the powers of nature, and this disposition is posited solely in acts morally good, with natural honesty. But if this disposition does not exceed the powers of nature, it can be brought about by free will, with only the general concurrence of God due to nature—therefore it can come from mere common and natural providence alone—therefore in itself it does not pertain to predestination—therefore on this score it is not repugnant for it to be the cause of the whole of predestination, as regards all its effects. That it is also not repugnant on the second count is clear, because such a disposition, as such, has no merit, neither of condignity, as is self-evident, nor of congruity, since such merit requires either the dignity of the person operating or at least a proportion of the work; but neither is found in the work in question. Hence St. Thomas, in I, dist. 41, art. 3, says that the good work preceding grace is not meritorious of it, but only a disposition for it, and in the solution to the first objection he says that some reason of predestination as to the effects of grace can be given on the part of man's disposition, but not a meritorious cause. Wherefore he adds in the solution to the second objection that this disposition does not prevent the effect from being given altogether gratuitously. Alensis thinks the same, part 3, q. 6, m. 1, §2, and m. 5. Indeed, Soto, in *De Nat. et Grat.*, book 2, ch. 4, contends that there can be no merit of grace at all in a sinful man, even of congruity, not even through acts elicited by the help of grace, even if they are true and proximate dispositions, and accordingly that any merit at all excludes the true character of grace, but not the character of disposition.

14. *The last part of the foundation is proved.* — The last part, namely, that it is consonant with divine equity that he should accept those acts in such a man as some disposition, is clear first because in Sacred Scripture the help of grace is promised to sinners who morally act well and exercise works of mercy: such as the frequent promises concerning almsgiving, Tobit 4 and 12, Ecclesiasticus 37 and 29, Daniel 4: *Redeem your sins with alms.* Matthew 5: *Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.* And to one who forgives an injury,

remission of sins is promised, Ecclesiasticus 28, Matthew 6, Mark 11, Luke 6. In these passages Sacred Scripture speaks of works that are honest and good, whether done from grace or without it. Second, it is proved because, just as intellectual or rational nature has an immediate order toward grace through a capacity implanted in nature (although with respect to glory it is obediential), so too good moral works proceeding from this nature have an immediate order toward grace with the same proportion, for the reasoning is the same. For just as nature in itself is capable, remotely, and as far as it can, so its good work disposes and accommodates nature remotely, and as far as it can: therefore, just as it is consonant with divine providence to raise rational nature to the order of grace, so too that it accept a good moral action as some disposition preparing that nature for the order of grace. This is confirmed because theologians say of the angels that God distributed grace to them according to the proportion of their natural endowments—not because this was owed to nature, but because it seems consonant with divine wisdom. And in this sense, that greater perfection of nature can be called a certain greater aptitude for receiving greater grace. Nor is it any less consonant with divine wisdom that he should grant a greater favor of grace to the man who makes better use of his natural powers in working good, so long as he does not have the powers of grace. Therefore that good work can be said to bring about in man a certain greater aptitude for mercifully receiving grace from God: and this is to be a disposition, at least a remote and imperfect one. Finally, in this sense theologians commonly say: *To him who does what is in him, God does not deny grace.* This reasoning, moreover, applies equally to predestination as to grace, both because, if that disposition prepares man for the whole order of grace from its first effect, that disposition is not itself from predestination, which concerns only the effects of grace—therefore it is presupposed to predestination, and accordingly can be a reason for it; and also because a cause of predestination cannot be given on the part of its effects in any other way than by causing the effects themselves, in their actual execution: but that disposition, in its own order, is some kind of cause of the effects when they are put into execution, as has been said; therefore it is also a cause of predestination.

15. *First assertion.* — Nevertheless, I say first: a morally and naturally good act is not a necessary disposition for obtaining the first grace from God. I hold this assertion to be certain, because it is defined in the second Council of Orange, canon 4. For it condemns him who says that God awaits our wills, that we may be cleansed from sin. This condemnation cannot be understood of a will already supernaturally excited by God, nor of the expectation of its cooperation

toward its own conversion: because in this latter sense it is most certain that God, after he has interiorly called a man by his inspiration and illumination, awaits his consent, in order to justify him, or to infuse faith—as is clear from the Scripture's manner of speaking: *The Lord waits, that he may have mercy on you*; *He waited that it might bring forth grapes, but it brought forth wild grapes.* And this is sufficiently gathered from the teaching of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 5, 6, and 7, and canon 4, and it has been treated at length in the last book *De Auxiliis*. The Council of Orange, then, speaks of man's will not yet supernaturally called and excited, and of the expectation of some work, done by man's own power and free choice alone, by which he might prepare and dispose himself for that very excitation by God and the first help of grace.

16. *That the Semipelagians did not say that a natural act is a necessary disposition for grace.* — In this sense, then, it is defined that God does not await our wills, because surely such a disposition is not necessary; for if it were, it would indeed have to be awaited. And this is proved by the testimonies of Scripture which the same Council adduces, Isaiah 56, and Romans 10: *I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask after me.* Hence even the Semipelagians themselves do not seem to have thought the contrary. For Faustus, in *De Gratia et liber. Arbitr.*, book 1, ch. 17, in tome 4 of the *Bibliotheca*, says thus: *If this drawing mercy of God is given only to the worthy, then the grace of God is in some way granted to human servitude*, etc. Cassian too, *Collat.* 13, ch. 8, nn. 15 and 17, expressly proves that God often calls men who are altogether undisposed and rebellious, such as Matthew and Paul, etc. And almost daily experience confirms this. The reason too is evident, since this disposition is not necessary either from the nature of the thing, being of a far inferior order, nor from the law of God, for it is nowhere written or handed down—indeed Scripture and all the Fathers cited in the preceding chapter, especially Augustine, teach the contrary. Add to this that the will can achieve nothing through an act of the natural order, or one done from natural providence alone, that it cannot achieve better through grace and a supernatural act. Why, then, would God always await from man that natural disposition, especially since it pertains to the commendation of divine grace and the display of its efficacy that he illumine the blind, soften the hardened, and convert the rebellious to himself?

17. *This assertion holds in every state of men.* — From this it is gathered, first, that this assertion holds, proportionately, in all the above-enumerated states of sinful men. First, indeed, in the unbelieving man, that he be first called and excited to faith, both exteriorly and interiorly. For in order that God may

confer this benefit, he does not await any good movement or prior effort of the human will, but prevents it both exteriorly and interiorly, calling one who has previously done nothing good, indeed much evil—as Augustine often says of Paul—and this is most evident in the case of the infinite multitude of the gentiles. And it is above all of this man that the canon of the Council of Orange is verified, that God does not await his will: because if he awaited it for the first illumination and calling, he would consequently await it for the whole purgation from sin, since this depends on, and takes its beginning from, that illumination. Second, it is true of the man already believing but not yet truly repentant of all his sins: for in order that God again excite him to true repentance, he does not await, nor does he of himself require from him, any good act of free will alone—because the good use of faith and of the grace already received, with the help accompanying it, suffices for God to grant new grace. Indeed (such is God's kindness) he does not always even await this remote disposition, proceeding from faith and the first help, in order to excite a man already a believer to perfect contrition—sometimes sufficiently, sometimes efficaciously—because there is no fixed order in itself between these imperfect and perfect acts, nor has God established any fixed law in this matter, as is clear from the treatise on justification.

18. *A doubt.* — One can doubt only concerning the man exteriorly called to faith but not yet believing, since he seems able interiorly, by free will and natural reasoning alone, to think about the things he has heard, and about their fittingness, and about the motives proposed to him to make them credible. Likewise, from that recognition there can be excited in him a natural desire either to hear the sermon on those words again, or to question others by whom he might be more fully instructed. And this manner of proceeding seems so connatural that it seems morally necessary, unless God wills to use a miracle. Therefore, on this score, some good natural use of free will seems necessary in order for man to prepare himself for the grace of faith. And the same proportion seems to hold of the man already believing with respect to repentance. For ordinarily a man is excited to repentance by the voice of a preacher, or the reading of a pious book, or other external means, which the man himself voluntarily takes up. And he can apply himself to these by an act of free will alone, by which he wills either to hear a sermon, or to read a book, etc., and after he has heard or read, he can, by natural discourse and feeling, think about these matters and gradually kindle himself, until divine grace intervenes and excites him, and raises him to supernatural conversion.

19. *Response.* — I respond: whatever may be the case concerning the possibility of these acts from the powers of free will, I now assert only, absolutely, that they are not necessary for faith or justification, insofar as they are understood as merely natural. For all these things come about better and more perfectly through the providence of grace and the internal motion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. And it is regularly to be believed that it happens in this way, and that God, even in this kind of supernatural providence, does not await the efforts of free will to anticipate him. And this very thing is signified by the testimonies of Scripture cited, and by what is read in Acts, that God opened the heart of *Lydia, so that she might attend to the things that were said by Paul*—where it does not say only *that she might believe*, but also *that she might attend*, which, strictly speaking, signifies those acts of prior recognition and intent consideration of the things proposed to be believed. And the same holds, proportionately, of the believing sinner with respect to performing repentance. As to whether those natural acts can sometimes precede, and, if they do precede, whether they contribute anything, we shall speak below. From this it can easily be understood that the same must be said of the man already justified by faith and grace, with respect to perseverance, that is, not sinning. For in order that he receive a new help of grace for this—which we suppose to be necessary—it is not required of itself that he dispose himself by good natural acts, both because supernatural acts suffice, for which he is already, as it were intrinsically, capable through the gifts dwelling in him, and also because, without such a disposition, by his own gratuitous benefit alone, God can confer such a gift on whomever he wills. For by what law has he bound himself to await that disposition?

20. From this, finally, it follows that the reason, at least adequate, of divine predestination, as to its various and unequal effects with respect to different men, cannot be taken from works of this kind belonging to those same men—as Augustine rightly gathers, in his book *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, and book 1, *Ad Simplicianum*, q. 2, and often elsewhere. Because, of two men equally sinners, God calls one and not the other—indeed he often calls the one who has sinned more gravely—while sometimes he calls both, but one more efficaciously and to a more perfect degree, or state; and so on with the other variety, which cannot be founded on the works done by such men. Nor can anyone have recourse to such works as future after the calling, but only as foreseen beforehand. Because this subterfuge was rejected above, in chapter five, and is excluded a fortiori by the same arguments—either because such works are equally unequal and disproportionate, and, insofar as future, altogether useless for disposing man toward the present effect; or also because it can often happen

that man would not even, in future time, perform such works, since he will die immediately after his conversion, or because he will be helped so as always to operate supernaturally. And from this it is also clear that the grace of the divine calling is not equally proposed and prepared for all men, even on the part of God and his will, as some say. For if there were equality on the part of God, given also equality on the part of man, the effect would be equal, since there is nothing from which it could receive inequality; therefore, since there is variety in the effect, the reason for the inequality lies in the divine will, since he distributes as he wills, and as he wills, and breathes where he wills.

21. *Second assertion.* — I say second: a good moral act, performed by the powers of free will alone, is never a sufficient and primary disposition for that effect of predestination which is the justification of the impious. This assertion, as to the general rule, is of faith, defined—as I have said above—in the Councils of Mileve, Orange, and Trent. And it is proved briefly because the justification of the impious first of all requires the foundation of infused faith, which is a disposition necessary on the part of the intellect alone. For of that faith which *is the gift of God* (Ephesians 2, and Philippians 1), it was said by the same Paul, in Hebrews 10: *Without faith it is impossible to please God.* And if any proximate disposition on man's part can intervene toward that faith, it is only the will, or the affection of believing—concerning which disposition it is likewise defined in the Council of Orange, canon 5, that it must be such as it ought to be, from the help of grace: therefore on this score too a natural disposition of the will is not sufficient. In this it is most agreed that the Massilians erred, and to them, through inadvertence, all theologians who think the contrary draw near. And the same must be said of the disposition required after faith, in the will, as proximate and ultimate to justice: for this disposition is none other than that of hope, charity, and repentance—all of which cannot be had, as is necessary for justification, without the help of grace, as Trent defines, canon 3, session six, and as the Councils of Mileve and Orange had earlier defined. Wherefore those theologians who seem to dissent from this rule may be excused, because they erred without pertinacity; yet their opinion cannot be defended from the error of the Pelagians, much less of the Semipelagians. The exceptions made by others, whether for a case of necessity or for justification with a sacrament, are plainly false and improbable, since they rest on no firm reason or authority—which would have to be most weighty in order to make an exception to the general rule of faith, as has been treated more fully in tome 4, *De Poenitentia*.

22. *Third assertion.* — I say third: a good moral act, performed by the powers of free will alone, is not a sufficient proximate disposition for the first

auxiliary grace, of itself and directly influencing it in its own genus, nor for any help of supernatural grace at all. And accordingly it cannot even be a remote disposition for sanctifying grace itself. This assertion is not as certain as the preceding ones, since it is not gathered as openly either from Scripture, or from the Councils, or from the Fathers; it is, however, in my judgment, far more probable, and true. That this is the opinion of St. Thomas, Bonaventure, Alensis, and other weighty theologians will be established from the following seventh and ninth chapters. It is now proved from the principles of faith, taking first the man who comes to the use of reason without having heard anything of the doctrine of faith, and who begins, by the light of reason, to do something good, before being illumined either exteriorly or interiorly. In this man, then, the first auxiliary grace is the first illumination and inspiration by which he is called to faith. But for the good moral work done by the powers of nature to be a direct disposition, and one that is per se toward that grace, it is not enough that the good act precede it, since not every priority is causality; rather it is necessary that the grace be given in view of, and by reason of, that act, in some genus of cause—otherwise it cannot be understood why it should be called a disposition. I argue, then, in this way: God in no way gives grace in view of that work; therefore it is not a disposition per se toward it. The antecedent is proved, because this can be understood in two ways: in one way, with the infallible following of the one from the other, such that, the disposition once had, that grace is infallibly conferred on him; in the other way, without this certain consequence, but only as far as concerns the act itself: neither way, however, can suitably be affirmed.

23. As to the first way, it is proved because either that infallible consequence is from the nature of such an act and from its intrinsic force, or from a special divine ordinance. The first cannot be said without falling into the error of Pelagius, or his remnants. First, because man would have quite enough of his own, if he could have something by which, of himself, he infallibly drew God to inchoate his grace in him. Second, because such an act could not fail to have a great reason of merit, at least of congruity, with respect to such an effect —whence that effect could not be called gratuitous to him who, by his own work, of himself and his own power, as it were impels God to give it; and so it would no longer be grace. Third, because, apart from the necessity of immutability—which presupposes the divine ordinance or will—no effect can be simply infallible with respect to the will of God. And if it is not said to be infallible simply, but only as owed to such a disposition from common providence, this conflicts with the disproportion and imperfection of such a

natural act, compared to any gift whatever of supernatural grace, as will be established a fortiori from what is to be said about the other main member.

24. Nor can it even be said that that effect is infallible owing to a divine ordinance and promise. For where is such an ordinance, or promise? You will say it is virtually contained in those passages where God testifies that he wills all men to be saved, and that he illumines every man coming into this world, and that he does not abandon those who seek him, and the like, which we shall adduce below in chapter nine. But in these passages either God promises nothing to man's work, but simply reveals his own will, which by its own immutability will infallibly be fulfilled in the manner in which it was absolutely held by God, whether man does good or not; or, if anything supernatural seems to be promised somewhere to man's work, it is to be understood of a work of piety, which cannot be without grace. Otherwise, how is this true: *Who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him?* and this: *What have you that you have not received?* But, they press, in Scripture remission of sins and the mercy of God are absolutely promised to almsgiving, to the forgiveness of injuries, and to other works of mercy, and no distinction is made between works of mercy done from grace, or without grace. We respond that all these promises at least presuppose faith, and are made only to faithful men, such as those who as they ought believe in God. Because *faith is the substance of things to be hoped for*, as Paul testifies in Hebrews 11. For hope is founded on the divine promise believed through faith; and so the divine promises contained in Scripture are made only to believers. Therefore before faith no grace is owed to man's works, by faithfulness, by reason of the divine promise. Hence it is often signified in the same Scripture that this promise is not made to works of mercy unless they proceed in some way from faith. As in Matthew 10: *He who receives you receives me, and he who receives a prophet in the name of a prophet*, etc., *and he who receives a righteous man in the name of a righteous man*, etc., *whoever gives a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple*—these particles "in the name of a prophet," "of a righteous man," "of a disciple," etc., indicate that these things must be done with a higher intention, somehow pertaining to faith, in order that the condition of such a promise be fulfilled. Indeed it is sometimes signified that these actions are worth nothing unless done from charity, as Paul says: *If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, but have not charity, it profits me nothing*; and as Christ says: *Without me you can do nothing*—but whatever is not done in some way from faith in Christ is done without Christ, whom God set forth as a propitiator through faith in his blood.

25. It is added, finally, that if this promise has been made to a natural moral work, and that work is therefore called a disposition per se and proximate to that first help of grace which is given by reason of it, then by the same reasoning that work will be a merit, at least of congruity, for that gift; therefore it will no longer be grace, since it is for the work, and not for grace, nor for a work founded on grace. Nor does it satisfy to respond that the promise itself is gratuitous, for here we are dealing with the intrinsic grace which is the principle of the work. Hence it also follows that, in that process toward execution, free will would inchoate salvation, and would first give something to God so that, according to the divine ordinance, it might be repaid to it—all of which is repugnant to Scripture and the Councils. And besides, it cannot be denied that in that case God awaits the will of such a man, to be purged from sin. For although he sometimes does not await the fulfillment of that condition on man's part, nevertheless, as often as he wills that it be posited first, in order that he fulfill what he has promised, he really awaits free will to go before, and does not give grace except as something following after—which, however, the Council of Orange, in the said fourth chapter, absolutely and in all cases condemns. Finally, of such a man it is most truly said that grace is given to him desiring, seeking, or in any way striving by his own free will, since it really is given by reason of that work, and to that man in particular it would perhaps not otherwise be given. But this too is repugnant to the same Council, in chapter six, which condemns those who say that grace is given to those *believing, watching, laboring*, or doing anything of the kind without grace, rather than that grace itself is necessary in order that all these things be done *as they ought*—that is, that they be of use unto eternal life. And therefore in chapter seven it condemns those who say that *by the vigor of nature something can be done that pertains to the salvation of eternal life.* But a disposition upon which God's grace infallibly follows pertains not a little to eternal life: therefore to admit such a disposition is greatly repugnant to the Council.

26. *Note. — Evasion. — Refuted.* — It is to be carefully considered, in the matter we are treating, that, since all these arguments are very conclusive concerning every first auxiliary grace, and every calling, they are still more conclusive concerning efficacious calling, and especially concerning that which proceeds from the design, and is proper to the elect. For with chief reference to that, Paul said: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy*, as Augustine testifies, in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 32, and in many other places. Hence so far is it from being the case that this calling can be infallibly obtained by some human work, that it cannot even be infallibly obtained by a

work done from grace, by force of any promise—since no such promise is found anywhere. It is necessary, then, that some calling from design should precede, so that by its fruits the elect may in some way merit the subsequent efficacious callings. Otherwise, everyone who disposed himself thus by the vigor of nature would immediately become one of the elect, or be justified, or believe, which is clearly altogether false and absurd. Therefore, even granted that such a disposition could be a reason for obtaining from God some calling (which is also false), nevertheless it could not be a reason of predestination as to its own proper effects. Because it could not be an efficacious reason for the first congruous calling, which is the first effect of predestination, on which the others depend. You will say it could be a reason for a congruous calling, if it were had at the time which is congruous for the calling to be efficacious in it. I respond, first, that this would be altogether accidental with respect to the one acting, since that congruity altogether escapes him, and therefore he cannot, per se, and as it were by his own intention, dispose himself to it. Furthermore, God is not bound at once, in that very moment or time in which a man has that good movement, to infuse the supernatural calling—since he has not bound himself to this either by his promise, or by the general reason of providence, or by the circumstance of the time in which that act occurs, since that circumstance is, with respect to the one acting, causal. Finally (and this is the chief point), congruity does not depend on time alone, but also on the internal mode of the calling, and this depends on the will of God.

27. *Another evasion. — It is pressed.* — But finally it will be said: granted that, for all these reasons, that disposition cannot be posited as so efficacious that it infallibly attains the effect, yet at least it is sufficient, of itself, to move and incline God to confer such grace, and sometimes, and often, can attain the effect, and on this account is rightly called a disposition, directly and per se—remote, indeed, with respect to the first calling grace. Let us, then, prove this against the second member posited above, concerning the manner of positing such a disposition, which coincides with this response. And first, the argument made above has a place here, namely that, even if all this were granted, no cause or reason of predestination could be taken from this consideration, as to its own proper effects. Because, given such a kind of disposition, God either gives or does not give the first congruous calling, or a non-congruous one, or even none at all—for that disposition is inefficacious and fallible with respect to any of these: therefore no reason of predestination can be taken from it. It might be answered that, in that first effect of predestination, two things can be considered: one absolute, namely, that this man is called by God; the other

relative, namely, that this man is called rather than another having a similar disposition. It will be said, then, that that disposition is the cause of predestination as to such effect considered absolutely, although it is not so as to that comparison. But from this follows that greatest absurdity which I drew out above in a similar case—namely, that the good of him who is predestined would ultimately be resolved into the man himself, while the lack of similar good would be cast back upon God alone, who would, of himself, be condemning a similar good disposition in man, contrary to that: *Your perdition is from you; your help is only from me.* Likewise, that first point, considered in itself, is sufficiently great a difficulty, for it is repugnant to Paul, who says: *Before they had done anything good or evil, I loved Jacob*, and other things which will be weighed below.

28. Furthermore, even if that disposition were not, in its genus and mode, an efficacious cause, it would at least suffice for it to be said that God awaits the will of such a man, and that from it he takes some reason for advancing the goodness which the man himself began, likewise that God is said to give his grace to such a man laboring, watching, etc., because he is laboring and watching, likewise that a work done by the powers of nature is said to be good, greatly conducive to the salvation of eternal life. But all these things are openly repugnant to chapters four, six, and seven of the Council of Orange. Moreover, the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, which that Council and Augustine frequently use in this matter, exclude every disposition that precedes God's operation through grace. Such is that text of Proverbs 19, according to the Septuagint: *The will is prepared by the Lord*—for preparation signifies disposition; and hence the common saying of Augustine: *It is God who prepares the will to be helped, and helps it when prepared.* Likewise that of 2 Corinthians 3: *We are not sufficient even to think*, etc.—for every pious disposition of the will must necessarily begin from a holy thought, as Augustine treats at length, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 2. Likewise that: *Without me you can do nothing* —for to dispose oneself remotely to justice, and proximately to the calling, although not efficaciously, but only of itself, and sufficiently, is already quite a lot: therefore nothing of this kind can be from us. And for this reason (as many theologians have noted) this work of grace is compared in Scripture to creation, according to that of 1 Corinthians 2 (sic): *Created in good works which God has prepared*; and Psalm 50: *Create in me a clean heart, O God*—because, indeed, just as creation presupposes no disposition on the part of the thing to be created, so neither does justification, taken from its first beginning. This Augustine also declared, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15, by the example of Christ the

Lord, whom he calls *the model of our predestination*, in whom no disposition preceded the first gift of grace, which in him was the grace of union.

29. *A philosophical argument.* — Finally, we can also bring forward a philosophical argument, since a disposition, even a remote one, must be proportionate and of the same order as the form to which it is said to be a disposition. Likewise there can be applied to this point the argument that St. Thomas brings forward, I-II, q. 109, art. 6, that it belongs to the same agent to induce the form and to dispose toward it, and also to begin that disposition. But God, as a supernatural cause, is the one who induces the form of grace: therefore he is also the one who principally disposes toward it: therefore he also begins the disposition, and not man. Furthermore, we can argue from an untoward consequence, because such a disposition cannot fail to involve some merit. For this disposition we are dealing with is not merely a physical disposition, but a moral one, and therefore requires freedom and goodness proportionate in some way to the proximate effect to which it disposes (for how could it be a disposition if it had no proportion?). Therefore it is repugnant to say that it is a true disposition and not in some way meritorious, at least of congruity. Because to such a disposition that form is in some way owed; therefore also to him who performs that disposition, since he does it freely and honestly, that same form will in some way be owed by reason of such an act: but this is merit of congruity, and nothing else. Wherefore the arguments brought forward in the preceding chapter prove this assertion equally. For what is given to man in view of a proportionate moral disposition is not given altogether gratuitously; and so, once this disposition is admitted, the perfect character of grace is also taken away—for in some way grace is thereby made subject to human labor.

30. And these proofs, which we have adduced concerning the man not yet called to the end, if rightly considered, proceed with proportion concerning the man existing outside the state of sanctifying grace, and operating by natural reason alone and the powers of free will: because by such a work he cannot dispose himself toward any new help of supernatural grace, or gift. For no such work has had any promise of God's supernatural goods made to it, nor does the work itself have, of itself, any proportion to such grace, nor does it participate in it from the dignity of the person acting, since he is supposed to be in a state of mortal sin, nor finally from Christ, since it is not done from him, and in him. Wherefore, although a sinner may already have infused faith and hope, and with them may perform something morally good, if he does not act from them in some way, he does not really dispose himself either toward the increase of faith or hope itself, or toward receiving new supernatural helps by which he might

gradually prepare himself for infused repentance. Because in such a man, with respect to such a work, faith and hope only exist as it were materially, accidentally, or concomitantly. Hence, when Daniel said to the king: *Redeem your sins with alms*, it is not to be supposed that he counseled him almsgiving merely as a work of mercy, but rather that he first of all required of him true faith in God, and a recognition that he had offended him by his sins, and hope of obtaining pardon from him; and that in this manner he counseled him to give alms from this faith, hope, and intention, in order to redeem his sins. And similar testimonies of Scripture are to be understood in the same way.

31. And the same, a fortiori, holds of the man called to faith, who does not yet believe, but rather dissents, resisting the things of faith: for while he is so disposed, he cannot dispose himself toward faith, since he is supposed to be in the worst disposition. But if he is not resistant, but deliberates whether he should believe or not, he too needs God's help in order to make further progress. For if he does something good in order to be illumined by God, he already begins in some way to believe and to act from God's grace, since that intention is not without some belief in God, and hope that he can be illumined by him. Likewise that intention is a work of piety, which cannot be done without grace: and therefore by such a good work he can in some way be disposed for receiving further help, as we shall say more fully below, in chapter twenty. But if such a man, after that calling, performs some good works in the same manner in which he previously performed them from natural reason alone, he in no way disposes himself morally by them toward the helps of supernatural grace, and this is established a fortiori from what has been said of the faithful sinner: because then that whole calling to faith which preceded stands materially and concomitantly with respect to the good work which is done afterward.

32. *A doubt. — Response.* — One could doubt only concerning certain acts which such a man can perform, by the natural powers of his own intelligence and free will, regarding the very matters of faith already proposed to him— either by reflecting on them himself, or by questioning others, or by hearing and meditating by natural discourse alone, in order to conceive them better, and finally to deliberate more prudently. He can even go so far as to believe them with an acquired and human faith, once that is acquired, and to be moved toward them in a human manner as well. But it does not seem deniable that, through these acts, such a man is better disposed to receive the final calling, and affection toward faith. Two things, however, must be said. One is that these acts, if they have any character of disposition, are so more physically than morally: and in this way it is not untoward that one man, through properties natural to

himself, should be in some way more disposed to perform supernatural actions than another—just as we said above of the angels, that the more perfect in nature were in a certain way more capable of the perfection of grace, and a man of better natural endowment is more disposed to perceive more easily the things of faith, and a man well tempered in his constitution is more apt for virtue. So, then, that man called to faith, through those acts which he afterward employs, can be made more easy and ready, as to physical faculty, for receiving the illuminations of faith, even if morally he does not have a disposition per se ordered to supernatural gifts. The other thing to be said is that these acts, although they can occur without internal grace proper to the supernatural order, nevertheless do not occur without a special providence of grace, nor without helps and concurrences not owed to nature as such, and accordingly in some way gratuitous—since they are all founded upon the first supernatural calling, which is already presupposed. And therefore whatever there is of disposition in these acts is not altogether without grace.

33. *Another doubt. — Response. — Summary of the whole chapter.* — It remained to speak of the just man who operates well morally not through justice, but through nature alone; but on this there is a peculiar question, namely, whether through such acts he not only disposes himself, but also merits —either of congruity, or even of condignity—which does not pertain to our present purpose. You will say, indeed, that it pertains very much, since perhaps such a man might, through such acts, dispose himself toward receiving the gift of perseverance, and thus toward his own predestination, or as to one of its chief effects. I respond that such acts really avail nothing for this; but he who would affirm this of them ought not to attribute it to nature, but to grace. For indeed such is the dignity of sanctifying grace that, just as it confers a singular dignity on the person in whom it dwells, so it pours back that dignity in some way upon all his good works, even if, as to physical efficiency, they otherwise proceed from natural power alone. And so, if there were any merit or disposition there toward the proper effect of predestination, it would already be not from nature, but from grace—which is not repugnant, as we shall see below. And besides, such works in a predestined man would not occur without a special providence proceeding from the power of the gratuitous election to glory, as we shall say below; and so they would be effects of predestination prior to being causes of another of its effects—although that one effect is the cause of another is self-evident, as we shall touch upon in what follows. Hence it remains, finally, that merely natural works can be not only no dispositive cause for the whole of predestination, but not even for any proper effect of it, as is clear from the

discourse made. As for the theologians who have thought otherwise, they are either to be charitably interpreted as not speaking of disposition, but only of the absence of an obstacle, or impediment, of which we shall speak below; or they are to be excused, because they did not see that they were inclining toward the opinion of the Massilians—whence those who, becoming wiser, noticed this, retracted their view. The foundation of that doctrine has been resolved from what has been said, and we shall say more in what follows.

CHAPTER VIII
WHAT THE ANCIENT FATHERS, ESPECIALLY THE GREEKS, AND AMONG THEM CHRYSOSTOM, THOUGHT ABOUT THE BEGINNING OF GRACE, OR OF PREDESTINATION, FROM THE WORKS OF NATURE

1. *The opinion of some.* — This question seemed necessary to complete this point, lest anyone take offense, either reading these ancient Fathers, or modern writers, who think that the Greek Fathers, especially Chrysostom, did not think rightly about the beginning of grace, on account of certain of his passages and words, which are without doubt somewhat obscure—especially homily 17, *On John*, and 12, *On Hebrews*, where among other things he says that *God does not anticipate our wills, lest he take away our freedom*, but awaits that we begin, and then adds his gifts afterward. Hence the Massilians used this argument chiefly against Augustine, that his doctrine seemed new and contrary to the earlier Fathers. And they seem to mean Chrysostom in particular, for Cassian, the chief author among the Massilians, was a disciple of Chrysostom, and professes to imitate his doctrine, as is clear from his book *De Incarnatione*. And from the passages cited above it appears that he says nothing more than Chrysostom. Hence, if we wish to interpret Chrysostom favorably, by the same reasoning we shall be able to expound Cassian, Faustus, and the rest.

2. *That the ancient Fathers rightly thought concerning the cause of predestination. — First conjecture.* — This opinion can in no way be proved to me; for, apart from the fact that it is in itself consonant with piety and reason to expound the holy Fathers orthodoxly where this can fittingly be done, many things occur in the present matter on account of which it seems incredible that Chrysostom, or other Fathers, held that opinion. First, indeed, because the doctrine we have confirmed is taught so clearly and manifestly by Paul (as we have seen) that those Fathers, especially Chrysostom, could not have been

ignorant of Paul's mind and meaning; and if they were not ignorant of it, surely they did not contradict it.

3. *Second conjecture.* — Second, because Pope Celestine, in his letter to the Gauls, confirming Augustine's doctrine, reproves the contradiction of the Massilians as a pernicious novelty and contrary to the doctrine of the Fathers. Nor is it likely that he would have so readily approved Augustine's doctrine, if he had thought it contrary to the earlier Fathers.

Third conjecture. — Third, a similar argument can be taken from the Council of Orange, insofar as it involves the authority of Pope Leo, for it approves the opinion of Augustine, and at the beginning and end of its canons it says that this opinion was accepted by the Fathers. This is likewise confirmed by Vincent of Lérins, in his book against profane novelties, last chapter.

4. *Fourth conjecture.* — Fourth, it is taken from the agreement of the Eastern bishops in the Council of Palestine, which Augustine reports, Epistle 106, ch. 11 and 12, saying that there the opinion of Pelagius, already arisen, was condemned, and also the opinion of the Semipelagians before it had arisen, since it was anathematized by virtue of the truths defined there. The Greek bishops, however, are accustomed in their councils to adhere most closely to the opinions of the Greek Fathers: therefore it is not likely that they defined contrary to their mind. This argument proves most of all about Chrysostom, who either was living at that time, and some judge it probable that he was present at that Council, or certainly his doctrine was at that time in everyone's hands, and held in the highest esteem.

5. Fifth conjecture. — Fifth, hence St. Augustine, in the same Epistle 106, near the end, absolutely states that the Catholic Church has always held this doctrine; and in his book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 14, answering this objection from the Fathers, he says: What need is there that we search through the little works of those who, before this heresy arose, had no need to be occupied with this difficult question—which, without doubt, they would have done, had they been forced to respond to such people; whence it came about that what they thought about the grace of God they touched on briefly and in passing. He does not, then, think that the doctrine of the Fathers is contrary to his own, but rather that it is contained in it, virtually and briefly. Hence in other places he always interprets Chrysostom favorably, as can be seen in his book De Nat. et Gratia, ch. 64, and especially book 1, Contra Julianum, ch. 6 and 7, book 2, ch. 6, where among other things he says (which is to be greatly noted): Chrysostom spoke securely at that time in the Catholic Church, because the

Pelagians had not yet arisen, and his words were rightly understood by Catholics.

6. *Sixth conjecture.* — Sixth, I add that St. Augustine often confirms his own doctrine by testimonies of the ancient Fathers; for in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, at the beginning, and *De Bono Persever.*, ch. 14, he brings forward that saying of Cyprian: *In nothing must we glory, since nothing is ours*; and he thinks this sufficient to confirm his whole doctrine. In like manner, in *De Bono Perseverantiae*, ch. 19 and 23, he brings forward Ambrose, on account of certain general words: *My heart is not in my own power, and to pray to God is a gift of the spirit.* Again, in the same ch. 19, he brings forward Nazianzen, oration 44, *On Easter*, simply because it has similar general words. But we can in like manner add Basil, homily 22, *On Humility*, saying: *Nothing is left to you, O man, of which you can glory*, and below: *God does not impute to you according to your own justice, but you to him according to his goodness*; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses* 1, saying: *It is God's part to confer grace, yours to acquire and keep it*— signifying that the first is God's alone, but the second is ours, yet not without God's help, as Augustine declared in a similar case, *Retract.* 1, ch. 23, and as we shall say again shortly. And below the same Cyril adds: *Do not despise grace, because it is given freely.* Philo, a contemporary of Epiphanius, and consecrated bishop by him through divine revelation, in book 1, *On the Song of Songs*, tome 1 of the *Bibliotheca Sanctorum*, on those words, *Terrible as an army arrayed in order*, having said that good works are necessary, adds: *But the bridegroom must first descend into the garden, for human frailty can do nothing toward this unless anticipated by divine grace.* And below: *Grace*, he says, *begins by alluring.* St. Diadochus, too, in *De Perfect. Spir.*, ch. 89, excellently sets out the process of grace, and how all good things begin from it. To these we can add Hilary, on Psalm 118, octave 4, on the words, *And take not the word of truth utterly out of my mouth: All things*, he says, *he wills to be begun from his own goodness*; and octave 3, on, *Incline my heart to your testimonies: First*, he says, *what is of God he set forth with honor.* From Jerome too many things can be taken, *Dialogue 1, Against the Pelagians*, which we touched on above.

7. Let us come to Chrysostom, who, homily 28, On Genesis, near the end, excellently declares how faith is persuaded to men by divine grace, and, having proposed many obstacles, adds: The grace that goes before removed all these things; and homily 38, among other things: Otherwise, always anticipating our prayers. And he likewise excellently declares how faith, and the petition of the Canaanite woman, had their beginning from grace. Likewise, homily 42 On First Corinthians, on those words, ch. 4: What have you that you have not

received? You have received, he says, not this or that, but all that you have; for these things, rightly done, are not yours, but of divine grace, even if you call it faith, that proceeded from a calling. Many similar things occur in homily 8 on the same epistle, on those words, to each as he divided, etc., and homily 8 on Philippians: God who works in us, etc. And the very inclination, he says, of the will, he himself supplies to us, and the operation. Similarly, homily 38, To the People: We must be humbled, because God has inclined toward you, passing over others. And below: Do not consider it a reward, that you may receive a reward; confess that you are saved by grace, so that he himself may confess himself your debtor. Other passages I shall bring forward later. And all these preceded Augustine.

8. Now at almost the same time was Mark the Hermit, to whom, along with Chrysostom, the opinion of the Massilians is also attributed, on account of a few of his words, which I shall report below from his book De Paradiso. He, however, both there and in another preceding book De Paradiso et lege spirituali, excellently sets forth the whole doctrine of grace. For near the beginning he says: First of all let us know with certainty that God is the author of every good, both of its beginning, and of its middle, and of its end—which he rightly carries through the first eight chapters and the fortieth chapter. The beginning of every virtue is God; and ch. 47: Every good proceeds from God, distributed according to his will. But in ch. 53 he has a sentence to be noted for what we shall say below: Every good work which we perform through our own nature accomplishes this much, indeed, that we abstain from the contrary evil or vice; but apart from this, it cannot bring us to the increase of the grace of sanctification. He has many other things in ch. 56, and ch. 137 and 168. From the book De Paradiso, I bring forward only these words: What is given through grace, we must no longer measure according to the measure and merit of the preceding weakness, since otherwise grace would no longer be grace.

9. To these we can add Cyril of Alexandria and John Damascene, who came after Augustine, although Cyril was almost his contemporary. He, then, in book 1 On John, ch. 20, expounding in passing that text of Paul, What have you that you have not received?, says: Not only being, but also being well, and being thus or thus, we have received; and below, they are enriched by the freedom of the one bestowing alone. And in book 10 On John, ch. 24, he expounds this matter most excellently: You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. I, he says, made myself known to you, though you knew me not, moved by mercy; and by this example he declares that God converts the unworthy and the resistant. And in book 3 On Isaiah 25, touching on those words, If anyone thirst,

let him come to me: They receive, he says, not buying with money, but by the most liberal and most ready generosity of him who calls. And below he adds: the rest is bought through faith. John Damascene, too, in De Fide book 2, ch. 30, writes thus of God: He himself is the principle and cause of every good, and without his cooperation and help it is impossible for us either to will or to do good; but it is in our own power to remain in virtue and to follow God as he calls us to it.

10. *The passages of Chrysostom are met.* — But what of Chrysostom? I respond, first, that since he is not contrary to himself, and certain of his words are to be reconciled with the others, it is better that the words which appear difficult be drawn into the good sense of the others, rather than the reverse—since this can easily be done, and is more consonant with reason and piety. Further, because in the other Fathers nearly the same diligence is necessary as that which modern authors apply and allow in their case; I do not see, then, why they should have believed this could not be done in Chrysostom's case. I think, therefore, that these Fathers imitated Scripture, which sometimes attributes everything to grace, and sometimes seems to require the beginning of the good work from man—Isaiah 30: *The Lord waits, that he may have mercy on you*; 1 Kings 3 (sic): *Prepare your hearts to the Lord*; and Psalm 118: *I anticipated in ripeness, and cried out*; and there are many similar texts, which the Council of Trent also adduces, session 6, and expounds, saying that by these we are admonished of our freedom, or excited so that, by using one grace well, we may obtain another, or be disposed for another—not, however, that the beginning of salvation, or of predestination, is signified by such words to be from us. I judge, then, that the meaning of Chrysostom and of the ancient Fathers is the same. But let us come to the individual sayings which seem to stand against this truth.

11. *Various sayings of the Fathers are unraveled. — First saying.* — The first is that adduced, *God does not anticipate our wills, lest he take away our freedom.* But first, the same is found in Damascene, *De Fide* book 2, ch. 29 and 30, book 4, ch. 22, where he says that *God does not predefine, or predestine, these acts.* Further, Chrysostom, homily 2 on Psalm 50, expressly says: *God provokes us, saying, give you also something*; and homily 23 *On Genesis*, near the end, holds the correct view about prevenient grace. Most excellently in homily 44 *On John*: *It is the mark of a certain generous soul not to reject divine inspirations*—which he declares to happen by the supreme *help*. I respond, therefore, that by this saying he intends only that God does not anticipate our wills by determining them to one thing, or, what would be the same, by physically predetermining

them. And this comes to the same as what St. Thomas answers concerning Damascene, that he spoke of a necessitating predestination.

12. *Second saying.* — The second saying of Chrysostom is that *God awaits that we begin, that he may add perfection.* Nazianzen, too, and Ambrose speak this way, and Augustine has cited them in support of his own opinion. For Ambrose, *De Abraham* book 2, ch. 7, says thus: *Show yourself such, by good pursuits and ready faith, that God may call you.* He has similar things on Psalm 118, octave 10, at the beginning, and on those words, *Let your mercy be done, that it may console me.* Nazianzen, however, oration 31, expounding those words of Matthew 19: *Not all receive this word, but those to whom it is given: it is given*, he says, *to those who are willing.* Hilary, moreover, in the passage cited above, says: *The beginning is from us, when we pray*; below, however, he adds: *The cry of prayer must be uttered, not by the voice, but by the spirit of faith.* More difficult is Jerome, dialogue 3, *Against the Pelagians*, who says: *Let it be ours to ask, his to grant; ours to begin, his to finish.* And similarly Optatus of Mileve, book 2, *Against Parmenian*, near the end: *It is ours*, he says, *to will, ours to run; but God's to perfect.* Finally, Mark the Hermit, *De Paradiso*, near the end: *He commands*, he says, *that man first know and bring forth his will*; and below, *the perfecting of the work is God's, but the will is man's.*

13. All these Fathers, then, intend to teach only that grace does not sanctify, nor dispose, an adult man without his free cooperation; and this free cooperation, which begins in man the first good moral disposition, they call a beginning on man's part, in the manner of speaking by which the Council of Orange, canon 5, called the will to believe a beginning of faith, or of salvation. The Fathers cited, however, do not deny that the divine excitation and calling precedes, before this cooperation of man. Rather, Ambrose, in the place cited just above, thinks that it was on account of this calling that it was said: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs—lest*, he says, *you should justify yourself, but should attribute everything to God, who called you.* And it comes to almost the same thing to say that these Fathers are not speaking of the beginning of the whole of justice, but of this or that divine benefit, and so they call prayer the beginning of that gift which is obtained through it; and thus they exhort men that they themselves begin, so that God may continue. This is to be especially noted in Chrysostom, for he was speaking to the faithful, whose faith he was striving to excite by the word of God, as by an instrument—as he himself often expressly declares. He asks of them, then, that they begin by consenting to God's grace, not without the help of that same grace, as he explains in other places too, which we shall touch upon below. And especially in that homily 2 on Psalm 50,

he says that God gives his calling to the unworthy, that he may commend his grace. This can also be seen in homily 9 *On Genesis* 19, *On the Acts*, and the fourth on Ephesians.

14. I add, finally, that St. Augustine himself sometimes speaks this way, and needs this explanation. For in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, q. 98, treating the text, *On whom he wills he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens*, he says this comes about: *From most hidden merits: for in him who is hardened, evil merits precede; and in him too, of whom God has mercy, most hidden merits precede*—which he there says precede justification. Nor is it true, as some answer, that Augustine retracted this opinion when he retracted the other, about the merit of faith, which he had taught on the Epistle to the Romans: for this retraction Augustine makes in *Retract.* 1, ch. 23, and immediately after, ch. 26, treating that same question 68, he retracts nothing, but confirms and explains what he had said—namely, that *those good merits, however hidden, precede the calling, without merit, beforehand.* Whence it incidentally appears (which is also to be noted) that by "justification" in that passage he does not mean the whole progress toward justice from its first beginning, but the infusion of grace and remission of sin—which man in some way merits, through repentance conceived from faith.

15. *Third saying.* — A third saying, and a difficult one, occurs in Chrysostom, because he seems to attribute more to natural reason and its works than is fitting. Homily 42 *On Genesis*, he exalts the holiness of Abraham, *because he advanced so far, not through faith received from his parents, but through knowledge implanted by nature.* And homily 3 *On 1 Corinthians*, he says: *Certain philosophers, by the light of reason, not only kept the precepts, but sometimes even surpassed them.* But more difficult to me is the saying of Nazianzen, oration *On the Father*, where, after praising him for the time before he received faith, he adds: *On account of these things (as I think) he received faith as a reward.* And yet (if Augustine cites Nazianzen rightly) this must necessarily be expounded by us. There the scholiast answers that he spoke of merit improperly, for some kind of disposition. I, however, judge that he did not mean that faith was a reward owed in some way to such works, but that, although such works were of themselves proportioned, or apt, for some recompense (according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21), he means that God did not wish to give, for them, a proportionate reward—which would have been of an inferior order—but in place of it gave faith, from his grace and magnificence.

16. Chrysostom, however, is more easily explained. For he praises Abraham only because, first, he so conducted himself by natural knowledge as

to place no obstacle to the divine calling, according to what we shall say below; and also because, not having faith from his parents, he showed himself ready to obey divine revelation and calling. Chrysostom never denied, however, that this latter, at least, occurred with the help of divine grace. And in the same way I understand what Gregory said, homily 13, on the disciples going to Emmaus: *They were not illumined by hearing; they were illumined by doing.* For he does not mean that they merited illumination by that work, since he says they lacked faith, but he signifies that that work was apt for Christ to take from it an occasion of illumining them. What Chrysostom said elsewhere about the philosophers, that by the light of reason they kept the precepts, is not to be understood of all the precepts, but of some; and he says that *they sometimes surpassed them*, because they also did certain good things which were not commanded—such as sometimes keeping chastity in some manner. Although elsewhere he also notes that *they did not always do these very things well and honestly*—that is, with the right intention—as can be seen in homily 8 of the same Epistle 1 to the Corinthians; and Cassian, *Collat.* 13, ch. 5, can also be consulted.

17. *Fourth saying.* — A fourth saying of Chrysostom is that *God calls him whom he knows will cooperate*, as is clear from homilies 31 and 96 *On Matthew*, and the homily on the conversion of Paul, and book 1 *De compunctione cordis*, at the beginning. But Cyril of Alexandria speaks more difficultly, book 3 *On John*, ch. 39, and book 4, ch. 6 and 7, saying: *God calls those who are worthy.* I add too that an almost similar saying is found in Augustine, Epistle 49, q. 2, and sermon 76, *On the Words of the Apostle*. These Fathers, then, in these places, are not speaking of works performed by the powers of nature, but by the powers of grace, and the efficacy of the calling itself: and so this saying does not pertain to the present question, but at most can favor another opinion to be treated below. Furthermore, they are not speaking causally—that is, that God calls a man because he foreknows that he will consent—but only by foreknowing that he will consent and cooperate with the calling, and so will be worthy of subsequent grace. But this is not only not repugnant to grace, but rather commends it: for to give a calling, namely an efficacious one, *at the time when God knows it will penetrate the soul* (as Chrysostom speaks), proceeds from the greatest benevolence of God—indeed this is the grace which Augustine especially extols. Finally, that foreknowledge of future cooperation can be understood either as conditional, or as absolute. In the former way, the matter is easy, and consonant with grace, as is clear from what has often been said. In the latter way, it already presupposes the gratuitous will of God, and so it can also truly be said that God

calls efficaciously him whom he knows will consent, because he foreknows this in his own gratuitous decree, by which, indeed, he has already preordained him to consent. In this way Augustine is also accustomed to say: *God predestines what he himself was going to do.*

18. *Fifth saying.* — A fifth saying of Chrysostom is that *God requires from man repentance, which of itself does not suffice to take away sin: but, with God's grace and mercy at once coming to it, sin is forgiven.* So he speaks, homilies 17 and 42 *On Genesis*, and often elsewhere—from which saying the aforesaid authors gather that Chrysostom requires a repentance elicited by free will alone, which obtains from God the remission of sin: because, were he speaking of repentance from the help of grace, that would of itself suffice for the remission of sin. And they say that Cassian imitated this sense, *Collat.* 20, ch. 8. I respond that it is false that Chrysostom speaks of natural repentance: for he evidently speaks of that repentance which is the sufficient and immediate disposition for the remission of sin—such as was David's repentance, when he said: *I have sinned against the Lord*, and the thief's, who said: *Remember me, Lord*, etc. For he uses these examples, and also those testimonies, *Be converted to me*, and the like. Chrysostom's opinion was, then, that even this repentance, however supernatural, does not of itself formally justify man, unless new mercy and grace of God forgiving sin and infusing justice come to it. This is most true and sound doctrine, which I have treated at length, in tome 1, disp. 4, sect. 8, where I adduced several testimonies of Chrysostom. And as to this, Cassian too can be drawn to a good sense.

19. *Sixth saying.* — Sixth, there is found another saying, especially in Mark the Hermit, namely, that *grace presupposes a readiness of the will implanted by nature*—indeed he even adds that *the will is, as it were, a help implanted by nature.* But the former words are similar to other words of Augustine: *To be able to have faith is of man's nature; but to have it is of the faithful, by grace.* For that readiness is nothing other than the very capacity of the will, which is not distinguished from the will itself, and is therefore said to be implanted by nature —although, insofar as, with respect to grace, it is in potency to a form not owed it, and of a higher order, it is properly called obediential. Or, at most, that readiness is so called on account of the natural inclination of the will toward the morally good, which shows its natural rectitude, which grace presupposes of itself, although in fallen man it exists impeded by the vice of original sin. In the other saying, the will is called a *help*, by reason of its freedom, without which divine grace does not perfect in us those works by which we are sanctified. Hence, speaking of the actual will, the same author expressly says, in the same

place: *If it is brought to completion unto salvation, it cannot be begun or completed except through grace*; but speaking of the very power of the will, he says it is an instrument of divine grace for supernatural operations.

20. Finally, it is usually weighed here that these Fathers, speaking simply and absolutely, attribute much to free will, and pass over grace almost in silence. How then could Clement of Alexandria be cited in favor of the Massilians, *Strom.* book 5, at the beginning, and Damascene, book 2, ch. 26, indeed even Augustine, in his 3 books *De libero Arbitrio*? To this he himself answers, *Retract.* 1, ch. 8, that he was then silent, but did not exclude grace, because at that time only that matter was being disputed. Hence too Faustus, *De libero Arbitr.* book 1, ch. 6: *When*, he says, *one thing is mentioned without the other, the other is passed over in silence, not denied—according to the rule which the bishop Augustine suggests.* Those Fathers, then, were either disputing at that time against heretics, especially against the Manichees, or rebuking men's negligence: and so they more often recall freedom, although in other places they do not omit grace.

21. I add further that Chrysostom, in a certain homily on Adam and Eve, professedly taught the whole doctrine of grace, to such an extent that many suspect that a certain part of that homily belongs rather to Prosper than to Chrysostom. And this also makes the matter doubtful to me: that in the often-cited letter of Celestine, that whole part is transcribed word for word. Others, however, think that Chrysostom, near the end of his life, had already heard rumors of Pelagius's error, and therefore declared his mind more clearly—and that Celestine made use of his words, which, though the matter is doubtful, nothing forbids us to believe.

CHAPTER IX
AN OBJECTION IS RAISED AGAINST THE FOREGOING RESOLUTION

1. Against what has been said in the preceding chapter, and in favor both of certain Scholastics and of the Massilians, one can object with that axiom taken from Paul: *God wills all men to be saved.* For from this it is gathered that God is ready to give his grace, or illumination, to every man who places no obstacle: and consequently to give it to every man who, in the manner he can, makes good use of his freedom and reason. Therefore he who has not been anticipated by any grace, if he does as well as he can, will obtain grace from God: therefore at least dispositively, or meritoriously of congruity, he will procure the first help, and by means of it will be able to obtain all the remaining effects of

predestination: therefore it is not repugnant that some cause of the whole of predestination be given, on the part of its effects, founded in an act purely natural and morally good.

2. The assumption is proved, because every adult man (for we are dealing only with this) for as long as he lives here has it in his own power to be saved—as we shall show even of the reprobate, in book four—but he cannot have this in his own power except by means of some use of his freedom: therefore, if he has not been anticipated by some grace, that power must necessarily be founded in a good act, possible to such a man: but no act is possible to him except one which he can exercise by the powers of nature: therefore that act will be a sufficient disposition and preparation for him to obtain prevenient grace from God. And this is confirmed, because, just as grace presupposes nature, and bespeaks an intrinsic relation toward it (for grace is a perfection of nature), so the first grace, which presupposes no prior one, ought to be content (so to speak) with that moral disposition which nature can elicit by its own powers. For to demand more would be unjust, since it would be to ask of man what is impossible for him. And to count that disposition for nothing does not seem reasonable, nor consonant with divine providence; for the weaker and more infirm a man is, if according to the powers he has he does what he can, it pertains to the providence of the author of grace to esteem that (so to speak), and to confer grace on that man, at least by beginning in him the work of grace. For this kind of providence seems owed to man, raised to a supernatural end—since, according to that state, he cannot otherwise tend toward it.

3. To this objection, some think it can only be answered by saying that man, without the help of grace, can do nothing through natural reason and free will alone that is not sin; and from this principle the objection is easily resolved, because either man is anticipated by some grace, or by none: if by some, that is already an effect of predestination, and thus the operation proceeding from it cannot be the cause of all the effects of predestination; but if he is anticipated by no grace, whatever he does by his own freedom will be sin, and consequently will rather impede grace and the effects of predestination than help them.

4. And those theologians seem to suppose this response who think that the axiom, *To him who does what is in him, God does not deny grace*, must be understood of a man already anticipated by grace, and making good use of it, as far as he can: for if he is not anticipated, whatever he attempts by himself will rather impede grace. This axiom St. Thomas expounds thus, I-II, q. 109, art. 6, ad 2, where St. Thomas speaks of man's preparation for receiving habitual grace. And, understanding the axiom of this grace, he says, consequently, that it must

be understood of a man doing what is in him by the help of prevenient grace. Yet, in q. 112, art. 2, speaking of preparation for the first help of grace, he says that none is required on man's part, since that help itself must come from grace. Whence, in art. 3, he concludes that no grace is infallibly given to man insofar as he, by his free will, does what is in him, but according to God's motion and intention. This opinion is followed by Cajetan and Conrad there, and by Soto, *De Nat. et Grat.* book 2, ch. 3, at the end, and Capreolus, II, dist. 28, q. unic., art. 1, ch. 2. Ferrariensis, *Contra Gent.* 3, ch. 159, Bonaventure, III, d. 28, art. 2, q. 1, where he first declares what he means by gratuitously given grace, namely, not only those which the Apostle enumerates, 1 Cor. 12, but whatever is superadded to natural endowments, helping in some way and preparing the will for the habit, or use, of grace. And then in the solution to the third objection he expounds that axiom about doing what is in oneself, by gratuitously given grace, and thinks it is not otherwise true. Gregory, I, d. 44; Marsilius, I, q. 44, art. 2, conclusion 4, and in II, q. 28, art. 3 and 4; Antoninus, part 4, tit. 9, ch. 5, §4. Also cited are Alensis, part 3, q. 69, m. 5, art. 3, Gerson, *Alphab.* 24, lit. M, and Altisiodorensis, *Sum.* book 3, tract 2, ch. 1. But of their opinion I shall speak below.

5. *The said response is further supported.* — And this response can be confirmed, because, unless the objection raised is repelled in this way, two errors are contained in it. One is that free will, of itself, can do what is necessary for living honestly, absolutely and simply; the other is that free will, by its own natural powers alone, can so prepare itself for grace as infallibly to obtain it from God. As to the first, it is clear, because in this sense it must necessarily be understood when it is said that man can do what is in him: for to do what is in him toward sinning, he doubtless can; yet it would be blasphemous to say that to one so doing what is in him God gives his grace: it must, then, be understood of one doing what is in him toward living honestly. But to say that man can, through free will, lead an honest and innocent life, is Pelagian: therefore. Nor can it be said that this is not affirmed in that axiom, but is said only conditionally—that if man does what is in him he will obtain grace—and that a conditional posits nothing in being. This (I say) cannot be said, because it is not in accord with the doctors' mind, nor does that sense serve the intended purpose, namely, to show that it is not impossible for a man not yet anticipated by grace to obtain grace: therefore it is supposed as possible, and feasible by man, through the powers of free will. And from this follows the other error, namely, that this kind of operation is believed to be a sufficient and infallible disposition for attaining grace, since this is what is directly affirmed in that

axiom. For I ask: is that operation supernatural? Then it is Pelagian to say that it is done by the powers of free will alone. Or is it only natural? Then it is Semipelagian to say that it is a sufficient disposition for obtaining grace.

6. To the objection, then, these authors will consequently respond that in the predestined man there is no good moral work which is not from predestination, and therefore it cannot be the cause of the whole of predestination. These same authors suppose that the adequate effect of predestination in this life is grace, and therefore conclude that such a work can only be from grace. This grace, in the predestined man, is an effect of predestination; but in the reprobate, if he performs such a work, it will also be from grace, although in him it is not an effect of predestination. But when it is asked how it is in man's power to have this grace, they answer that it is because God is ready to give it to all: and this is proved only from the words of Paul: *God wills all men to be saved.*

CHAPTER X
THREE WAYS OF ASSERTING THAT A GOOD MORAL WORK CANNOT EXIST EXCEPT FROM PREDESTINATION, OR GRACE, ARE TREATED

1. Theologians dispute professedly, in the treatise on grace, whether man can, without the help of grace, and by the powers of free will, perform some morally good work, honest simply, that is, as to object and circumstances. We could not, however, avoid examining this principle carefully here, because some in our time seem to have taught that there is so necessary a connection between gratuitous predestination and the necessity of grace for every such work, that it cannot be defended that predestination lacks a cause on our part as to the collection of its effects, unless we simultaneously defend that a good moral work cannot be done without grace. This has seemed to us hard and difficult, because the true does not depend on the false, nor the certain on the uncertain: and therefore that principle is here to be diligently examined.

2. *The first manner of speaking is this. — This manner is rejected as heretical.* — In various ways, then, it has been asserted, or can be conceived, that man, by the powers of nature, without grace, cannot do any good. The first way is to understand this of grace in the sense which many heretics of this age have asserted, with Luther, article 36. But this sense is heretical, because from it it follows that all sinners, even if they have faith and are Christians, sin in all their works, since they act without sanctifying grace. This consequence is most

absurd and heretical—otherwise even in the very act of dead faith, or of fear, or of attrition, the sinner would sin, which was condemned in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 7. And it is self-evident, because sanctifying grace, with its habits, remaining merely in first act, without actual influence, is not a circumstance necessary for the moral honesty of a work: therefore a good work can be done without it, good and honest in every respect, even though, in mode or in all its properties, it is not done as perfectly as it could be—for this perfection is not necessary for the goodness simply of the work, with which we are now dealing.

3. *The second manner of speaking. — This opinion is set aside, both because it is heretical and because it is brought forward without foundation.* — The second manner of speaking was that of those who thought that faith is necessary for the moral honesty of any human work whatsoever. Thus understanding that of Paul, Romans 14: *Everything that is not from faith is sin*; and that of Hebrews [11]: *Without faith it is impossible to please God*: because every good work pleases God. This opinion the heretics of our time also teach, gathering many testimonies of Augustine in its confirmation, which it is not permitted to treat here, since this matter does not serve the present purpose, and is professedly treated in the matter on faith. This opinion, then, is to be left aside as heretical and without any foundation. For from it it follows that all the works of unbelievers are necessarily sins: which the faith does not admit. For Christ the Lord, Matthew 5, supposes that the heathen have a good natural love. *Do not*, he says, *even the heathen do this?* And if anyone says that the heathen indeed do what is good as to substance, but not with all the circumstances necessary for it to be done well: certainly Christ the Lord did not so limit it, but absolutely admits that the heathen can do the good which nature itself dictates; but nature dictates not only that good must be done as to substance, but also well as to circumstances: therefore this too the heathen will sometimes do. For infused and supernatural faith is not a circumstance necessary for the moral honesty of a natural work, since they are of different orders. Likewise, otherwise, if an unbeliever, before he believes, does something in order to hear the faith, or to examine its credibility, or to obtain its light, all of that would be sin, which is most absurd and plainly comprehended in the condemnation of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, canon 7. Although, then, faith is necessary for good works to please God with a view to eternal life—as to the highest sense in the second testimony of Paul—it is not necessary, however, for natural goodness, or honest morality, for which it suffices that the work be consonant with the dictate of right natural reason, and so be from conscience. And in this sense Paul takes "faith," when in another place he said that everything that is not from faith is

sin, that is, that everything that is against conscience is sin, as is more probable from the context and from common opinion—although that text otherwise admits of other expositions.

4. *The third manner of speaking. — The said manner of speaking is rejected.* — The third manner, then, of positing the necessity of grace for individual morally good works was that of those who, by grace, understand not some habitual gift, but some motion of the Holy Spirit, which is sometimes given even to believing men—and which is nonetheless a true interior grace of the supernatural order, by which God specially premoves and induces man to act well morally. This seems to have been the opinion of Gregory, II, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 2, whom Capreolus follows there, art. 3. Although they themselves do not explain clearly enough what sort of grace this is, which they require for individual moral works. Their foundations I shall bring forward in the fourth opinion, since they are general and can be applied to whatever mode of grace is required for such works. This opinion, then, seems in this sense outdated and abandoned by all, and many of the things I shall say against the last opinion will tell against it too.

5. I now ask only of these authors whether they think that a morally good act is, of itself and from its intrinsic nature, above the natural powers of human free will, or not. To say the first is in itself incredible and involves a contradiction. First, because neither in the object, nor in the substance, nor in the mode of such an act is anything found that exceeds the natural powers of the human will. For the object, affected with due circumstances, is knowable by natural reason—otherwise it would not be that good of which we are treating: but the act of the will, which tends only toward the object as conformed to natural reason, cannot, on that account, have a substance or entity exceeding the natural capacity of human nature. For why, or whence, would it have it? Nor does it require a mode, or intensity, or any other similar condition exceeding the natural active power of the will, since natural reason never demands this, as is self-evident.

6. Second, because otherwise such an act could not fall under a precept connatural to man, since nothing can be commanded to a nature, by force of that nature, which is above the natural powers of that same nature. Nor is it enough that such an act be possible through grace, since nature dictates nothing about supernatural grace, and hence does not oblige one to seek it—especially if nature itself is considered precisely and nakedly, as it must be considered for the obligation arising from it. But it is certain that these acts fall under the natural law, not only as to substance, but also as to their due circumstances—otherwise

to omit them would not, of itself and from the nature of the thing, be a sin: therefore.

7. Third, because it follows that, in no state, not even that of integral nature, could man have performed any good moral work without this true and supernatural grace: because the natural powers intrinsic to the will, and per se belonging to it, are the same in themselves and in every state: whence, if the act itself, even from itself and by force of moral honesty alone, exceeds them, it exceeds them in every state. But this consequence is against the common doctrine of the Councils, of Augustine, and of all who have followed him, who say that every infirmity or impotence of human nature regarding the doing of moral good, insofar as it is consonant with natural reason alone, arose from the fall of the whole of nature, nor can any probable reason for a different origin be given.

8. Indeed, it cannot even be understood what, or to what end, that supernatural motion would be: for if it is an illumination on the part of the intellect, it ought not to propose a supernatural thing (so to speak), nor a supernatural manner of acting: for neither of these is necessary for the honest act with which we are dealing. But if that motion is a supernatural inspiration applied proximately to the will, this, first of all, never has a place except illumination is presupposed. Hence, if supernatural illumination is not necessary, neither is inspiration. And then, a similar motion is necessary only to relieve and help the will where the effect exceeds its powers: but it has been shown that this effect does not, of itself, exceed the natural powers of the will: therefore. Finally, this is a clear sign: that the habit corresponding to such an act is not infused per se, but acquired: that motion, however, is usually proportionate to the habit, and of the same order, and perhaps takes its place when it is lacking: hence, just as an acquired habit is not simply necessary for such an operation, but helps toward operating more easily, so neither can such a motion be simply necessary, but at most will help toward facility—for we speak of individual acts, since of a collection of acts it is another matter.

9. And if, finally, it is said that this necessity of grace, or impossibility of having this act by natural powers alone, is not of itself from the mere comparison of the will and such an act, and from a disproportion found between them, but arises from the conjunction of the will with the lower appetite, and from the tinder of sin, and other extrinsic obstacles, especially the instigation of demons—against this it must be said that, from this point of view, it is indeed rightly proved that grace is necessary for performing good moral works over a long time without admixture of sin, but it is not thereby proved as

to individual acts and moments. Because that rebellion of the appetite is not found equally in all acts, nor in all opportunities, nor in all persons or constitutions. For in doing good to friends and relatives, and parents, sensuality does not resist, nor does it always incline toward exceeding the limit of reason, in each and every act of beneficence. The same holds of honoring parents, of helping the poor, especially if the person is by nature inclined to liberality and compassion. And so of others. The same is almost true of extrinsic obstacles, since they do not always occur in every act and at every time. And besides, against these extrinsic obstacles, an extrinsic guarding and protection of God, of himself or through angels, would be sufficient, without that proper internal grace by the motion of the Holy Spirit, of which we are now treating. The same holds of the instigation of demons, of which we shall say more below.

10. *An objection is raised against what has been said.* — One objection proper to this opinion occurs, which can be made more against the force of the arguments adduced than against the assertion. For, indeed, if the arguments are valid, they could be applied, without exception, to each and every moral act consonant with nature, and accordingly would prove that even the love of God above all things, as the author of nature, could be had without internal and supernatural grace, as perfectly and efficaciously as it could be had in the state of integral nature. This consequence seems contrary not only to St. Thomas, but also to common doctrine; and there are not wanting learned men who think it pertains to the errors of Pelagius: therefore. The inference seems clear, applying the arguments made, which anyone can easily do: and so I do not dwell on it.

11. *The objection is answered. — In the state of innocence man could observe the law of nature.* — This objection touches a new and lengthy matter, foreign to this place, and so I shall not pursue it; but I shall say two things briefly. One is that there is a certain difference, as to this point, between fallen man and man in the state of integral nature, in this: that before the fall man could, in the state of innocence, observe the whole law of nature for a long time by the powers of nature alone; now, however, in corrupted nature, he cannot. Since, then, the love of God above all things includes the formal or virtual purpose of keeping the whole law of nature, and never sinning against it, it is necessary that, for the power of having this perfect love, there be some difference between those two states. On this score, then, in answering the objection, the inference is denied as to that part, *as perfectly and efficaciously.* For although it is true that the act of such love, as to its entity and species, does not exceed the natural powers of the human will, even considered in itself, and so it is not repugnant for it to be done, for some instant, or short time, by the natural powers of the will, nevertheless it

does not follow that it can be done as perfectly and constantly, because the perfection of that act, as to its efficacy, depends extrinsically on man's state—for on that depends the possibility of fulfilling all that that act includes, which is not found in other honest acts of the lower virtues. Such an act will therefore be in corrupted nature less efficacious, or rather inefficacious, since by itself, and without grace, it will not be capable of fulfilling all the precepts of the natural law for a long time, with the perfection it would have in integral nature.

12. This very imperfection, however, can be understood in two ways. First, that the will now eliciting such an act cannot be constant, or persevere long in the purpose which such an act includes, because the actual love itself lasts only a short time, and once it has passed it does not leave sufficient force to keep the will in its duty, acting well and honestly—for which, nevertheless, a similar love in integral nature would suffice. But if anyone considers rightly, this difference is not in some intrinsic perfection of the acts themselves, but in duration, or perseverance, or efficacy, which is greater in one than in the other—not because one act is more perfect than the other, but because one finds in its subject a greater resistance than the other. As, for example, the heat of six degrees existing in water, or in iron, does not differ in intrinsic perfection or intensity, and yet in water it will last less and have less efficacy on account of the greater repugnance of the subject and contrary activity: so, then, it will happen in those two acts, if the only difference found between them is the one stated. And this is not without probability; but because St. Thomas seems to intend more than this when he speaks of this matter, another manner of explaining the imperfection of that act can be added.

13. *In the state of fallen nature, the human will cannot exercise its powers absolutely and efficaciously in the natural love of God.* — From the aforesaid difference, then, which is on the part of the subjects, it follows that, in the state of fallen nature, the human will cannot exercise its powers in this natural love of God as absolutely and efficaciously as it could in integral nature. And the reason is that, just as nothing is willed unless previously known, so, according to the measure and mode of the natural judgment by which something is proposed as possible, or lovable, the will can break forth, by its natural powers, into a natural love of the natural object proposed to it. In the state of innocence, then, since nature was sound and integral, the observance of the natural law was proposed absolutely and simply, and at any time, not only as possible, but even as easy, and therefore the will too could easily elicit a perfect and obediential natural love of God, with an absolute affection and purpose of pleasing him in all things, without limitation of time and without any condition applied. Nor does it

matter, in this regard, that that soundness was not owed to nature, but was conferred upon it by a gratuitously given gift, since that gift was not the principle of this love, but only a condition without which it could not be, and one removing the obstacles to that love—which, once removed, the will can exercise that love by its own powers, and it matters little whether they were impeded through nature, or removed by miracle. But in corrupted nature, that long and constant observance of the commandments is proposed as impossible by the powers of nature constituted in such a state, and therefore the will cannot, by itself alone, with absolute and altogether efficacious affection, will and propose it, and therefore it cannot love God as absolutely and perfectly as it could before, but always includes, tacitly or expressly, the condition of loving and obeying as much as it can—as I have explained more fully in a similar matter, tome 4, *De Poenitentia*, disputation 3.

14. *An objection is raised. — The objection is rejected. — Man is not restored, by grace, to that integrity of nature which he enjoyed in the state of innocence.* — You will say: at least, nature once healed by habitual grace, the man now justified will be able to love God above all things with a natural love, as a natural end, so that grace is not the principle of such love, but a condition without which it could not be—about which we have already said that, although it is supernatural, it does not prevent the act afterward from being natural, and done by the powers of nature: because, once the obstacle is removed, the will operates by the powers of nature alone. It is answered that perhaps there would not be lacking those who would grant this, because in the just man the obstacle of sin and of conversion toward the creature ceases, which made this love of God difficult; and because such a love would already be in some way from grace and charity—yet this is not proved to me. Whence I respond by denying the inference. And the reason can be given, that, although the soul is healed by grace as to the death of guilt, man is nevertheless not restored to that integrity of nature which he had in the state of innocence: but the possibility of keeping the commandments by the powers of free will, in that state, did not arise from the mere lack of guilt, but in great part from the lack of the tinder of concupiscence and the due subordination of the powers; and therefore in this respect the reasoning of both states is not equal. And hence it follows too that, in the state of fallen nature, the just man cannot, for a long time, keep the whole natural law without a new and special help of grace. From which it further follows that he cannot love God, as the author of nature, above all things, with an act altogether absolute and efficacious, unless he relies on the help necessary to him for keeping the whole natural law. But just as that help is supernatural, so too a

certain hope of obtaining it, as far as concerns God's part, cannot be had except faith be presupposed, and with the help of grace. And by similar reasoning, the love, which must in some way rely on these principles, cannot be perfected without grace. What sort of grace this is, however, depends on another question, concerning the observance of the commandments, which is not to be treated here. And so, of this third opinion, this much now suffices.

CHAPTER XI
THE FOURTH OPINION IS SET FORTH, DENYING THAT MAN CAN PERFECT A MORAL GOOD BY THE POWERS OF NATURE

1. Other more recent authors, then, first of all grant that a man lacking sanctifying grace, and faith, and every supernatural illumination or inspiration, and his own calling to faith—using, in short, only natural reason and discourse, and doing what is in him—can perfect a morally good act, both as regards its object and as regards all its circumstances; and nevertheless they say that man never brings about such an act without some prevenient grace freely given, that is, some divine motion toward performing something good. This, they say, is a true grace through Christ—the grace the Councils speak of when they require grace for good action—and accordingly that it is a true and interior illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit: not indeed of the supernatural order, yet not owed to nature, and (in that sense) is above nature. Accordingly they say it is an effect of predestination, although grace alone is the true effect of predestination according to the mind of Augustine, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10, and consequently that this act cannot be the cause of the whole of predestination on the side of its effects.

2. Now to set out this opinion, three foundations are laid down, from which it is necessarily inferred. The first is that certain moral works obtain some grace from God through Christ, as is clear from the promises made in Scripture concerning almsgiving and other similar works alleged above. The second is that this holds distinctly true of all moral works; for those who affirm that by certain works of mercy and other moral works of acquired virtues no help of grace is obtained from God distinguish unwarrantedly among these works, since Scripture does not distinguish but speaks indifferently. The third is that the moral work which obtains some help of grace from God, or disposes toward it, is itself from a prior help of grace, as we proved in chapter seven. From these, then, it is evidently concluded that no moral work is done well without grace, by reasoning syllogistically thus: every moral work which of itself obtains the help

of grace is from the help of grace; but every good moral work, as far as it is of itself, obtains some help of grace from God; therefore every good moral work comes about through the help of grace. Or conversely: no good moral work can exist that is not such as to obtain some grace; but every work that obtains some grace must necessarily be from grace; therefore every good moral work must necessarily be from grace.

3. Furthermore, the more weighty theologians of antiquity are cited in favor of this opinion: St. Thomas, *1, 2*, question 109, article 2, where in the body of the article he says that human nature, neither in the state of integral nature nor in that of fallen nature, was able to perform any moral good without divine help, by which it is moved to act well. And, in the reply to the first objection, he says that every human deliberation must begin from some exterior principle that is above human minds, because before all deliberation there must necessarily precede some non-free thought of the intellect, which can come from no one but God. And they say that all his distinguished disciples understood St. Thomas in this way, especially Capreolus, *2, d. 29*, question 1, article 1, conclusion 4; Deza of Seville, *2, d. 28*, question 2, article 3, annotations 2 and 6; Francis Romaeus, in his book *On the Liberty and Necessity of Works*, truths 14 and 15.

4. But as for the mind of St. Thomas, it is evident that by divine help he understands nothing other than the general concursus of the first cause. For in the same way he had said in the first article that man needs divine help for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever, in the mode in which the action of any created agent depends on God both as the giver of form and as the actual mover —for so St. Thomas calls the general concursus of the first cause; hence he adds that man needs no new illumination except to know those truths that exceed natural knowledge. And in the second article, reply to the third, he clearly shows that he had spoken of the same divine help in both articles. Hence, in article 1, reply to the first, he says that every truth, by whomever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit, who infuses the natural light and moves [the mind] to understand and speak the truth. In the same sense, then, he said in the reply to the first that man's intellect is determined by the author of nature in the first thought that precedes proper deliberation—namely, through the very natural light implanted by God, together with the common motion and due concursus that flow from general providence, as he expressly says in that article. And so St. Thomas was understood by Cajetan, there, who well notes in the first article that, when it is asked whether a man can do this or that without grace, *this is to be understood of every grace that is above the whole natural order.* And in the second article,

treating this question at length, he rejects both that opinion and that interpretation of St. Thomas. The same may be seen in the more recent commentators on that passage—Medina, Zumel, Vázquez.

5. Next, Alexander of Hales is cited for the same opinion, *3 p.*, q. 69, member 1, article 2, otherwise q. 61, sole member, § *Consequenter*, where he requires grace for acting well. Some explain this of the collection of good works as a whole, not of individual acts—that is, that grace is necessary for acting well without defect and without admixture of sins against the law of nature. But it is clear from the title of the first article that he is not treating of the necessity of grace for acting well, but of the necessity of grace for salvation. And so, when in the body of that member, in its first part, he had set out the various meanings of grace, he concludes: *When, therefore, it is asked whether grace is necessary to attain salvation, the intention concerns sanctifying grace, by which man is made acceptable to God.* And he immediately states the conclusion: *This grace is necessary for meriting and for attaining eternal life.* But it is most certain that this grace is not necessary for individual moral works; he cannot, then, be speaking of these. But because for keeping, collectively, the whole law and the entire honesty of nature this sanctifying grace is necessary, therefore, as far as this principle goes, that doctrine could be understood of moral good taken collectively: for thus it is necessary for salvation, because *whoever offends in one point has become guilty in all.* In truth, however, the resolution is also true of individual acts of which Alexander speaks, namely meritorious acts, by which eternal life is acquired. And so, in the reply to the first objection, he expressly declares that man cannot perform *meritorious good* without God; and in the remaining replies he always speaks of an act by which something supernatural is intended, namely likeness to God, and so on. And in the same way, in the second part of that member, which begins, *Consequenter*, etc., the many testimonies he adduces plainly treat of the necessity of grace for supernatural acts. Although further on, in the resolution, at the words *Dicendum ergo*, he concludes generally: *free will does not advance toward good by avoiding evil and doing good except by the power of grace, and thus without grace it cannot do good and abandon evil.* Here he seems to be speaking collectively of the good necessary for salvation—not by reason of individual acts, but by reason of their totality—unless this too is to be explained of meritorious good unto eternal life.

6. Further, William of Auxerre is cited, book 2 of the *Summa*, treatise 11, chapter 1, question 4, because he says that without grace freely given we can do no good. But it must be noted that this term *gratia gratis data* is highly ambiguous, especially among the Scholastics. For it frequently signifies those

graces which are of themselves ordered primarily to the benefit of others, not to the sanctification of the recipient—of which Paul speaks, 1 Corinthians 12, when he says: *There are diversities of graces, etc.* Sometimes it signifies an actual motion of the Holy Spirit surpassing nature, by which souls are converted to himself—the sense in which Bonaventure speaks, *2, dist. 28*, article 2, question 1, and others there, and such grace is the same as exciting or assisting grace without habit. In yet another way, every divine influence or cooperation, however proportioned and suited to nature, is called *gratia gratis data*—because, although by a certain ordinary manner of speaking it is usually called owed to nature, nevertheless, simply speaking, it is given freely. And it is in this third way that William of Auxerre, in the passage cited, takes the term *gratia gratis data*, as he himself explained in resolving the argument, which concerned the necessity of divine cooperation, saying: *If grace is taken broadly for everything freely given by God, we readily grant that free will cannot do a work of the genus of good things without grace*—from which it appears that, in this way too, general influence is called grace.

7. This opinion is also attributed to Gerson in his treatise On the Spiritual Life, first lecture, which falls in Alphabet 61, letter G, as though he were saying that man cannot perform any work of moral virtue without some help of God's interiorly moving grace. The words of Gerson, however, are: For the conformity which a free act has with the first and highest honesty—that is, moral and praiseworthy goodness—the bare nature of the will cannot elicit, unless there be communicated to it a faculty and grace in producing it beyond that by which it regards only the substance of the act and not the other circumstances. In these words he seems to require a twofold grace for an act that is simply good: one for the substance of the act, another for observing the remaining circumstances, as is plainly clear from those words, unless another grace be communicated besides that one. But indeed, as for the substance of the act, it is clear that grace properly through Christ is not required; it is therefore a sign that this author too is speaking broadly there of grace as comprehending any influence of nature superadded, even one that belongs, in its own way, to general providence owed to nature. This was the meaning the same author had explained a little before the words quoted, saying: I do not wish, however, to deny that the soul can act well morally in its natural life. And below, concerning man created in pure nature and without the contagion of sin, he says: No one has ever doubted that he could, by the powers of free will, perform a moral good with all its circumstances. Otherwise (he says) man would be more wretched than all the animals, which can perform works suited to their nature with the help only of

general influence. Concerning fallen man, however, he reports that some have said he cannot attain to moral acts—an opinion he refutes, saying: They can do this by the powers they actually have. Hence he concludes by distinguishing regarding grace: For if it is taken (he says) for a gift implanted above or beyond the powers and industry of nature, then grace is not necessary for individual honest works; but if every gift freely conferred is called grace—just as life itself is a free gift—then grace can be said to be necessary.

8. Among Scholastic authors, then, few (as I think) will be found who hold this opinion in the manner explained. Yet Gregory and Capreolus, cited above as holding the first opinion, can be interpreted in its favor; for they never explain clearly enough what kind of grace they require. Likewise certain modern authors can be cited for this opinion who, while holding that God does not predetermine the human will to evil acts even materially, nevertheless hold that he predetermines it to all good moral acts, and that without this predetermination man can do nothing, even within the order of moral acts. For these can rightly call this predetermination grace, since it is given out of God's liberality and is not simply owed to nature. Indeed, many think that Gregory and Capreolus were speaking of this, which is by no means certain, as I noted in book 2, *On Aids*, chapters 3 and 6, where I also pointed out the modern authors who hold this opinion, and showed that the distinction they draw on this point between good and evil acts cannot be proved. What is to be held, simply speaking, about that predetermination with respect to any acts whatsoever has been treated at sufficient length in that entire work.

9. Now to understand the foundation of this opinion as explained in this last way, it must be known that this grace, said to be necessary for good acts, is posited only by way of a previous excitation suited to acting well, which is reckoned grace just insofar as it is given in a suitable manner so as to induce the will, with effect, to perform a good act—because, as to that congruity, it is not owed to nature, even if it does not elevate the will to physically elicit or perform anything that surpasses the natural active powers of the will. That this excitation is necessary, they do not think arises from the wounding of nature through original sin, nor from a disproportion or excess of the act over the natural powers of the will, but solely from the dependence the will has, in acting well, upon a prior thought of the intellect, and from the indifference which the human intellect has by its nature with respect to the first thought (I call "first" every thought that precedes the free use of the will)—for that thought is not in man's power, since he cannot freely apply himself to it, nor propose to the intellect by his own will anything that might excite it, because nothing is willed

unless it is first known. Such a thought, then, is necessarily natural, that is, not free, and therefore proceeding from an extrinsic principle. That this thought should be such as to excite rather to good than to evil, and that it should so excite to good as is suited to a will so disposed—whether through natural inclination, or through habit, or through a particular bodily temperament, or through any other fitting occasion—so that it efficaciously excites and leads it to action, is not placed in human choice, nor does it happen by chance with respect to divine providence: therefore such a thought, as it is from God and from his special providence, is grace, because it is not a gift owed to nature—otherwise it would be given to all according to the ordinary law. This grace, therefore, is necessary for every good work.

10. St. Thomas seems to use this line of reasoning, *1, 2*, question 109, article 2, in order to prove that man's free will cannot perform any good without the prior motion of God, its author. Augustine too proves this everywhere against the Pelagians, that the beginning of all good works is from God, because a holy thought cannot have its origin from us, but from God. And he uses for this purpose the testimony of Paul, 2 Corinthians 3: *We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.* And therefore he also thinks it was said by Christ: *Without me you can do nothing*—because without a holy thought we can do nothing good, and we cannot have a holy thought except from him. Likewise that text: *He who has begun a good work, continues it certainly through holy cooperation.* Augustine reasons in much this manner in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 2 and following; *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapters 7 and 10; the book *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 8; book 1, *To Simplicianus*, question 2, near the end; book 2, *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, chapter 8; and book 2, *On the Merits of Sinners*, chapter 17. Hence in letter 106 he lists, among the errors of Pelagius, that the grace of God is not given for individual acts. The same is found in letter 107. And Jerome, in his letter to Ctesiphon, column 4, says of the Pelagians: *Thus they posit the grace of God, that we do not strive and are not ruled by his help in each individual work*—a position he often condemns, saying: *We need God's help in individual works.* Prosper, in his works on this matter, imitates Augustine, especially in his replies to the objections of the Gauls, chapter 9. Likewise Fulgentius, in the book *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapter 12, and Peter the Deacon, also in the book *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapters six and following. Consonant also is that saying of Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 10: *The efforts of free will toward the good are vain if not assisted, and*

they are nothing if not stirred up. And so this opinion is shown to be proved at once by reason, Scripture, and the Fathers.

11. It can further be confirmed from the definitions of the Councils and the Popes. For the Council of Orange, chapter 9, says thus: It is a divine gift when we both think rightly and keep our feet from falsehood and injustice. For as often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work. Here it expresses the same teaching and the same foundation of it; and chapter 20: Many good things are present in man which man does not do; but no good thing does man do that God does not bring it about that man does it. And (which is most weighty) it adds in chapter 22: No one has anything of his own except falsehood and sin. And chapter 25, after gathering many testimonies of Scripture to this effect, concludes: We also confess and believe this, with salutary effect, that in every good work we do not begin [it ourselves]—and it has many other similar statements.

12. Consonant with these are the words found in the first letter of Pope Celestine to the bishops of Gaul, expressing the mind and judgment of the Apostolic See, where in chapter eight we read: That all the zeal, all the works, and all the merits of the saints are to be referred to the glory and praise of God, because no one pleases him from any other source than what he himself has given. And in confirmation of this truth are adduced the words of Pope Zosimus in his letter to the bishops of the whole world: We, indeed, at God's prompting (for all good things are to be referred to their Author, from whom they spring) have referred all matters to the conscience of our brothers and fellow bishops. This judgment the bishops of Africa especially praise and commend, as is reported in the same place: Therefore (they say) because the will is prepared by the Lord, and so that they may do some good, he himself, by paternal inspirations, touches the hearts of the faithful. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God, so that we may neither feel our own free choice to be lacking, nor doubt that, in every good motion of the human will, his help avails more; and, chapter 9, it is immediately added: That God so works in the hearts of men and in free will itself, that holy thought, pious counsel, and every motion of good will is from God; because through him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing; and the same doctrine is found in the letters of Innocent and Leo on this matter. Finally, the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter sixteen: The virtue of Christ (it says) always precedes, accompanies, and follows all our good works.

13. *This opinion is established by reasons.* — Besides all this, this opinion can be confirmed by other reasons drawn from the same definitions of the

Fathers and Councils. The first is that Augustine everywhere gathers the necessity of grace from the usefulness and efficacy of prayer, because no one asks of another what he has in his own power. This manner of arguing was imitated by the Council of Orange and other Fathers. But we must pray that God help us in each individual work, so that we may do them honestly; therefore grace is necessary for each one. Second, because the same Councils teach that we cannot overcome any temptation without God's grace: therefore *a fortiori* we cannot do any good without divine grace, for it is more to do good than to avoid evil—especially since there is no good work that cannot be hindered by the temptation and industry of the demon: therefore, in order that it not be hindered, and so that it may be done, grace is necessary. Third, the Saints and Councils teach that the beginning of grace, or of predestination, is not from free will, as was seen against the Semipelagians. But if man could, by free will alone, perform some good moral work, he could subsequently, by free will alone, begin his salvation by acting well, once he reached the use of reason. Therefore it could not be avoided that, in such a man, the beginning of grace would be from free will. The consequence is proved, both because every honest good pleases God and is of itself worthy of some favor and reward from him, and also because that man would do what lies in his power; therefore at least by congruous providence God would also promote his effort. And finally, because that good act could be one of some love toward God, through his natural thought, or a desire of living honestly and fleeing evil, with some petition made to the author of nature—how, then, can some congruity be denied to such acts, that they be the beginning of salvation? If, then, these are in free will alone, grace is subordinated to free will.

CHAPTER XII
THE TRUE OPINION—NAMELY, THAT MAN CAN BY REASON AND FREE WILL PERFORM SOME MORALLY GOOD WORK HONESTLY—IS PROVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES

1. But indeed the common and received opinion is that man, even in the state of fallen nature and existing habitually in sin or unbelief, can perform some good moral work of acquired virtue, with the due circumstances, without true and proper help of grace. For although he cannot do these good things for a long time without falling, nevertheless he can ordinarily do one or another. This is the clear opinion of St. Thomas, *1, 2*, question 109, article 2, which (as I said above) Cajetan understood thus, and after him the remaining writers. St.

Thomas openly teaches the same, *2, 2*, question 10, article 4, where, treating the question whether all the works of unbelievers are sins, he says: *It is manifest that unbelievers cannot perform good works that are from grace—that is, meritorious works—yet good works, for which the good of nature suffices, they can perform in some manner.* Now that word "in some manner" he understands as meaning without any moral malice, but in a natural mode, which is not sufficient for merit. This is the evident sense, for he then infers that not all the works of unbelievers are sins—an inference he would not rightly draw unless he understood that unbelievers can perform those works well, morally, by the good of nature; for if they were not done well, they would already be sins. This is especially so in the view of this same holy doctor, who does not acknowledge any indifferent work in the individual. And therefore he immediately declares that an unbeliever can act with a good end and good intention, not acting out of unbelief as such, but out of pure and right natural reason, as he declares in the reply to the second objection. Hence among the disciples of St. Thomas this is the common and undoubted opinion.

2. Bonaventure too, *d. 28*, plainly follows this view. For although he seems to require grace, he nevertheless speaks at length in the sense explained above, as is clear from article 1, q. 2, where he gives the example of the precept of honoring parents, which he says can be fulfilled as to its substance through natural piety and devotion, and this he calls *gratia gratis data*. Much the same in article 2, q. 1; and in q. 2 he says that man can overcome some temptation, though not all, without any grace; and in q. 3, concerning man in pure nature, he says he can perform some good moral work without any grace—where he seems to take grace more strictly, for a supernatural gift or help. But at the end of the question he expressly explains that, if it is said anywhere that man cannot perform some good moral work without grace, under "grace" must be included the common influence which is freely given by God. Indeed, what is more serious, he so explains those words of John 15: *Without me you can do nothing.* This I do not approve, but I adduce it nonetheless, since it declares the opinion of that author. For this same view Alexander of Hales is also usually cited, *3 p.*, question 61, but he never declares his mind clearly enough, although he favors this side rather than the opposite in members 1 and 7. Altisiodorensis and John Gerson, in the places cited above, taught it more clearly. And still more expressly —indeed inclining to the opposite extreme—Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, and those who follow them, as was seen above. This opinion is also much approved among modern writers, especially against the heretics of this age, who say that free will in fallen nature is a thing of name only, and so a slave of sin that

without grace it can do nothing else—as may be seen in Driedo, *On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race*, treatise 4, chapter 2, part 2; Ruard, article 7, against Luther; Fisher (Roffensis), article 36; Bellarmine, book 5, *On Grace and Free Will*, chapters 2 and 3.

3. *The exposition of Augustine.—This exposition is not accepted.* — This opinion is commonly proved by these authors from that text of Paul to the Romans, 2: *The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things that are of the law.* This passage is usually understood by Augustine of Gentiles already illumined by the faith of Christ, who are said to do by nature the things that are of the law—not because they do them without grace, but because, their nature already healed through grace, they naturally do the things that belong to the natural law, that is, they perform what is consonant with nature, though not without the help of grace. This is more or less Augustine's view in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapters 26 and 27, which Fulgentius follows, *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapter 16, and St. Thomas, *1, 2*, question 106, article 4, reply to the first objection. But not even Augustine himself adheres entirely to that exposition, for he immediately adds another, which we shall presently see; nor does it indeed seem consonant with the context, nor with the words. First, because Paul is not speaking of Gentiles already illumined by Christ's Gospel, but absolutely and according to themselves, as they were before Christ's coming, and as they were to be, as it were, the matter around which the evangelical preaching, or the soil in which the word of the Gospel was to be sown. As he speaks also of the Jews, not as already believing in Christ, but as professing their own law. For in this way he speaks of both: *Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that works evil, of the Jew first and of the Greek*, that is, of the Gentile (for these two words are equivalent there in Paul, as Augustine himself well notes). And indeed, "Gentile" is the same as "living in uncircumcision," without the yoke of the written law. And in this way Paul had said, in the first chapter to the Romans: *I have often proposed to come to you, that I might have some fruit among you also, even as among other Gentiles*—where he calls "Gentiles" all those living in uncircumcision, among whom he was bearing fruit.

4. Indeed, in Sacred Scripture, that word "Gentiles" is hardly ever found taken for Christians, but rather for uncircumcised idolaters, 1 Corinthians 10: *The things which the Gentiles sacrifice.* And chapter 12: *When you were Gentiles, you went to dumb idols, etc.* They are more expressly distinguished from Christians, together with Jews, in 1 Corinthians 1: *To the Jews indeed a stumbling block, and to the Gentiles foolishness; but to them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.* The names "Gentiles"

and "Jews," therefore, when used absolutely by Paul, are not names of men already called to the faith—that is, of Christians—but of two peoples concerning whom he intends to teach, in that Epistle to the Romans, that they can be indifferently justified through the living faith of Christ. This is confirmed by the words the Apostle adds next, in that same second chapter to the Romans: *Glory, and honor, and peace to every one that works good, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek: for there is no respect of persons with God.* He speaks, then, of Jews and Greeks according to themselves, insofar as all can be called to the faith, and it can profit all of them, if they accept it. When, then, he compares Gentiles and Jews in their manner of sinning, with or without the law, he is not treating of Christian Gentiles or Christian Jews, but of them according to themselves and apart from the faith of Christ: therefore he speaks in the same way of the Gentiles when he says: *The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things that are of the law*—both because he uses that word univocally, and also because he brings this in to show that it is not without cause that those sins which he had recounted in the first chapter are imputed to the Gentiles as fault, since they had the law naturally implanted in them.

5. *Objection.* — But someone may say: granted that Paul is not speaking of Gentiles converted to the faith of Christ, but as they were in the state of the law of nature; nevertheless, when he attributes to them that they observe the law, he is not speaking of unbelievers and idolaters, but of believers, who could be just in that state. For the name "Gentiles" is indifferent as between the just and sinners; and although they were more frequently wicked and idolatrous, and hence such evil works are attributed to them, nonetheless some could be just and observers of the natural law. Of these, then, Paul seems to be speaking in that passage, since of them he says that *the doers of the law shall be justified*, and that to them also was *glory and peace for those who work good.* Hence it is necessary that he be speaking of the law of nature not as dictated by the natural light of the intellect alone, but as it was also dictated in that state by the light of faith, since it could not otherwise suffice to obtain glory and peace, or justice. When, therefore, Paul says that such Gentiles *naturally do the things that are of the law*, he does not say "naturally" so as to exclude the spirit of faith or the help of grace, but so as to exclude the written law—in the way that state is called the state of the law of nature, not because it was of nature alone, without grace and faith, but because it had no other precepts than those nature dictated: nature, I say, not bare, but ordered to God through grace; and thus that law was naturally kept—that is, with nature as guide, in the same way, not pure, but affected by the light of faith.

6. *The objection is rejected.* — But although this doctrine is true in itself, I do not think it was intended by Paul in that passage. First, because that word "naturally," strictly taken, seems to exclude powers surpassing nature. For what Catholic would dare say that Job and other just men of that time, uncircumcised, believed naturally and loved God above all things naturally? Especially since, by common usage and according to common Scriptural phrasing, that is said to happen "naturally" which happens from the very inclination and efficacy of nature. Second, because to treat of believing Gentiles, acting from faith, did not belong to Paul's intention in this passage. For he is rather considering there both Gentiles and Jews as acting by their own powers, without the assistance of faith and grace, so as to show them to be insufficient and most weak for living honestly and holily—which, in the first chapter, he demonstrates from the multitude and bitterness of vices in which the Gentiles were engaged, and, in the second chapter, from similar conduct among the Jews. Yet so that he might not seem to accuse the Gentiles unjustly, since they had no law, he adds concerning them that they had their own mode of natural law, which they sometimes kept naturally. He speaks of them, then, not considering faith or grace in them, but only nature. Hence, although it is true that he speaks indifferently of the Gentiles, whether just or wicked, whether believers or unbelievers, he does not, however, consider in those who were believers the power of faith or grace, but only that of natural light and reason. All the more so because those Gentiles who were believers, insofar as they were led by the spirit of faith, belonged not so much to the law of nature as to the law of grace, as the Fathers teach, and as we taught in the treatise on laws.

7. *The true exposition of the Pauline passage is Augustine's.* — The true sense of Paul's words, then, is the one which Augustine, in the chapter cited, chapter 28, sets forth in the second place, saying: *Among the Gentiles too, even idolaters, certain deeds have been found, or are read of, or heard of, which we cannot only not blame, but indeed deservedly praise. And although, if one examines the end for which they were done, scarcely will any be found among them worthy of praise. Nevertheless* (he says) *the image of God in the human soul has not been so worn away by the stain of earthly affections that no extreme outlines, as it were, remain in it, whence it can rightly be said that, even in the very impiety of his life, a man does some things of the law, or has some understanding of it, etc.*—and accordingly that he can naturally do the things that are of the law as regards certain simply honest moral works, *because that which was expressed there by the image of God, when they were created, has not been entirely wiped out.* It is true, however, that this same Augustine, book 4, *Against Julian*, chapter

3, while admitting this very interpretation, adds that when Gentiles naturally do the things that are of the law, if they act without faith, they do not do well, because they do not act for a good end. But surely, although this may perhaps not happen more frequently, it is not necessary in each work, because infused faith is not necessary for acting from an honest end; for it suffices to will the external work itself for the sake of its honesty and its conformity with right reason, without entertaining any depraved intention—which is within man's power. Indeed, even with regard to God as the end of nature, some good intention can be naturally conceived, of his true adoration and worship, or something similar, intended in a manner consonant with natural reason. Finally, one cannot simply be said to fulfill the natural law, as Paul says, if in the very work by which he seems to fulfill it he violates that same law. Man, then, according to Paul's opinion, can "naturally"—that is, without grace—do some good that is simply consonant with the law of nature. This exposition was handed down there by Origen, Chrysostom, and all the Greeks, Jerome, and St. Thomas in the same place, where also Cajetan and Soto. The same is indicated by Jerome, letter 151, to Algasia, q. 8, and Cyprian, book 3, to Quirinus, chapter 99.

8. *Objection.* — You will say, then, that what Paul says in the same place—*Glory, honor, and peace to every one that works good*—is also understood of one who naturally keeps the law of nature. Likewise what he says, *the doers of the law shall be justified*, is true also of Gentiles who naturally keep the law of nature: but this is against that other testimony of the same Paul: *If justice be by the law, then Christ died in vain.* For, as Augustine argues, letter 196: *If justice be by nature, then Christ died in vain.*

9. *The first part of the objection is explained.* — As to the former testimony, that its proper sense may be understood, the words immediately preceding must be considered, in which Paul speaks in a far different manner, and requires such a mode of good action for the merit of eternal life that it is sufficiently clear it cannot be fulfilled without grace. For thus he says: *To them indeed, who according to patience in good works seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.* Here, in the first place, he requires not just any good work, but altogether *patience in good work.* In this expression I think two things are included: one is perseverance in acting well, which is not exercised without great patience and endurance, according to that text of Luke 8: *Hearing the word, they keep it, and bring forth fruit in patience.* The other is integrity (so to speak) in acting well, with respect to the whole collection of precepts and their observance. For since one who offends in one point becomes guilty of all, it

cannot be said that he seeks glory according to patience in good works who keeps one or another precept now and then, but only one who most patiently devotes himself to the observance of them all—nor indeed can this be done without great patience and constancy. And perhaps for this reason Paul said: *Patience is necessary for you, that, doing the will of God, you may receive the promise* (Hebrews 10). Now it is established that these two things cannot be furnished without grace. Besides these, moreover, Paul adjoins a plainly supernatural intention in acting well, namely, *seeking glory*—indeed with God—and true and stable honor, and incorruption either of this life, which consists in purity of morals (and 1 Peter 3 calls it *the incorruptibility of the spirit*, just as conversely the foulness of life is called corruption, Genesis 6), or of that other life which Christ taught and promised, as the same Paul says, 2 Timothy 1. When, then, he immediately adds: *Glory, honor, and peace to every one that works good*, he understands this in the manner he had declared; hence he is not speaking of one who works good by the powers of nature alone, but through faith and grace, without which no one has the power to act well in this way.

10. It is otherwise, however, with those words which he adds below, and which we are now treating: *The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things that are of the law*—both because these are not joined to the preceding words, but are said for a far different purpose, and also because they are not similar; for in these there is nothing about patience or perseverance in observing the law, nor about the intention of seeking glory, as is said in the former. Finally, because in these he is speaking only of Gentiles—there, either of Jews already illumined by faith, or generally of all who act well in such a manner, a manner that plainly requires grace. Hence, in the former passage, the word "naturally" is not added, which is placed in these words.

11. *The other part of the objection is refuted.* — As to the other part of the objection, taken from those words, *For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified*, it must be considered that, although other words we are treating follow immediately after these—*For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things that are of the law*—nevertheless these words do not give the reason for the prior statement, *the doers of the law shall be justified*; rather, they are adduced only to remove a tacit objection, and to show that the Gentiles were not without a law, although they did not receive it externally in writing—as is clear from the following words, *who, having not such a law, are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts.* When, then, Paul says that *the doer of the law is justified*, he speaks of one who does the whole law entirely and fully, for the word itself,

taken absolutely and simply, "doer of the law," indicates this. For who would call a man an observer of the law who sometimes acts according to it, but frequently violates it? And the matter itself bears out this sense, because whoever offends in one point becomes guilty of all, and therefore no one can be justified unless he is an observer of the whole law. It is established, however, that no one can be in this way a doer of the law by the powers of nature alone, but needs faith and the grace of God. But when below Paul says that Gentiles naturally do the things that are of the law, he speaks indefinitely, and does not say they do all things, nor does he say they are justified through those works, but only adduces a sign of the natural law implanted in their hearts, for which it suffices that in one or another act they sometimes show forth their light and the good propensity of nature.

12. *The matter is pressed further.—It is responded.* — You will say: then, in the same context, Paul speaks ambiguously of the Gentiles, now of unbelievers, now of believers, now of those acting by the powers of nature, now of those acting by faith and grace—which seems inappropriate, since in this way the whole statement is rendered uncertain. I answer that Paul does indeed speak indifferently of the Gentiles, even those existing before Christ's coming, whether they had knowledge of the faith or not, as he is accustomed to speak of them under the name "uncircumcision." And of them he affirms that they were before God capable of justice, merit, and eternal reward, no less than the Jews, if any kept the precepts in the way that was required. But what this manner was, and by what powers it could come about, he does not explain in that chapter, but in the following ones; for there he was treating only of the difference between Jews and Gentiles in the benefit of the law written and received from God, and was showing only that this benefit was neither sufficient of itself for justice nor necessary for it—because without it the Gentiles could be justified, and with it many of the Jews were condemned, either because they did not keep the law itself, or because they thought that works of the law performed of themselves and without the spirit of faith were sufficient for true justice. And so there is no ambiguity in the use of these words, because among the Gentiles comprehended under that general name there could be some acting through faith, others through natural light alone; and the same persons, having faith, could now act from it, now merely naturally, from the dictate of reason—as also happens nowadays among the Christian faithful. Hence Paul sometimes admonishes them to attend to what nature itself teaches them, 1 Corinthians, chapter 11: *Does not nature itself teach you?* And similarly among the Jews, who gloried in the law, there could be some who observed it from the spirit of faith, others

mere professors, either through human presumption or through error, as the Jews indeed are now. Therefore, without any equivocation of words, Paul could rightly, when he said, *the doers of the law are justified*, understand this of those who keep the law with the true spirit of faith—or of those who observe the whole law entirely and patiently, which comes to the same thing, since without the spirit of faith the whole law cannot be kept entirely; and nevertheless, when he said, *The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things that are of the law*, understand this of those who, by the powers and light of nature alone, do something consonant with the natural law, whether or not some have faith. And this is in truth the proper sense of that passage.

13. Further confirmation of this common opinion can be drawn from another passage of the same Paul, in the same Epistle to the Romans, chapter 1, where he teaches that the Gentiles could, by natural way and reason, have knowledge of the true God, and were very culpable for not using it well to glorify and love God. This is proved from these words: Who hold the truth of God in injustice; because that which is known of God is manifest in them, for God hath manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable: because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God, or given thanks, etc. From these words we understand, first, that in those men whom he reproves (for they are the ancient Gentiles) there was, on that head—that is, on the part of the intellect—a truth of God sufficient for natural justice at least, that is, for the exercise of moral goodness and honesty. Otherwise Paul could not say of those Gentiles, who hold the truth of God in injustice, if either they did not attain the truth, or it were not sufficient for honest action. Second, we understand that this truth was indeed manifested to those Gentiles by God, but not through faith or supernatural revelation, but through the natural teaching of creatures, as that causal clause evidently proves: For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world, etc. Third, we understand that this knowledge was sufficient for glorifying God and giving him thanks, as the words plainly prove: so that they are inexcusable; for if the knowledge were not sufficient, they could rightly have been excused.

14. *The common opinion is strengthened by reason.* — From this an argument is concluded: Because, without grace, by the mere course of nature, whatever is necessary on the part of knowledge for acting well according to some natural honesty can be had; but, this knowledge being given, grace is not also necessary on the part of the will; therefore grace is not simply necessary for

individual good moral acts of acquired virtues. The major premise is taken as established from what was said in chapter ten, because that act of which we are speaking does not exceed the physical powers of the will, and therefore for eliciting it does not need another principle in itself. This even the doctors with whom we are disputing admit, as is clear from the account of their opinion, and will become more evident from what follows. The minor is expressly stated by Paul in the words quoted; for he resorts precisely to creatures and the effects of God to declare that this knowledge was through nature without grace, as the Fathers understood, whom Bellarmine learnedly gathers, book four, *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter two, and book five, chapter two.

15. And this truth agrees very well with another testimony of the same Paul, Acts 14, where, having said of God: *Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways*, he adds: *And indeed he left not himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains, etc.* This testimony we shall examine more fully in the following chapter. For now we only note that the natural testimony of creatures is reckoned by Paul as sufficient to excite man in some way to seek God and perform something good. Of this testimony of God he again adds, chapter 17: *That they should seek God, if haply they may feel after him, or find him, although he be not far from every one of us, etc.* In these passages Chrysostom and other Fathers interpret these texts of natural knowledge and the good action conformed to it.

16. Finally, those words of Christ, Matthew, chapter five, can rightly be adduced in confirmation of this truth: *If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? Do not even the publicans do this? And if you salute your brethren only, what do you more?* By these words Christ signified that such love and beneficence is indeed good and can come about through natural reason and inclination, although it is not worthy of reward, because it is neither from faith nor from grace, as St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and other commentators indicate there. Among whom Maldonatus rightly said that Christ did not deny that those who love their friends will have reward, since loving friends belongs to charity, but denied that they would have reward if, like the publicans, they do this alone —that is, if they do it not for God's sake but either out of natural propensity toward friends or for their own utility—because God rewards not nature but grace. This too St. Thomas indicates, *2, 2*, question 27, article 7, reply to the first objection.

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIII
THE SAME OPINION IS CONFIRMED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCILS

1. *A twofold manner of arguing from authority is assigned.* — Third, this opinion can be commended by the authority and definitions of the Church. Here a twofold manner of arguing from authority must be distinguished. One is what is called arguing from negative authority; the other is direct demonstration. In this chapter we shall use more the former manner of arguing than the latter, although the testimonies of the Councils can also be brought forward in this latter way. For, in the first place, the Councils nowhere teach absolutely that for any and every good moral work special help of grace is necessary. Next, if in one or another place they speak indistinctly, in others they expressly declare which good works are to be understood when they speak indefinitely. Hence, that the argument may be more pressing, it can be called not only an argument from negative authority but also from the contrary sense, or from the principle that an exception confirms the rule for the contrary case—that is, that a prohibition or condemnation made with a limitation indicates that the proposition taken without limitation is not included, but is rather exempted from that condemnation.

2. Thus, then, all the passages of the Councils can be adduced to prove this opinion in which that phrase "as is fitting" or some equivalent is added. As in the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 3, which says: *If anyone shall say that, without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as is fitting, in order that the grace of justification may be conferred on him, let him be anathema.* For it was not without cause that this phrase "as is fitting" was added; for whatever is signified by it as necessary on the part of the act, so that it may be a sufficient disposition for obtaining the grace of justification—and whether justification there refers only to the infusion of habitual justice, or to the whole sequence of justification from its beginning up to the infusion of justice—it is certain the Council wished to preserve from that condemnation those who said that man can believe or love without the aids of grace, though not so "as is fitting" that he obtain the grace of justification. Indeed, it seems to presuppose that man can do this; otherwise that limitation and restriction would not have been necessary. Someone will say that man can indeed believe or love without the help of grace, in a manner other than what is

required for justice, yet that, by that very fact that the act is not "as is fitting," it is evil and sinful, if it is human and moral. But this cannot be said, because that circumstance, "as is fitting," whatever it ultimately is, is not intrinsically necessary for the moral honesty of the act, as is known of itself: therefore neither does its absence, of itself and intrinsically, render the act evil.

3. Next, on this point I weigh the first canon of the same session: *If anyone shall say that man can be justified before God by his own works, which are done either through the powers of human nature or through the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.* In these words the Council presupposes that man can have certain works through the powers of human nature, or through the teaching of the law—that is, alone, and without the help of grace, as Pelagius said. For if to the teaching of the law there is added the help of grace, there is no doubt that man can be justified through such works. But those works which the Council presupposes can be done by the powers of nature or the teaching of the law are not immediately evil, but can be good, according to the mind and intention of the same Council. For who ever said that man can be justified by evil works of free will? The Council, in that canon, condemns Pelagius, who affirmed this of good works done through the powers of free will or the teaching of the law—not because he said such works could be done, but because he said those works sufficed for justification; this it either presupposes or seems to allow, but condemns him on the point that he said such works sufficed for justification.

4. And this is confirmed by what the same Council had explained in chapter eight, that man is said to be justified gratis *because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merit the very grace of justification.* Here it does not judge that all those works are evil, even if done without faith or grace, but only that they are not merits of justification. And therefore in canon seven it condemns those who say: *That the works which are done before justification, for whatever reason they are done, are truly sins.* This canon more evidently concludes—if we suppose (as the authors with whom we are disputing suppose) that in this doctrine and the canons of the Council of Trent the name "justification" is understood to mean the whole change of man, from the first and most remote disposition, which begins from the first good work done out of grace, up to the infusion of justice: therefore it is necessary, on this supposition, that they admit that before the whole of that justification a good work can be given; because Trent defines that not all such works are sins, and, in the individual, between sin and good work there is no middle ground: therefore such a good work is not always done from grace, for if it is done from

grace, it does not precede justification, taken in that sense, but begins it, as these same authors profess.

5. To the same kind of argument belongs canon six of the Council of Orange: *If anyone shall confess that not by the gift of grace, but by God's, the willing and believing, etc., but does not confess that to believe, to will, or to be able to do all these things as is fitting comes about by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit in us, etc.* And it has much the same in canon twenty-five, similarly adding that phrase "as is fitting," which, when added, openly suggests that a good work can be done in another, lower mode—not indeed evil, but insufficient for the business of salvation. For so I think that phrase "as is fitting" is to be interpreted in this place—namely, "as is fitting for the business of salvation," whether that be for conferring or meriting salvation, or for beginning it through whatever disposition: therefore, if a work is not in this manner "as is fitting," although it be good, it could come about without prior inspiration of the Holy Spirit—or at least, by the Council's intention, it is not repugnant that it come about so. In a similar manner does canon seven of the same Council, which says: *If anyone, through the vigor of nature, [thinks he can do] some good that pertains to salvation, eternal life, etc.* Here is the explanation of the phrase "as is fitting," added with the same caution and limitation, lest that definition be understood absolutely of any and every good work. Hence, when there it alleges Christ's words, *Without me you can do nothing*, it tacitly explains this of a work pertaining to the salvation of eternal life. And similarly it explains Paul's word: *We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, etc.*

6. Now the exposition of both passages, and this whole limitation or determination of the good work from which we argue, is taken from the doctrine of Augustine. For he, in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 29, explains Christ's words, *without me you can do nothing*, of the works of justice. And in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 8, he explains it of the works *by which eternal life is rendered.* And in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 2: *What pertains* (he says) *to religion and piety, of which the Apostle was speaking, etc.*; and in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 13: *As regards the way of piety and the true worship of God, we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves.* Hence in letter 106, near the beginning, he keeps the same manner of speaking, saying: *So that unless grace assist, we can have nothing of piety or justice, either in deed or in will*; and in the book *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 4, he says that care must be taken lest, in defending free will, *no place be left for the help and grace of God in a pious life and good conduct, to which eternal reward is owed.* This, however, Augustine so exaggerates in other

places that he sometimes signifies that without grace and charity no good work can be done, as in the same book *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 18, he says: *Whatever a man thinks himself to do well, if it is done without charity, is in no way done well.* These and similar words are to be understood of good works by which eternal life is rendered, as he had said in chapter eight. Hence here "to act well" is the same as "to act meritoriously." And in the same way Augustine seems to be explained, book *On the Grace of Christ*, chapter 26, where he says: *But what good would we do, unless we loved?*—good, namely, meritorious good; for a little earlier he had said: *What good merits could we then have, when we did not love God?* Hence after those earlier words he adds: *Although the commandment of God seems sometimes to be done by those who do not love but fear, nevertheless, where there is no love, no good is imputed*—to merit, that is. And so it seems clear from these passages that by "good work" Augustine understands a work meritorious in some way.

7. *Some difficult words of Augustine are explained.* — But in this last passage Augustine adds words that render the matter obscure: *Nor is it rightly called a good work* (namely, a work done without charity) *because everything that is not of faith is sin: and faith works through love.* He thus signifies that every work that is not from faith working through charity is sin. But these words must be piously explained by all Catholics, unless one wishes to attribute two condemned errors to Augustine—namely, that every work of sinners, whether believers or unbelievers, is sin. He says, then, that it is "not rightly called a good work," not because it is not one, but because it does not have the condition befitting a Christian man; or surely because such a work is not regularly good—not because it cannot be, but because man is so frail that, if he either lacks faith or does not act from it, he is wont to act with some perverse intention, or one not conformed to faith—and in this sense Augustine's proof is to be taken: *because everything that is not of faith is sin*, that is, that which is repugnant or alien to the dictate of faith, such as ordinarily tends to be the work of an unbeliever or a sinner. Though that Pauline passage may have another sense, perhaps truer, as I said above. That Augustine intended nothing else, even in that passage, is clear, because after those words he again adds: *Let him who wishes to confess truly so confess the grace of God, by which the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, that he doubt not at all that no good pertaining to piety and true justice can be done without it*—where he applies the same limitation and restriction.

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XIV
THE SAME OPINION IS PROVED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE FATHERS

1. *A twofold manner of arguing, directly demonstrative or only indirect. —* Here too the twofold manner of arguing noted above can be distinguished, namely, directly demonstrative, or only indirect. Of this latter manner we have already reported something from Augustine. Here we can add many other expressions of Augustine which are to be taken in this sense. For, question 2, *To Simplicianus*, near the beginning, he says: *Let no one think that he has received grace because he has acted well, but that he cannot act well unless, through faith, he has received grace. Now man begins to receive grace from the moment he begins to believe God, moved to faith either by internal or external admonition.* Here he does not deny that, before receiving grace, man can do something morally good, but he denies that he can act well in such a way as to merit grace. And of this manner of acting rightly he well says that no one can act well unless, through faith, he has received grace. "To receive grace" in this passage is not understood of reception through the infusion of habitual sanctifying grace, since it is clear from Augustine's teaching that this reception of grace is not necessary for every merit of some grace; and because he immediately says that man begins to receive grace when he begins to believe God, which often occurs before sanctifying grace. Nor is "to receive grace" merely to accept a calling, or the touch of prevenient grace, because it can happen that after that touch or calling, someone does not begin to believe God. Therefore "to receive grace" is to accept the calling, or excitation, of grace, which man begins to do when he begins to believe God. And so it is rightly said that man cannot act well—that is, meritoriously—until, through faith, he has received grace. And so he himself declares a little further on, saying: *No one believes who is not called. Now the merciful God calls, granting this to no merits, even merits of faith, because the merits of faith follow the calling rather than precede it; unless, then, the mercy of God precede by calling, no one can believe, so that from this he may begin to be justified and may receive the faculty of acting well and meritoriously*—or as is required for eternal life, for this faculty man receives through the calling. And in the same sense he says further on: *Upon whom God will be merciful, so as to call him, he will have mercy that he may believe, and upon whomever he has been merciful, that he may believe, he will bestow mercy, that is, will make him*

merciful, so that he may also act well. In the very same sense, that is, so that he may perform works of mercy as is required in relation to eternal life. And therefore he infers that no one can boast that he has earned God's favor through works of mercy, because the works of mercy themselves are from that grace, namely, the grace which can earn something with God.

2. In the same sense is to be taken what, in letter 143, near the end, the same Augustine says, speaking of faith which works through love: *Without which, and before which, no man's good works at all are to be reckoned, since everything that is not of faith is sin.* In these words, I confess (as in the preceding ones) that the meaning is easy, but the reasoning difficult. For it is true, in the sense explained, that such works are not to be reckoned good in the Christian forum (so to speak), that is, with that goodness which conduces to eternal life. But when he immediately adds, *because that which is not of faith is sin*, he seems to fall into the opposite extreme; for between sin and a work of piety there is a middle ground, namely a good moral work consonant with nature; but Augustine does not seem to recognize this middle ground, for from one extreme he proves the other. This reasoning, however, must by all either not be admitted, or be moderated and piously explained, either in the way said a little before, or certainly by saying that such a work is called sin improperly, because it is joined to sin and exists in a state of sin and is alien to grace, or because it is not an act of virtue simply speaking, and is thus sin in the broadest sense. Thus the same Augustine, book 19, *On the City of God*, chapter 25, says that virtues, even if sought for their own sake, if not referred to God, are presumptuous and proud, and accordingly, *they are to be judged not virtues, but vices.* And, book 4, *Against Julian*, chapter 13, he says that without faith there is no true virtue—which, explaining, he says: *We are rightly admonished so to love wisdom that we may most eagerly desire to treasure it for ourselves, and that it may be acquired more and more for us, and not at all diminished, by enduring hardships and curbing our desires, etc.* When we do this, *therefore* we have true virtue, because the thing for which we act is true—that is, this is consonant with our nature for salvation and true happiness. Hence he further infers: If, then, the virtues are of no use to man for attaining true beatitude, they are in no way true virtues. Which he pursues at length there.

3. But sometimes he hints that they are not true virtues because they are sins by reason of the intention of an evil end, or the omission of a due end. But this must be understood regularly, not always, because it is not absolutely necessary, as I shall show below. And so the same Augustine judged of the virtues of the Romans, book 1, *On the City of God*, chapter fifteen and following.

Sometimes too he indicates that no work is "good yet barren" (as Julian put it), that is, not apt for merit. But this must be understood of a complete and integral good, which constitutes the agent simply good, for so he says: *It is impossible for us to be barrenly good, but we are not good, whatever we are barrenly.* And below: *In no way, then, are men barrenly good; but those who are not good can be either less or more evil.* And so a work can be barren good; but a good man cannot be barren, because no one without faith and grace can be simply good; but if a man has faith and grace, he cannot fail to act fruitfully, if indeed, being such, he acts —which, morally speaking, he cannot always fail to do. Finally, for this reason, with respect to persons, Augustine retracts, book 1, *Retractations*, chapter 3, what he had said in the books *On Order*, that *the philosophers, not endowed with true piety, shone with the light of virtue.* And in the book *On Continence*, at the end, he said: *Continence without faith is not true continence, since it is sin.* Augustine was saying this not because no honest work could be found in such men, but because it was rare, and so could not generate true and absolute virtue, or because it was so tainted with sins and depraved intentions that it could hardly be found pure.

4. *A notable passage.* — This will be established more evidently by approaching another manner of proving this truth directly from the Fathers, who clearly distinguish two kinds of good work, one consonant only with nature, the other with faith; in which connection there is a notable passage in Augustine, book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapters 27 and 28. There, as I said above, he admits that those words of Paul—*The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things that are of the law*—can be understood of Gentiles who, by the powers of nature alone, in the very impiety of their life, do something good, dictated by natural reason. For of them (he says) we read, or know, or have heard certain deeds which, according to the rule of justice, we cannot only not blame, but indeed rightly and deservedly praise. He declares, however, that he is speaking of good works not only as regards the object, but also as regards all the circumstances. For he adds: Although, if one examines the end for which they are done, scarcely will any be found worthy of the praise or defense owed to justice. When he says "scarcely," he admits that it sometimes happens, and tacitly explains other passages that seem contrary, so that they may be understood of what happens more frequently. How this comes about through the powers of nature he declares: because the image of God in the human soul has not been so worn away by the stain of earthly affections that no outlines, as it were, remain in it. And below, of the Jews, however much they lived corrupt lives even under their law, he says the same force of nature remained in them: For they too were

men (he says), and that force of nature was in them, by which a rational soul both perceives and does what is lawful; but piety, which transfers to that other blessed and eternal life, has its law immaculate, etc. And finally, below, he writes thus: Just as certain venial sins, without which this life is not led, do not impede a just man from eternal life, so certain good works, without which the life of even the worst man is hardly found, are of no profit to the impious for eternal salvation. What could be clearer?

5. There is, besides, a notable passage attributed to Augustine, book 3, *Hypognosticon*, near the beginning, where, having said: *Sin deprived man's free will of the goodness of possibility, not its name and reason*, to explain what he understands by "the goodness of possibility," he adds: *We confess that free will exists in all men, indeed having the judgment of reason, not such that it is fit, on its own, either to begin or even to complete the things that pertain to God, but only in the works of the present life, both good and evil.* He confesses, then, that man did not lose free will through Adam's sin as regards the possibility of every good, but retained it, at least in the works of the present life, even good ones. You will say, he is speaking only of good works—not indeed of moral, honest goodness, but only of natural goodness, that is, according to suitability to the comfort of nature; for this is what the words and examples he subjoins indicate, when he says: *I call good those things which arise from the good of nature, that is, to wish to labor in the field, to wish to eat, freely to wish to have a friend, to wish to have* clothing, to wish to build a house, to wish to take a wife, to raise cattle, to wish to learn the art of various good things, to wish whatever good pertains to the present life—all of which do not subsist without divine governance; indeed, they are from him and through him, and began to exist through him.

6. *An evasion is excluded.* — I say, however, that Augustine is evidently speaking of all these, insofar as they can be done morally well through natural reason. First, indeed, because unless such works are of this kind, they cannot be called simply good, nor be distinguished from evil ones. Second, because by "evil works" he understands those that are morally evil, as he shows by examples and concludes by saying: *Whatever it is not lawful or not expedient to do.* Conversely, then, by good works he understands those that it is lawful to do, and as is lawful and expedient: because if it is done otherwise, it is not good to drink or eat, or to have a wife or a friend. Third, because even these good works, done morally well, arise from the good of nature, and as such also pertain to the good of the present life: for these very things, if not done well, redound to great evil and harm of the present life.

7. Fourth, Augustine confirms this same point in another passage, the book *On the Perfection of Justice*, where, responding to Caelestius, who objected with that text of Paul, *Let him do what he will*, in order to prove that a good will could be had without grace, he answers thus: *See, I beg, how absurd it would be that the mercy of God is not necessary to one willing and running—mercy which even precedes him so that he might run; for the Apostle speaks of someone: "Let him do what he will,"* there (as I think, where it follows) *he says, "he sins not if he marries," as if it were to be reckoned mere willing to marry, where the laborious help of divine mercy is in question. Or indeed, does merely willing avail anything there, unless God, by the providence with which he governs all things, joins male and female?* Here it is clear, from Augustine's opinion, that man can will to marry in such a way that he does not sin, as Paul says, without special help of divine grace. But indeed, for that willing to be without sin, it is necessary that it also come about well as regards the circumstances, and thus simply honestly and morally well. Especially since, in the individual case, it cannot come about otherwise than either by sinning, or simply well. And here is to be especially noted that statement of Augustine, that *where the necessary help of divine grace is laboriously discussed*, such willing, even though honest and without sin, does not fall under such discussion, because it is not reckoned as anything great (that is, as something), if nothing higher is found in it.

8. Nor will I omit, in these testimonies of Augustine, to weigh further those words in which, in both passages, he signifies that these very moral and natural goods are benefits of divine providence, and on that title to be principally attributed to God, and to be counted among his gifts, and sometimes perhaps even special gifts, even though they do not belong to the gifts of grace. This is indicated in the former passage by those words: *which all do not subsist without divine governance; indeed, they are from him and through him, and began to exist [through him].* And similar are the words near the end of the latter testimony, by which he answers a tacit objection, lest man think he can attribute to himself some good which he has not received from God—because every good is always from God, with due proportion: the good of the natural order from God as author and provider of nature; the good of grace, by a higher reason. Among the goods of the natural order, which are to be referred to God as provider of nature, Augustine reckons the good moral work precisely considered, as consonant with rational nature. But goods simply speaking he calls those works that conduce to true sanctity, whence below he concludes: *There is, then, free will, which whoever denies is not Catholic: and whoever says*

this, that without God a good work—that is (note the explanation) *one that pertains to his holy purpose—can neither be begun nor completed, is Catholic.*

9. There is, moreover, an illustrious passage of Augustine on this matter in letter one hundred and three, where he reports that Polemon, an intemperate and incontinent man, was through the works and persuasion of Xenocrates converted to a better mind; and he adds: Not so that he was acquired for God, but only freed from the dominion of lust. And yet, of this very effect, he adds: Nevertheless, not even that itself, which was made better in him, would I attribute to human work, but to divine. That he was speaking not of the work of grace, but of natural providence, is shown by the reason he subjoins: For of the body itself, which is our weak part, if there be any good things, such as form, strength, and health, and anything of this kind, it is from none other than God the creator and perfecter of nature: how much more, then, can the goods of the soul be given by no one else? For what could human folly think more proud or more ungrateful, than to suppose that, while God makes man beautiful in the flesh, man is made chaste in soul by himself? This reasoning proves excellently that God, as author and perfecter of nature, confers a gift of this kind. Augustine immediately adds, moreover, the testimony of the Wise Man, Wisdom 8: No one can be continent unless God grant it—which the same Augustine, and with him all theologians, very frequently explain of a gift given through grace. But both meanings can be comprehended under this same passage—namely, both that the perfect, immaculate gift of continence, free from mortal guilt, is a gift of grace, and that the imperfect gift, as regards one act or another, is a gift of God as the author of nature. For so Augustine is wont to interpret, in connection with the gifts of grace, that text of Romans 11: *Of him, and through him, and in him are all things*—even though it is also extended to the goods of the order of nature, as the same Augustine touches on in the cited testimony from *On the Spirit and the Letter*. Augustine immediately adds, moreover: *Polemon, then, if, having become continent from being licentious, he had known whose gift this was, so that, casting off the superstitions of the Gentiles, he might worship God piously, he would have been not merely continent, but also truly wise and salutarily religious, which would have availed him not only for the honesty of the present life, but also for future immortality.* Hence it is clear that this Polemon was a Gentile, and thought nothing of the faith of the true God; and so his continence, of whatever sort (for without doubt it could not have been very perfect), pertained only to the honesty of the present life, and so was a gift of God the author of nature—not, however, of proper grace, which according to Augustine begins with true faith, and elevates continence to the fruits of eternal life.

10. It is further to be added that this was the common opinion of the Fathers who preceded Augustine, and that those who followed after him, and who adhered most closely to him in the doctrine of grace, remained in the same opinion. The former part, as far as the Greek Fathers are concerned, can be shown *a fortiori* from what was said in chapter seven, where we especially adduced Chrysostom and Mark the Hermit, who seem to attribute so much to free will that some accuse them of inclining to the error of the Semipelagians; but we both defended them from that error and adduced many passages in which they hold as certain that man can do something good by the powers of nature. To the same effect we there adduced Nazianzen, Clement of Alexandria, and Damascene—also a Greek, though later than Augustine. We can here add the same Chrysostom, homily 67, to the People, where he says that no one is so evil that he does not sometimes do something good under the guidance of nature, and does not receive in this life some reward from God for it, because he is to be punished for it in the other life. The same is found under Chrysostom's name in homily 26 of the *Opus Imperfectum* on Matthew, insofar as it is there said that unbelievers sometimes do something good, moved by a natural good. Basil, homily six on the first chapter of Genesis, says that there are in us certain virtues according to nature, for which *familiarity is present from nature itself.* This same view is used by Damascene, book 3, *On the Faith*, chapter 14. Among the Latins, Jerome expressly taught this opinion, in chapters 1 and 5 on Galatians. For in the former passage he says that men lacking faith sometimes act *holily*—that is, honestly, and without the stain of sin—and plainly signifies that this is done without grace, by the guidance of nature alone. In the other passage, indeed, he says that there can be good works without faith, just as faith can be without charity—so those good works are dead without faith. Ambrose, book 1, *On Abraham*, chapter two, held that the King of Egypt, by the guidance of nature, behaved rightly with Abraham, and abstained from adultery. And similar instances are frequent among the ancient Fathers.

11. After Augustine, indeed, Prosper, book *Against the Conferences*, chapter 26, acknowledges that even after sin man has reason, by which he can do certain works that *can honor the present life, but cannot confer eternal life.* Similarly Fulgentius, book *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapter 26, says that there can be in unbelievers or sinners certain good works which, because they are not done from charity, or even not from faith, are of no profit for salvation. More clearly Gregory, homily 27 on the Gospels, distinguishes natural love from the love of charity: *One thing* (he says) *is that which is spontaneously rendered to nature; another, what is owed to obedience out of charity.* And he says both are

good in their own order, since Christ commends the latter especially; the former, however, as he says: *The sacred utterances do not contradict.* This distinction and doctrine was embraced by Rupert, on John, chapter 15, and is received by the usage and common consent of the Church. And finally—and this is the most important—Pius V and Gregory XIII approved it in the bull against Michael Baius. In which bull these Popes either confirm and approve this opinion concerning the power of free will to do some morally good and honest work without special help of grace, or at least greatly favor it. Their opinion, however, we shall report more conveniently in chapter sixteen.

CHAPTER XV
THE SAME OPINION IS CONFIRMED BY REASON

1. *This truth can be shown in two ways.* — We can confirm this truth by reason in two ways: indistinctly, namely, through media that are, as it were, extrinsic, which show more that this truth, considered in itself, is credible, plausible, and likely, and favorable to nature—if it is not repugnant to grace, as indeed it is not; or by directly showing and demonstrating this same truth *a priori*.

2. *The first way.* — I declare the first way of proving it thus: because this opinion declines in no way at all into the error of Pelagius, or his remnants, and departs from the other extreme error of Luther, who asserted that free will, after Adam's sin, avails for nothing but sinning; and it proceeds by a middle way, which is both quite consonant with nature itself, considered in itself and as regards what it has from God, and redounds to the praise of the Creator himself, and does not prejudice Christ the Redeemer and his grace: therefore it is altogether to be preferred. The antecedent, as regards the first part, concerning the error of Pelagius, is sufficiently established from the doctrine of the Councils and the Fathers that we have adduced; and because none of them reprehends the Pelagians or the Massilians on the ground that they said that men could perform some good work through free will, but because they said that man could fulfill all the precepts, or live an innocent life, or by his own powers merit grace and begin the business of salvation—from all of which this opinion is far removed. And although they sometimes reprehend Pelagius for denying that the help of grace was necessary for individual works, they are plainly speaking of works of piety and conducive to eternal salvation, as has been seen. And in the response to the arguments it will be said again, where we shall also touch upon another sense.

3. As to the other part, concerning the error of Luther and the heretics of this age, it is most certain that they, under this pretext of commending grace and the redemption of Christ, so exaggerate the fall of Adam as to say that it wiped out the image of God impressed in man's nature, and entirely took away the powers of free will, especially for doing good. And therefore they inveigh sharply against the Scholastic doctors, because these commonly assert that there remain in fallen man the powers of free will to do some moral work without any stain of sin, if he does what is in him, by using well his natural reason and his liberty. These heretics seem to have introduced this dogma so as to do away entirely with all the merits of men, all dispositions toward grace, and consequently the necessity of good works. And finally, so as to deny liberty of free will altogether, even in good works, or in works of grace; because (as they say) man's will has been left so weak through sin that, unless God uses it as an inanimate instrument, it can do nothing good; but if he does not use it so, it necessarily works evil. From all these errors the opinion stated is so far removed that it wishes to agree with these heretics not only in substance, but not even in manner of speaking.

4. Hence the other part is manifest, namely, that this opinion holds a middle and safe path, which is easily seen to be consonant with nature, because it looks to nature's perfection and does not exceed its limits, as will be established from what follows. This perfection nature has from God, without whose proportionate concursus it cannot use it; and it pertains to divine goodness and providence not to deny this general influence to a nature created by himself, however much it may be infected by sin; and so even if it can do some good work by the powers of free will, it does not thereby do this without God's proportionate help: and so the whole thing redounds to the praise of the author of nature. And finally, just as this does not prejudice the grace of God, neither does it prejudice the redemption of Christ; because (as Augustine says, letter one hundred and five) *Christ did not die for many that men might be condemned, but died for the impious that they might be justified.* By these words he signifies that Christ's redemption presupposes natural gifts and adds supernatural ones, in order to relieve and aid nature in acting, and to remove the impediment of sin superadded to nature. No injury, then, is done to Christ's redemption by our confessing that some spark of natural good, even free and moral, remained after sin.

5. *The latter way of proving it.* — The latter, demonstrative way of proving it is this: because a cause having sufficient powers for some effect can sometimes, by those same powers, bring about that effect, notwithstanding an arising

obstacle which, although it impedes somewhat, does not intrinsically diminish the powers, nor induce insuperable resistance, nor remove some condition simply necessary for such a work, or always impede it. But free will in fallen nature is so related to morally good acts proportioned to nature: therefore [it can perform them]. The major premise is shown by the example of a rational power affected by a habit inclining it to the other side; for this power has of itself and in its own order sufficient powers for the opposite act: but the supervening habit impedes it somewhat from performing an act contrary to the habit; nevertheless, because this impediment does not intrinsically diminish the powers of the faculty, nor insuperably resist the contrary inclination of the same faculty, nor remove a condition necessary for acting, such a faculty can, notwithstanding the habit, elicit, by its own powers, an act contrary to it. And the reason is that a cause that is of itself sufficient and unimpeded, and has all the conditions requisite for acting, can produce its effect, with the common influence of the first cause. Indeed, if it is a non-free cause, it will immediately produce that effect, as much and in such manner as it can: therefore, if it is free, it will be able, at least if it wills, to produce such an effect: but if it can do this with the common influence, special grace is not necessary for it to do so.

6. It remains for us to prove the subsumed proposition, namely, that free will in fallen nature is related to good moral acts (speaking of itself) as a cause having sufficient powers for such an effect in particular, and not always having an insuperable impediment, or a lack of some condition necessary for acting. This is proved because, in the first place, the human will, considered of itself and intrinsically in its pure nature, or in the state of integral nature, has powers sufficient for a good moral work and for performing it well. For we can consider a twofold faculty, or power, necessary for acts of this kind: one on the part of the will itself, really and intimately belonging to it, which we can call physical, because it is the cause truly and really effecting such an act; the other faculty is on the part of the intellect and its judgment, or its proposal, which we can call moral, because it is not physically efficient of the act of the will, but only moves and excites it metaphorically, counsels it, and as it were persuades it. The physical power of the will, then, intrinsic and connatural to it with respect to such an act, is proportioned and sufficient to it: otherwise such an act, considered in itself, would not be natural to man, nor proportioned to him, but would surpass his nature: therefore it is necessary that man's nature, whether integral or pure, have sufficient physical powers for such an act. And by the same reasoning, it has sufficient moral powers, both because the will follows the intellect and keeps proportion with it, and so the will can naturally will and

accomplish nothing except what the intellect can naturally dictate and propose to it, as something feasible by it and naturally suited to it; and also because such a judgment and proposal of the object does not exceed the natural powers of the intellect itself. Hence (which is to be noted) although with respect to the will it has moral causality, with respect to the intellect it is regarded as an effect truly and physically produced by it; and for producing it, the intellect, considered in its pure nature, has sufficient physical powers, because such an effect does not exceed its natural capacity, or its due proportion—just as has been said of the natural act of the will compared to the physical powers of that same will. Therefore, by the same reasoning that the intellect has by its nature sufficient physical powers for performing such an act, it also has sufficient power to induce the will morally by means of such an act. And if it be said that the intellect itself needs the proposal and excitation of an object, for this too it has a sufficient natural mode, through the external offering of objects, which comes about by the common course of nature, and through the internal power of the agent intellect, God cooperating in all this through general influence.

7. *The powers, both of the will and of the intellect, were not intrinsically diminished by the fall of nature.* — Powers of this kind, of both the will and the intellect, are not intrinsically diminished by the supervening sin, or fall, of nature. Because these powers are not something superadded to these faculties beyond their entities, but are the very realities of such faculties themselves, just as the powers of heat to warm are not something beyond the very entity of that heat. But the entity of the will or the intellect is not diminished by sin; indeed it cannot be diminished, because it is not a quality capable of intensity and remission, but altogether indivisible, which either must be entirely removed—which has not been done, nor could it have been done without monstrosity, or a miracle—or must remain whole, since an indivisible thing cannot be divided. But if the whole entity remains, it retains the whole power of acting, because it [the power] is nothing other than the entity itself. Just as heat at degree eight, while it remains whole at that intensity and degree, cannot fail to retain the integral natural powers it has for warming—it then begins to lose them, or to have them diminished, when it begins to be remitted; whereas, if it were not a remissible quality, its powers could in no way be diminished while its entity is preserved—so it is, then, in the will and intellect of fallen man. Since, therefore, free will is nothing other than the faculty of will and reason, the interior natural powers of intellect and will for performing good remaining intact, both physically and morally, the powers of free will too, as to its physical power, must necessarily have remained intact.

8. That, however, an insuperable impediment to acting well does not always and in every act occur to man, even in the state of fallen nature, can easily be shown to be persuasive, because either this is a positive and intrinsic, permanently existing impediment in the intellect, the will, or another power of the soul—and this cannot be conceived, because through sin no such positive thing or quality was superadded in faculties of this kind, but they were only deprived of the gifts of grace and original justice; hence they remained in that positive disposition in which they would be in pure nature: and it is certain that in pure nature, and intrinsically, no such positive disposition belongs to these faculties.

9. Or this impediment is the rebellion of the sentient appetite, and the infirmity of the corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, etc. But this disordering of the faculties, which was contracted from original sin, although it so weakens the powers of free will for performing a moral good consonant with natural reason that without grace it cannot fulfill all of it, without sometimes—indeed often—falling away: nevertheless it does not so press and impede in individual acts as to always introduce great difficulty, let alone induce an insuperable impediment. For often something honest to do presents itself which is not repugnant to the appetite, or to the inclination of the species or the individual—such as giving alms to a poor man, honoring a parent, and the like. In acts of this kind, then, it often happens that there is almost no difficulty; in some, indeed, although some resistance of appetite intervenes, it is not so great and immense that it cannot be overcome by the power of reason and liberty, as experience itself teaches; and there is no reason that would persuade the contrary. Therefore nothing stands in the way of man's sometimes, on these occasions, doing as much as he can by the powers of nature, so as to exercise a good and honest act.

10. Or finally this impediment is extrinsic, arising from the suggestion and temptation of the demon: and we shall speak of this point below, in responding to the arguments. For now we only say that this impediment does not always press for every act and every instant, or at least does not press so instantly that man, using reason, cannot morally reject the demon's suggestion for a brief time, sufficient for one act or another—whether this be because the demon himself does not of himself have such power and might over man, or because God does not permit him always to use his full power. Whichever way this comes about, there does not intervene there a true internal grace, given through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, of which we are now treating. And so it is

always true that, notwithstanding this impediment, man can perform some good moral work without grace.

11. *Objection.* — Someone will say that this argument rightly proves that man can, without grace, do a work honest in its genus, but not good in all its circumstances—and this not from a defect of physical power, nor from a positive impediment, but from a defect of knowledge and from the impediment of privative ignorance, which at least always impedes the due circumstance of the end, without which an act cannot be simply good. This is approximately Gregory's response. For he thinks that for the honesty of an act a relation to God as ultimate end is necessary, and that this cannot be brought about without knowledge of faith and the help of grace.

12. *It is refuted.* — But this is mistaken in many ways. First, because an actual relation of every good act to God is not necessary for the act to be done well and to be simply good, without any stain of fault, as I suppose to be certain from *1, 2*, question eighteen. Now I call "actual relation" that which is founded in the agent's own act, directly willing that end and the relation of the work to it —whether this relation comes about then, when the work is performed (which is called formal relation), or has preceded it and comes about in virtue of it (which is called virtual relation). It suffices, then, that the relation be quasi-natural and intrinsic to an act tending to an honest object as such: for by the very fact that it is for the sake of the goodness participated in the object, and is not interrupted or impeded by an extrinsic relation to an evil end, the act itself of itself tends to God as the ultimate end of every good—which is sometimes also called a virtual relation arising from the force of the work, not from another action of the agent. And so this circumstance is never lacking, if the proximate end is honest and another, evil end is not added—which can come about by mere knowledge of the goodness of the object, with all the circumstances required for its intrinsic honesty, without higher knowledge of God.

13. Second, because, even if actual relation to God were necessary, it would suffice for natural honesty that it be made to God as the author of nature; and for this relation there can be sufficient knowledge through the powers of nature, and, that knowledge being given, it does not exceed the powers of the will to produce it in some act: because it is not necessary that it be made to God loved efficaciously above all things, but it suffices that it be made to God loved in some imperfect manner, or out of some affection of cultivating and honoring him—which is possible through the powers of nature, as Paul to the Romans 1 openly supposes.

14. Third, because if that relation is omitted through inadvertence, or ignorance either of God or of the obligation of applying that relation, I ask whether that ignorance is inculpable or not. For if it is invincible, the omission of such a circumstance will not be culpable, and accordingly will not render the act evil, nor impede the goodness it can have from the object and other circumstances. But if the ignorance is culpable, this supposes in man the power to dispel it, and sufficient powers for referring the act to that end; otherwise its omission could not justly be imputed as fault. Finally, the reasons given proceed equally for goodness from the circumstances and from the object, since all that goodness does not exceed the proportion of the natural powers of the will, nor the dictate of natural reason.

15. And this argument can be briefly proposed and confirmed in another form: because if grace is necessary for individual morally good acts, this is either by way of a physical principle, or only by way of a moral help exciting the will and aiding it in the same moral way: neither can be said: therefore [grace is not necessary]. The minor, as to the former part, concerning a physical principle, is established from what has been said. Because the will has sufficient physical powers for performing such an act, both as to its substance, and as to the mode due to it from its own nature, or from the dictate of natural reason—which mode suffices for the act to be done simply well and honestly. And similarly the intellect has sufficient physical powers for dictating, by the light of nature, and proposing to the will whatever is necessary for the honesty of that act. As to the other part, concerning moral help, it is also clear from what has been said, that such extraordinary help, exceeding the order of nature, is not simply necessary except where moral impediments occur, and man cannot morally overcome them all unless aided by another, superior power: but such impediments do not occur in individual morally good acts, as has been declared: therefore that moral help is not simply necessary for individual acts of the natural order, though it may be necessary for innocence, or for perseverance over a long time.

16. *A response is given to all that has been said.* — To all this, however, other authors are forced to respond (as far as can be gathered from their reasoning) that these arguments rightly prove that the help of grace is not necessary for man to be able to perform such a moral act, but is necessary for him to actually perform it—just as the actual concursus of God is necessary for man to act, but not for him to be able to act. The reason for such necessity, however, was given above, concerning congruous thought: for without an honest thought man cannot act morally well, and unless such a thought is congruous in God's conditioned foreknowledge, man will not in fact act, however much he

may be able to. A congruous thought, then, is necessary for the act itself; this thought, however, is not owed, nor is it given without God's providence: it is, therefore, freely given, and consequently a true grace: therefore without some grace a simply good work cannot, in fact and with effect, be done. Hence they also candidly admit that this thought is not called grace because it is in itself supernatural as to its substance, or its intrinsic mode—for nothing of this kind can be probably thought concerning it, since that thought has a natural object too, and attains it under a natural aspect, or by means of the order of nature, and is ordered only proximately to eliciting a natural act of the will. They say, then, that it is called grace only because it is a certain gift freely given in relation to the honesty of life, and perhaps also to true sanctity and the attainment of eternal beatitude.

17. *The response is examined.* — Now, that we may examine with how much probability this is said, since this whole gift, freely conferred, is placed in that congruous thought alone, certain things must be inquired into concerning it. First, since it often happens that this thought is excited through an external proposal of the object, or through human words, or the occurrence of a visible object—such as a poor man, or a dead man, or some other similar thing—I ask whether a special providence of God is necessary for this object to occur at a congruous time and manner, or whether it can sometimes, and often, occur from the general course of secondary causes operating with only the general influence of God. On this point, granted it be true that very often these opportune occasions for acting well morally arise from a peculiar providence, with at least the peculiar custody of the holy angels intervening, nevertheless there seems to be no doubt that this is not always necessary, because nothing is found in such an external object that could not, by the common course of nature, occur to man at the opportune time, the secondary causes being merely allowed to run their courses, with the common influence of their author. Just as, also, the occurrence of objects exciting to evil, at the time when they draw a man to consent, does not come about positively from God's special providence, but from general providence with foreknowledge, and permission, and common influence; and although it often comes about through the industry of evil angels, it is not with the infallible certainty of the future effect that exists in God; nor again is that means always necessary, but by the mere course of secondary causes such an occasion of scandal can be offered, God permitting and foreknowing. So, then, it can be in a good act, with this exception—that in it there does not precede mere permission alone, but also either a precept, or a counsel, or an approval of God, through his simple, or antecedent, will. But an

absolute will specially procuring the occurrence of such an object is not necessary, although it is possible; for no true reason for such necessity can be given, nor is one given by other authors: indeed, on this point they do not seem to us to disagree.

18. This being supposed, I further inquire whether, given such an object, it is necessary that the thought come about, or be directed, by God in a special interior mode of action, beyond the general concursus owed both to external objects, or occasions exciting such thought, and to the intellect itself eliciting and judging according to them; or whether, rather (supposing the application of such objects made through the ordinary course of secondary causes), that thought, and the practical judgment about performing such a good work, comes about from the intellect with only the general concursus of the first cause. On this point too it must be said altogether that it is not necessary for that thought to come about through a special action of God, operating interiorly in man's intellect; because in that thought there is nothing supernatural, neither on the part of the intellect itself, nor from any intrinsic mode of it that can be understood or conceived with foundation, nor from any extrinsic end or elevation to some supernatural effect, since it is ordered only to the good moral act of the will—since in other respects it is in substance and mode natural. That thought, then, can be excited and come about in man through the ordinary course and influence of secondary causes, God concurring only with general concursus, both interiorly and exteriorly. Therefore that thought is not from grace, but from nature: therefore the work of virtue also, which proceeds from that thought alone, with the powers of free will, and the general influence of the first cause, is not necessarily from grace.

CHAPTER XVI
THE SAME OPINION IS ALSO COMMENDED BY SHOWING THE VARIOUS UNTOWARD CONSEQUENCES THAT FOLLOW FROM THE CONTRARY OPINION

1. The arguments made in the preceding chapter seem sufficiently to show this very point: that, given the first disposition of the universe, the common course of secondary causes, and their concursus with the general influence and providence of the first cause, suffices for conceiving that good thought which is sufficient for a good moral operation of the natural order, brought about through free will. Nevertheless, the authors of the fourth opinion teach that, when that thought is such that it moves with effect to a good work, it is a true

grace, distinct from the gift of creation and all the benefits of God which are owed by, or follow from, creation. Their reason reduces to this: that the very original (so to speak) disposition of things, and the concursus, or occurrence, of such causes, or objects, with such a man and his faculties, is not without God's foreknowledge and providence, who has provided such an order of things as he foresaw would be congruous and future for this man, so that at such a time he might act well. This suffices for that thought to be said to be above man's natural faculty, because man could not prepare for himself such a thought, or the causes that excite it. It is also said to be a help of grace, because such a disposition and order of causes was not owed to such a man, and so neither was such a thought owed. It is, then, given gratuitously, so as to excite and help him to act well: rightly, then, it is called a help of grace, or gratuitous help. Now it is established that such a thought is necessary for any good moral operation whatsoever. By this reasoning, then, they defend that no morally good work can be done by man without the grace of God.

2. This opinion, so explained, can seem in reality not to differ from ours, but only in manner of speaking. For we openly confess that for a good act of the will a prior thought of the intellect is necessary. Likewise, that this thought, at least the first one, is not in man's own power, but must be excited extrinsically. Likewise, that this excitation does not come about without the providence of God preparing its causes—and indeed (as we more probably believe, and admit as true) foreknowing when and where such a thought will be so congruous that, if it occurs to the intellect, it will infallibly have the effect of a good will. Likewise, we all agree that an actual concursus of the first cause is necessary for these acts—which not even the Semipelagians denied, whatever the Pelagians thought. And finally, those authors confess with us that, for a thought and a good act of this kind, no superior or special internal motion of God is necessary, beyond the said mode of providence. Of this we also confess that that occasion of acting morally well, and of thinking and judging congruously about such a work, was foreseen by God as his own peculiar benefit. The controversy, then, seems to remain only over the name—whether it should be called a help of grace or not. Nevertheless we think it must be said that that benefit does not transcend the order of general natural providence, and therefore is not sufficient for such an act to be said to be from the grace of Christ; nor do the Councils speak of this kind of grace, but require something greater, when they require the grace of God for acting well. And we judge this point to be most weighty, as necessary for understanding the Councils and the Fathers, and perhaps also for avoiding

many untoward consequences that are sometimes incurred from words spoken in a disordered way.

3. *The first untoward consequence.* — The first grave untoward consequence, then, that follows from that opinion is this: that that manner of grace does not suffice for the propriety and rigor of the words by which the Councils teach that grace is necessary for acting well: therefore, if the Councils, in their definitions, include any and every good moral work, of whatever order and mode they be, then some greater help on God's part is necessary to be conferred; or certainly, if the Councils do not comprehend all these acts, it is said without foundation or truth that grace is necessary for the others. The antecedent is clear from the Council of Orange, chapters five and six, where it requires *illumination and inspiration, through the infusion of the Holy Spirit*, and chapter 6 says: *To think rightly belongs to a divine gift, and as often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may act.* Who, then, would say that a natural thought, which arises from the force of natural causes, with only God's general concursus, is to be called "the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit," or to come about "through his infusion," or that by reason of it alone "God works in us, that we may act," or "brings it about that we act," as is said there in chapter twenty? Therefore it is far truer that the Councils do not comprehend all good actions, but those which pertain to the salvation of eternal life, as has been said.

4. *The second untoward consequence.* — Second, if anyone contends that this congruous thought, explained in the manner stated above, is rightly called the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, it follows, by force of the doctrine and definitions of the Councils, that a higher prevenient and assisting grace is not necessary for believing, hoping, loving, and repenting—which no Catholic, I now suppose, will say. The sequence is clear, because the Councils speak in the same tenor, and with the same universality, of all these, as is clear from the words quoted: *As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may act*; and from the testimonies of Scripture which the same Council of Orange adduces: *Without me you can do nothing*; and, *What have you that you have not received?*; and, *No one has anything good unless it has been given from above.* Finally, the Council of Trent, session six, speaking of the grace necessary for acts of faith, etc., declares it *through the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit.* Therefore, if that congruous thought alone suffices for the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, a similar manner of grace would suffice for believing, loving, and doing penance, as is fitting. But the consequence is altogether false and absurd: for the order of grace is confused

with the order of nature, and the necessity of habits properly infused is removed. And in particular, the testimony of Augustine can be weighed, letter one hundred and six, near the beginning, where, bringing forward the example of the prodigal son, *who, returning to himself, said: I will arise and go to my father*, he says: *When would he have had this good thought, had not his most merciful father, in secret, inspired even this in him?* I weigh, indeed, the phrase "in secret," by which he signifies that a similar thought is not enough, insofar as it can be naturally excited by external objects, to be a true internal grace and true inspiration, unless the Holy Spirit works something higher, internally and secretly.

5. Besides, the absurdity of this can be further declared briefly in this manner. Since, when the things of faith are proposed, man can give them some human faith, if he believes them only on human tradition—which human faith can be a morally good act—if, then, such it is, it will come about from grace, according to the prior opinion: therefore it will be from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, because it will be from some congruous and gratuitous thought, in the manner explained: therefore someone can, without error, say that this faith is sufficient for salvation, as coming from the infusion of the Holy Spirit, since it is conceived from his illumination and inspiration. But this consequence is most absurd. And indeed I hear that there is no lack of theologians who, convinced by this reasoning, admit that this kind of grace, illumination, and inspiration suffices for all the good moral works that precede the faith necessary for salvation, and even for the will to believe sufficient for true faith, and for true attrition, which together with the sacrament is sufficient for justice—and nevertheless they do not dare to grant that this kind of grace suffices for the acts of faith, hope, and charity necessary for salvation. Their caution and modesty in this latter point I commend; but since in the former they confess that true grace is necessary for those acts, I do not see by what consequence they speak, nor how they gather from the Councils the distinction they make between acts of this kind—especially since the Council of Orange, chapter five, speaks in the same manner on this point both of the will to believe and of the act, or assent, of faith.

6. They will perhaps say that the Councils require for the acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance not only divine illumination and inspiration, but also divine help—for so the Council of Trent expressly speaks, session 6, canon 3, and it is to be understood of a supernatural help, which adds some efficiency beyond God's general concursus; otherwise that definition would be of no importance for commending the grace of God. But against this it is urged, third,

that this help of the Holy Spirit is necessary not only for the acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance, but also for others. For as often as Augustine speaks of the grace necessary for acting well, he says not only that a prevenient grace, inspiration, and illumination is necessary, but also that the help of divine grace is necessary; and he adds that it is necessary for individual acts of piety, as he often repeats in letters 106 and 107, adding that *without this help man can have nothing of piety or justice, either in deed or in will.* Either, then, Augustine is speaking only of supernatural acts, which by antonomasia are called Christian justice and piety—and so it cannot be gathered from Augustine's teaching that grace is necessary for individual morally good acts; or he is speaking of all good acts, even moral ones, consonant only with natural reason—and so it will be necessary to say that, even for individual acts of this kind, the help of divine grace is necessary. And accordingly, all that the Council of Trent requires for faith, hope, etc., will be necessary for individual good acts—namely, the prevenient illumination of the Holy Spirit and his help. Either, then, that congruous thought is not enough for good moral acts, or another, distinct and proper, help of grace is required—which these authors do not concede, nor is it likely; or it is necessary that they say (as indeed they do say) that that very thought, insofar as it precedes the human will, is prevenient grace, and insofar as it accompanies, and in its own way cooperates with, the will, is the help of divine grace.

7. But if this is said, it follows, as we were inferring before, that a higher grace is not required for the will to believe, beyond a congruous thought about the things to be believed, which can be excited and conceived by a sufficient external proposal of the faith, and consequently that this same grace suffices for the act of believing. For (as I was saying) the Council of Orange, chapter 3, speaks in the same way of the grace necessary for the will to believe as of faith itself. Likewise, because we are forced to believe nothing else about the act of faith itself except that it cannot be had without illumination, inspiration, and the help of the Holy Spirit; but all this is said to be sufficiently safeguarded by that congruous thought with respect to a good moral act: therefore it will also be sufficient with respect to the will to believe: therefore, by even greater reason, also with respect to the act of faith itself; for the very will to believe can also be called a help of grace for eliciting the act of faith itself.

8. But if anyone wishes to assign a difference—that for these acts of faith and the like a help of a higher order is required, elevating the faculty to producing them, and so physically helping, that they may be supernatural—this indeed he will say, on other principles, but, speaking consequently, this cannot

be founded on the doctrine of Augustine or the Councils, if it is once said that the grace of illumination and the help of the Holy Spirit, which they require for acting well, is sufficiently conferred through that congruous thought alone—because they require grace, in the same terms and no others, both for believing and for the other acts. This untoward consequence, then, follows from that opinion: that it provides occasion for denying physically assisting grace, since it does not leave an efficacious manner of founding it in the doctrine of Augustine and the Councils. For it will not be found stated in the Councils that those acts are supernatural by this formal term, but only that they are from the infusion of the Holy Spirit, or that grace is necessary for each of them. Hence that opinion also provides occasion for denying truly supernatural acts, as I shall say below.

9. *Another untoward consequence.—The error of Pelagius.* — Fourth, this opinion provides an occasion for the error of Pelagius, who indeed admitted that grace was necessary for believing and acting well, but afterward explained that grace to be nothing other than preaching, or revelation, or the example and teaching of Christ, or the law, which instruct the intellect, for afterward the will alone, by its own liberty, either follows or rejects such a thought. For Pelagius would not deny that the thought arising from preaching and teaching, or from another good object presenting itself, is grace, in the way he called the teaching itself grace. Nor would he hesitate even to call it grace exciting the will, that it might will, and helping it when it wills: and nevertheless he is reprehended by Augustine, in letter 106 and often elsewhere, for having deceitfully confessed the necessity of assisting grace at the Council of Palestine, while not acknowledging a true and internal assisting grace. But surely a mere congruous thought, in the manner explained above, has itself in the same way as a law or teaching; because it is nothing other than a certain proposal of the object and dictate of conscience, which is, as it were, a private law, according to that text of the Apostle to the Romans 2: *The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things that are of the law, these, having not such a law, are a law unto themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness.* If, then, that thought, which is otherwise natural and can be had through natural secondary causes, with only God's general concursus, is said to be a sufficient exciting and assisting grace, so that the definitions of the Councils about the necessity of grace for acting well are accommodated to it with all propriety and truth, surely, by even greater reason, that thought which results from the preaching of the Gospel, or from the proposal of the law, will be said to be a grace of itself sufficiently exciting and assisting.

10. *An evasion.—It is foreclosed.* — But if anyone says that that thought does not have the character of grace except insofar as it is congruous, certainly Pelagius would not deny that a similar congruity can be found in the proposal of the law, or the preaching of the faith. Because Pelagius did not fail to know that God foreknows, if this Gospel be preached with such signs, etc., who will believe and who will not, as is manifest from the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, and from Augustine's book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, and *On Grace and Free Will*. Pelagius, then, admitted that God foreknows for whom the preaching will or will not be congruous: therefore, if everything the Councils teach about the necessity of grace is sufficiently safeguarded by that congruous thought alone, in such foreknowledge, I do not see why, with respect to faith and other supernatural acts, the same should not be sufficiently safeguarded by a mere congruous proposal of objects—that is, one which, by God's foreknowledge, will have an effect—since, in truth, both the thought itself and its effect come about by the powers of nature alone, according to that opinion. But this destroys the truth of internal grace, and differs in reality not at all from the error of Pelagius; for now no interior illumination or inspiration will be necessary for believing, beyond external preaching done at an opportune time, together with an internal thought and judgment which can be conceived by natural discourse from the force of such preaching. And the same can be said of penance and other things.

11. *Another untoward consequence.—For individual good moral works, taken singly, an interior grace implanted in the will is not necessary.* — Fifth, from the same principle it follows that an internal prevenient grace, impressed in the will itself, is not necessary for acting well, even if the good action be one of believing, or willing to believe, or hoping, loving, etc. The consequence is false and altogether to be avoided, as I now suppose, and as has been proved elsewhere—at least speaking of moral necessity and ordinary power. I prove the sequence from that principle, that the Councils and Augustine, when they speak of the necessity of grace for any and every good work, speak generally and indifferently of good works, and require, equally for all, a grace exciting and assisting. If, then, under those good works they include any and every moral work, even of the natural order, it must consequently be admitted that the same kind of grace is necessary for such works as for the remaining acts. And conversely, that prevenient grace which would not have been necessary for good moral works is not necessary either for faith, or other acts, as far as the doctrine of the Councils requires it, which, as has been said, is given in the same way for all. But it is certain that, for good moral works, taken singly, an internal

prevenient grace, implanted in the will itself, is not necessary; because, the object being proposed through a congruous thought, the will does not need a special elevation for such an act, which by its own nature is proportioned to it. Hence, when the Councils say that for good works the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit is required, it must be said, in that opinion (as is indeed said by its authors), that, with respect to moral acts, this same congruous thought undergoes both descriptions: for, insofar as it perfects the intellect, it is called illumination; insofar as it invites and draws the will, it is called inspiration. A way is thus opened for anyone who wishes to philosophize in the same manner about all the acts of grace, however necessary to salvation—denying that, for any of them, a peculiar motion of grace made in the will itself is necessary—because the doctrine of the Councils does not compel this, since the whole of it is verified in other good works without such a motion.

12. *The sixth absurdity.* — Sixth, a way is opened for someone to deny that there are acts truly and in themselves supernatural, not only as to their entity, substance, and species (which is now sufficiently absurd) but even as to any good, real, and intrinsic mode; or at least someone could deny that such acts are necessary for salvation, which is also most absurd, as I suppose. The sequence is declared, because, as I was saying a little before, the Councils do not define, under this formal wording, that acts which are supernatural are necessary for salvation, but that an exciting and assisting grace is necessary for performing acts necessary for salvation, as is fitting—from which principle we do not infer that such acts are supernatural. But if an exciting and assisting grace is necessary for performing each individual morally good act—because they are of themselves of the natural order—surely that inference cannot be made for any acts at all. For though someone says that the act, for example, of faith, necessary for salvation, is in its entity and species, and in every intrinsic mode of its own, natural, he will say nonetheless that it cannot come about without inspiring and assisting grace, and only from a relation to that is it, or is denominated, supernatural. Nor will it be possible to disprove this from the definitions of the Councils, on the foundation supposed concerning the necessity of grace for moral acts. Hence (as I hear) there are some who concede that, if anyone believes our mysteries of faith, as to their substance, by mere human faith—through paternal tradition, acting well morally and according to human prudence in that belief—that faith will be sufficient for salvation on the part of faith, that is, if the other precepts are observed; because it is a faith from grace, although in itself it is not supernatural—which, how absurd it is, it is not now necessary to expound or prove. And so others, as I said above, admitted this

concerning the will to believe, but not concerning the act of believing itself; nevertheless, if they wish to speak consistently, they cannot deny it; and the same reasoning proceeds in the other acts.

13. *The evasion is rejected.* — Nor will it suffice to answer that, with regard to the objects of the theological virtues, there can be acts that are, in themselves or in their substance, supernatural. Because here we are not treating whether they are possible, but whether they are necessary for salvation: for this latter point is what, of itself, pertains to the dogmas of faith, whereas the former pertains to them only by reason of the latter; but from the principle stated, this necessity seems to be overthrown, as has been shown. And if anyone should perhaps grant this, he could consequently say that supernatural habits, properly infused, are not necessary, and consequently dismiss the whole doctrine of true and supernatural grace of God as superfluous, and reduce the whole business of grace assisting—necessary for acting well and holily—to that congruous thought arising from a gratuitous disposition and providence. And, at most, it could be added that in some matters divine revelation is necessary, so that man might think about them and act congruently concerning them. All of which, indeed, is not to be tolerated, for it plainly contains the Pelagian doctrine, nor do the Catholic doctors with whom we are disputing grant it; but what we desire is that they teach us a firm and solid way of avoiding these untoward consequences.

14. Seventh, from that principle it follows that the necessity of divine grace for acting does not arise from the supernaturality of the actions, nor from the excellence of the end to which man is ordered through grace, nor even from the frailty of fallen nature on account of original sin, but precisely from the condition of rational and intellectual nature, which has a certain indifference, or universality, in the intellect's thought, and can be bent to good or evil through free will; and that, in order to be so bent, it needs a prior thought which, absolutely speaking, is not in the free power of the agent; and so the fact that it is congruous for acting well must be referred to divine grace and liberality. And so it would be, according to this reasoning, that not only in fallen man, but even in integral nature, grace would be necessary for any and every morally good act to be performed, even from the dictate of natural reason alone. Indeed, the same would have to be said not only of men, but also of angels, as in fact the authors of this opinion say consequently. Indeed, some of them even say it implies a contradiction for a good act to come about without grace, in the way it implies a contradiction for the will to love without prior cognition. Because it is equally necessary that a good thought precede the good motion of the will, and it is also necessary that this come from the providence of God, since he cannot be

ignorant whether that thought will be such as to have an effect, and consequently whether it will be congruous: therefore it can in no way happen that a created will perform a good act, however much proportioned to its nature, without the grace of God. All this, however, is very new and alien to the common sense of theologians.

14[bis]. Eighth, it follows that an intellectual creature cannot be made by God without the aids of grace, if it is to be governed prudently and according to a providence worthy of God. The consequence is false: therefore [the principle is false]. The sequence is clear, because God cannot fittingly produce a rational creature without providing it with the aids necessary for acting honestly, at least in some actions: therefore, if those actions cannot be done honestly without the aids of grace, God cannot found a nature without conferring grace on it. That this is absurd is clear, because then grace would no longer be grace, since it would be owed to nature. For what help can be more owed than that which God cannot deny to it, according to a prudent manner of governing?

15. *A response.—It is attacked.* — Perhaps it will be said that a rational nature indeed cannot be founded without a help of itself sufficient for acting honestly, but it can be founded without an efficacious and congruous help, and so can be founded without grace; because that sufficient help is not grace, but something owed to nature; the congruous help, however, is grace, because, as to its congruity, it is not owed. But first, this is something else new and quite marvelous in this opinion—that the same help, of the same order, if it is only sufficient, is not gratuitous; but if it is efficacious, that is, infallibly effective in God's foreknowledge, it is called, properly and strictly, grace, the grace of which the Councils speak. This does not seem rightly, or consistently, said. For, since if that efficacious help is true grace, it contains the proper illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, it must necessarily be that the help, which in the same order is called sufficient, contains the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; because efficacious help agrees with sufficient help in this, and only adds that the illumination and inspiration be congruous: but for the character of grace, it suffices that there be illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. And therefore, if efficacious help is grace, it seems necessary that sufficient help also be grace, although lesser. Furthermore, this is so because an honest thought, although through man's fault it will not have the effect of an honest action, is a certain benefit of rational nature, and is not simply owed to it in this or that individual—because it is not repugnant that it be given even to a man who, his whole lifetime, has no honest thought without the admixture of some depraved circumstance: therefore, if that character of an undue benefit suffices for the

character of grace in a congruous thought, even though in all other respects it be natural, by the same reasoning it will suffice for a good thought, of itself sufficient for acting honestly, to be true grace—because, if it is not owed to all individuals, it is owed to no one in particular. Therefore, if rational nature cannot be founded without this benefit, it cannot be founded without grace.

16. *That response is further attacked.* — Hence that response is further attacked, because, although in one or another individual, or with respect to some particular acts, God can found a man to whom he does not give congruous help for acting honestly, nevertheless that he should deny such help to every man, and with respect to every good action, seems alien to divine goodness and to his wise providence. But this is enough for this help not to be gratuitous, or of grace, but owed to nature. For, that a thing be reckoned owed to nature, it is not required that it necessarily be given to all individuals, but it suffices that it cannot be denied to the whole species, according to the demand of such a nature. This is clear from the example made a little before, of an honest thought as such, prescinding from whether it will or will not be congruous, effective or not—which is not reckoned grace, but owed to human nature, although it is not necessary that all men receive it, or sometimes exercise it: it suffices that the whole of nature, in all its individuals, cannot and ought not always lack such a thought.

17. *A more fitting reason is given.* — The *a priori* reason, indeed, is that human nature, through natural powers, can produce a thought of this kind, and from objects, according to the natural course of things, can be excited to it: therefore it cannot happen but that, in so great a variety of men, and diversity of objects, good thoughts are quite often excited in some men. It belongs, however, to God's due providence to concur generally with these causes and objects. Nor would it be consonant with divine goodness either to refuse to concur, whenever a thought that is to be excited would be honest, or specially to impede it, by providing that there always intervene a cause or object admixing some baseness. But if he himself does not specially provide for this, but lets things run their whole course, it is surely not possible that honest thoughts, consonant with reason, not be excited quite often in the hearts of men: and therefore such a thought, insofar as in its order it is a sufficient help for an honest action, is not, of its kind, reckoned a help of grace, but of nature.

18. The same reasoning can be applied to a congruous thought of the same honest work, which adds only, on God's part, the will to give it in conditioned foreknowledge that it will have the effect of an honest action. For similarly it cannot happen but that, in the whole multitude of men, such a thought will

often have its effect, unless specially impeded or prevented by God. This seems true not only in that disposition of things and secondary causes which God has in fact established, but also in any possible disposition not impeded but left to the common course of secondary causes. For, in so great a variety of occasions, and multitude of men, it can hardly fail that, in many men, an honest thought, and a prudent judgment, sometimes arises, which is followed by a good choice. Since, therefore, it is repugnant to divine goodness to undertake the care, so to speak, of impeding through his providence this good effect from sometimes following, it also seems altogether alien to divine providence to found human nature in such a way that it never has a natural thought congruous for acting honestly: therefore, on account of this congruity, it cannot truly be said that God cannot found human nature without the gifts of grace.

19. *Another response is given.—It is not accepted.* — It can be otherwise answered that grace is twofold: one elevating man's natural faculties to elicit acts surpassing the powers of nature; the other exciting and assisting the same faculties to elicit acts consonant with and proportioned to the natural powers of those same faculties; and that man's nature could be founded by God without the former grace, but not without the latter. But this too does not resolve the difficulties touched on. First, because, although that distinction can in itself have a good sense, nevertheless it is weakened and rendered uncertain by that very opinion which we are attacking. For if man cannot act well without grace, how is it established that among good acts some surpass man's natural powers, others are proportioned to them, since man is said to need the help of grace absolutely for any and every one of them? Hence too a twofold end of man could be distinguished, which man or angel could attain without the powers of grace. For from no other source do we know with certainty that the end to which man, as well as angel, is destined is supernatural, except that it cannot be attained without the powers of grace. But if that distinction has no place even in the end itself, there is no reason it should be admitted in the acts which are means to that end. Finally, because that without which nature, considered according to its species, cannot be founded is unjustly called grace, even if it need not be necessary for it to be conferred on every single individual, as has been shown.

20. *The ninth untoward consequence.* — Ninth, we can add another reason: that it follows that grace is necessary not only for any morally good act, but also for indifferent acts (if these can occur in the individual, as the same proponents admit). The sequence is proved, because an indifferent action has at least this property suitable to man, that it lacks all moral malice, and on the other hand brings some convenience to nature—for example, moderate delight, or

recreation that is not depraved. Hence an indifferent action, compared to a depraved action, is without doubt a benefit of nature; but this benefit is not owed to the man so acting, because at the time when there is offered to him a thought suited to performing an indifferent act, there could be offered to him a thought inducing a base act, and it is not in man's power to bring it about that the one thought, or its occasion, rather than the other, is offered: therefore it arises from an undue providence of God: therefore it is an undue benefit: therefore, according to that opinion, it is true grace, although lesser than the help required for acting well. Indeed, if the argument is made proportionately, it would prove that grace is necessary for sinning venially rather than mortally—because that there should not occur a thought inducing mortal sin, but only venial, is from God's providence, which is not owed to such a person. But this no one would admit: therefore it is a sign that that reasoning from an undue benefit does not suffice for the true character of grace.

21. *The tenth untoward consequence, worthy of note.* — Tenth, another inappropriateness presents itself, which seems worthy of consideration. For from that opinion, as explained, it follows that man, through acts elicited by the powers of free will, merits or obtains true supernatural aids for supernatural acts, and even the first supernatural calling to those same acts. But this consequence coincides, in reality, with the error of the Semipelagians, and is against the intention of the Councils that condemn that error: therefore [the opinion is false]. The defenders of the contrary opinion do not admit this sequence; but it even seems they defend that opinion chiefly for this reason: so that they may attribute to a good moral work some merit of congruity, and yet not attribute the beginning of salvation to free will, but to grace. They say, then, that the beginning of grace is taken from that congruous thought, which is necessary for the first morally good act of the will; and, because, given the first grace, man can through it merit a second, they consequently say that, through that first good act, man can merit the help of grace for another, better act, and so on consequently up to the acts proximate to sanctification. They excuse themselves, however, by saying that they by no means agree with the Semipelagians, because they do not attribute the beginning of that progression to nature, but to grace, by reason of that congruous thought.

22. But surely, although the words are changed, we believe the matter to be the same. For in the first place, that prior congruous thought does not prevent such a good act from coming about by the powers of free will alone; because, that thought being given, the will alone, by its innate free faculty, with only the general influence of the first cause, elicits such an act. This, however, is to act by

the powers of nature alone. For certainly Pelagius taught nothing else; for he did not doubt that a non-free thought, at least in the first act, must precede free volition. Indeed, before the will to believe, he admitted that a supernatural revelation precedes, at least on the part of the proposal and application of the object, as I noted above; nevertheless, because he said that, the proposal of such a credible object being made, the will alone, using its natural liberty, with God's general influence, could either will or refuse to believe, he was therefore condemned for teaching that the will to believe was from the powers of free will alone—although he did not say that the thought which precedes that will was from free will: therefore, *a fortiori*, the good moral act is in reality from the powers of free will alone, whatever be the case with that good thought. All the more so because that good thought too can be, and often will be, from the natural powers of the human intellect alone, provoked and excited through the external senses, which also operate by their own natural powers and are excited by objects according to the course of nature, and operate with only the general influence of the first cause. In what way, then, can an action be conceived that is more from the powers of free will alone?

23. Nor did Pelagius even fail to know that this honest, natural thought came from God's general providence. Nor finally did the Semipelagians fail to know that God foreknows what free will is going to do, if, constituted in such a disposition and order of things, it is excited to such a thought on such an occasion: for it is established that the Semipelagians acknowledged such foreknowledge in God, although they did not use it well. Those, then, who say that man merits the grace of God through these works, in reality say nothing different from them. This is shown thus. For if it were explained to them that the grace required for these works is nothing other than that disposition of things and causes from which that thought was to be excited, certainly they would not hesitate to admit such grace, since they also called the gift of creation grace; because with these manners of grace it stands perfectly well that free will operate by the powers of nature alone. In no way, then, is it to be thought that the beginning of grace, or of justification, of which the Councils speak, is taken from a natural thought, however right according to the light of nature, and however congruous in God's knowledge, so that it will infallibly have the effect of some morally good choice consonant with natural reason. And so the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, when it says: *The beginning of justification in adults is taken from the prevenient grace of God*, certainly does not understand by "prevenient grace" that good thought, but *the supernatural calling, by which, without preceding merits, men begin to be called to faith and justice*, as it declares

at the beginning of that chapter and the following one. Therefore, on account of that thought alone, and its congruity, it cannot be said that a good moral work is necessarily from grace, nor does such an application of the term "grace" serve to avoid the error of the Semipelagians, but rather to cover and conceal it.

24. *The eleventh untoward consequence that follows from that opinion.* — Eleventh, from that opinion arises an occasion for saying that faith is not the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice of the Christian man, because before faith many good works precede, done from that grace, which they say are truly and properly dispositions toward faith and supernatural grace, and consequently, that the beginning and foundation of the spiritual edifice can be said to be taken from such dispositions, or good works. For the spiritual edifice includes all the works that, in themselves, conduce in some way to eternal life, whether mediately or immediately, whether through proper merit, or by way of obtaining, or congruous disposition: therefore the foundation of this edifice is before faith—indeed even before the proper calling to faith—which some consequently grant. This, however, is not sufficiently consonant with Paul calling faith *the foundation of things to be hoped for.* Here the Fathers and commentators understand faith to be the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice and of the whole of merit. And Augustine often says that the beginning of faith, and accordingly faith itself, is given to us gratuitously; through faith, however, we can merit and obtain the rest. But if there were some other, prior foundation, on which the merit of faith itself, or of the calling to it, could be founded, faith itself could not be called the first foundation, nor would it be the first grace, nor the beginning of grace.

25. *An evasion.* — Perhaps it will be said that the act of faith is the first foundation of the whole supernatural edifice, because it is the first act of that order on which the rest rest; and so Paul said it is the foundation of things to be hoped for; the remaining gifts of grace, however, which precede faith, are of a lower order in their being, although they agree in the character of a gratuitous gift, and therefore can be called not so much a foundation as a certain disposition, which does not remain with the edifice, nor pertains to it intrinsically, as the foundation does. Indeed, some add that even the will to believe, which is as it were the proximate disposition to the act of divine faith, is contained in that lower order of graces, which in their being are not supernatural. Nor does this seem inappropriate, since it is not necessary that the dispositions which precede be of the same order as the form.

26. *Access to this evasion is foreclosed.* — But surely, by the same reasoning, it could be said that acts of the natural order, even if not from grace, can be

dispositions to grace—for why should they not be able to, if it is not necessary that they be of the same order? Likewise, the proximate disposition to sanctifying grace would not need to be in itself supernatural, if it is not necessary for a disposition to be of the same order as the form by reason of which it is immediately conferred. Moreover, there is no foundation (as is clear from what has been said above) for distinguishing two orders of acts, if for any and every one of them that help of exciting and assisting grace, given to us on account of Christ, is necessary; because it has not otherwise been handed down to us that those acts are supernatural, except insofar as we are taught that each of them cannot come about without the aids of grace. Finally, it is necessary that the spiritual edifice of the Christian man be founded on some knowledge, because the will cannot build, except upon a prior knowledge. Either, then, that knowledge is natural, or supernatural. The former cannot be said, otherwise the beginning of grace would be from nature: but if the latter is said, that knowledge must be either of faith, or at least of a proximate calling and internal inspiration, or illumination, of the Holy Spirit drawing the soul to faith, all of which is comprehended under the foundation of faith. Therefore, before this foundation, there can be no merit, or grace, that could found the spiritual edifice of the Christian man.

27. *The twelfth untoward consequence.—The error of Michael Baius.—Another error of the same author.* — Twelfth, it follows from this opinion that man, by his own nature—as though by a power of divine providence, as it were, connatural to him—does not have the power of free will, except for sinning. This consequence is most absurd, and among other propositions is condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII, in the bull against Michael Baius, among which one of his propositions was: *Only by the Pelagian error can any good, or non-evil, use of free will be admitted, and he who so thinks and teaches does injury to the grace of Christ.* Others are: *Free will, without the help of the grace of God, avails only for sinning.* Likewise another: *It is the Pelagian error to say that free will avails to avoid any sin.* These doctrines were said by that author of fallen man, and in that sense are condemned: but much more condemnable things are said of man in any state whatsoever, even that of integral nature, and of angels, and of every possible rational or intellectual creature: for all this follows from that opinion, and is without doubt injurious to nature and its author. That this absurdity does indeed follow is manifest, because that opinion affirms that man needs grace as altogether necessary for individual morally good acts: therefore free will does not have natural powers to perform even a single good moral work without grace: but it has been shown that, consequently, it follows that it cannot even

perform an indifferent act without grace. Michael Baius saw this inference, and tacitly admitted it in the words quoted. It remains, then, that free will, by its nature, is solely a power for sinning.

28. *Someone will try to evade the force of this reasoning.—The response is enervated.* — It can be answered, first, that there is nothing inappropriate in this, because in the Council of Orange 2, canon 22, it is said: *No one has anything of his own except falsehood and sin.* But one thing is to have something of one's own, another is to have in oneself and in one's nature powers and a faculty for doing something that is not sin. For although free will can, without grace, do some good work, nevertheless it can be said to have that work "of its own" when it performs it, but it is from God, not as the author of grace, but as the author and provider of nature, to whom thanks are owed for every good action, because everything is referred to him, though each with due proportion. But man is said to have sin "of his own," because sin, as sin, is not from God, but from free will. Indeed, it is not even from free will itself by reason of that perfection which it has from God, but by reason of the imperfection it has of itself—namely, that it is from nothing, whence it has, consequently, this defectibility, as is the common doctrine of the Fathers. So the Council of Orange never said that free will has no natural power except for sinning, but said that it has nothing of itself except sin, because everything else must be referred to God.

29. *Another evasion.—It is rejected.* — Otherwise it can be answered that free will indeed has, by its own nature, a power for acting well, but needs grace in order to use that power. For the grace of congruous thought, explained above, is not necessary for man to be able to act well, but to actually act well in fact. But against this it stands in the way, first, that this is not said consistently: because if the power is natural and, in its kind, entire and sufficient for such an action, then the concursus, or providence, of God necessary and sufficient for that same action must also be connatural, because (as they say) nature does not fail in necessary things. Next, the following reasoning especially stands in the way of that response.

30. *The thirteenth untoward consequence.* — Thirteenth, then, it is objected that, from that opinion, it follows that the grace which Augustine requires as necessary for individual good works is not necessary for being able, but only for willing, or doing, good. The consequence is false: therefore so is that from which it follows. The sequence is proved, because, by the preceding reasoning, this is already conceded for good moral acts, and from this an argument is made (as has often been insisted) that, by consequent reasoning, the same can be said of any good act, of whatever order—because Augustine speaks generally of the

necessity of grace for acting well, and from this necessity alone we infer the powerlessness, or insufficiency, of nature for some good work. Therefore, if with this necessity for the work there stands an absolute power from nature, it could be said of any good act whatsoever that it can come about through nature, although it does not come about without grace. This consequence, however, is Pelagian.

The foundation of Pelagius's error. — For it is established from Augustine, book one, *On the Grace of Christ*, chapter five, that the foundation of the Pelagian error was that *he placed the possibility of good will and action in liberty* —that is, a power sufficient for performing supernatural acts, which he said is helped by law and teaching. And therefore the Council of Trent, session 6, canons 2 and 3, says not only that grace is necessary *for man to act*, but also *for him to be able to act.* And the same is found in the Council of Orange 2, canon 7, and the Council of Mileve, chapter five, and the African Council, chapter 80. And Christ the Lord did not say *without me you will do nothing*, but, *you can do nothing.* If, then, these expressions comprehend any and every good moral act, it must consequently be denied that there is a possibility for them in nature; and conversely it must be affirmed that grace is necessary, not only for us to do them, but also for us to be able to do them. Or finally it must be admitted, as we intend, that those expressions of Augustine and the Councils do not extend to any and every moral act, and accordingly it is asserted without foundation, and with great inconvenience, that grace is necessary for individual moral acts.

31. *The fourteenth untoward consequence.* — Fourteenth, it follows from that opinion that only that providence of the author of nature, from which an evil moral work, or sin, efficaciously or infallibly follows, is owed to man, considered according to his own nature. The consequence is false: therefore [the principle is false]. The sequence is declared, because, by force of rational and free nature, some providence and concursus of God is owed to man, so that he can use his liberty, and proceed to some work; for to every created nature some concursus is owed for performing the works consonant with that nature. But according to the aforesaid opinion, excitation or concursus, by which man acts well, is not owed to man: therefore only help is owed to him by which he acts badly. The consequence is proved, because either no deliberate indifferent work is given in the individual, as is more probable, or, even if we admit that it can be given, by the same reasoning that help is not owed by which a good act comes about, neither is that owed by which an indifferent act, free of malice, comes about, as we argued above. It remains, then, that only help is owed by which we act badly.

32. *A response is given to this reasoning.—It is refuted.* — It can be said, first, that there is nothing inappropriate in granting this of fallen man, who, on account of sin, has become unworthy of all good. But, in the first place, this has no place in that opinion, which founds that necessity of grace on the natural condition of the rational creature. Next, if natural help for acting morally well is owed to man considered in pure nature, it is also owed to fallen man, because through sin, especially original sin, he is not deprived of the general benefit of concursus, or owed influence, of nature. All the more so because the state of fallen nature is not the state of damnation, in which the damned person, by his own merit, is perhaps deprived of all concursus for acting well.

33. *Another evasion.—Illustrated by two examples.—The first.—The second.* — It can otherwise be said that no determinate help, namely either for acting well or for sinning, but disjunctively one or the other, is owed to human nature, and so, with respect to each individual, pertains to grace, that he be rather given that help which is in fact to be conjoined with good action rather than with bad. Just as a man who is bound to distribute money among the poor whom he wishes does some favor to the one he chooses, because, although he is bound to give to this one or that one, he is not bound determinately to this one. A more fitting example may be this: if an heir, by force of some legacy, is bound to give someone one silver vessel out of many that the deceased left, he does some favor if he does not give the cheapest of them, but one of greater value, or price.

34. *The evasion is rejected.* — We respond, first, that, granting that with respect to individuals some liberal benefit of God intervenes, it nevertheless does not exceed the order of nature, nor belong to the order of grace. For who would deny that there are many benefits which God confers, not only in matters of morals, but also in other natural goods, which no one would say pertain to the goods of grace of which the Councils speak when they say it is necessary for acting rightly? As, for example, since it is contingent that a man be generated, either with such a concursus of material and efficient causes that he is born whole and with the best disposition of his members, or so as to be produced monstrous, or maimed, etc.—surely God owed to no one such an order and disposition of causes, that he should concur to that one's generation in the former way rather than the latter. Shall we say, then, that a man could not be generated whole without the grace of God? Who has ever spoken in this way? For a similar favor is even granted to brute animals. And similar benefits, pertaining either to relieving the necessities of this life, or to avoiding things contrary to health, or fame, or honor, or the goods of fortune, are conferred daily through God's providence, which is in itself general, and as it were

indifferent, and is not, without some liberality, determined to a manner and order of causes suitable to man rather than unsuitable: yet this does not suffice for such providence to be said properly to pertain to grace.

35. Rather we add, from what has been said above, that, although with respect to individual persons or particular events some liberality, or merely voluntary choice of God, was necessary—which is discerned in the first disposition and constitution of things, under such an order of causes from which it finally happens that here and now there occurs to me such an event, suitable rather than unsuitable—nevertheless, with respect to each species, such a kind of providence is owed, which is not determined to evil or unsuitable, or monstrous, effects, but, at most, that it be general and common. From which it necessarily follows that good, or suitable, effects sometimes arise, unless they are impeded by the peculiar care of the author of nature himself; which it would not be consonant with wise governance always, and without any special cause, to do, especially in moral works. This the author of nature observes, both in the lower species of things and in man himself, with regard to goods suitable to nature, which indeed are not denied to the whole species; the distribution of them, however, with respect to individuals, is contingent, such that certain individuals attain those goods, and not others, on account of the varied disposition of causes, or concursuses, with which it happens that they are produced, or act: this contingency, however, is not without the providence and will of God, thus pre-ordaining and disposing the course of secondary causes; the whole of this disposition and distribution, however, pertains to general providence. This very thing, then, is observed with human nature, considered in itself, in relation to a moral good consonant with natural reason; and accordingly, from natural providence and concursus, it is owed to it, as far as it is from God's part, although it is not owed to individuals, or their acts. And accordingly, although the disposition of causes from which it comes about that Peter, rather than Paul, is moved to a good natural act, is from God's free choice, it is nevertheless not outside, or above, connatural providence, or one pertaining to the order of nature, but shows that, even in this, God uses his liberty, namely in distributing the goods that pertain to the order of nature.

36. *A final argument against this opinion.* — Finally, let us confirm all this, because from the contrary opinion it follows that man cannot, in this life, attain knowledge of any natural truth—whether of natural or moral philosophy, or of mathematics, or of any art, or political prudence—without proper and true grace. The sequence is clear, because the human intellect, even in natural matters, is exposed to deception, and is, as it were, indifferent to true and false

knowledge. That it be determined to the true rather than the false depends entirely either on extrinsic teaching, or on objects that occur, on phantasms and apprehensions that arise from them. But that other motives occur, which lead rather to the true than to the false, is not in man's power, but is of itself contingent—although, as it indeed happens under divine providence, it occurs infallibly: therefore it is a singular benefit of God, not owed to this individual—that such an excitation to the true is given to him: therefore it is just as much proper grace as that which is required for a moral work.

37. *A response.* — They respond by conceding that none of these natural virtues can be known without grace, broadly taken for any benefit of God not owed to nature. Nevertheless it can come about without the grace of Christ, because Christ merited for us only the help of God which is offered to us for living rightly and piously: but that help, for knowing, or for mere speculative natural knowledge, or works of art, is not for living piously, and therefore is not given to us through Christ. Because Christ did not die so that we might be philosophers, or craftsmen, but that we might be good and honest, as Augustine said in a similar matter, letter 105. And therefore that help cannot be called the grace of Christ, and consequently not absolutely grace, because grace, simply speaking, is called by the Fathers only that which is given to us through Christ and his death, as Augustine signifies, letter 95, to Innocent.

38. *The response is refuted.* — But this response does not enervate, but rather confirms, everything we have said. First, because from the response itself it is established that the difficulty is more evaded in words than declared. For whether something is grace or not does not depend on whether it is given through Christ or not given through Christ; because to give through Christ is a certain relation to an extrinsic cause, which presupposes that the gift itself, which is given on account of Christ's merit, is in itself grace; it has, then, from elsewhere, that it is grace, independently of whether it is given through Christ or not. Besides, these authors, in this very matter, teach that grace through Christ was given neither to angels, nor to Adam in the state of innocence; will they say, then, that they were converted to God without grace, as is required for justice, or salvation? Besides, either good moral works are considered as ordered to eternal salvation, and in some manner useful and actually conducing to it, or only as conformed to it by reason of the suitability of nature. In the former way they admit they fall under the merit of Christ; yet by the same reasoning Philosophy and Rhetoric, ordered to the same end, are from the merits of Christ, and the help given for learning them is given on account of Christ. But in the latter way, by what reason help is not given on account of Christ for speculation, neither is

it for any moral action whatsoever, which does not conduce to the eternal life, justification, and remission of sins. For (from these same passages of Augustine) Christ died so that we might be faithful and holy, not that we might obtain natural goods, whatever they are, considered in themselves and without ordination to supernatural ones. Finally, that benefit which does not pertain to the benefits of grace through Christ pertains without doubt to the order of nature, and is given by force of natural providence, with the suited distribution which it requires in its own order, without which it cannot be, as I said above: hence it is not a gift simply distinct from the gift of creation, but connected with it in the manner explained above, and therefore is not properly grace, neither through Christ, nor without Christ. All this, moreover, is common to the help, or excitation, given for knowing matter to be given in the abstract, and for willing to give a single alms—taken of itself, without ordination to eternal salvation: therefore the one is no more grace than the other, but both pertain to the grace of creation and general governance. And that one is given for perfecting the intellect in natural matters, and the other for perfecting the will in only one, minimal, natural perfection, is a very material difference, which surely contributes little to the character of grace.

39. *Objection.* — One objection remains, which seems to enervate many of the reasons made. For, if they were efficacious, they would prove not only that grace is not necessary for any and every good moral work, but even that there is no good work of the natural order for which grace is necessary—indeed not even for acting always well morally, collectively (as they say), that is, for never interposing any sin. The consequence is false, because at least for eliciting love of God above all things, as he is author or end of nature, and other arduous works, and for keeping all the natural precepts collectively, grace is necessary, as I now suppose. The sequence is proved, because if grace is necessary for one moral act, almost all the arguments we have made apply to it, because from it it can be inferred that the necessity of grace for some act is not on account of the supernaturality of the act, and accordingly, from the necessity of grace, it cannot be inferred that supernatural acts exist, and thus the principal foundation from which we gather them is removed, and consequently the firm foundation by which we assert it is certain that infused habits exist is also overthrown, and thus consequently many of the things said can be applied. It is responded by denying the sequence, because by the arguments made above we have not proved absolutely that a moral work cannot be from grace, or that grace cannot sometimes be necessary for some good moral work, but only that, on account of the mere necessity of that congruous thought alone, grace cannot be said to be

necessary for it. Hence, since it has already been shown that, on account of such a thought, no other special internal motion is required for individual good moral works, it is concluded absolutely that grace is not necessary for individual works either. Nevertheless, for some excellent or very arduous work, and for keeping the collection of natural precepts, or for performing moral works frequently without the stain of sin, grace is necessary—which, according to the doctrine of the Councils, consists not in that natural honest thought alone, but also in a special illumination, inspiration, and protection of God. And as to this kind of grace, there is not the same reasoning concerning these graver actions, or perseverance in them, and concerning each and every other one, because in those effects there is a far greater and special difficulty, which cannot be overcome without God's special help. That necessity of grace for some moral works, however, is, as it were, accidental, on account of extrinsic impediments of corrupted nature; there is given, however, another necessity, of itself, for other good works, which arises from the loftiness of the end to which they must be proportioned, and from this necessity it is best concluded that such works are, in themselves and intrinsically, supernatural. What kind of grace, however, is necessary for some good moral works, and how it is distinguished from the grace necessary for individual supernatural works, is a matter for another consideration.

CHAPTER XVII
A RESPONSE IS GIVEN TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONTRARY OPINION SET FORTH IN CHAPTER TEN

1. *The first foundation is resolved.* — The first and chief foundation of the contrary opinion was placed in this: that a congruous thought is necessary for acting honorably, and that this is not owed to nature, and is therefore grace. To this a manifold response can be drawn from what has been said. One is that this thought, whether it is owed or not, is contained within the bounds of natural providence, and is therefore a natural benefit, but not true grace. Nor is it enough to say that this natural providence arises from the intention of giving glory to the predestined, and is therefore reckoned grace. This (I say) does not suffice, because even creation itself is given to the predestined from that same intention, as I said above, and is not on that account grace properly so called. Likewise, it is not necessary for such a thought to arise from that intention, as is clear in the case of the reprobate. But if it is said that in them it is given from the antecedent will of giving glory, this too is not in itself necessary, as is clear

concerning man in pure nature. Now concerning a principle necessary for operation, judgment must be made from what belongs to the thing *per se*, not from God's extrinsic intention. If, then, such a thought in fact brings some benefit in relation to the supernatural end, it can indeed be said to come from supernatural providence, yet not to be grace properly speaking except by extrinsic denomination. Just as health, or goods of body or fortune, are sometimes given or taken away by supernatural providence, yet are not thereby the proper grace we are treating of.

2. *The same foundation is resolved in another way.* — Another response is that this thought is owed to nature considered in itself, even if it is not owed to this particular individual, and is therefore not true grace; for this is owed in no way either to the individual or to the species, and therefore human nature could have been instituted without the whole order of grace. This can be illustrated by the example suggested above. For one who is bound by justice or by an owed office to distribute money among the poor will not be said simply to give it, or to do a favor, to each individual poor person, even though he voluntarily chose these rather than others to confer such alms upon. There intervenes, then, a certain benevolence in the choice of persons; but the gift itself, considered in itself, is owed, and therefore is properly and truly not a favor. This is so above all because, given the first institution of things and the common course of causes, that thought will already be owed to such an individual, since from the mere general course and concurrence of secondary causes, together with the general influence of the first cause, it follows—unless extraordinarily impeded. And this is enough for such an action to be called owed according to the order of nature. For the fact that this first institution of order, and of the causes of the universe, was made by God voluntarily in this way rather than another, pertains to the gift of the creation of such a universe, composed in this particular mode rather than another; it does not, therefore, belong to the order of sanctifying grace, of which we are treating. The effects, therefore, that follow from such an institution of things, together with the common course of secondary causes—both free and natural—and with the general influence of God, pertain to natural benefits, not to the order of grace. And that this congruous thought is of that kind has already been shown sufficiently.

3. *Interpretation of St. Thomas's thought.* — Nor did St. Thomas, in the passage cited there, *1, 2, q. 109, art. 2*, indicate anything repugnant to this doctrine. For in the body of the article he treats absolutely of all acts of the will and teaches generally that every volition of good requires the help of God moving it, by which he understands the general concurrence of the first cause, as

has been shown above. But afterward, in the response to the first objection, he specially attributes to the first volition concerning the end that it is from an exterior principle, namely God, and thus reduces all motions of the will to the prompting of God—not only by reason of the general concurrence by which God immediately flows into all acts of the will, of which he had spoken in the body of the article, but by another, special reason, namely, because with regard to all acts concerning means the will is moved by the intention of the end, and toward the intention of the end it is moved by God himself; and thus at least the ultimate resolution of the motions of the will is into God. Although it is obscure and disputed in what mode the intention of the end is from God, beyond the general concurrence, it is nevertheless certain that St. Thomas is not speaking there of the motion of grace, but generally; for, if his line of reasoning is sound, even the intention of a depraved end, insofar as it is not from a prior act of the will, is from the extrinsic agent God. That motion, therefore, is of the natural order if it is given for the effecting of a natural act according to the exigency of nature; or it will be a supernatural motion if it is given for acts of a higher order. Hence Cajetan there well notes that this doctrine coincides with what the same St. Thomas, in the same book, *q. 9, art. 4*, had taught concerning the motion of the will in general.

4. As for what the cited authors say—that this motion of God is a thought moving toward the intention of the end, which naturally occurs before the counsel or deliberation of the will—this (I say) is not consonant with the mind of St. Thomas. For this thought pertains to motion on the side of the object, whereas St. Thomas speaks of motion on the side of the power, as is clear from the cited *q. 9, art. 4*. Likewise, because that thought is not always reduced to God as its proximate cause, but to external objects, whereas St. Thomas holds that God immediately gives this motion. Others, then, say that this motion is a physical determination which God alone specially makes regarding the intention of the end. But this too is false, because if such a predetermination is necessary, it will also be necessary for acts concerning the means; or if it is repugnant to liberty, it will likewise be repugnant when given for the intention of the end, since that too is a free act. Likewise it will be specially repugnant with regard to the intention of a depraved end, even though St. Thomas's argument applies to that case as well. And for the same reasons that motion cannot be understood as some peculiar actual and vital instinct which God specially impresses with regard to the intention of the end: both because this is repugnant in the case of the intention of a depraved end, and also because in

acts that are merely natural—even good ones—this special motion is not necessary, as has been proved.

5. It must therefore be said that in natural acts this motion is nothing other than the natural inclination of the will toward the good suited to its nature; while in supernatural acts it is either an infused habit or some divine supernatural inspiration. Hence, speaking of acts of the order of nature, the same St. Thomas, in the cited *q. 9, art. 4*, says that the intention of the end is attributed to the author of nature in the same way that the motion of a heavy body is attributed to its generator. This proportion holds only in this respect: that both motions proceed proximately from an inclination of nature given by its author—saving, however, the diversity in the mode of producing it, vital and free in the one case. This attribution, then, or reduction of such an act to the author of nature, is not by reason of any grace, but of natural providence alone. A sign of this is also that it is common to a depraved intention of the end—not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it tends toward some good which is genuinely such. For this too arises from the general impulse of nature toward good, although, since it does not arise from necessity but with liberty, it can therefore, through a defect of the proximate cause, be done badly.

6. *They respond to the passages of Augustine.* — To the passages of Augustine that are brought forward concerning holy thought, by reason of which the beginning of all good works is attributed to God, we say briefly two things. One is that Augustine is speaking of that holy thought which leads us to works of piety or things conducive to eternal life. The other is that under the term "holy thought" he includes the whole supernatural vocation, that is, not only the illumination of the mind but also the inspiration of the will and its internal excitation. Both of these have been proved above and will be further established from what is to be said. Hence other testimonies of the Fathers and Councils, which require grace for individual good acts, are explained by these same authors (as we have seen) as referring to acts of Christian piety, or (which is the same thing) to good acts done as is required for salvation, or for justification—whether to merit it or in some way to begin it. And in this way too is understood the word of Christ: *Without me you can do nothing*—namely, nothing useful for eternal salvation; for it was of this matter that he was speaking there, as Augustine noted. And this is the manner of speech of Scripture, that *nothing* is said to be that which does not contribute to eternal life, according to that text, 1 Corinthians 13: *If I have not charity, I am nothing. If I distribute, etc., but have not charity, it profits me nothing.*

7. It can also be added that it is probable that the Pelagians denied even the necessity of the general and actual influx of God toward works suited to nature, and thought that the necessity of that concurrence was repugnant to liberty; and that in this sense it was sometimes handed down by Councils and Fathers that good natural works cannot be done without the help of God, as St. Thomas also speaks, *1, 2, q. 109, art. 1 and 2*—that is, without the cooperation of God. But although perhaps one or another testimony of the Council of Orange, or of Jerome, or some other similar one, could be expounded in this way, not all of them can; especially those which speak of the necessity of helping and prevenient grace through divine inspiration and illumination. For these clearly suppose that there are not sufficient powers in free will for those acts of which they speak, not only because they depend in their operation on the first cause, but also because, considered as a proximate cause, free will is insufficient. And therefore, when they speak of the necessity of grace for individual acts, they are without doubt treating of works of piety, as has been shown.

8. *To the first argument.* — To the first argument, drawn from the necessity of prayer, it can be said, first, that true prayer—of which the Saints and Councils speak—is one of the works of piety which cannot be done without the grace of God, as the Council of Orange expressly teaches, *cap. 3*, saying that grace is not given in response to human invocation, but that grace itself causes us to invoke God. And the reason is that true prayer must be made from faith, as Christ said repeatedly in the Gospel, and as is taken from that text of Paul, Romans 10: *How shall they call upon him in whom they have not believed?* But prayer from faith is also from grace. And the same Paul confirms this, Romans 8, saying: *The Spirit helps our infirmity.* And explaining for what purpose he helps, he adds: *For we know not what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit himself asks for us with unspeakable groanings*—that is, he teaches and causes us to ask, according to Augustine's exposition of this in the second book of *On the Trinity*, c. 6; and in the same sense he adds that *the Spirit asks for the Saints according to God*—that is, he causes them to pray with a prayer *according to God*, that is, as it ought to be, so that it may be acceptable to God. It is of this prayer, then, that Augustine speaks when he draws from it an argument for the necessity of grace. But this prayer could neither be made by man in pure nature, nor can it be made by an unbeliever, since it is founded on faith. Therefore either man in pure nature, and now the unbelieving man, cannot do a good moral work—which is most absurd—or that prayer is not necessary for each and every good moral work, nor can Augustine's argument be applied to the matter at hand.

9. *Second response.* — Second, we say: granting that grace is not necessary even for the believer for each individual good moral work of acquired virtue, nevertheless God must be prayed to, that he may give peculiar help for the proper accomplishment of each work, or that such a work may be done not merely naturally but in some way meritoriously. Or certainly, although the help of grace is per se not necessary for each of these works, it is at least necessary in order not to sin, even against the law of nature, and it is contingent for one to sin in any individual act, and it is uncertain to man where a sin against natural reason may befall him; and therefore he ought to pray in each instance, lest this occur. Hence, if without faith man could have some knowledge and an imperfect hope of divine help, as the Jew now has, he ought also, insofar as he is able, to pray for that same reason, although in truth such prayer has no value of itself.

10. This is illustrated by the example of the sick man, which St. Thomas uses in this matter. For although without the help of another he can take a small step, or render individual steps, nevertheless, since he cannot by himself accomplish the whole motion, and can fall at any single step, he therefore asks for continued help for all of them; so likewise man ought to make provision for himself regarding each individual good work, on account of the danger present in each. This is so above all because, in God's conditioned foreknowledge, such help can be necessary for this or that work to be accomplished with effect, even if it is not absolutely necessary—since God indeed foresees that without such help the work will not be done, even though it could absolutely be done. And thus, although generally speaking, the prudent petition for help is not always made on account of absolute powerlessness and necessity simply speaking, but can be made on account of greater ease and facility, as is evident in human affairs, nevertheless with respect to God this convenience is always reduced to some necessity, because in his foreknowledge it can be necessary for the existence of the work what is not simply necessary for its possibility.

11. *Whether grace is necessary to overcome some temptation against the law of nature, or for each individual one.—First view.—Another opinion.—Third opinion.*—In the second argument it is asked whether man can overcome some temptation against the law of nature, or whether grace is necessary to overcome each one individually. For there is no lack of most learned men who, although they admit that grace is not necessary for individual honorable works, think it necessary to overcome individual temptations, at least insofar as these can be increased and pressed by the industry and effectiveness of the demon. This grace is either positive, to overcome the most grave temptation that God permits, or at

least negative, since not permitting the demon to tempt as much as it can is itself a grace. Others, however, hold the opposite extreme, contending that man can resist any temptation individually, however grave it may seem, by the powers of free will alone, although he cannot long persevere in this victory without the help of grace. Others respond that lighter and ordinary temptations, taken individually, can be overcome by man through the powers of free will, by not consenting—which indeed suffices for performing some good moral work. For (as I said) we are not here dealing with any work whatsoever, even distributively and including the most difficult ones, but indefinitely, with some good work; and such a work can occur even without any temptation at all.

12. But if it is pressed that there is no work which, grace being removed, could not be difficult—indeed even impossible—if God permits man to be tempted by the demon as much as it can, I respond, first, that perhaps it is not so, because many good works occur to be done that are so easy from their object and circumstances that, with the persevering use of reason, the demon would not be able to attach such difficulty to them. For if it disturbs or distracts the mind of man so much that he cannot attend to it, then it will no longer be a culpable act or omission; but if man can attend sufficiently, the matter itself will often not admit so great a difficulty. Next, it is said: granting that we concede that there is some grace by which God does not permit man to be more gravely tempted in individual good works than he is in fact tempted, this is not contrary to the truth we are defending. For that grace is extrinsic and is not a cause *per se*, but only as removing impediments; here, however, we are treating of the internal grace of illumination and inspiration, and of divine assistance, which grace is the proper and *per se* cause of those acts for which it is given. To the third argument we shall speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVIII
SATISFACTION IS GIVEN TO THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTION PROPOSED IN CHAPTER NINE

1. Concerning the principal objection proposed in chapter nine, on whose occasion we have said all these things, many theologians do not consider it inconvenient to grant that in some—indeed in many—adult men, some or several good moral works precede every internal prevenient help that is true and supernatural grace. For since such a work is possible from reason and free will alone, it has no per se connection with the prevenient help of grace; therefore there is nothing inconvenient about its in fact preceding it.

2. And hence, furthermore, many are taught that to one who does what is in him to act well morally by the natural powers which he then alone has, God confers his grace—not sanctifying grace, but that of the first supernatural help, or vocation to faith. So St. Thomas expressly taught, *2 dist., 5 quaest., art. 1, dist. 28, quaest. unic., art. 4, q. 14, de Verit., art. 11, ad 1*, treating of the son of unbelievers brought up in the forests, who, on reaching the use of reason, follows the guidance of right reason, of whom he says that he will be supernaturally illuminated by God. He confirms this in *lib. 3, contra Gentes, cap. 159*, and *1, 2, quaest. 89, art. 6*. The same was held by Altisiodorensis, *lib. 3 Summae, tract. 2, cap. 1, quaest. 5*, and *lib. 2, tract. 11, cap. 1, q. 4*; Alensis, *1 part., quaest. 29, M. 3, art. 1, ad 1*, and *2 part., quaest. 19, M. 8, § 1*, and *3 part., quaest. 69, M. 5, art. 3, ad 5 and 6*; Gerson, *Alpha. 24, lit. M*, and *Alpha. 61, lit. G*, and in the treatise *On the Spiritual Life, lect. 1*. The same was commonly taught by theologians on *2, dist. 28*: Albertus, *art. 1, ad 4*; Giles, *art. 2, § 2, ad 2*; Richard, *art. 1, quaest. 2*; Nicolaus de Orbelli, *art. 2*, and *dist. 27*; Gabriel, *2, dist. 22, quaest. 2, art. 3, dub. 1*; and others whom I cited in chapter seven. The same was followed among modern Thomists by Soto, *4, dist. 1, quaest. 2, art. 3*; Vitoria, *Relectio on the child coming to the use of reason, 3 part., num. 14*; Cano, *Relectio on the sacraments in general, part. 1 and 2*; Medina holds it probable, *1, 2, quaest. 89, art. 6, dub. ult.*, and *quaest. 109, art. 6, dub. 3, ad 2 and 3*; Viguerius, in his *Institutiones Theologicae, cap. 10, § 4*; Zumel, *1, 2, q. 112, art. 3, disp. 5*. The same is followed by Vega, *lib. 13, in Trid., cap. 12, Via 3*; Cordoba, at length, *lib. 2, de Ignor., quaest. 4* entire, and *quaest. 5, ad 4*. Also Driedo, *tract. de Concordia, part. 2, cap. ult.*, and *de Capt. et Redemp. gen. hum., tract. 2, c. 2*, says this is piously believed and that one does not err pertinaciously in holding it. The same is held by Ruard, *art. 7, § "Doctores"*; Albert Pighius, *On Free Will, against Calvin, fol. 99*, where he says this is the opinion of the Fathers, which many others have followed among those who wrote against the heretics of this age.

3. And indeed, whatever may be the truth of this opinion, which it is not now necessary for us to defend or explain, for the purpose of resolving the difficulty proposed, as I shall say a little below, it is nevertheless not plausible that so many grave theologians should have erred dangerously in this doctrine, or that they could not have a sense entirely foreign to the error of Pelagius. I have no doubt, then, that they held that this entire first grace, even if given to a man acting well morally, is not given on account of the merits or disposition of such a work, but from the pure grace of God; and that the good work itself can at most serve, while it lasts, to impede sin, which could perhaps be an obstacle

to divine illumination. This sense I explained in the third book *On Helps*, chapter two, and I find it taught by Marcus the Hermit in the words I cited above in chapter eight, from the book *On Paradise*, chapter fifty-three. Nor does this sense exclude the other concerning one who does what is in him through supernatural help. For with regard to different graces, the same words can be uttered in different senses. Thus, with regard to justifying grace, and for obtaining it, it is necessary that man do what he can through prevenient grace's help. Or, what is the same, man already prevented by supernatural help, if he wishes to progress, must, through the help received and to the extent it avails, act accordingly; but with regard to this very help itself, if man is not yet supernaturally prevented, he cannot operate through such help. Therefore it is said of him in the other sense that he should do what he can, by taking care not to place an obstacle, and by doing something good in this regard, as far as he is able.

4. *From this opinion it does not follow that a cause of predestination is given with respect to all its effects.* — Hence it is also established that, even if this opinion be admitted, it does not follow that a cause of predestination is given, with respect to all its effects, on the part of the predestined man. For through such a good work he is not for himself the cause of the first assisting grace; rather, God confers it by his own freedom, either from that will by which he wills to save all men, or, with respect to the predestined, from that will by which he chose him. But if you say that at least it follows that a cause is given *per accidens*, as removing an impediment—for thus such a man seems to be the cause of the first help conferred upon him—I respond that not even in this way is he the cause of that effect, as far as predestination is concerned. For, first, because to the predestined that first illumination is given not only as sufficient grace but also as efficacious and congruous grace, to which such a work in no way contributes, even *per accidens*; rather it proceeds immediately from divine election. And also because, if by that good work such a man is prevented from placing an obstacle to his vocation, this very fact stems from predestination, as I shall say more fully below.

5. *Other inconveniences alleged do not follow.* — And thus the inconveniences that were inferred from that opinion also cease. For that opinion does not suppose that man can live innocently, or that he can often act well without the help of grace, without sinning much more frequently unless he is divinely prevented; rather it supposes only that he can do something good, which, though it be small, can at least serve to impede sin for that occasion. And then it trusts in God's mercy that he will not fail such a man—not on account of

his work, which has no proportion with grace, but because God is of himself disposed to give all men sufficient and necessary remedies for salvation.

6. *Response to the principal objection.* — Finally I add that this whole opinion is not necessary for us in order to resolve the difficulty proposed, and therefore I now neither approve nor reject it; for it depends on many principles that must be examined in the treatise on grace. I say, then, that from those words of Paul, *God wills all men to be saved*, it more probably follows that to all adult men some beginning of salvation is given, and thus some vocation. Hence, although before this supernatural vocation man can do, and does, some good work, and afterward is called by God, it does not follow that he is called on account of that work, but on account of God's general benevolence toward men and on account of Christ. Nor is it even necessary that such a good work should concur by removing an obstacle, since even if man were to sin as gravely as possible, God would illuminate him from that general will, as can be piously believed. For since the time of giving this first illumination is not one and the same fixed time for all men, but God gives it at the opportune time, defined by himself, therefore whether man acts well or badly beforehand, that time predetermined by God is neither hastened nor delayed; nor in determining it did God have regard to man's work, but to the order of his wisdom and the counsel of his will.

7. *There is no connection between the cause of predestination on our part and the power of free will toward some moral good without grace.* — And thus it is finally established that there is no connection between these questions: that of the cause of predestination on our part, and that of the power of free will to do some good moral work without grace. For even if such a work is done before any help of supernatural grace, it can in no way found grace itself, much less predestination to it. And this, since it is true of every help, especially of the congruous and efficacious kind, such as that which is usually the effect of predestination. All of this will be more confirmed by what is to be said in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XIX
A GOOD MORAL WORK OF THE NATURAL ORDER, OR OF ACQUIRED VIRTUE, CANNOT BE THE PROPER CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION WITH REGARD TO ANY OF ITS EFFECTS, EVEN IF IT PROCEEDS FROM SOME EXTRINSIC GRACE

1. Up to this point we have spoken of good works insofar as they can in some way be done by free will without grace; now we must speak of works done from grace. Since, however, grace is necessary not only for supernatural works, but also helps in the honorable perfection of moral and natural works, we shall in this chapter speak of moral and natural works proceeding in some way from grace, and afterward of supernatural acts; and at the same time we shall further declare and confirm certain things said above. I suppose, however, that the discussion is not of a cause that is altogether improper and *per accidens*, but in some way *per se* and moral—such as is a proportioned disposition, or some degree of merit, at least of congruity, or of impetration. I suppose further that there are two ways in which a work of acquired virtue can be from grace. In one way, because it is done from some special providence and impulse of God, by which man is excited or helped to do that work, yet without anything supernatural resulting thereby in the work itself—neither physical, as to its substance, nor intrinsic and real and inhering in any way in the act itself; nor even moral, as to any relation to a supernatural end. Rather man is only morally helped, so that the work itself, within its own order, with the due circumstances, concerning an object consonant with natural reason, is accomplished. In another way man can be elevated by grace to perform such a work with some supernaturality resulting in the work itself, at least morally.

2. *First assertion.—A moral work done from grace, although in its species it belongs to the natural order, can be the cause of some effect of predestination.—It is supported by argument.—First part.*—I say, then, first: when a moral work is done from grace in such a way that, although it remains in its species of the natural order, it receives in itself some supernatural mode, it can be the cause of some effect of predestination, though not of the whole of predestination with regard to all its effects. This latter part will be evident a fortiori from what we shall say concerning supernatural acts. For now it is briefly shown, because such a work presupposes some efficacious grace, suited to the end of predestination;

therefore it presupposes some effect of predestination; therefore it cannot be the cause of the whole of predestination. I now take the consequence as clear. The antecedent I prove thus: that work cannot be done in such a way unless some illumination of faith precedes, and a supernatural intention directing and elevating that act in some way to the supernatural order; for no other intrinsic supernatural mode can be conceived in such an act.

3. *The latter part is shown.* — The other part, namely that an act so done can be the cause of predestination with regard to some of its effects, can be proved, first, from those passages of Scripture in which moral works, especially of mercy, are said to be very useful for obtaining the remission of sins: Daniel 4, Tobit 4, Luke 6: *If you forgive, you shall be forgiven.* These texts, and similar ones, are true at least of these works insofar as they are done in some supernatural mode. Hence, if they are done in sanctifying grace and charity, and from some supernatural motive and relation, they merit even *de condigno* some effects of predestination. But if they are done only from helping grace and faith, they merit only *de congruo*, or by way of impetration, or by way of a proportioned disposition, some further grace which can pertain to the effects of predestination. Nor is this contrary to gratuitous predestination, since it is already grace upon grace, and the origin of the whole causality is true, supernatural grace, as we suppose. Nor is there any difficulty in this assertion. It only remains to be explained of what kind that grace, or supernatural mode of such an act, must be in order to be able to participate in this causality; this will be evident from the following assertion.

4. *Second assertion.—A moral work performed by free will and by natural powers alone cannot be the cause of predestination with regard to any supernatural effect.* — I say, then, second: if a moral work, as done by free will, has only what can be done by natural powers, and receives no supernatural mode, physical or moral, from any gift of supernatural grace, it cannot be the cause of predestination with regard to any of its supernatural effects—and consequently not even of the first supernatural grace, that is, of vocation and divine illumination or inspiration. This assertion clarifies further the controversy treated in the preceding chapters concerning the good moral work, namely whether it can be done without grace or not, and in what this consists in reality, and in what it more consists merely in words. For as to those who think that a moral work is not done well without grace, and by "grace" understand merely a congruous natural thought, and then attribute to this work the merit of the first vocation and supernatural illumination, I fear they depart from the Massilians only in words—calling "grace" what those others called a natural

benefit, perhaps more fittingly—while in substance they incline to their opinion, when they say that the work of almsgiving, for example, done without faith and from a purely natural motive, is meritorious *de congruo*, impetratory, and dispositive of supernatural vocation, merely because it is done from that gratuitous gift of God by which he offers man a congruous occasion and concurrence for doing such a work.

5. Against this opinion, then, I prove the assertion proposed, beginning with the testimony of the Council of Trent, in Session Six, asserting that *the beginning of justification is taken from the divine vocation, with no merits preceding.* It explains, moreover, both in chapter five and more clearly in chapter six, that this vocation is that *by which man is excited to believe to be true what God has revealed*, and to the other supernatural things that follow from this. The same was signified by Paul, 2 Timothy 1, saying: *He called us with his holy calling, not according to our works*; for in calling that vocation holy, as if by antonomasia, and distinguishing it from our works, he plainly held it to be a supernatural gift, elevating man to supernatural objects. This vocation Christ signified by the name of *drawing and internal teaching*, John 6, as Augustine there expounds, *On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 8*, where he says: *that school in which the Father teaches in another way is far removed from the senses.* Honorable natural knowledge, then, which is naturally excited by sensible objects, does not pertain to that school; therefore that thought does not pertain to vocation; therefore it cannot be a merit or root of it. Therefore, before true vocation, there is no merit of it, by whatever reasoning it is thought to be accomplished. And likewise, before the said beginning, there is no beginning; but there would be, if that moral work so done were meritorious of vocation—indeed, rather the occasion or thought leading to such a work should be called the beginning of justification. And this very point is confirmed by all the definitions made in the Council of Orange; for in them grace pertaining to the supernatural order, elevating man to operate in it, is always required, as I have more fully declared in the preceding chapters, and shall declare even more presently, weighing that phrase, *as it ought*.

6. This is now confirmed by the testimony of Augustine (whose doctrine that Council without doubt followed): for in *1, ad Simplicianum, quaest. 2*, he says: *That he might show that man cannot act well unless through faith he has received grace; but man begins to receive grace from the moment he begins to believe in God.* Therefore that thought which is posited as preceding the first vocation to faith is not that which the holy Fathers require for merit before God with regard to supernatural gifts. And therefore Augustine in the same place

teaches that Cornelius already had faith when, through his prayers and almsgiving, he merited to obtain from God the knowledge of the Gospel. *For he showed himself worthy* (he says) *to whom an angel should be sent*; and he teaches the same in *On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 7*, and *quaest. 84, in Leviticum*. The same is held by Bernard, *sermon 78, on the Canticle*, near the end, and Hugh of St. Victor, in his *Epistle to the Romans, quaest. 266*; and best of all St. Thomas, *2, quaest. 10, art. 4, at the end*, where he confirms this with the testimony we adduced above, that *without faith it is impossible to please God*; but Cornelius pleased God through those works, and is therefore called *religious and fearing God*; therefore those works proceeded from faith. This testimony and reasoning equally prove that works which do not proceed from faith cannot please God in such a way as to be fit to obtain from him a calling to faith. Hence Augustine, *lib. 3, Hypognosticon*, after the middle, says in the same sense: *In an unbelieving man there are no good works*—on which subject we have brought forward much above. And in the same way Prosper frequently speaks against the Collator, and Fulgentius to Monimus; thus also Nazianzen said, *oration 13*, a little after the beginning: *As faith without charity is dead, so every action without faith is fruitless.*

7. *It is proved by reason.* — Finally I use this argument: if a work is not in itself better, nor of another moral condition on the part of the man himself or of the grace inhering in him, it is not more or less meritorious, nor does it more dispose toward supernatural gifts, on the ground that it proceeds from an extrinsic principle specially helping, or only generally concurring. But such is the case in the present matter, as we suppose: for a morally honorable act, of its nature pertaining to acquired virtue, is not in itself morally better simply because it proceeds from a special providence of God; nor can it be explained wherein that greater goodness consists. The major is proved, because a relation to an extrinsic cause does not of itself alone render the effect better; therefore that act, merely on account of its relation to such help, is not in itself physically or morally better; therefore it is not more proportioned to merit or disposition. Likewise, because, if the matter is considered from the side of the man acting, he who, with less help, performs a work equally good, in a certain sense does more, and puts more (so to speak) of his own into it; therefore it is not plausible that another should merit more before God, on the ground that he, with greater help, nevertheless does not operate better.

8. *An objection is forestalled.* — Finally, I weigh in this regard that phrase of the Councils, *as it ought*, since by it some condition or perfection of the act is signified, by reason of which grace is necessary. For when the Councils say: *If*

anyone shall say that someone can repent as he ought, etc.—they do not understand *as it ought* to mean merely in a supernatural mode on the side of God who acts; otherwise it would amount to a kind of negation, for it would be the same as saying: if anyone shall say that someone can repent by special help, without grace, let him be anathema. They indicate, therefore, that in the act itself some property or perfection is necessary, by reason of which exciting and helping grace are necessary. And they require this same perfection for the act to be meritorious or dispositive toward grace; therefore, if the act is not in itself better, it matters little to the aforesaid effects that it proceeds from some special help. And on this ground I have proved elsewhere that the true act of penitence must in itself be supernatural, whether it be contrition or true attrition. And the same holds for the rest.

9. *The escape is rebutted.* — It will perhaps be responded that a good moral work can never be done without a congruous thought. But this amounts to nothing, both because it has been shown that this thought is not true grace—and it seems to me quite absurd to found the whole dispute and doctrine of the Council of Orange and of Augustine against the Massilians upon that mere appellation—and also because that congruity does not always add greater perfection or power of acting to that thought, but only a relation to a future effect foreseen by God, and perhaps specially provided and intended; and this is not sufficient for a greater goodness or moral value of the act. Therefore, if the act in itself has no proportion to such merit, it will not have it either by virtue of proceeding from a thought so rendered congruous. And besides I press that phrase, *as it ought*; for according to that opinion it would signify nothing other than *morally well*—but this is contrary to the mind of the Councils, for it was self-evident that grace is not necessary for evil works. Therefore, when they say that grace is necessary to act well *as it ought*, they distinguish certain special good works which have such a mode that they entirely require grace, and are by this distinguished from other common good works.

10. *Response.—It is refuted.*—It can still be said that there are other heroic moral works which are never done without the help of grace; likewise that perseverance in these works always requires special help, that they may be done without admixture of sin. Of these, then, it can be believed that they merit, or dispose to, the help of grace. And the argument made above ceases to apply, since free will alone could never do anything similar and equally perfect. I respond: the same proportionate point must be said in these cases. For if an outstanding and difficult moral work proceeds from true and supernatural grace, it does not pertain to this latter assertion but to the former, and therefore

the objection is not to the point. But if it does not come from true supernatural grace, but from some greater providence by which the infirmity of fallen man is morally helped or guarded, certainly the work will not be very outstanding, nor heroic in the absolute genus of virtue. And whatever it may be, it makes no difference for the act to be meritorious of supernatural grace. Hence in an angel, or in a man in the state of integral nature, such a work could occur without any difficulty or special assistance, and yet it would in no way be meritorious of the first grace, since that always and in all cases retains the character of grace, and cannot be obtained by a work of nature. The same holds for the continuation of such works. For first of all, to a man lacking faith, grace for persevering without a new lapse is never given, even in these works. And although some proportionate help might be given, it would not suffice to merit help of a higher order. Because that help does not presuppose faith, and although it may broadly be called grace, it is not grace of the sanctifying kind, as St. Thomas said, *2, 2, quaest. 136, art. 3, ad 2*.

11. *Man before faith cannot merit any true grace.* — From this it is concluded that not only can man, before faith, not in any way merit any true grace, but the same must be said of the man already a believer who is preparing himself for true penitence, while in a state of sin. For even in him, works of free will alone cannot avail of themselves and directly for this purpose, if they in no way proceed from faith and supernatural grace. All that has been adduced thus far proves the prior part, which is confirmed by this argument: for if man, before faith, could merit supernatural gifts through a good work proceeding from some other prior benefit of God, then he could merit even the very preaching and revelation of the faith—which not even the Pelagians dared to say. Likewise, given external preaching, man could, through an imperfect desire for faith or salvation, or through a natural imperfect faith and similar motions which he can have through free will, merit interior grace to believe as he ought—which was also condemned in the Semipelagians. That this follows is clear, because those acts are good and proceed from an honorable thought, which can much more be said to proceed from some grace, and consequently to be grace, than an honorable moral thought excited by natural objects. If, then, a good moral work, otherwise natural, can be meritorious of supernatural grace because it proceeds from that thought, why should not those natural acts concerning supernatural objects taken materially be all the more capable of being the merit of a higher interior grace?

12. Now, then, concerning the believing man, with due proportion preserved, the assertion is proved. For there, faith stands as if it were not, since it

exerts no influence. Likewise, because that general principle equally holds in these works, namely that without divine supernatural grace no work can be done that of itself contributes to eternal life; but what contributes much is that which is the cause of obtaining a supernatural vocation to penitence. Furthermore, such works are not more efficacious for merit *de congruo* in a believing sinner than they are for merit *de condigno* in a just man; but in a just man they are not meritorious *de condigno* of sanctifying grace or of eternal life unless—as is the more accepted doctrine—it is required for merit that the work itself proceed in some way from faith and grace. This is strongly favored by the Council of Trent, *sess. 6, cap. 16*. Finally, a man having faith and in no way acting from it, in a certain sense does less of what is in him than a gentile acting well without faith; therefore there is no reason why he should merit supernatural grace through such works. Wherefore, when in Scripture these works are said to avail before God to merit something supernatural, or the remission of sins, something is always added by which it is signified that such works must be done from faith or a supernatural motive, as I noted above. Hence Clement of Alexandria, *lib. 4. Strom.*, rightly gathers that the merit of a work depends on the mode and reason of its operation.

CHAPTER XX
SUPERNATURAL WORKS PROCEEDING FROM GRACE ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION WITH REGARD TO ALL ITS EFFECTS

1. *A supernatural work, since it proceeds from a prior grace, is the cause of what follows.* — We have spoken of works of the natural order; it remains to speak of works of the supernatural order, which in the matter itself, and in execution, proceed from some supernatural grace, at least from vocation and the cooperation of grace. Concerning these works it is constant that one work, insofar as it proceeds from a prior grace, can be the cause and reason of a subsequent grace, and in this way, on the part of such a work, a cause can be given of some effect of predestination; for the first effect can be the cause of the second, and the second of the third, and so for the rest. From this an easy resolution seemed to follow concerning the whole of predestination, namely that it cannot have a cause. Because it is necessary that the first supernatural work proceed from some grace, namely from vocation; therefore it proceeds from some prior effect of predestination, since that grace from which it proceeds is an effect of predestination; therefore that work cannot be the cause of that grace,

because it cannot be the cause of its own cause; therefore it cannot be the cause of the whole of predestination with regard to all its effects.

2. *An argument that renders the question doubtful.—A work proceeding from grace can be meritorious in three modes.* — This argument seems to demonstrate what it intends; nevertheless there are among theologians various opinions on this matter, founded perhaps more in the mode of speaking about predestination, or its effects, than in the matter itself, if we agree on the meaning and effects of predestination. In three modes, then, it can be understood that a work proceeding from grace is meritorious of predestination with regard to all its effects. First, concerning a work that follows upon one grace and, insofar as it is such, precedes another. Second, concerning a work concomitant with some grace, insofar as it is precisely concomitant. Third, concerning a work that follows upon grace as actually consequent in reality, though it is presupposed to be future from that grace. And according to these three modes, there seem to have been three opinions of theologians on this matter.

3. *First opinion.* — The first says that man can merit his own predestination with regard to its effects, because he can, through some work proceeding from grace, merit from God all the effects of grace pertaining to predestination. If you object that such a work does not merit that grace from which it proceeds, they respond that this grace is not an effect of predestination, and therefore, although he does not merit it, he can merit all the effects of predestination. That this grace is not an effect of predestination they show because it is common to the reprobate and the predestined, whence it is a sign that it is not from predestination but from the common providence of grace. Nor does it matter that this grace is an efficacious vocation, since even an efficacious vocation, with regard to some effect, can be present in the reprobate; that it does not in him proceed to further effects is his own fault—whereas, on the contrary, that it proceeds further in the predestined has its cause on the part of his cooperation with grace; and therefore there is simply given in him a cause of predestination with regard to its effects, insofar as they are such.

4. *A foundation is established for this opinion.* — Those who do not think that God chose the predestined efficaciously to glory before foreseen merits can easily defend this opinion; they cannot consequently say that the effects of grace which occur in the predestined from the sole antecedent will of saving all are not effects of predestination, and accordingly that such grace cannot be a principle of meriting the effects of predestination. Thus seem to have thought Ockham and Gabriel, on *1, dist. 14*, with regard to those men whom they think are saved even if they were not pre-elected, or (as they themselves put it) even if

they were not predestined before merits. Catharinus, although in his books *On Predestination* he holds the same view in substance, nevertheless does not wish to call "predestined" those who are saved without pre-election before foreseen merits, and therefore does not posit in them a cause of predestination, since he does not even admit predestination in them; nevertheless, if he were forced to admit it, he could not but think the same way about its cause. Yet these authors do not seem to recognize any other effect of predestination falling under merit besides glorification; this, however, they think suffices, since they call predestination only the efficacious purpose of giving glory. But St. Bonaventure, *1, d. 41, art. 1, quaest. 1 and 2*, seems to admit a cause of predestination even with regard to the effects of grace, a cause which he places in some merit, at least *de congruo*. Of this merit he says, *4, d. 15, art. 1, quaest. 5*, that it must proceed from some help of grace; and therefore he seems elsewhere to suppose that this help is not an effect of predestination, for on this account he says that a work proceeding from that help can be the cause of predestination with regard to the proper effects of grace and glory. And toward this opinion Alensis also seems to incline, *1, part., quaest. 28, membr. 3*, as I shall note below. Javelli seems to fall into the same opinion, in his treatise on this matter added to the First Part of St. Thomas.

5. *Augustine's distinction between the predestined and the reprobate.* — The foundation of this opinion depends on another, concerning election from foreseen merits, and therefore, that being removed, this opinion has no plausibility. For, given God's efficacious intention of saving the predestined, it is certain that all the gifts of grace which proceed from that intention are effects of predestination; but in predestined men all the grace by which they are saved with effect proceeds from the efficacious intention of saving them; therefore it is an effect of predestination; therefore also the first help and the first vocation is an effect of this kind. But the predestined man cannot merit that first help through a work proceeding from himself, as the aforementioned authors admit; therefore neither can he, through such a work, merit his own predestination. This argument, absolutely considered, has great foundation in Paul, Romans 8, where he says: *Whom he predestined, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also sanctified; and whom he sanctified, them he also glorified.* For in these words he clearly teaches that, in the predestined, the whole series of graces, beginning from vocation itself, are effects of predestination. Indeed, Augustine places almost the chief difference between the predestined and the reprobate *in the deep and secret calling*. Since, then, all the merits of the predestined are from vocation, and vocation is an effect of predestination, the

predestined man cannot be for himself the cause of all the effects of predestination through a work proceeding from vocation itself.

6. *Second opinion.* — There is, then, a second opinion, which considers two things in the good work itself proceeding from supernatural vocation: one is the influx of grace, the other is the cooperation of free will. It admits that this work, insofar as it is from grace, is not the cause of predestination, since it is its effect; but it nevertheless affirms that the cooperation of free will itself—not as prior, nor as posterior to efficacious grace, but as simultaneous with it—is in some way the reason for predestination, not as a proper merit, but at least as a condition without which not. For this cooperation, as such, is not grace but the proper influx of free will; therefore it is not an effect of predestination but proper to man himself; therefore on this score it is not repugnant for it to be in some way a cause of predestination. From another point of view, however, this cooperation is at least a condition without which no grace is efficacious; therefore without it no grace is an effect of predestination; therefore it is in some way the reason for all the effects of predestination, as such, at least as a condition without which not. This seems to have been the reasoning of Aureoli, *1, dist. 40, art. 1, and d. 41, art. 1*, and of Eck, in his treatise *On Predestination, Centur. 3, num. 2 and following*. Henry, in *quodlib. 4, quaest. 11, and quodlib. 8, quaest. 5*, attributing the same mode of causality to free will, seems to place it not in positive cooperation but in mere non-repugnance, or non-resistance, of free will. And it is this opinion, understood in this latter way, that certain modern writers of our time seem to have revived, who say that God gives to the predestined an efficacious help proper to the predestined themselves, because they freely do not resist the sufficient help, which help is also given to the reprobate; and therefore this would not seem to be an effect of predestination, but of the common providence of grace.

7. *This opinion is rejected.—Cooperation can be related in three modes.—The first mode.* — Nevertheless this opinion, in no sense, is plausible or probable from what has been said. And first, speaking of the positive cooperation of free will with the help of grace: although it cannot be denied that such cooperation is in some way the cause of some effects of predestination, yet it cannot in any way be said to be the cause, or the concomitant condition, on account of which all the effects of predestination are given. Both points are made clear, for this cooperation can be compared either to the term produced by it and the effects resulting from it, or to the influx of actual grace cooperating with and aiding free will itself, or to the exciting grace which necessarily precedes such an influx of free will, either in time or at least in nature. In the first mode, that influx of

free will is the cause of the act, or the term produced through it, by a causality that is in some way physical—in the way, namely, that an action is the cause of its term; for that influx is so related to that act. Because that influx is nothing other than the action by which that act of love, or another similar act, is produced by free will itself. Hence free will itself is, in its own genus, the physical cause of that influx, as it proceeds from free will: just as the principle of acting is the cause of the action, and consequently, by means of that action, it is the cause of the term, by way of a principle; while the action itself is the cause in a broad sense, by way of an action. And since that act can be a merit or a disposition toward other effects of grace conducing to the ultimate effect of predestination, therefore, morally speaking, this cooperation of free will toward such an act is the cause, or co-cause, of subsequent effects of grace, and thus it can be the cause of several effects of predestination.

8. *The second mode of relation.* — Moreover, the cooperation of free will, compared to the causality, or co-causality, of helping grace, can rightly be called a condition without which such actual help of grace would not be given to man; hence, insofar as that actual help is an effect of predestination, it can on this score be said that some reason, cause, or condition on man's part is given for his own predestination with regard to some of its effects, and consequently also with regard to other effects that follow from it. There does not, however, intervene there a proper notion of cause—not even a moral one—with respect to the actual influx of cooperating grace, because in reality there is no distinction between the influx of free will and that of cooperating grace, but it is one indivisible action proceeding simultaneously from both principles; and therefore there cannot in reality be a causality of one influx upon the other, distinct in reason, nor can free will itself be said to be the cause of the actual influx of grace, formally speaking of it as the influx of grace, since under that aspect it is not from free will but from grace. Free will itself, then, is said to be a co-cause of grace, without which grace itself would not flow into such an act; and for the same reason that very influx of free will can be called a condition without which the actual influx of such grace is not given. But this is not enough for that cooperation of free will to be called a condition without which not of the whole of predestination, with regard to all its effects, because, besides this effect or help of grace, other things are necessary for the complete effect of predestination, and that cooperation cannot be said to be a condition necessary for all the other effects, as will appear from the following point.

9. *A third mode of comparison.* — Third, then, a comparison can be made to the exciting grace, which must necessarily be supposed before that

cooperation of free will. But with respect to this, cooperation cannot be a cause, nor a concomitant condition, since it is subsequent—indeed it is truly an effect of that very exciting grace, not only as it passes into helping and cooperating grace (in which way it can at least be called a co-cause), but also as it is prevenient and exciting. For God, by calling man, is the cause drawing and inclining him to consent; therefore through his vocation he is the cause of consent, even as it proceeds from free will. For although he is not a necessitating cause, nor one that wholly predetermines the will so that it cannot resist, he is nevertheless of himself an inducing and moving cause. Hence, when free will yields to the calling grace, that effect is rightly attributed to vocation as to its cause. And thus Scripture speaks: *I will cause you to do. I will give you a heart of flesh. All believed whose hearts God opened.* All these and similar things are said by reason of vocation and prevenient help. Therefore the cooperation of free will cannot be the cause, nor the presupposed condition on man's part, for all the effects of predestination.

10. *The force of the argument can be escaped in two ways.—The first way.—The second way is excluded.* — The force of this argument can be evaded in two ways. First, by denying that this exciting grace, as such, is an effect of predestination. But this falls into the first opinion just refuted, and will be further established as false from what is to be said below concerning the effects of predestination. Second, by conceding that this is the condition for such prevenient help to be given. But this falls into the third opinion, to be treated and refuted shortly; because, although that cooperation can be the reason for such help by way of an end and effect on account of which it is given, it cannot be so by way of a condition or disposition prerequired or simultaneously posited on man's part.

11. *Objection.—Response.* — You will say: although that cooperation is not a necessary condition for such exciting help in itself, it is nevertheless a necessary condition for it to be efficacious, since without it it cannot be efficacious; therefore under that aspect such help is not given except with that condition; but under this aspect of efficacious help, it is an effect of predestination, and not otherwise; therefore that cooperation is rightly called the condition without which not of the first help of grace, as it is an effect of predestination. I respond, first, that this exciting help, not only under the denomination of efficacious, but even absolutely and in itself entirely, is an effect of predestination, because it proceeds wholly from the efficacious intention of giving glory to such a man, nor is it understood to be given under one aspect prior to another, such that it could have a cause on man's part under the one

aspect rather than the other. Next, either that help is denominated efficacious solely from the actual action—that is, because it actually accomplishes its effect, and thus is considered not as exciting but as helping; we, however, consider it under the prior aspect, and thus inquire into its cause on man's part, and find none. Hence, if that help is denominated efficacious as exciting, it does not in this way intrinsically include the cooperation of free will (so to speak), but only terminatively, since it regards it and bears a relation to it as something to be actually attained: and thus it does not regard it as a cause, nor as a simultaneous condition, but as a future end and effect. And accordingly the influx of free will, as simultaneous with grace, cannot be the reason for the whole of predestination with regard to its effects.

12. *By the same line of reasoning that negative condition is also opposed.* — A nearly similar argument can be made concerning that negative or privative condition called *non-repugnance, or non-resistance*. For this too must necessarily presuppose some prevenient grace, or vocation, to which man is said not to resist, or to resist. For before any vocation and impulse, although man does not act, he cannot be said to resist, since he does nothing—both because, not yet excited, he cannot act, and because he has nothing to resist. Therefore this non-resistance presupposes the vocation of grace; therefore it cannot be the reason for it, nor a concomitant condition, since it is simply posterior. But that vocation is an effect of predestination, as has been shown, since it proceeds from the efficacious intention of saving the elect; therefore that non-resistance cannot be said to be the reason for all the effects of predestination.

13. *A second argument.* — Besides this argument, drawn from comparison with the preceding help, other more evident ones can be made with regard to subsequent or concomitant graces. Second, then, I argue thus: that non-resistance either is prior in nature and causality to positive cooperation, of both free will and grace, or it is altogether concomitant. The second cannot consistently be held, because, if in that same instant of nature the will already cooperates, it cannot be understood that in that same instant it does not resist by mere privation, but rather by a positive form that formally excludes resistance. But if that non-resistance is prior, it is either from free will alone, by its own powers suspending the contrary act—which seems to be within its natural power—and thus some use, at least privative, of free will, by its own powers alone, without the aid of grace, would be the reason for the whole of predestination, which cannot be said, as is established from what has been said against Pelagius and his remnants; or that use is from some concomitant help of grace, and thus the arguments made concerning positive cooperation apply to

this privative use as well, with the added difficulty of understanding what this use is, and what help of concomitant grace is necessary for it.

14. *A third refutation against the same.* — Hence I argue, third: in that prior instant according to the order of nature, in which the will is said not to resist, either it can already at that same prior instant cooperate positively, or it cannot. If it cannot act for that instant, nor resist, it should not be said to "not resist" for that instant; for resistance, to be free, must presuppose the power of resisting and not resisting for that same instant for which one is said to resist or not resist; therefore it presupposes the power of acting and not acting. But if for that same instant it has the power of acting or cooperating with God's help, then, by the very fact that it does not cooperate, it resists, in that it at least fails to do what is in it together with the help; indeed, on its part, it for that occasion renders the vocation of grace inefficacious, for the efficacious intention of an end is repugnant not only to deviation toward another end, or toward means contrary to such an end, but also to not using the means necessary for such an end. Therefore that pure privation, or lack of action, both cooperating and resisting vocation, cannot be the reason for obtaining a new efficacious help, or other effects of predestination; indeed, of itself it is a sufficient cause on account of which God denies further grace. I omit many other things that can be said against this opinion, so understood, concerning negative preparation or condition, since I have treated this at length in the third book *On Helps*, chapter thirteen.

15. *Third opinion.* — I come to the third opinion, which places the reason for predestination, with regard to the first effect of grace, in the good use of that same grace, subsequent and future, on the part of free will—not alone, but aided by grace itself. I say *with regard to the first effect of grace*, because in subsequent effects there is no need to have recourse to a subsequent or posterior use, but to a concomitant or prior one, as is established from what has been said against the two opinions. For, given the vocation that necessarily antecedes every free use of grace, actual helping grace is given to man not without his free influx; and thus on man's part some necessary condition can be understood, concomitant with such grace and entirely simultaneous with it, for receiving it. But when man, with God's help, effects a good act, by it he can already in some way merit, or obtain by impetration, further grace, and thus proceed further even to the end of predestination. The whole difficulty touched on in the preceding opinions concerns vocation itself, to which this third opinion responds: that God, before giving such vocation, foresees whether man will make good use of it or not; and when he sees a future good use, by reason of it and as its reward, he gives man

vocation. And thus the first reason for predestination, with regard to its first supernatural effect, is held to be placed in the future good use.

16. *The error of the Massilians.* — Some, indeed, think this was the opinion of the Massilians; and perhaps in part it is so; nevertheless they erred worse, both because they did not speak of the good use of liberty with the help of grace, but were content with the mere use of free will by its own powers alone, in order to draw from it the reason for vocation; and also because they spoke not only of a good use truly to occur at some time, but also of one that will never occur, but would have occurred, had the man lived. For from this they also drew the reason why an infant is prevented by the grace of baptism, in which it immediately dies, and obtains the ultimate effect of predestination. These two points, however, this opinion does not admit. In the former sense, this opinion is usually attributed to Albert, *1, dist. 41, art. 2, ad 3*. But in him I find nothing that bears on the present matter. Furthermore, Alensis is referred to the same opinion, *1 part., quaest. 28, membr. 3, art. 3*, where he asks whether foreknowledge of a future good use is the reason for predestination, and answers affirmatively—whence he seems to incline to this opinion, especially at *ad 2 and 3*. It is, however, hard to believe that he speaks in the sense described, and that he holds that the first vocation is given to the predestined from merits to proceed from that very vocation, with free will cooperating, such that the vocation itself is the reward of such merit, or future good use, from it. For the same Alensis, *3 part., quaest. 69, membr. 5, art. 2, § 3*, teaches that the principle of merit does not fall under that same merit, and therefore the first grace is not given from merit—which is most true of grace that is altogether first, as is vocation. And if in reality it is not given from merit, much less could it be predestined from merit, as I shall now say. So perhaps Alensis speaks there of the good use of grace future in time relative to eternity, that is, of merits foreseen before the will to give the reward of glory, or of that grace which can fall under some merit. Hence although in the response *ad 2* he speaks absolutely of the conferral of grace, it is not necessary that he include under "grace" the first vocation, but only that grace before which merit can antecede.

17. *The opinion of certain theologians.* — Whatever may be the case regarding the opinion of the ancients, certain theologians contend that this opinion should be ascribed to all theologians who assert that God, before choosing anyone for beatitude, or deciding to give this or that vocation to each, foresaw how each individual would use such a vocation, or such, in each occasion of opportunity. For from this they gather that these theologians place the foreknowledge of the future good use of grace before predestination, and

accordingly that this good use, so foreseen, is the reason on account of which God wills to give the whole of grace, even the first and congruous vocation, and thus is the cause of predestination. And this seems to be the case because we said above that this conditioned knowledge of future good use was the condition without which the divine will to give such helps would not be of predestination, but of general providence. Likewise, from what has been said it follows that free cooperation, future under such a condition, was the condition without which God would not have such conditioned knowledge, since the thing is not future because it is foreknown, but is foreknown because it is future; therefore futurition is presupposed as a necessary condition for foreknowledge, and foreknowledge for predestination; therefore, from first to last, the future good use is the reason for the whole of predestination, at least as a necessary condition. But there is an equivocation at work here, because this knowledge is posited by us only as a necessary condition on the part of predestinating God—not that it moves him to predestine by way of merit, but that he may be able freely to intend the end of predestination through such means—which is far different.

18. *First assertion.—The first vocation and beginning of salvation is bestowed on us gratuitously.* — It must, then, first be said that the first help of grace, or supernatural vocation, even congruous, whatever it be, is not given to man in time from foreseen merits, even if these merits be future and supernatural. Although this assertion does not seem as certain as another similar one is certain against the Semipelagians, it is nevertheless quite certain from the definitions of the Councils saying that this first grace is given gratuitously, since the beginning of justification does not fall under merit; nor do they distinguish between merit founded on grace or on nature alone, nor between antecedent or subsequent merit, but absolutely exclude merit. This must be understood of every merit, since otherwise it would not be given gratuitously, if it were given on account of foreseen merits. Just as, with respect to Christ, the first justification and remission of sins was not given gratuitously to the ancient Fathers, since it was given from the future and foreseen merits of Christ. That the first vocation and beginning of salvation is given gratuitously and without merit is taught by the Council of Orange, *cap. 25*, and Trent, *sess. 6, cap. 5*; and it is much to be noted that, in chapter 8, the same Council declares that justification is given to man gratuitously, because before it no merit precedes—as if certainly supposing that the merits which follow are not merits of the preceding grace from which they proceed. This doctrine is amply confirmed by

Augustine, in the books *On the Predestination of the Saints* and in Epistles 105 and 107.

19. *The reason for this assertion is established.* — The reason *a priori* is that the principle of merit does not fall under merit, but that vocation is the foundation of the whole future merit arising from its good use, since true merit, of which we are treating and of which that opinion speaks, is founded on prevenient grace, and consequently also on helping grace; therefore that first grace cannot in reality be given from a merit future from itself. The major is common among theologians, as I cited above from Alensis, and the same is established from St. Thomas and other writers, *1, 2, quaest. 114, art. 5*; and it is evident from the absurdities involved, because otherwise one could say that the first sanctifying grace and remission of sin is given from merit *de condigno*, not preceding but subsequent and future foreseen. Likewise, otherwise the grace of union would have been given to the humanity of Christ from infinite merits future from it. These things, however, are absurd; otherwise it would in fact no longer be grace, for *if it is from works, it is no longer grace*. The reason for that axiom is that no effect is the cause of its own cause; but merit is the effect of that grace from which it proceeds; therefore it cannot be the cause of it; therefore it cannot be the merit of it, since merit is the cause of the reward. The major is evident, because an effect is posterior to its cause, while a cause is prior; the same thing cannot be both prior and posterior with respect to the same, especially in the same genus of efficient cause, in which the cause is prior in the order of nature, or of presupposition in existing; but merit is from grace as from an efficient cause, and merit is the cause of the reward, even in the genus of efficient cause.

20. *Objection.* — It can be said, however, that the causality of merit is not properly effective, but only metaphorical and moral; and therefore it is not necessary that merit always in reality precede the reward in existence, but it is enough that it be foreseen as future. And thus a work foreseen as future from such a principle can be the merit on account of which that very principle of grace is conferred on man; and at the same time, in execution, that grace can be the proper and physical efficient cause of such a meritorious work. A common example is that a king can give a man arms and a horse with which to serve as a soldier, and nevertheless give them as reward and payment for future labors of military service, since he can give an anticipated payment for future labor, even if that labor is in reality future from that very thing which is given as the price, as from an instrument or principle of such a work. We also know that, with respect to Christ the Lord, many graces were given to men on account of his

merits, before they occurred, simply because they were foreseen. And it is probable that the ancient Fathers merited *de congruo* the Incarnation of Christ, even though the Incarnation itself, as foreseen, was the first principle and foundation of the whole merit of any men whatsoever.

21. *It is resolved.* — I respond that we are not now disputing whether it would have been possible, by absolute power, to give the first grace as a reward for a future good use with the help of that same grace. Some indeed affirm this, either because they think it repugnant that grace would not be grace, which would be the case if it were given from merits, or because there cannot be cause and effect in the same genus with respect to the same thing, nor simultaneously prior and posterior. To me, however, these arguments do not show an implication of contradiction. Not the first, because, although the gift of the first grace is essentially a gift, or help, above nature, it is nevertheless not essential to it that it be given gratuitously and without regard to any merit, for this depends on the liberty of the giver. Now in fact the first habitual grace is not given to the sinner purely gratuitously, for with respect to the Redeemer it is given from his justice; with respect to the recipient, however, it is given from some disposition, or merit *de congruo*, founded on a prior helping grace; but it could, without either respect, be given by God in a purely liberal way, and then it would receive another denomination of grace in the character of a gratuitous gift. The first help of grace, then, although it is now an entirely and most perfect grace with respect to the recipient in the character of a gratuitous gift, could nevertheless have been given by God in another way, with that denomination of "gratuitous" in that gift being changed. Nor is the other argument a stronger demonstration, as the argument made shows. For although, broadly speaking, those causalities are of the same genus, they are nevertheless diverse in mode and species; and therefore there is no contradiction in those two being mutually each other's cause in these diverse modes. On this matter I said something in the treatise on the Incarnation, and other things must be said in the treatise on merit. Whatever, however, may be the case regarding that question of possibility, it is certain de facto and according to the ordinary law that this first vocation is pure grace. Given this truth, it follows excellently that it is not given from any merits whatsoever. Indeed, even the ordinary law that merit in reality must precede the reward, was, only in Christ, for a special reason and on account of the infinity of his merit, in some respect dispensed with in this law; this is not to be drawn into precedent, nor extended without compelling authority.

22. *Second assertion.* — I say, then, further, that no cause or reason of the whole of predestination is given, with regard to all the effects of grace that occur

in predestination, founded in the good use of that same grace. This is proved, because what is not given from merits cannot be predestined from merits, both because something is predestined in the way it is to be given, and is given in the way its predestination requires. For although the inverse inference does not hold —that if the conferral of some gift in time is made from merits, its predestination from eternity was also from foreseen merits, as touched on above and as I shall show expressly in the following chapters—nevertheless the inference holds in the contrary direction: a donation in time is gratuitous and made without regard to merit; therefore, in eternity, the predestination, or will to give such a gift, was gratuitous and not in view of merit. The reason is that willing to give is prior to giving, and willing stands in the manner of a commanding act; giving, as a commanded act; willing as the cause, giving as the effect. Hence it can rightly happen that an act of the will be such that it comprises in itself the will of giving and procuring merit for someone—and yet that will be gratuitous, and not from merit; indeed, merit itself can be procured through means that are not from merit, but are given gratuitously. But conversely, if the donation in reality is future gratuitously and without merit, it is necessary that the will to give also be gratuitous and without merit; because if God is in time to give gratuitously and without merit, it is necessary that he have willed from eternity to give gratuitously and without merit—positing this mode on the part of the object, since it is necessary that from eternity he will not only the action, but also its mode, since both pertain to his direct and efficacious will. Therefore it is further necessary that, on the part of the act, he willed to give purely gratuitously, and not from the motive of some foreseen merit. This consequence is proved—wherein lies the whole difference of reasoning—because the will is the efficacious cause of the donation itself; therefore, if there were merit on man's part for that very divine will to give him some gift, a fortiori there would be merit for the gift itself and its conferral, since what is the cause of the efficacious cause and primary origin (so to speak) of the conferral of such a gift is a fortiori the cause of the will to give. Thus prayer, which impetrates the will to give, impetrates the donation; indeed, the donation cannot be better impetrated, since it cannot otherwise occur except by the will to give, nor can it fail to occur, if an efficacious will is had and power is supposed.

23. *Objection.—It is answered.* — You will say: conversely too, he who merits the donation will necessarily merit the will to give, since the donation cannot occur except by will. I respond that it is rightly inferred that some executive will is from merit, but not every will from which that donation draws its origin; for there can be some will prior to merit, as has been explained. But

conversely, if the donation in reality is gratuitous, no will from which such a giving proceeds can be from merit; because if the first root were from merit, then the whole consequence would already be from merit. By this reasoning, then, from this certain principle—that the beginning of salvation is not from merit—it follows with the same certainty that the predestination of that beginning is not from merit; and in this sense at least it is most certain that the whole of predestination, with regard to the effects of its grace, is not from foreseen merits, even future ones, from that same grace.

24. Indeed, if the matter is carefully weighed, this is more evident—that is, concerning predestination itself, than concerning the giving, in relation to such future merits from that same grace. For with regard to the donation of the first grace, it perhaps would not involve a contradiction to be given as a reward for its own future effect, if it were not truly given absolutely but depended on a future effect, and as it were under a condition of it—such that the subsequent work would not now be considered worthy of any reward, but would be reckoned already sufficiently repaid by that anticipated gift. But with respect to predestination, that is, to the first will to give such a gift, it does seem to involve a contradiction to have it from a future merit, as I have explained more fully elsewhere. For, in order for some will to be had from merit, it is required at least that the merit be foreseen as absolutely future, and therefore also its principle; but it cannot be future unless by the will of God to give that gift from which such merit would be future; therefore, before the foreseen merit, it is necessary that such a will be supposed in God; therefore such a will cannot be from merit —neither from a merit already posited, since it does not yet exist, nor from a foreseen one, since the will exists before the foreseeing. But that will is predestinative; therefore the predestination of that gift cannot be from merits future from it.

25. *Jerome's exposition.* — And thus this truth is excellently confirmed from that text of Paul, Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy in his sight in charity.* With the added weight of Jerome's commentary on this passage, and of Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 17 and 18*: God did not choose us because we were holy, but that we might be holy. Holiness, then, was the end of election, not its reason; or rather they are diverse, such that they signify contrary relations and require mutually repugnant conditions. For an end is not supposed to be future in order to be intended, but is ordained, through the intention, to be future. But what moves by way of merit is presupposed as already present, or at least as future and foreknown. When, therefore, God chose us that we might be holy, he had

not yet foreseen us as future holy ones, but ordained this very thing by choosing us. And in the same way the Council of Orange, *cap. 25*, reads and weighs Paul's words, 1 Timothy 1: *I obtained mercy, that I might be faithful*; because he did not say, *because I was faithful*, but, *that I might be*. And since that exact phrase, *that I might be faithful*, is not found in Paul, the Council seems to have added a tacit interpretation. For Paul says: *I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief, but the grace of our Lord has abounded exceedingly with faith.* Therefore he obtained mercy in order to have this grace, not because he already had faith. Hence Paul adds again something equivalent: *Therefore I obtained mercy, that in me first Christ Jesus might show forth all patience, for the instruction of them that shall believe in him unto life everlasting.* He was called, then, to faith for the manifestation of the grace and liberality of God toward rebels—for he calls them that they may become faithful and holy, not because they were going to be such. It is not, then, on account of future works, even from grace; for such works presuppose faith, and confer true holiness; those works, then, are in some way at least the proximate or intermediate end of predestination, not its reason or merit.

26. *Last assertion.* — From this, finally, I say: although before predestination there must necessarily be supposed in God, in the order of reason, foreknowledge of future works from grace, under the condition that such grace be given, it is not, however, supposed that there is an absolute foreknowledge of them; and therefore such works can be, and necessarily are, the cause of predestination (with regard to the first effect of its grace) by way of an end, but not by way of merit, or of a condition moving God to give such an effect. This assertion has already been proved in part, and it is easy to infer one part from the other. For, first of all, before the will to give the first grace, or vocation, there is supposed in God a foreknowledge of the future work from such vocation, if it should be given; and this has been touched on in the first book, and is demonstrated generally in the other books on the science of God, from Scripture and the Fathers. To me it now suffices that these words of Paul prove it: *He chose us, that we might be holy.* For if God chose the predestined for holiness, he certainly foreknew by what means he would infallibly lead them to holiness; otherwise the election would have been without prudence; therefore before that election such foreknowledge is necessarily supposed. That this must necessarily be said in every opinion has been shown in the first book. Nor does it follow from this foreknowledge that the good thus foreknown under condition is the merit of the prevenient help that is given for it, or of its predestination; rather it only follows that it is the reason by way of an end. For in order that

man might have a pious use of his liberty, God wills to give him such help; he gives, then, such help on account of such use as on account of a proximate end. This must be said in whatever way one holds regarding efficacious grace. For that a means is efficacious in this or that way, or more or less, does not change the nature of means and end; therefore conditioned foreknowledge of merits does not introduce another genus of cause, on their part, with respect to predestination, whether that foreknowledge be solely of the help, or of the very truth of the future event.

27. Absolute foreknowledge of such merits, however, cannot antecede the whole of predestination, in any opinion whatsoever. Because that foreknowledge presupposes likewise an absolute foreknowledge of the future grace, or vocation, from which those merits will proceed; for such knowledge presupposes, on the part of the object, the absolute futurition of such an effect; but the futurition of the effect presupposes the absolute futurition of its principle, or cause; and that cause is the first grace, or vocation, which is to be given by God alone through his absolute will; hence, for it to be absolutely future, such a will is necessarily presupposed; therefore that absolute foreknowledge presupposes the efficacious will to give such grace, which pertains to predestination; therefore that absolute foreknowledge cannot antecede the whole of predestination. The reason, then, for the difference between these two modes of knowledge is that absolute foreknowledge of future merits from grace presupposes the will to give grace, and thus presupposes predestination in some part; whereas conditioned knowledge does not presuppose such a will in God as already had, but only under the condition, if it should be had—a conditional which does not yet posit such a will in being; and therefore such foreknowledge does not in any part presuppose predestination; rather it is presupposed for it, and is necessary, and suffices, for the relation of end; but it cannot suffice for another kind of motion, by way of merit or anything similar, as has been sufficiently disputed against the Semipelagians.

28. *An objection.—It is destroyed.* — But it is pressed: the future good use of grace is the condition for such an effect to be had. And such knowledge is a necessary condition for the predestination of such a man to occur by will; therefore the future good use is a necessary condition for predestination; therefore it is a cause, or motive reason, of predestination. I respond by denying the final consequence, because that word "condition" is taken variously and equivocally in the antecedent and in the consequent, such that it is not permissible to infer from it a cause, or motive reason, of predestination. For when in the antecedent it is said that the futurition of a contingent effect is a

condition necessary, on the part of the object, for knowledge of such a future thing, this is most true, understood of a condition necessary on the part of the terminative object of such knowledge. For that knowledge is purely speculative, or cognitive of truth, and therefore presupposes truth in the knowable object to which it can be terminated; and that truth depends on that condition, or rather consists in it, since from the fact that a thing is, or is not, a proposition is true or false. And in this sense the saints whom I have cited in the books *On Helps* frequently say that God knows future things because they are future—which is much more certain in the case of future evils, as the Council of Valence under Lothair, *cap. 2 and 3*, signified. On this matter one may consult the scholastics with the Master, on *1, d. 38*, especially Gregory, Richard, and Bonaventure, *1, d. 40, art. 2, quaest. 1*; Altisiodorensis, *lib. 1, Summae, q. 5, cap. 9*; Alensis, *1 part., quaest. 24, num. 5*; Bellarmine, *lib. 4, de Gratia, et libero Arbitrio, cap. 13*. That condition, however, is not the proper cause, just as the term of a relation is not the cause of it. Nor can it even be called a motive, since the divine intellect does not need a motive outside itself in order to know whatever is knowable; for the infinite power of representing the divine essence, with infinite light, suffices for it.

29. *In what way conditioned knowledge is a necessary condition for the decree of predestination.* — Again, when it is said that this conditioned knowledge is a necessary condition for the decree of predestination, this too is entirely true, of a condition necessary on the part of the will, that it may be borne toward its object; for it needs prior knowledge of it, since it cannot be borne toward what is unknown. Hence it is also necessary that every reason which is to be sought or willed in the object be presupposed as foreknown; and therefore, in order that something be prescribed by an infallible decree, it is necessary that it be foreknown to be efficacious in such a way that, if it is applied, it will infallibly achieve its effect. Since, therefore, the decree of predestination includes an absolute and entirely certain direction toward the end through such a means, it therefore presupposes, on God's part, as a necessary condition, that foreknowledge by which he knows that this means of such a vocation will infallibly achieve its effect, if it is applied. And for this reason it can rightly be said that the decree of predestination could not have been such, that is, of predestination, except on the supposition of that foreknowledge, without which there could only be a decree of general providence, which does not necessarily have an infallible direction toward the end. It is not, however, to be said on this account that predestination has its entire certainty, or infallibility, from foreknowledge; for one must consider the

absolute certainty of the future event, namely that this man will be saved, or converted; and this does not arise formally and proximately from foreknowledge, but from the absolute decree of God's will, who is able to do what he wills, and immutably does what he absolutely decrees. Nevertheless it can radically be said that the infallibility of predestination arises from that conditioned foreknowledge, as from a necessary condition, in order that the divine will may be able to break forth into that absolute decree.

30. From this, however, it is not rightly further inferred that this future good use of grace, as foreseen under a condition, is the cause or motive reason, but only that it is the condition without which God would not choose such a means for saving the predestined, because without that condition it would not be an efficacious means, that is, one infallibly to be effective, and accordingly would not be suited to the end of predestination; whereas with that condition it is a proportionate means. That proportion, or condition, on which it depends, as foreknown under the said condition, is not offered to the will as something already done, or simply to be done, but rather as possible; for that whole conditioned presence does not simply transcend the order of possible things, and is therefore enclosed under the knowledge of simple intelligence. And accordingly it does not in its own way move divine justice, or gratitude, or fidelity, or any other virtue that rewards good services, but it moves in its own way divine mercy, goodness, and liberality; and therefore it is not the cause, or motive reason, on account of which God predestines, although it is a condition in the order of intention and election, necessary on the part of the one predestining, for willing and choosing in a perfect and prudent manner.

31. *The chief decision of the question is established.—It is strengthened by reason.* — Lastly, from what has been said, a general response is concluded to the question proposed, namely that, on the part of the good use of grace, or the cooperation of free will with divine grace, no cause or motive reason can be given of the whole of predestination with regard to its effects. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and clearly of St. Augustine and of all who follow his doctrine, as can be established from what has been said, and will be even more evident a fortiori from the following chapter, twenty-one. It is also concluded by reason from what has been said: because every cooperation of free will with grace presupposes in some way an effect of grace, since it is in no way from cooperation—rather it is the root and cause of the cooperation itself; therefore, although one cooperation, from grace preceding it, can be the cause of further grace or excitation, it cannot in like manner be the cause, or reason, of the antecedent help; for if before that help another cooperation precedes, before this

in turn another excitation must necessarily precede; and so, proceeding in this way, one must necessarily come to rest in the first calling grace, which has no prior cause from any work, or free cooperation of the will. That grace, then, must be altogether gratuitous, since it cannot rest on a subsequent cooperation; therefore predestination, as it embraces all the effects of grace down to that very first one, cannot be founded on any good use, or cooperation with that same grace. Nor does any new objection or difficulty arise on this point.

CHAPTER XXI
WHETHER, ON THE PART OF CHRIST, OR OF SOME MERE MAN, A CAUSE OF ANOTHER'S PREDESTINATION CAN BE GIVEN WITH REGARD TO ALL ITS EFFECTS

1. We have seen that no one can merit or impetrate the whole of his own predestination for himself; it remains to see whether at least one person can merit it for another. Now merit with respect to others existed in Christ in a singular and excellent way, and therefore this question is usually treated particularly concerning him, and has been disputed by us in *1 tom., 3 part., disput. 41, sect. 3 and 4*. Yet since even a mere man can in some way merit for another, St. Thomas also touches on this question, in the cited *quaest. 23, art. 8*; and therefore we shall briefly dispatch both parts. This question, moreover, has a great connection with another to be treated below, concerning the manner in which one can merit another's predestination, even on the part of the divine act, or election—which questions we distinguished above, though they are usually confused; for in reality it contributes not a little to the comprehension of the whole matter, and therefore, for the completeness of the matter, we also separate them here; nevertheless we shall be briefer on this one, since almost the whole difficulty of the present question depends on the other, as we shall see. But that this may be more clearly established, and the difficulty treated more distinctly, it will not be useless to say a few things on the question proposed.

2. *Christ the Lord merited for the elect all the gifts of grace which are effects of their predestination.* — As to what pertains to Christ the Lord, it is certain that he merited for the elect all the gifts of grace which are the effects of their predestination. This is proved sufficiently, at the very least, from those words of Paul to the Ephesians 1: *Who predestined us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ.* For in order for this to be true, it is at least necessary that the means of predestination be conferred on us through the merit of Christ. This Paul also signified there, a little above, saying: *Who blessed us in every spiritual*

blessing in heavenly places in Christ. And a little below he signifies that even the first vocation itself is given *in Christ*, that is, by his virtue and merits. *In whom* (he says) *we were not called by lot*, etc. *By lot* (he says, by metaphor)—that is, by the gratuitous election and will of God we received our vocation; yet *in Christ*, that is, on account of his merit and virtue. But if vocation is in him, the consequence necessarily is that the other gifts also are from him. And thus the Councils of Milevis, Orange, and Trent teach that all the gifts of God's grace, by which men are prevented or helped in attaining their eternal salvation—from the beginning of justification, through its consummation and increase, and perseverance in it—are given to us through Christ, and therefore they call that grace the grace of Christ, or the grace of God through Christ. And thus, although some among the ancient theologians once doubted this truth, it is no longer permissible to doubt it; for it is a most certain matter. Its reason *a priori* must be drawn from the supreme perfection of divine providence and the excellence of his love toward men, and especially toward his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, and from the infinity of his merits, as I have more fully pursued in the place cited.

3. *The conclusion stated is understood not only of the effects of grace which are received in the predestined man himself, but also of the effects on others.—It is proved.* — From this it is gathered that the conclusion stated is true not only of the effects of grace received in the predestined man himself, or occurring proximately concerning him—whether positive and internal, such as inspirations, illuminations, cooperations, infused acts and habits, and the like; or positive and external, such as the application of the Sacraments, the preaching of the word of God, an object exciting to good especially in a congruous manner, and similar things; or external and privative, such as impeding temptation, removing depraved occasions, etc.—but also that the same truth holds of the effects of grace that occur with regard to others, insofar as these sometimes contribute much to the salvation of the predestined, as we shall presently say. It is proved thus: that effect of grace which is given to one, and benefits not only him but also another, is an effect of the merits of Christ, because, universally, all gifts of grace conferred on all men, indeed even on all angels, are from the merit of Christ, as I showed in the cited *1 tom. disput. 42*; therefore also the grace, or help, conferred on one, insofar as it benefits another and is an effect of his predestination, is also an effect of the merits of Christ. This is confirmed because the benefit of grace conferred intrinsically (so to speak) on Stephen, in order extrinsically to benefit Paul, is a great benefit conferred on Paul, contributing to the salvation of his soul; therefore it is comprehended

under Paul's general rule: *He blessed you in every spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ.* For that must be understood with the same universality, respectively, such that whatever gift of grace, with respect to whatever person, takes on the character of a spiritual benefit conferred on him, proceeds from the merits of Christ. You will say, then, that the Incarnation itself will also be an effect of the predestination of men, for *for us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven*; and if this is so, then Christ will no longer be the cause of our predestination with regard to all the effects of grace that arise from it, because Christ is not the cause of his own Incarnation. I respond by denying the first inference, because the Incarnation either is not *per se* primarily ordained for the redemption or salvation of other men, but for itself, and for the exceeding communication of divine goodness; or, in the way in which it is ordained to the salvation of men, this is not peculiarly from predestination, but from the general will of redeeming men; and so, although that will is the cause of all the effects of predestination of individual men, it is not necessary that it itself also be from the merits of Christ the Lord—which will be further explained from what is to be said in the last chapter of this book.

4. *One man can merit another's predestination.* — Finally it must be said that one mere man can in some way merit for another his predestination, with regard to the effect of his grace, even with regard to the first, which is in the predestined man himself, or occurs concerning him; yet no such man can simply merit for another the whole of his predestination, with regard to all its effects pertaining to divine grace, nor in the manner in which Christ merited them. The first part is commonly held, and is taught by St. Thomas, in the cited *quaest. 23, art. 8*, and *3 part., quaest. 4, art. 3, ad 4*, and *quaest. 6, de Veritate, art. 6*, where, in the response *ad 3*, he admits in the latter place the point proposed—that one can merit for another both the first and the final grace, and yet not merit the whole of his predestination. And in the response *ad 2*, he teaches that Paul's predestination was, in this way, brought to effect through the prayer of Stephen. This was also Augustine's view, *quaest. 2, lib. 1, ad Simplicianum*, and *serm. 1 and 4, de S. Stephano*. From this example it is established that Paul's vocation was an effect of Stephen's prayer. Hence the same Augustine, *de Bono persever., cap. 22*, says generally: *If there are any not yet called, let us pray for them that they may be called, for perhaps they are so predestined that they are granted to our prayers.* But vocation is usually the first effect of predestination that occurs in the predestined man himself; therefore one man can be the cause of another's predestination with regard to such a first effect. The reason is that, although this effect, with respect to him in whom it is received, is the first, such

that it does not in him presuppose grace, and therefore cannot fall under his own merit, nevertheless it presupposes grace in the other, and therefore can fall under the merit of that other; for a man pleasing to God can merit, at least *de congruo*, not only for himself but also for others.

5. *In two ways one can merit a gift of grace for another.—Through the Most Blessed Virgin, benefits of grace are granted to us.* — The other part is first declared as follows: in two ways one can merit some gift of grace for another. First, immediately and in itself, in the way it is said that Stephen merited vocation for Paul. Second, in the root, in the way that the same Stephen merited for Paul all the good things he did after his vocation, since all of them drew their origin from that vocation: for Stephen did not merit for Paul all the spiritual graces which he afterward received in the course of his life, immediately and in themselves, since he did not pray for all of them individually in particular; nor is it necessary that God, in view of Stephen's merits, gave Paul each and every good of grace that he conferred on him. And the same reason and proportion hold of any mere man with respect to another, even if the discussion concerns the Most Blessed Virgin praying or meriting for others. For although the saints sometimes say, by way of exaggeration, that all the benefits of grace are granted to us through the Virgin's intercession, there is nevertheless no certain law to this effect, such that this means is necessary by law, although it can be most useful, and most pleasing to God, with regard to each and every one—which the saints chiefly intend.

6. *A difference between Christ the Lord and a mere man as to the cause of men's predestination.—A second difference is established.* — This, then, is the first difference between Christ and a mere man: that Christ, by a certain and infallible law of God, is the cause of the whole predestination of other men in such a way that all and each of its effects are conferred—not only in their root, but immediately and in themselves—in view of his merits, so that even the very glory which each one merits for himself *de condigno* is given also proximately and immediately, and by a higher reason, on account of the merit of Christ; all of which has been shown in the said first volume. But no mere man can in this way merit for another all the effects of predestination, and therefore no one is properly said to merit another's predestination simply. And accordingly St. Thomas very fittingly said that one's predestination can be helped, but not brought about, by another's prayers. Another difference is that a mere man does not merit *de condigno* for another, much less of strict justice, but only *de congruo*, as is established from *1, 2, quaest. 114*; whereas Christ merited

predestination for us not only *de condigno*, but even of strict justice, as is shown at length in *3 part., quaest. 1, art. 2, and quaest. 19.*

7. *Another difference.* — Finally, another difference can be assigned: that a mere man, Stephen for example, so merited the vocation of the predestined Paul that nevertheless that very prayer, by which Stephen merited it, was itself an effect of Paul's predestination, insofar as, in the order of reason, it precedes in the mind of God all of Stephen's merits, as we shall see shortly. And thus, although that vocation could be the first of those effects of Paul's predestination which are received in Paul himself, it is nevertheless not simply the first, since Stephen's prayer is prior, and is numbered among the effects of Paul's predestination—not of those that occur in Paul himself, but of those that occur peculiarly on his account. The same reasoning applies to any predestined man compared to another mere man. But Christ merits for another a congruous vocation, which is an effect of predestination, in such a way that it is nevertheless not necessary that Christ's own merit, or the principle from which it proceeds, be an effect of Paul's predestination, or of another's like it; because Christ's merit stands as a more universal cause, which arises from a certain higher predestination, as we shall declare more fully in the last chapter.

CHAPTER XXII
WHETHER A CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION CAN BE GIVEN ON THE PART OF THE ACT OF THE DIVINE WILL

1. *Properly speaking, no cause of divine predestination is given. — In a free act of God two things can be considered.* — Thus far we have spoken of the causes of predestination as regards its effects; now we must see whether predestination can have any cause, or reason, on the part of the act itself remaining in God, and if it can have such a cause, we shall then inquire what that cause is. In this matter, then, it is certain first of all that, if we speak properly and strictly of a cause really influencing, no cause of divine predestination can be given — just as none can be given for reprobation, or for any divine act whatsoever. The reason is that the act of the divine will is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and therefore it can have no true and real cause, even an eternal one, much less a temporal one. This is what St. Thomas and all theologians assume as evident in this matter. However, speaking more broadly of cause, insofar as it means any reason or objective condition whatsoever, in this sense the present question has a place with respect to predestination on the part of the divine act. For predestination consists in acts of God's foreknowledge and free will, as was seen

above. Now in a free act of God we can consider two things: one is the existence of that act as regards its whole real being, and under this aspect it is not considered here, nor does the question have any place, because such an act as such is not free but necessary, and so it can have no cause or reason on the part of the free creature operating. The act is viewed in another way, however, as freely terminated at a created effect, and as regards this determination (whatever it may be) the question does have a place, namely, whether it has any objective or motive reason on the part of man.

2. *The reason for the doubt.* — That it can have such a reason seems to be proved. First, in the foreknowledge of future things, for God foreknows them because they are future, as the Fathers commonly say — whom I cited in Book 1, *On Grace and Free Will* [De Auxiliis], chapter 13, and Book 3, chapter 8. Therefore the very futurition, or the truth of such a proposition about the future, is the objective reason on account of which divine knowledge is terminated at such an effect; and if the thing is future by the predefinition of the divine will, then the will itself is the objective reason of divine knowledge. In this sense it was said by Hilary, Book 9, *On the Trinity*, that God foreknows future things because he wills them, as I noted more fully and explained in Book 1, *On the Knowledge of Future Things*, chapter 5. Augustine contends this most strongly in this matter, whose sense Prosper had grasped, although, in order that it might be further confirmed by Augustine himself, he asks the same Augustine in a letter to him — Volume 7, before the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, near the end — whether the proposition stands by reason of knowledge (as the Massilians said), or rather whether foreknowledge is grounded upon the proposition, as he himself held. Augustine, however, confirms this latter opinion throughout the whole book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, especially chapters 9 and 10, and in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, especially chapters 18 and 19, and in Letters 105 and 106, and often elsewhere. Hilary held the same view in his letter to Augustine. They do not hold, however, that it is necessary that foreknowledge always be founded on predefinition, but only that it sometimes is, and chiefly that it is so founded in the case of the predestined. For it is established from the same Fathers that foreknowledge can sometimes be of things which are not predestined, if they are future merely by permission, as the same Augustine taught in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10, and Book 5, *On the City of God*, chapters 9, 10, and 11.

3. *Arguments.* — Again, on the part of the will, an objective reason can be given for the free determination of God — concerning which matter I have said much elsewhere, especially in Part 3, Volume 1, on question 19, and

Reconsideration 1, and also in the treatise on Part 1, question 19, article 5. Since, however, it is a necessary foundation for this subject matter, it must be briefly confirmed and explained. Thus St. Thomas holds here, article 5, reply to 3, and in *Against the Gentiles* I, chapter 82, reply to the fourth argument, and chapter 86, where Ferrariensis comments, and in chapter 87. Likewise Capreolus, Book 1, distinction 41, question 1, article 2, near the end, where Durandus, question 2, number 5, says that one free volition of God is the reason for another, in our manner of understanding, just as one attribute is the reason for another; and Gabriel held the same view there, question unique, at the beginning, and Gregory, question 1, article; Marsilius, Book 1, question 41, article 1; Alensis, Part 1, question 28, member 3, article 3. And it is declared by reason, because God wills one object as an end, and another as a means to it: therefore that which is the end is the reason for willing the other. Likewise, God wills something on the supposition of some condition on the part of the creature, which he would not will if that condition were not supposed; therefore that condition is in some way the objective reason of such a volition. The antecedent is shown in the natural order: for when God creates the rational soul in the generation of man, he creates it only insofar as the body, already perfectly disposed, requires it and rightfully demands it; therefore that disposition of the body is the objective reason inclining the will of God to will to create the soul here and now. This is even more evident in moral matters, for God wills to give what is asked because it is asked by virtue of a promise made by himself; he also wills to confer a reward by reason of merits; these things therefore objectively determine the will of God to confer the reward. This is clearer still in the rendering of punishments, which God does not will of himself, but as provoked by us, as Damascene says, Book 2, *On the Faith*, chapters 29 and 30. Therefore the demerits of man objectively determine the will of God to will to punish them. By "determine," however, we mean not by imposing necessity, but only insofar as it is, of itself, moving and inclining, as St. Thomas speaks, *Against the Gentiles* I, chapter 82.

4. *Evasion. — It is rejected.* — It is usually responded to this and similar arguments that they correctly prove that one effect of the will is the cause of another, but not that it is an objective reason of the divine will, which by one most simple act wills one thing to be for the sake of another, or to be a disposition toward another, etc. But this can satisfy by no reasoning, because this causality of one effect with respect to another exists only by means of the divine will, inclining it toward such an effect — as, for example, prayer is the cause of the effect requested, not because it of itself and immediately brings it

about, as is evident of itself, but because it inclines the divine will to bring it about, which Scripture sometimes expressed in these words: *God obeying the voice of man.* And it can be understood from human affairs, for one who asks alms from another is to that extent a cause of the alms insofar as he inclines the will of the other, nor can such causality be understood otherwise. And thus St. Thomas also explains it, II-II, question 83, article 1. And the same holds almost universally in every moral causality, such as is found in merit or demerit, and also in moral disposition: therefore if God wills the causality of those effects among themselves, he also wills that in one of them — for example, in merit — there be a sufficient reason on account of which his will is determined, at least in the order of execution, to will the other effect.

5. *An a priori reason.* — The a priori reason, moreover, is that this is not only not repugnant to the divine perfection, but is also most fitting and necessary for his infinite perfection. The first part is established, first, by the example of knowledge, in which this is found without any imperfection. Second, because by one most simple act God can will all these things under whatever reason is found in the things themselves and is conformed to divine wisdom. From this the other part is also clear, since it belongs to the perfection of God to regulate (as we speak in our manner) his free acts by his divine wisdom, as St. Thomas rightly said, Part 1, question 21, article 3. It also belongs to the perfection of God to exercise distributive or punitive justice, fidelity, mercy, liberality, and similar virtues in his free acts. But these things cannot be done unless various conditions and reasons are considered in the objects, which demand this or that mode of will; and this is precisely what we mean when we say that in the objects themselves are found certain reasons of the divine volitions. Nor do I find any difficulty in this truth: for this is not true causality, such that it would be repugnant to God, but is a condition presupposed on the part of the object, which is in no way repugnant, because such a condition is not supposed absolutely with respect to every will of God, but is supposed with respect to one will in relation to another, distinct in reason.

6. *A conclusion drawn from what has been said. — In the executing divine will a cause of predestination can be given. — What remains under controversy.* — From these principles, then, in the present matter we conclude that it is necessary to inquire whether, on the part of the divine will or foreknowledge as terminated at the effects of predestination, there is some cause that is an objective reason on the part of man. On this question all theologians seem to agree: with respect to the executing divine will, a reason for predestination can often be given, because a cause can be given for some effects of predestination,

which do not come about except through the divine will as terminated at them; therefore that same cause of glory or of grace — that is, the merit of glory, or the disposition for grace — will be the reason of the divine will insofar as it is determined to bestow those things. In this sense Augustine said, Book 1, *To Simplicianus*, question 2, that a certain eternal election to glory is from the presence of merits. Thus also the final disposition for grace, foreseen by God, was the reason on account of which he decreed from eternity to infuse justifying grace, and so with other means which can have a reason of this sort. Two points, however, remain under controversy. One is whether in all the means of predestination some such reason of the divine will can be found. The other is whether, in those very effects in which it is found, this is the first reason of their predestination, or rather whether this very cause itself proceeds from another, prior predestination of such effects — which two points are to be treated in what follows.

CHAPTER XXIII
WHETHER ON THE PART OF THE ELECT MAN A CAUSE, OR REASON, OF PREDESTINATION IN ITSELF CAN BE GIVEN, THAT IS, AS REGARDS THE FREE DETERMINATION OF THE ETERNAL ACT

1. *In what the chief difficulty consists.* — At the outset it must be supposed, following Durandus, Book 1, distinction 41, question 2, that although there is dispute among the authors as to in which act, of intellect or of will, predestination formally consists, nevertheless, when the question concerns the cause of predestination in itself, all agree that the matter must be referred back to the act of the will. The reason is that the foreknowledge of the intellect concerning a thing absolutely future — whether by way of simple notice, or by way of the knowledge of approbation, or, as others hold, by way of command — always presupposes an act of the will, and once that is presupposed, it has no other reason except either the truth of the future thing, or the efficacy of the purpose itself. And therefore, if the purpose has some cause or reason on the part of man, predestination, as it is in the intellect, will have the same cause. But if there is no cause of such a purpose on the part of man, then the ultimate resolution of predestination does not rest in the work of man, but in the purpose of God. Finally, if some reason can be given for predestination at all, it will above all be insofar as predestination is free to God, and in this is found something which is the reason of the free determination of God; freedom,

however, is formally in the purpose of the will, which once posited, the other things, which pertain to the intellect, follow of necessity. Therefore this dispute is rightly referred back to the cause of the purpose itself.

2. *There is no controversy concerning a cause that could be founded on a work done by the powers of free choice alone.* — Second, I suppose that here there is no longer a question concerning a cause that could be founded on a natural work done by the powers of free choice alone, because it has been shown that such a work cannot be the cause of any effect of grace; and from this it evidently follows that it cannot be the cause of predestination, or of God's purpose of conferring some effect of grace. This inference was demonstrated in passing above, and now it is briefly explained by way of converse. For he who is the cause of predestination is also the cause of the effects of predestination, since predestination itself is the cause of such effects, and he who is the cause of the cause is also the cause of its effect. This causality, although in natural things it is accidental, in moral matters, with which we are dealing, is essential [per se]. Indeed, in the present matter causality can scarcely have a place in any other way: for prayer or merit is the cause of some effect only insofar as it obtains or inclines the divine will to bring it about. Now the first and principal will of God is the predestinating will; therefore he who would be the cause of the determination of such a will would be the cause of its effect; therefore, by contraposition of the consequent, since one cannot be the cause of the effect of predestination, much less can one be the cause of predestination itself.

3. From this it further follows that this question also has no place even with respect to a work done from grace, in relation to the divine decree as terminated at giving the first congruous calling: for in no way can such a work be the cause, or reason, of such a decree or of its determination. This is proved by the same argument, because it has been shown that such a work cannot be the cause of this effect, namely, of the calling; therefore neither can it be the cause of its predestination. This reasoning (let me note this in passing) proves not only with respect to that calling as it is given to the predestined, but also as it is often given to the reprobate; for it is also given to him from the eternal purpose of God, and that purpose must of necessity be altogether gratuitous, without foundation in any future work, or one foreseen in such a reprobate, arising from such a calling. For by such a work no one can merit such a calling; therefore much less can one merit the preparation, or purpose, of giving it. Indeed, this can further be applied to the purpose of giving a sufficient calling, even though it is not congruous, because that too is a gift which falls under no merit.

4. *The first opinion.* — These things being established, there are various opinions on this question which, although they differ little in fact in the manner of speaking about the cause of predestination, agree much in their principal foundation. Many, then, by the name of predestination understand only election to glory, or God's efficacious will to give someone glory. From this principle some say absolutely that in all the predestined some cause foreseen by God precedes, on account of which the divine will is determined to predestine them. So holds William of Rubio, Book 1, distinction 41, question 1, articles 1 and 2, and Major, distinction 40, question 2, and Osorio, Book 9, *On Justice*. Others, however, with respect to certain ones singularly chosen by God, do not admit a cause of predestination, because God of himself, and prior to any cause foreseen in them, decreed absolutely to give them glory; they believe, however, that these are few in number in comparison with all the rest who are saved. Hence, with only these excepted, they say that in all the rest a cause of predestination is given. And this was the opinion of Ockham and Gabriel, Book 1, distinction 41, question 1. From these Catharinus does not really differ, Book 1, *On the Predestination of God*, last chapter, and Book 3, chapters 1 and 2. But he differs in his manner of speaking, since he does not call every efficacious will of God to give someone glory "predestination," but only when God, of himself and without foreknowledge of merits, has such a will. For he thinks that in the name "predestination" the particle *prae* signifies not only the precedence of eternity over time, but also a priority (according to reason, in the instants of eternity) of the will over the knowledge of God. And thus, he says, the efficacious will of God to give someone glory is "destination"; it is "predestination," however, when that will precedes the foreknowledge of merits. Hence, as regards manner of speaking, he denies that there is a cause in the predestined, on their part, on account of which God predestined them — because by that particle *prae*, explained in the way stated, such a cause is excluded. Yet he consequently says (in which manner of speaking he erred greatly) that very many are saved although they are not predestined; whence he could also deny that a cause of predestination is given for them, since what does not exist has no cause; in those, however (as he thinks), predestination does not precede. But in fact he grants that in all of them a cause is given on their part on account of which God wills to save them efficaciously, and elects them, and from eternity efficaciously destines them to glory.

5. *Another opinion.* — Other doctors, however, call predestination the will to give not only glory, but at the same time sanctifying grace together with the gift of perseverance up to the attainment of beatitude; they do not wish,

however, that under predestination be included the first aid of grace, or the first calling, even if it be congruous with respect to its proximate effect, whether of faith, or of penitence, or of first justice, or of any temporal grace and sanctity whatsoever, because these effects can be found in the reprobate; hence they do not proceed from predestination, but from general providence. Having supposed this principle, they teach that a cause of predestination is given on the part of all who are saved, because God does not will efficaciously to give anyone glory until he foresees that he will persevere in grace to the end of life; nor does he will to give him the gift of perseverance until he sees him making good use of the prior gifts of grace; and then he predestines him, when he wills to give him this perseverance up to glory. This opinion Bonaventure seems to have taught, Book 1, distinction 41, articles 1 and 2, although somewhat obscurely, and Alensis indicates it in the same way, Part 1, question 28, member 3, article 3, and Albert, distinction 41, article 2, joined to 3. This opinion, however, cannot be applied to infants, as Bonaventure also understood, because in them no use of grace is foreseen; and therefore in their case it must necessarily be said that no cause of predestination is given on their part. This opinion, then, applies only to adults; and since in them there is no meritorious cause of strict right [de condigno] with respect to the gift of perseverance, but only one of fittingness [de congruo], while with respect to beatitude there is merit of strict right, it is necessary that, when they admit a cause of predestination, they speak absolutely of a dispositive, or impetratory, or meritorious cause, abstracting from merit of fittingness or of strict right.

6. *A third opinion.* — Other doctors besides, understanding by the name "predestination" the efficacious will of God, or the absolute decree of giving man grace and glory — including under grace every grace from the first calling up to the last help given for persevering in grace to the end of life — teach that no cause is given on the part of man predestined, nor any reason on account of which God has such a decree toward them. Among these doctors, however, there is a certain diversity. For some admit that in that decree are virtually contained several decrees, distinct by reason, according to the objects and benefits of grace at which they are terminated. For thus Paul, Romans 8, under the one simple name of predestination, includes only this whole business, saying: *Whom he foreknew, he also predestined, to be made conformable to the image of his Son.* Afterward, however, he distinguishes the individual things contained in that predestination, saying: *And whom he predestined, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified.* These same authors think that the same order of reason is preserved among those decrees which the effects

themselves, or the objects of such decrees, in fact preserve among themselves. So that, just as calling is prior to justification, so also God, in priority of reason, willed to give calling before justification, and decreed to infuse justice in such a degree before he decreed to give such an increase, or perseverance in it, and established this before he predefined the conferring of beatitude, which they hold to be the last decree of predestination. Hence they conclude finally that, if we speak of each of these decrees as distinct by reason, no cause is given on the part of man for the first of them, since nothing can precede that decree which would be its cause; but whatever follows from it, or after it, cannot be its cause — all of which has been sufficiently proved above. But of all the remaining decrees they say a cause can be given on the part of man, whether dispositive, impetratory, or meritorious, of fittingness or of strict right, respectively. The reason is that any later decree, according to reason, presupposes some foreseen effect of free choice already excited and supernaturally aided through the effect of the first decree: for the decree of justifying man presupposes the foreseen disposition of him, conceived through the calling given by the first decree, and through the aid concomitant with such a calling, and so on consequently with the rest; nor do they admit any other order among these divine decrees. Hence it happens that, strictly speaking, only the first decree is purely gratuitous, while the rest arise from some merit of man founded in prior grace, and already foreseen by God.

7. *An objection against the said opinion.* — But if it should be objected that from this it follows that a cause is given on the part of man for his predestination, since predestination consists chiefly in the decree of giving glory and perpetual sanctity, never to be lost, as is gathered from Ephesians 1: Turrianus responds, in his treatise *On Election*, accommodating the name of predestination in his own way. For sometimes (he says) it signifies only the efficacious decree of giving glory, which, in the book *On Predestination and Grace* attributed to Augustine, chapter 3, is called the predestination of glory and reward. Sometimes, however, it signifies the decree of giving perseverant and stable grace, according to that text of Ephesians 1: *Who predestined us unto the adoption of children of God.* This distinction having been supposed, Turrianus says that a cause is given on the part of man for predestination to glory, as the objection proves, but not for predestination to grace. This author, in fact, differs in nothing from Gabriel and the others whom I cited in number 4, but only in his use of that word. And besides, speaking consistently, he could and should distinguish predestination to sanctifying grace from predestination to calling grace, and admit a cause with respect to the former, and especially

with respect to predestination to perseverant and stable sanctity even to death — because that (according to this opinion) is not predestined except after some foreseen merit of man, at least of fittingness; or, certainly (according to others), it is not absolutely predefined prior to the foreseen entire free cooperation of man, through which one perseveres effectively. It remains, then, that according to this opinion and division, only the predestination to the first congruous calling has no cause on the part of man.

8. Others, however (to whom this distinction does not seem necessary, and who therefore do not wish to use it), respond simply by denying the inference: because predestination, simply stated, does not signify some single decree of God, as distinguished by us in reason from the rest, but signifies, as it were, the collection of all those decrees from the decree of calling up to the absolute and efficacious decree of glory. Of this collection, no cause is given on the part of man, since no cause is given for that first decree, which is, as it were, the foundation of the rest. They therefore say it must simply be denied that a cause of predestination is given, although they easily admit that a cause is given of election to glory, or to one or another grace, which presupposes another gratuitous election to a prior grace. And the defenders of this opinion think that this was the mind of Augustine and St. Thomas, indeed that it must be the view of all authors who admit that a cause can be given, on the part of man, for all graces and effects of predestination up to glory itself, except the first calling, or first auxiliary grace. For just as we said above that it correctly follows negatively — no cause is given for the effect of such grace, therefore none is given for predestination as terminated at such an effect — so they think it correctly follows affirmatively: a cause is given for such an effect of grace, and of predestination, therefore a cause is also given for predestination as terminated at such grace, which is more properly called election to such a gift of grace, or of glory.

9. The reason for this inference is given as follows: that election, or predestination, cannot have a cause, or reason, of the divine decree in itself, but only by reason of the effect, or by means of the effect; therefore if a cause is given for the effect, a cause is given for God's predestination, insofar as it is terminated at such an effect. The antecedent is shown thus: in the divine purpose by which God predestines, two things can be considered. One is the real and uncreated act of God, and of this it is clear that no cause, or reason, can be given outside God, since, as such, it is simply necessary. The other is the free determination of such an act to such an effect, and this adds to God nothing except with respect to a relation of reason, which results in God from such an effect: therefore if

some cause can be given in man why the act of God has such a relation, it can only be insofar as some cause can be given for such an effect. Just as, in created things, nothing can be the cause of a relation except insofar as it can be the cause of the foundation, or term, of the relation: therefore whatever is the cause of some effect of predestination is the cause of predestination itself, that is, of God's will as terminated at such an effect. Many things are also brought forward from Scripture in favor of this opinion, but I omit them, since they prove nothing other than that we can merit glory and an increase of grace. Several passages from the Greek Fathers are also cited, some of which have been explained above, others of which will be briefly touched on below. If anyone, however, considers rightly, even this manner of speaking differs in fact in nothing from the preceding opinions, insofar as it does not admit an efficacious decree of God concerning glory, or perseverance and sanctifying grace, except after absolute merits already foreseen, or the free disposition of man and by reason of it; it differs only in its use of the term "predestination."

10. There is, finally, another opinion, which I judge also differs from the preceding one only in manner of speaking. For it agrees with that opinion in this: that it places the whole reason of gratuitous predestination in gratuitous calling, which cannot come from any merits; it also agrees in manner of speaking, as regards this — that, simply speaking, no cause of predestination is given on the part of man. It differs, however, in two other respects: first, because it does not admit, in predestination, that distinction of decrees, even according to reason, but says there is one simple decree of constituting man in such an order of things, in which he attains both congruous calling and grace with perseverance up to the term of glory inclusively. Of this decree it is evident that no cause can be given on the part of man predestined. For what can be foreseen in such a man as absolutely future, before it is decreed that he be constituted in some order of things? Now in this simple decree is included (according to this opinion) not only predestination, but also election to glory and to every grace; and therefore this opinion infers that, just as no cause of predestination is given, so neither is a cause of election admitted, whether to glory or to grace, since these are nothing beyond that simple decree, nor are they distinguished within it as something prior or posterior, since they are not even to be distinguished by reason.

11. But, as I said in the first book, it does not appear how a distinction of reason between those decrees can be denied, since they not only have distinct material objects, but also proximate motives, by reason of which one is an act of justice rendering a reward; another is of a special fittingness and congruity of

giving form according to the disposition; another is purely gratuitous and liberal, from the divine goodness alone. Likewise no one can deny that God will in time confer glory on account of merits: therefore neither can it be denied that he had some internal decree to give glory on account of future merits, which of necessity had to have been foreseen before such a decree, since the determination of the decree rests in its own way on the merits. Who, then, would deny that such a decree is distinct in reason from the decree of constituting man in such an order of things? — since this latter does not presuppose absolute knowledge of future merit in such a man, nor is it an act of justice, as the former is. The same argument can be made concerning the decree of giving any grace after the first, which God in time gives by reason of some merit or disposition: for it cannot be denied that God had an eternal decree of giving that grace in such a mode and under such a title, even though he had no similar decree concerning the first grace.

12. But if this opinion does not intend to deny these decrees, but says that they do not pertain to predestination, but rather to the execution of predestination, and that predestination consists only in that first decree of constituting man in such a state of things, etc. — in fact this is true, and as regards denying a cause of predestination we shall not disagree with it. We do not see, however, why it should be denied that in that decree of predestination is contained, formally and expressly, the efficacious will of giving the predestined man beatitude, as his ultimate end, and all the gifts of grace, as means to it — including the order among them, in the reason of proximate end and means — since the decree is determined to all these things formally and expressly, and with such a relation or motive. But if it formally and most simply contains all these things, it must necessarily be admitted that several decrees, distinct by reason, pertaining to the order of intention, can be distinguished in it — no less than the decree pertaining to execution is distinguished from this decree of predestination; or no less than, in execution, the will of glorifying, and of sanctifying, and of remitting sins or punishments, and of calling, etc., are distinguished; or, finally, no less than several ideas and the like are usually distinguished.

13. Wherefore in this opinion, explained in this way, I see nothing that can be reproved, except that confused manner of speaking, without a distinction of reason between those decrees, which is of little importance. According to other ways of explaining it, however, one is reproved gravely and with censure by many, namely, that it should be asserted that a cause is given on the part of the elect for their efficacious election to glory — which is very false and contrary to

Scripture, as Abulensis said, Genesis 25, questions 3 and 4, and Soto agrees, on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, and others. I, indeed, although I find nothing in that opinion, as explained, condemned by the Church, nor pertaining to the error of Pelagius, or of his remnants — because it does not attribute the merit of grace, or of its predestination, to free choice operating by the powers of nature alone, and thus does not admit merit for the whole of grace, nor for its beginning — nevertheless I do not judge it to be true, since it rests on a false foundation, in that it denies that, in the order of intention, an efficacious decree of God precedes — even as regards beatitude and perseverance, and the justice to be conferred on the predestined through free acts as means — concerning which matter enough has been said in the first book. Nor do I believe that the authors of this opinion can give a sufficient reason, even as regards manner of speaking and explaining, why a cause of predestination should not be admitted as regards the free determination of the divine act. What, then, must be held by us, and what seems more in keeping with Augustine and St. Thomas, I shall explain in the following assertions.

14. *First assertion.* — I say, then, first: predestination has no cause, or reason, on the part of the predestined, not only as regards the decree of giving him the first congruous calling, but also as regards the efficacious decree of giving him eternal happiness and sanctity. Consequently I judge that neither Scripture nor Augustine is satisfied if we say only that man cannot merit congruous calling, or predestination to it, and that God had no other special providence, purely liberal and gratuitous, toward the predestined — which that opinion is necessarily forced to say. I prove this, first, from the frequent and customary manner of speaking of Scripture; for I shall examine one or another testimony in particular below, but for now it suffices in general to say that Scripture speaks of God *predestining* or *electing* (which in the present matter, according to the first supposition, is the same thing) *to perpetual sanctity before him*, *foreordaining to eternal life*, *having so loved the predestined that no one snatches them from the hand of Christ*. All these and similar expressions are limited to the sole benefit of calling both contrary to the proper meaning of the words and without any foundation.

15. Second, I show that this is contrary to the mind of Augustine, first from Pope Celestine, in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul, where, after teaching that the beginning of salvation is not from us, but from God, against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, he adds at the end of the letter: *The deeper and more difficult parts of the questions that arise, which those who resisted the heretics have treated more fully, just as we do not dare to disregard, so we do not*

consider it necessary to add to. These questions are without doubt none other than those concerning predestination and reprobation, which Augustine — whom he there tacitly refers to — had treated most extensively and most recently. From this it may be gathered that, in Augustine, the question of the merit of the first grace, and the question of the merit of predestination, were distinct; for the Pontiff, while approving Augustine's opinion in the prior question, abstained in the latter, although he did not dare to oppose it either. I gather the same from the letter of Prosper to Augustine near its end, for after he had taught, or supposed as a settled matter, that the beginning of grace is not from us, he asks Augustine to explain more fully the doctrine of predestination apart from the foreknowledge of works. For it seemed to many that the older Fathers had taught that God predestined to glory those whom he foresaw would act well with the help of grace — the contrary of which Augustine taught, as Prosper held. And the same is plainly gathered from the letter of Hilary.

16. We can also bring forward testimonies from Augustine himself, but since I have spoken of these above, in Book 1, and more fully in Book 3 *On Grace and Free Will*, I shall note only one from the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 9, where Augustine posits two men, called with a congruous calling to faith and to equal sanctity for some time, of whom one perseveres and is saved, while the other does not, but is damned; and he seeks the first root of this and answers: *because they were not separated by some other discernment* — namely, *from the mass of perdition*. I ask, then, what is this other discernment? For it could not be from their works, since if Augustine held this, he would more easily have answered that the reason was that one cooperated, and the other did not. Likewise, since all the works that preceded the fall are supposed equal in both: therefore God had, concerning one, some gratuitous discernment, or predestination, which he did not have concerning the other; therefore this was not merely toward congruous calling, since he had also predestined the other, similarly, gratuitously. Hence Augustine adds there that the difference was that *one was called according to the purpose, but not the other.* I ask, then, of what sort, or of what thing, is that purpose? For it cannot be merely the purpose of calling congruously with respect to present faith or sanctity, since in this way both callings were "according to the purpose." Therefore Augustine supposes that, concerning the predestined man, God had another kind of purpose and predestination, toward eternal goods, from which such a calling arose — which calling Augustine calls *according to purpose.* That purpose, then, is none other than that of glory, or of perseverance, concerning which Augustine had said above, comparing those two men he had proposed:

Why perseverance is given to this one even to the end, and not given to that one, the judgments of God are too inscrutable — therefore he held, even as regards this discernment, that no cause is given on the part of man, which must be understood as regards predestination, for in execution some reason can be given from man's cooperation with grace. And this is what he says above: *They were not called according to purpose, they were not elect in Christ.*

17. *It is established by reason.* — Third, I show and declare the same truth by reason: because it is not repugnant that a merit, or cause, of some effect be given which is not the cause, nor the merit, of the predestination of that effect: therefore it is said without foundation that the predestination of all effects which can fall under merit must necessarily fall under the same merit. The antecedent is evident by examples: for Christ merited the glory of his own body, as is certain, but not the predestination to it. Likewise the Blessed Virgin, according to common doctrine, merited of fittingness the dignity of mother of God, but not, prior to that, the predestination to it. One man merits perseverance for another, but not predestination to it, as I shall show in Chapter Twenty-Four. In other modes or kinds of causes also, many causes of the effects of predestination can be found — such as of death, or of birth, or similar effects, which truly proceed from predestination, and are means predefined in relation to it — and yet the causes of such effects, or means, are not the causes of the predestination of those same means, but rather those very causes are themselves effects of the predestination of their own effects, insofar as they are prepared, or permitted, by it.

18. *An a priori reason.* — Hence the a priori reason is that the effect is posterior to predestination itself, and further — distinguishing, according to reason, in the divine will itself, the executing will from the predestinating will — the executing will is posterior according to reason: therefore it is not repugnant that something be the cause, or reason, of what is posterior, and not of what is prior. If this is not repugnant, then it must be reckoned that not all the effects of grace which are given to the predestined by merit are also predestined by merit, since this is more in keeping with Scripture and divine grace. Otherwise, the proper discrimination between the predestined and the reprobate, in the business of predestination, would have to be attributed to the merits of the predestined. This consequence, however, seems little in keeping with Paul, 1 Corinthians 4, who says: *For who distinguishes you?*, and Ephesians 1, where he holds predestination to be a perfect grace, or liberal benevolence — for this is the sense of the Apostle's words: *He chose us in him, that we might be holy in his sight, and we were called by lot, predestined according to his purpose.* And this is

confirmed because the chief difference between the predestined and the reprobate lies in the gift of perseverance. For in the other, antecedent goods, it happens that they are equal; indeed, sometimes the reprobate receives greater goods; therefore that discrimination too is from the singular benevolence of God, and not from the merit of man.

19. *An evasion is met.* — Nor will it satisfy anyone who says that this is so because perseverance itself does not fall under merit. For, first, this is an obstacle: although perseverance does not fall under merit of strict right, it can nevertheless be obtained by entreaty from a man already justified — both of which St. Thomas taught, I-II, question 114, article 8, in the body and reply to 1, and this is the doctrine of Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapters 6 and 7; therefore that whole point, in which one man exceeds another, could come from his works done from grace. And further, if perseverance is given altogether gratuitously to one rather than to another, then predestination is not toward congruous calling alone, but also toward perseverance, and this not from merits, but from God's election — which is what we intend. And Paul confirms this excellently, Romans 11, where he cites that text of 3 Kings 19: *I have left me seven thousand men*, and tacitly weighs the force of the word "left," that is, "I have kept by my own benevolence." Hence he infers: *So then, at this present time also, there is a remnant saved according to the election of grace.* On this point Augustine may be consulted, Sermon 7, *On the Words of the Lord*.

20. *Second assertion.* — From these things, then, I infer, and say secondly: that on the part of the predestined no cause of predestination is given as regards the eternal predestination to glory, or to perseverance, or to sanctifying grace, or to good supernatural acts — even though, as regards such effects insofar as they are given in time, some cause, or reason, may be given on the part of man. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, Part 1, question 23, article 5, where Cajetan and other modern Thomists comment; the same in *Against the Gentiles* III, chapters 161 and 163, where Ferrariensis comments; the Master, Book 1, distinctions 40 and 41, where Scotus, Durandus, Gregory, Capreolus, Giles, Richard, Major, Hispalensis, and others frequently comment; St. Antoninus, Part 4, title 14, chapter 12, §4; Abulensis, Matthew 20, question 111; the commentators frequently on Romans 9; Cordoba, Book 1, question 56, of opinions; and excellently Bellarmine, Book 2 *On Grace*, chapter 14 and the following. And it is without doubt the opinion of Augustine in the places often cited, besides which one may see Sermon 7 *On the Words of the Apostle* and the preface to the last Psalm, and his commentary on Psalm 30, where he explains those words: *In thy hands are my lots*, concerning the lots of grace and glory, according to Paul,

Ephesians 1 and Colossians 1, and Augustine says that "lot" is election to salvation, and in Sermon 2 he says it is God's will to give man grace and perpetual charity — which election is called a "lot," since it happens to man with no reason whatsoever had on his part.

21. I have brought forward many things from Scripture above, which confirm this truth; now I shall bring forward only the famous passage in this matter, Romans 9: *Before they had done anything good or evil... I loved Jacob.* Concerning this passage, it must first be observed that it is doubtful what Paul understood by the name "Jacob" and "Esau": for many modern authors think he is not speaking of persons, but of the peoples descended from them, since he immediately cites that text of Genesis: *The elder shall serve the younger.* Esau, however, in his own person, never served Jacob, but the Idumean people, who were of Esau, served the Israelite people, who were of Jacob. Hence, Genesis 15, it was revealed to Rebecca: *Two nations are in thy womb*, etc. But, even granting that the peoples are also included in this distinction, the persons of Jacob and Esau are in no way to be excluded, for it was said chiefly of them, Malachi 1: *I have loved Jacob*, etc. Likewise, since from this Paul infers further on that Esau was reprobated; and he also infers: *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth* — where he plainly speaks of individual persons. Finally, those words, *Rebecca having conceived by one*, are literally understood of persons, and this is the commonly received exposition, as is clear from Chrysostom and the Greeks, Anselm, St. Thomas, and among the Latins, Jerome on Malachi 1, Augustine, question 83 *On Genesis*, and often elsewhere, and Anastasius of Nicaea, on the questions of Scripture, question 59. Nor does it matter that Esau did not serve Jacob bodily, for it is enough that he was set above him in the right of the firstborn — hence Isaac said to Esau: *I have made him thy lord.*

22. *The interpretation of some.* — Next it must be observed that some have wished to interpret these words solely of love, or preference, with respect to temporal goods and paternal inheritance. For, Malachi 1, that hatred toward Esau is explained by these words: *I have laid his mountains waste, and his inheritance to the dragons of the desert* — which signify temporal devastation. But whatever may be the case with the passage in Malachi, it is certain that Paul is speaking of the difference of divine grace and election, which he confirms by this example — whether explaining what was contained figuratively (for thus the things done in the Old Testament are often cited in the New) or declaring that in this sense too those words were spoken by the prophet Malachi, as Francisco Ribera excellently explains there.

23. *Exposition.* — Again, some commentators, although admitting that Paul speaks of the goods of grace and the will to give them, nevertheless do not wish to speak of predestination and reprobation, but only, in general, of the greater or lesser abundance of the gifts of grace which we see God conferring on different peoples and nations — for to these faith is preached, and not to those, etc. This difference, they admit, must be traced back to the divine will, from which it does not follow that the predestination, or reprobation, of individual persons is to be attributed to the divine will in the same way. Nor was this necessary for Paul's intention, who only contended, against the Jews, that the Gentiles had been chosen and called to the faith by divine good pleasure, just as they themselves had been elect in Jacob by the pure love of God.

24. *The preceding exposition is rejected. — The true and genuine interpretation is given.* — But this exposition supposes another, rejected in the first point. Hence, just as it was shown there that Paul does not speak only of peoples, but also of the persons of Jacob and Esau, so too it is certain that he speaks not only of the difference between peoples (though this too is included), but chiefly of the predestination of one and not the other. This is the common exposition. And it is clear from those earlier words: *that the purpose of God according to election might stand.* For with these words Paul usually explains predestination itself, as is clear from the preceding chapter eight, and from the first chapter of Ephesians. Likewise, because love and hatred toward individual persons, in the strict sense, signify this. For Esau would not be said to be held in hatred if he were to be saved: therefore the other is simply said to be loved, because just as in this life he was destined to be the firstborn, from whom Christ would be born, so the other was destined to eternal happiness. Finally, Paul declared this sufficiently with the added example of the potter, who makes some vessels for honor, others for dishonor, from the same clay. For it is manifest that by these terms the predestined and the reprobate are signified. Otherwise, one who receives great benefits of grace, even though finally damned, would be a vessel of honor; and conversely, one who receives few, even though saved with them, would be a vessel of dishonor — which cannot be said. And the same is established from the passages from which Paul took this example, Isaiah 45, Jeremiah 18, and especially Ecclesiasticus 33, where the Wise Man introduces another example concerning the differences of days, which Jansenius excellently explains there with respect to the matter we are treating.

25. *The distinction between Jacob and Esau, and between the vessels of wrath and of mercy, as signified by the Fathers.* — Finally it must be observed that some of the ancient Fathers, especially Chrysostom and the Greeks, and Ambrose, if

the commentaries on Paul are his, and Jerome, signify that this distinction of Jacob and Esau, and between the vessels of wrath and of mercy, although made before their merits, was, in being put into execution in time, not made without foreknowledge of merits. This interpretation, however, either should not be admitted, or must be explained of a foreknowledge not antecedent, but consequent, to the divine election: first, because otherwise Paul's admiration would be without cause — for what mystery is there in the fact that God's love precedes a man's works in eternity? It is a mystery, then, that, even before merits foreknown, he loved one and not the other, as Augustine rightly weighs, Letter 105, and often elsewhere. Likewise, why does Paul answer: *Who art thou, that repliest against God?*, when he could easily have given the reason from foreseen works? Moreover, how would that be true: *It is not of him that willeth... but of God that sheweth mercy*, which Augustine, in the passage cited, question 2, *To Simplicianus*, rightly declares must be understood to mean that it is of God's mercy alone — for this is confirmed by the following words, *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy.* But if that mercy were from foreseen works, it would no longer be of God alone. Likewise, he therefore said absolutely "not of works." Finally, otherwise vessels would not be formed from the same clay, since they would have had a difference and varied disposition through works; and therefore Paul attributes everything to the power and will of the potter, which must necessarily be understood as regards the eternal disposition and preparation on the part of God — for in execution it is true that this difference does not come about without a diversity of merits. But because these are given and follow from gratuitous predestination, therefore everything is attributed to God's mercy.

26. *The reason for the assertion is given.* — The reason, finally, for the assertion must be taken from the principle laid down above, that love toward glory precedes all the means of predestination, as the efficacious intention of the end. From which it plainly follows that predestination to glory itself has no cause on the part of the predestined, since no absolute foreknowledge of merits precedes it. Then, by force of this intention, all the congruous means are prepared: therefore the predestination of these means also precedes the absolute foreknowledge of them: therefore, etc. Nor does any new difficulty arise against this truth, except those which pertain either to reprobation, or to the harmony of predestination with free choice, which shall be discussed below.

27. *The third assertion is established. — This assertion is reconciled with the common doctrine.* — Hence, finally, we conclude and say thirdly: not only is no cause, or reason, given on the part of man for the whole of predestination, as

regards the predefinitive decree of God's will, insofar as it is terminated at all the effects of predestination, whether distributively or collectively, but also no such cause is given in relation to that act as terminated at any single effect of predestination. This may seem contrary to the common doctrine, which holds that no cause of predestination is given as regards the whole collection of effects — and this chiefly by reason of the first effect — yet that a cause can be given in relation to the individual effects, and to all of them up to the last, except the first. But in fact this is not an assertion contrary to that doctrine, for that doctrine is understood of the execution of predestination, while our assertion concerns the preparation on the part of God's will: for just as in glory we distinguish two things, namely, the conferring of glory and its preparation on the part of God through an act of efficacious love, which has the character of intention with respect to the means, although it is called election by comparison with persons not so loved — so we distinguish those same two things in the conferring of grace and of the individual graces subordinated among themselves. Hence, just as no cause of predestination to glory is given, although a cause of glory itself is given, so no cause of predestination to perseverance in grace is given, although some impetration, or other similar cause, of such an effect may be given. For the proportional reason is the same: just as glory is first in intention, by which it is, in its own way, predestined or predefined, so sanctification is prior in intention to the disposition or merit for it; and the disposition itself is prior, in the same order of intention, to the calling toward it, and so with the rest: therefore the reason is the same.

28. *The foundation.* — This is easily declared and proved by a certain induction, whether we begin from calling and proceed up to glorification, or conversely. For, first of all, the purpose which God had of giving man the first congruous calling had no foundation in the merits of man, as we all agree. From this it follows, moreover, that the eternal purpose by which God first decreed to give this man an act of faith was not from a foreseen merit of the same order, since such a merit would have had to be founded in faith — because before faith there is no merit — and it could not be founded in faith, since faith itself flows from the purpose of giving faith, and not the other way around. The same, proportionately, holds for the other supernatural acts, which are the efficacious means by which the predestined is saved. This reasoning supposes that God predefined these acts in themselves by an absolute decree, not only from eternity, but also prior in reason to his foreknowledge, in that same eternity, that they would be absolutely future. That this is true, and more in keeping with the perfection of divine providence, we have shown in Book 3 *On Grace and Free*

Will. This, however, cannot be sustained according to the contrary opinion, which is necessarily forced to say that God did not, of himself, absolutely predefine these acts, but, by an antecedent will, desired them and gave means of themselves suited to bring them about, and finally foresaw that free choice would cooperate with them, and then, as it were, approved or accepted them. And thus, that man is not predestined to have faith or contrition except after his cooperation is already foreseen, even as absolutely future; and so such acts are not future because they are predefined, but rather, because they are future, they are therefore absolutely predefined in themselves. All these things are not proved to us, nor do they seem sufficiently in keeping with Scripture and Augustine, as we have tried to show in the place cited from *On Grace and Free Will*, and in the first book of this work.

29. Moreover, we hold the same concerning the infusion of grace and of other supernatural habits, and concerning perseverance in it to the end of life. For although in time God infuses this grace into the one disposing himself, and because he disposes himself with the help of grace, nevertheless he did not predestine it from eternity in this way, but rather the converse: because God predestined to sanctify this man, already an adult, at such an age, time, etc., and therefore he also foreordained to give him a disposition suited to sanctification. And thus, although the attainment of justice comes from disposition, nevertheless the predestination of justice does not come from a foreseen disposition, but rather is the origin of such a disposition. And in a similar way, because God willed that the predestined man should end this present life in grace, therefore he prepared for him, by an absolute decree, both the grace itself and the congruous means for persevering infallibly in it for some time, up to death. And if perhaps man merits of fittingness such a gift of perseverance, that merit is not the cause, but rather the effect, of man's predestination to perseverance in grace — although it is in some way a cause of its execution, since God gave man such merit precisely because he had predestined him both to persevere and to obtain the gift of perseverance through such a means. And finally, we philosophize in the same way concerning glory: for God decreed, before all things, to save the predestined man and make him blessed, and therefore prepared the other means, from the first to the last, by certain and infallible decrees; and therefore no cause of predestination to glory can be given on the part of the predestined, though a cause of glorification can. And the reason for all this is that the order of intention is prior to the order of execution, and predestination, as it pertains to the will, is placed among the decrees pertaining to the order of intention.

30. *In what sense the authors speak on this difficulty.* — Wherefore, when authors are accustomed to say that a cause of predestination can be given as regards individual, or later, effects of it, but not as regards the whole collection, or the first effect, they are speaking only of effects considered in execution, not according to the order of intention; or (which comes to the same thing) they speak of those effects as regards their being, not as regards their formal predestination. For thus it should rather be said that no dispositive or meritorious cause is given, on the part of man, for the preordination of some effect of predestination, but only a final reason — just as merits are predestined because glory is predestined, and grace is predefined so that merits, which are supposed to be predestined, might arise from it, and so with the rest. Nor is that inference, which some modern authors use, sound — namely, that a meritorious cause is given, on the part of man, for some effect of predestination, therefore a cause is given for the predestination of such an effect, or of the divine election as terminated at such an effect. Just as it does not follow that a merit of glory is given, therefore a merit of predestination to glory is given: because (as I said) the effect in itself, or in execution, is something posterior to its predestination; and from the fact that a cause is given for what is posterior, it does not follow that a cause is also given for what is prior, since that very cause can take its origin from that prior thing — just as merits, which are the cause of glory, take their origin from predestination to glory.

31. *A difficulty against this opinion. — It is satisfied.* — Only one difficulty remains against our opinion: that predestination implies an infallible providence of means, by which the elect are most certainly, and thus efficaciously — that is, with effect — brought to the kingdom of heaven. But such providence cannot be infallible unless the foreknowledge and presence of man's free cooperation is supposed; for without it man will not be saved, and consequently the means will not be efficacious without it: therefore they cannot be infallibly preordained except from the infallible foreknowledge of such cooperation: therefore that cooperation is supposed as a necessary condition for the predestination of that effect, which is to be future through it: therefore it is supposed as a certain foreseen merit, which, at least of fittingness, could be the cause of one or another effect of predestination. I respond: if the argument were valid, it would also apply to predestination as regards the first calling. For such a calling, insofar as it falls under predestination, is formally preordained as congruous, or efficacious, and consequently as having its effect infallibly (because in this respect the ordination of predestination is chiefly distinguished from common providence): therefore the predestination of that calling too, in order to be such,

supposes the foreknowledge of future free cooperation, as was shown above: therefore the same inconvenience follows concerning that first effect, as ordered by predestination; or if it does not follow concerning that one, it is not rightly inferred concerning the others either.

32. It must therefore be said that from this it is inferred only that a conditioned foreknowledge of free cooperation is supposed, which does not suffice to make that cooperation a meritorious or dispositive reason, but only to make it intended by way of a proximate end with respect to the other means, which must precede it in execution — that is, with respect to the calling and excitation itself. For God calls the predestined man so that he may be converted with effect, and so that he may cooperate freely, since under conversion this cooperation is included, as a partial action: and consequently it follows also that this same cooperation is elected and predefined by God as a means, or part of the means necessary to the end of glory, which is already supposed intended. This relation of end and means, however, does not remove gratuitous predestination, because the ordination of God to give such a means, as it is to be efficacious in the future, is from the sole gratuitous will of God. Because (as we said above) that cooperation, only as foreseen under a condition, cannot induce a debt, but is only the necessary condition for such a means to be constituted under the character of an infallible means, and consequently eligible through predestination — although the election always remains in the sole liberality of God, as Augustine rightly teaches, Book 1, *To Simplicianus*, question 2, and the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 14, and Prosper, *Against the Objections of the Genoese*, objection 8.

33. *The difficulty is pressed further. — It is responded.* — But you will press further, because, although before the decree by which God determines, for example, that Peter should believe, or grieve over sin, free cooperation is supposed only under a foreseen condition, nevertheless, once that decree is posited, that knowledge already passes into absolute knowledge, and God foreknows that this man will have some merit through such faith, or penitence: therefore that merit, thus foreseen, will be the reason for giving him such a calling, and for predestining it, since that decree, and that foreknowledge, are prior in reason to the decree of giving such a calling. It is responded that this kind of foreknowledge also does not suffice, at least according to the ordinary law, for meritorious or dispositive causality, but only for the character of an end, or a means, because by that knowledge man is not foreseen as already operating in himself, nor as having all the principles and gifts necessary for meriting, but only that effect is foreknown as future from the efficacy of the divine will, from

whose liberality those gifts, which are to be the future principles of such merit or disposition, are still awaited (so to speak). And therefore the decree which God has, in a later sign of reason, of giving man such a calling, in no way arises from the merit of the man himself, however much God already foreknows, in his decree, that the man will have such merits — because he does not yet see such merits as accomplished and exhibited by the man himself in the presence of eternity; indeed, he does not yet see the man as already graced by him, or as raised up to operate supernaturally: that decree, then, and the foreknowledge in it, moves only as the intention of an end, in giving means suited to the end already determined.

CHAPTER XXIV
WHETHER A MERE MAN, OR EVEN CHRIST THE LORD, COULD MERIT FOR OTHERS THEIR PREDESTINATION, AS REGARDS THE FREE DETERMINATION OF THE DIVINE ELECTION

1. *An opinion affirming this. — The foundation is laid.* — There is no lack of modern theologians who teach that, just as a mere just man can merit gifts of grace for another, so too he can merit for another his whole predestination, even as regards election itself to glory. Their foundation is constructed from several principles. The first is that the efficacious election of the predestined to glory is not the first act of the divine will concerning the predestined, but rather the last. The second is that one man merits for another the first calling of grace, and consequently God's decree concerning that congruous calling to be conferred, at least as regards the free determination of the divine will toward such an effect. The third is that, by the same reasoning, one man can merit for another all the other later effects of predestination after calling, even as regards their predefinition in the will of God — both because, just as one man can merit congruous calling for another, so too he can merit perseverance, and consequently the other effects; and also because, even granting that he does not merit the other effects immediately, nevertheless he merits all of them virtually, or is in some way the origin and cause of all of them, since by meriting congruous calling he virtually merits actual conversion, which is the preparation for the subsequent effects, and so on consequently up to glorification. The fourth principle is that the prayer, or merit, of one for another already predestined is not to be counted among the effects of his predestination, nor is it grace given to the one for whom prayer is made, but to the one praying — because the prayer of another is not, for the other predestined man, the principle of acting well, but

only obtains for him such a principle; and only that which is the principle of acting well is the proper effect of grace and predestination. From these principles it is concluded that one man can merit for another his whole predestination as regards its effects, and consequently also as regards election to glory or to grace — because election to glory is not supposed prior to other foreseen effects of grace, and election to glory is nothing other than the efficacious will of giving that congruous calling, which is plainly merited by one who merits congruous calling.

2. *The aforesaid opinion is refuted.* — This opinion is both new and singular, and therefore, just as we said above that one mere man cannot merit for another all the effects of his predestination, so too we now say of the same man that he cannot merit for another divine predestination as regards efficacious preordination to glory, or to grace, as regards the absolute decree of giving it. This is the plain opinion of St. Thomas, in the place cited, question 23, article 8, and the common opinion of the commentators there, and Durandus, Book 1, distinction 41, question 3, number 4; and Gregory expressly teaches it, Book 1 of the *Dialogues*, chapter 8, where he explains that predestination is aided by the prayers of the saints, not because prayer is the reason or motive on account of which God predestines another, *but because the very predestination of the eternal kingdom has been so disposed by Almighty God, that the elect arrive at this through pious labor, in such a way that, by asking, they merit to receive what God had disposed to give them before the ages.* This he proves by the example of Isaac, who prayed to God for Rebecca's conception, and obtained it, although the propagation of Abraham's line through Isaac had already been promised, and was therefore predestined.

3. Prosper holds the same view, Book 2, On the Calling of the Gentiles, last chapter, or the penultimate. There, having said that the election of the predestined is according to the purpose and grace of God, he adds: Against this most splendid light of an intricate truth, certain men are accustomed to say, not soberly, that it is superfluous to labor for the acquiring of merits by good works, and that it is in vain to persist even in prayers, by which God is hoped to be entreated, if the election of Christian grace stands by his unchangeable purpose. To this objection he responds, in sum, that the divine election does not exclude the means which, in its own presence, it foreknew, and which it prepared by that same election to grace, or predestination: God, then (he says), gives to those whom he chose without merits the means by which they may also be adorned with merits. And it is said in vain that the reason of operating does not belong to the elect, since they operate for this purpose: that they may become elect — that

is, that they may become such as they were ordained, or predefined, to be through election. And he thinks the same must be answered concerning prayers, for prayers too presuppose the purpose of election, and flow from it, so that through their mediation it may be put into execution. Hence he adds further on: That the concern for prayers is not dissolved by the purpose of divine election, I shall prove evidently by one testimony, so that I may, for the sake of brevity, omit the rest. This is the example of the younger Tobias, of whom he supposes that it was predefined by God that he should have Sara as his wife, and yet he is admonished by an angel to ask for her, etc., Tobit 6; and he finally concludes: Although, therefore, what God has determined cannot by any means fail to come about, nevertheless the efforts of prayer are not removed, nor is the effort of free choice relaxed by the purpose of election, since the effect is so preordained as to fulfill the will of God, etc. This, finally, Augustine plainly supposes, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 22, when he says: If there are any not yet called, let us pray for them, that they may be called; perhaps they too have been so predestined, that they are granted to our prayers.

4. *Testimonies from Scripture are brought forward.* — Moreover, if one weighs the testimonies of Sacred Scripture by which Augustine, Prosper, and other Fathers prove gratuitous predestination and election, they show not only that it is gratuitous with respect to the one who is predestined, but also with respect to others (I now except Christ, of whom I shall speak presently). This is proved because, first, Christ attributes to no one else but himself the election of men, when he says: *You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.* These words, then, plainly show that all are elected from the sole will of God. Therefore, just as it is rightly gathered from this that God elected no one on account of a good will or petition foreseen in him, so too he did not elect anyone on account of the petition of another — otherwise he would not have done it from his own will alone, nor primarily of himself. Paul says the same, Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world*, etc., and below: *Predestined according to his purpose:* therefore the whole election of men is from the sole purpose and good pleasure of God. But if it had some relation to the merits, or actions, of some man, this can be attributed only to Christ, of whom Paul says uniquely (*in him*); therefore he did not elect Paul "in Stephen" — that is, on account of the prayer of Stephen — but only "in Christ." Indeed, even in Christ himself he chose us *according to the counsel of his will*, as we shall presently explain: therefore he did not choose Paul from the counsel of the will, or prayer, of Stephen, but rather, from that same counsel of the divine will, Stephen prayed, so that Paul might obtain the benefit of grace to which he had been elected.

5. *It is strengthened by the unacceptable consequences it avoids.* — This can also be confirmed by the unacceptable consequences that would otherwise follow: for it would follow that the Blessed Virgin and the more ancient Fathers merited the predestination of Christ the Lord and the election of his humanity to the hypostatic union — which cannot be said, as Augustine supposes as certain, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 24, and as is shown in the treatise on the Incarnation. The consequence is clear, because those Fathers obtained that Incarnation by their prayers, and obtained, through prayer, many means antecedent to it — as the Virgin's parents obtained her conception, and Abraham merited the procreation of Isaac, and so with the others. Hence, universally, it would follow from that opinion that, as often as someone obtains for another some gift, or benefit of God, he also obtains predestination to it; and accordingly that the Virgin's parents merited for her, at least remotely and mediately, election to the motherhood of God — since she was not first elected to be mother before being preordained to exist. If, then, the parents obtained that she be predestined to exist, then at least remotely, and as a foundation, they merited the other things which followed from it. And in the same way Stephen would have merited for Paul his election to the apostolate: for if he merited for him election to glory, what wonder that he also merited the apostolate, which is posterior?

5. [bis] Hence it further follows that anyone merits for himself election to all those goods, or to whatever dignity, which he obtains for himself by prayer, or merits for himself in some way through prior grace: as, for example, that the Blessed Virgin merited for herself election to the dignity of mother of God, since that dignity, as actually exhibited, supposes grace in the Virgin, by which grace she in some way merited for herself that dignity, and therefore also the election to it. And thus Abraham would have obtained for himself election as the ancestor of Christ, because he merited for himself the promise of that benefit. The inference is clear, because if it is asserted that, on some ground, he who merits calling for another also merits election for him, this is only because the calling of one supposes grace in the other, by which he can in some way merit calling for another, which calling has the character of a first grace with respect to the one called — though with respect to the other it is, as it were, a second grace; but in a similar way the dignity of motherhood supposes grace in the Virgin, with respect to which that dignity is a second grace. These and similar claims, however, are false, as I suppose from other places: and it is enough for us that they are alien to the common opinion of the Doctors.

6. *An a priori reason is given.* — The a priori reason, finally, is that the prayer by which one obtains calling for another is an effect of predestination — not only of the one praying, but chiefly of the one for whom prayer is made: it is not, then, the cause of the whole predestination. The antecedent is proved generally in the following book, by showing that not only the actions of the predestined, or their principles, but also every action of any man whatsoever which specially cooperates toward the salvation of another, is an effect of the predestination of him who is saved through another. For now, however, it is briefly shown in two ways. First, from the principle laid down in the first book, that election to glory is the first act of the divine will concerning the predestined, and accordingly that all the predestined were, in the same sign of reason, elected to eternal salvation. From this it plainly follows that one man could not merit election for another, since the election of all was made simultaneously, before all their foreseen works; and consequently, whatever one merits, obtains, or works for another, which with effect contributes to the execution of the election, is itself an effect of that same election, in the way that means are effects of the intention of an end. Indeed, although that intention of giving glory to Paul did not precede by an efficacious and absolute decree, nevertheless it cannot be denied that God inspired Stephen to that prayer from an intention and affection of saving Paul, whatever that affection may have been — that is, whether it was through an efficacious will, or only through a simple and antecedent one. Because that prayer was without doubt from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and the effect of Paul's conversion and salvation was excellent: therefore it is incredible that it was not intended by the Holy Spirit, at least with a simple effect. All the more so because the one entreating himself — Stephen, for example — is accustomed to intend and desire this very thing, and this very intention is from the Holy Spirit; therefore the Holy Spirit holds that intention in a far higher way. But this is enough, according to the opinion of these authors, that the calling of Paul itself be an effect of his predestination — namely, that it proceeds from the simple affection of God to save Paul: therefore the same will suffice in the case of the prayer made for him by another — for the fact that this prayer is in another does not prevent it from being an effect of Paul's predestination.

7. This is proved, secondly, because grace given to someone is not only his benefit, but also the benefit of another, if it is given on his account and for his benefit. For grace given to a preacher, for example, to Philip, that he might enlighten another in a congruous way — namely, the Ethiopian eunuch — is without doubt a benefit done to the eunuch, supernatural and gratuitous; it was,

then, grace, and if that eunuch was predestined, as is to be believed, plainly it was an effect of his predestination. So, similarly, the prayer of one for another is a benefit of grace conferred by God on him for whom prayer is made, even if it does not inhere in him. Because the benefits of grace extend more broadly: hence if the one for whom prayer is made is elect, and that prayer cooperates efficaciously toward the ultimate effect of the election, without doubt the election is not from the prayer, but rather the prayer from the election. And the same holds of any other merit of one for another. Such a prayer, then, or merit, cannot be the reason for the whole predestination of another — neither as regards all its effects, nor as regards the free determination of the divine election.

8. *The foundation of the contrary opinion is explained.* — A response to the foundation of the contrary opinion is easy from what has been said. For of the four principles which it assumes, the first is false, and the one arguing from it does not correctly, or consequently, infer, as we have seen. The second principle, however, although true as regards the merit of another's calling, is not true as regards the decree by which such a calling is predestined — for as such, it is compared as the proximate end on account of which the spirit of such prayer is given to another. Nor is that inference sound — that one merits another's calling, therefore one merits the first determination of the divine decree predefining such a calling — as has already been sufficiently discussed. The third principle, although admitted as regards execution, concerning the effects of predestination which are, in execution, posterior to calling, makes no difference here, because those effects are prior to predestination in the divine preordination, and so it does not follow that such a prayer is the reason of predestination as regards the determination of God's act itself. Moreover, those are not all the effects of such a man's predestination: for the prayer of another, and the grace for it, is also an effect; and so that prayer cannot be the cause of all the effects simply, as they are conferred in execution. Hence the fourth principle is simply false. And the reason given for it is of no weight. For why should such great principles of acting well be effects of predestination? We shall show the opposite below. Or why, also, is that prayer not called the principle of another's good operation, at least remotely, in the way it is customarily said that to be the cause of the cause is to be the cause of what is caused? — which causality, although physically accidental, is nevertheless morally of great weight and reckoned almost essential.

9. *A new difficulty arises. — The reason for doubting. — A probable opinion.* — But from this another difficulty arises, pertaining to the other part proposed

in the title of the chapter. For it also follows, on the part of Christ the Lord, that no reason, or cause, is given for the election of the predestined, insofar as it is the free decree determined to efficaciously will the salvation of such men. This consequence seems contrary to Paul, Ephesians 1, who says: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world:* therefore, etc. The inference is proved because even the merit of Christ, or the reason of it, on behalf of the elect, is an effect of their election and predestination. For why is Stephen's prayer for Paul an effect of Paul's predestination, while Christ's prayer for Paul is not an effect of Paul's predestination? Therefore, just as Stephen did not merit election for Paul, neither did Christ. And this is confirmed because we said above that the election of all the predestined was made before the foreseen original sin; but concerning Christ the Lord, the probable opinion affirms that he was not predestined before original sin was foreseen: therefore it plainly follows that the rest of men were neither elected nor predestined on account of foreseen merits of Christ; and although Scotus and others hold that Christ as man was predestined before original sin was foreseen, nevertheless that same Scotus, Book 3, distinction 19, question 1, says that he was not preordained to merit before the election of the predestined: and thus this election of the predestined could not be from foreseen merits of Christ. This also seems to follow on our own opinion, by which we asserted above that the election of men was made before original sin was foreseen: from this it follows that Christ was not elected before other men, but at most simultaneously with them, in the same sign of reason. From which it also follows that the election of men did not suppose foreknowledge of the merits of Christ — just as the election of Christ himself did not suppose his own foreseen merits.

10. On this question the ancient scholastics speak obscurely. For although almost all teach that Christ was the cause of our predestination, they immediately explain this by distinguishing, with respect to predestination, between its effects, and the acts of the divine will or intellect; and they declare that it must be understood in the former way when it is said that Christ is the cause of the predestination of other men: for as regards the act itself of God, they think he cannot be a cause. So proceeds St. Thomas, Part 3, question 24, article 4, and Book 3, distinction 10, question 3, sole article, question 3; and indeed, if the doctrine of the same saint in Part 1, question 23, article 8, is attentively examined, especially in the solution to objection 1, although it is general, it seems also to embrace the merit and prayer of Christ. For, the argument having been proposed that predestination is eternal and the prayers of the saints temporal, and that therefore predestination cannot be aided by the

prayers of the saints, he responds that this argument proves correctly that predestination is not aided by the prayers of the saints as regards the preordination itself. But if this is true of the other saints, the same reasoning applies to Christ, since his prayers too were temporal.

11. Alensis proceeds in almost the same way, Part 3, question 3, member 5, and Bonaventure, Book 3, distinction 41, article 1, question 3, Albert, distinction 10, article 3, Richard, article 4, last question, Durandus, question 3, who in the solution to objection 2 adds that Christ was not the cause of our predestination as regards all its effects, because among these effects he places the Incarnation itself. Gabriel likewise, Book 3, distinction 19, article 2, conclusion 4, although he dissents from Scotus in assigning the instants, or signs of reason, in eternal predestination, or election, nevertheless agrees in the conclusion that Christ is not the cause of our election as regards the divine act. For, he says, that act is so simple that neither in reality nor in reason can several things be distinguished in it, and therefore no cause, or reason, can have a place in it, such that it is terminated at one object rather than another. Hence he too uses that common distinction of the theologians, concerning the cause of predestination as regards the act, or as regards the effects, and agrees with the others in denying a cause on the part of the act, although for a different foundation. Nor does this opinion, or distinction, seem sufficiently explained when understood solely of the will as regards the real act itself, because in this way the distinction and resolution would be insufficient. The reason too, which many use — that what is temporal cannot be the cause of what is eternal — would not be adequate, because what is temporal, as foreknown from eternity, can be a cause — that is, a reason of an eternal free determination — if otherwise it is not repugnant by reason of the identity of the act, or its priority, or simultaneity, in the sign of eternity.

12. Among modern authors, some teach more clearly that the election of men was made from the foreseen merits of Christ. I followed their opinion in Volume 1, Part 3, disputation 41, section 4, expounding it together with almost all that the ancients had said, declaring that opinion in such a way, however, that I judged the choice (so to speak) of the elect — that is, that these rather than those be predestined — should be reserved solely to the divine will; for I did not think this could be attributed to the merits of Christ, even though that election, insofar as it is benevolence and benefit to the elect, is to be attributed to them. And I defended this not as a matter certain by faith, nor as the constant opinion of the theologians, or the Fathers, but as a pious and probable opinion. And I

judge now that this must almost be held still; but something more must be explained, and certain objections must be met.

13. *Two things are noted in the recent opinion.* — For I observe that two things, in what I have just related, have been remarked upon by later writers as deserving correction. They assert, first, that the election of the predestined — not only as it is love and benevolence toward them, but also as it is election from the mass of perdition (by comparison, that is, with others who are not so loved) — is from the merits of Christ. Then they hold that this assertion is not merely a probable opinion, but Catholic doctrine — in which they signify that the matter is certain by faith. They base this chiefly on the passage of Paul, Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy*, etc. For since in these words Paul clearly teaches that we are elected in Christ, it cannot be denied (they say) that our election was from the merits of Christ. Nor do they think it permissible to interpret that passage of election insofar as it is love, without relation, or comparison, to others — both because this is to misuse the word, and also because the Greek Fathers hold the opposite, especially Photius, in Oecumenius on Ephesians 1, where, expounding the words, *He hath blessed us with all spiritual blessing*, he says: *He blessed us through the Son, he chose us through the Son, he made us dear through the Son.* They confirm the same with those words of the same Paul: *He predestined us unto adoption through Jesus Christ.* And from 2 Timothy: *He hath called us with his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the times of the world.* From this passage a reason is also taken: because God, in time, gives to the elect every grace up to glory inclusively (so to speak) on account of the merits of Christ: therefore from eternity he determined to give it to them on account of the merits of Christ: therefore he chose and predestined them on account of the merits of Christ. For what God executes in time, and the manner in which it is to be executed, he predestines from eternity.

14. *The assertion is examined. — A twofold sense of the phrase "on account of merits" is opened up.* — But let us first examine the assertion itself, and then inquire into its degree of certainty. And in the assertion itself, a twofold ambiguity, or equivocation, in the words must be opened up and guarded against, lest, while we exalt our election in Christ and through Christ, we instead remove it from consideration altogether. For first, above, in the first book, and in this second book, we noted that there is a great equivocation in this inference: God from eternity willed to give, in time, grace, or glory, on account of merits; therefore he predestined, loved, or chose, on account of merits. For if the sense

is that the phrase "on account of merits" refers to the object, or effect, of predestination, the inference is excellent, for the sense is that God from eternity predestined that such grace, or glory, should not be given in time except on account of such merits. But there is another sense, namely, that the phrase "on account of" refers to the will of him who predestines, as terminated from eternity at conferring such grace, or glory, efficaciously on such a man — so that the very termination of the divine will, as predefining, or efficaciously intending, such an effect, was on account of merit. And in this sense the inference is not sound, as I showed above: for God in time does not give the adult elect glory except on account of their merits, nor sanctifying grace except through their free, mediating disposition. Hence it is certain that he decreed from eternity to give it in time in this way, and not otherwise. And nevertheless it is most true, and sufficiently certain, that God's first efficacious decree, by which he loved, chose, and predestined men to glory, was not from their merits, and that his first intention of sanctifying them was not from their foreseen disposition, but rather because God had chosen them for true sanctity, he prepared their disposition for it, and finally bestowed it.

15. *The force, or strength, of a certain consequence is declared.* — When, therefore, by a similar inference, it is concluded that God had, on account of the foreseen merits of Christ, an eternal will to save the predestined in time and to bestow grace upon them, because in time he gives all these things on account of the merits of Christ, and from eternity disposed not only the effects, but also the manner of carrying them out: in this sense, indeed, the inference is sound, and the doctrine can rightly be called Catholic — for it plainly follows from two certain principles. One is that grace and glory are given to us in time on account of the merit of Christ; the other is that whatever God does in time, and the manner and reason of his doing it, was established, or decreed, from eternity by the will of God, in the way that the effect demands. Hence, if our grace and glory in time are the reward of Christ's merits, then certainly God from eternity willed that it be the reward of such merits, and therefore disposed that Christ should merit them for us. This, then, is the sense intended by the said authors, and they deny any other election of men on account of the merits of Christ, because they admit absolutely no other gratuitous election, or predestination, of men. Hence it happens that they attribute congruous calling, and consequently that will of God by which he decreed from eternity to give man such a calling, immediately to Christ and his merits alone. For the other gifts of grace and glory, they must say not only that he predestined them, and decreed to give them, on account of the merits of Christ, but also on account of the merits of the

man himself who receives them — which they must say especially of glory, and of the increase of grace, consequently: namely, that God did not, from eternity, predestine someone proximately and immediately to glory, or to such great sanctifying grace, on account of the merit of Christ alone, but on account of the merit of the man himself, because it is thus given in time, and is predestined from eternity in the same manner in which it is given in time.

16. *Our own conclusion. — The reason for the conclusion.* — We, however, not only admit this truth, insofar as it concerns the matter itself, but admit further that not only that election to glory which we above called "of justice," but also that which is purely gratuitous with respect to the man elected — insofar as it is benevolence and love of such a man, as we shall presently explain — was from the merits of Christ. And we say the same of every gratuitous decree of God to give grace to the predestined, from the first to the last. And in this sense we probably understand the cited testimonies of Paul, which the last opinion brought forward, concerning which we shall add a few things shortly. The reason can be given thus: for either we hold that the election of the predestined was made after foreseen original sin, choosing and separating them from the mass of perdition; or we think that men were elected before any sin was foreseen, just as the holy angels were elected. According to the first opinion, it is easy to understand that the merits of Christ were foreseen before the election of men, whether Christ himself is held to have been predestined before the foreknowledge of original sin, or after it. Because in either way, Christ is the first of all the predestined in the mind of God, and the first loved and elected, and therefore his merits could have been foreseen before the election of other men.

17. But if we hold more strongly the other opinion, which we have set forth above — that the men who are to be saved were preelected by God before original sin was foreseen — with much greater reason we ought to admit, and we believe it to be true, that Christ, God and man, was per se first predestined, before any occasion of future sin was foreseen. For Paul, Colossians 1, plainly teaches that Christ himself was the first of all the elect and beloved of God, and holds primacy in all things, even in the mind and intention of God. And this is most fitting to his excellence and majesty, as is treated more fully in Part 3, question 1, article 3. This being established, it is also easy to understand that the merits of Christ preceded, in the foreknowledge of God, the election of other men: because in the very predestination, or love, of Christ, his merits are understood as predefined, and accordingly are foreseen in the same sign as absolutely future. If, then, in the sign in which God elects the predestined, he already has present the future merits of Christ, then on account of them he

could love whomever he loved: and so it was done, because those merits are worthy of whatever reward is possible according to God's ordinary law: and because in this way the divine work itself is accomplished in a more excellent manner, and redounds to the greater glory both of Christ and of men.

18. *Another difficulty. — The difficulty is resolved.* — There remained, however, another difficulty there: that those merits of Christ could not have been foreseen as founded in Christ's passion, because in that sign Christ is not yet understood as ordained to death — for this took its origin from sin, or the occasion of sin — whereas Christ merited for us only through his passion and the works ordered to it. It must briefly be said, however, that in that sign the merits of Christ were foreseen either simply and absolutely, neither including nor excluding the passion, but insofar as they can be in any work of such a person; or certainly they were foreseen as founded in the exceptional love of Christ for God and men, which love could be had both in suffering and in impassible flesh, and through this Christ in fact merited for us, and not only through the proper works of the passion — although through these the redemption was consummated.

19. *Second conclusion. — Christ truly and properly merited predestination for us. — It is proved by analogy.* — We say further that, for Christ truly and properly to be said to have merited for us predestination and election, or love, to glory, and to sanctifying grace in such a degree, and with the gift of perseverance, it is not enough that he merited for us the first grace of congruous calling, which we receive in ourselves, nor the free determination of that eternal decree by which the divine will confers this effect in time; but it is necessary that that first efficacious intention of saving and glorifying the elect, which God decreed purely gratuitously with respect to them, had a relation to the foreseen merits of Christ. If God did not have this, then certainly he did not predestine men to glory on account of Christ, although he decreed to give it through Christ. This is proved, first, by analogy: because God, through the prayer of Stephen, gave such a calling in time to Paul, and consequently, on account of that same foreseen reason, he had, from eternity, the decree by which he committed that effect to execution in time; and nevertheless this is not enough for Stephen to be said to have merited the election, or predestination, of Paul, as was seen: therefore neither does it suffice in the present case, for the reason is the same, which we shall presently explain.

20. *An a priori reason.* — Second, there is an a priori reason: that to merit what is prior, it is not enough to merit what is posterior; but the will of calling, even in this way, is posterior to election to glory: therefore the merit of that will

alone is not enough for the merit of this election. The minor is declared, because before the will of giving man such a calling, there precedes, in the order of reason, the efficacious intention of giving glory, through which intention man is especially loved, and in this consists either formal predestination, or certainly the root of the whole predestination: therefore if God did not have that intention toward me from the merits of Christ, even if he willed to call me in such a way from the foreseen merits of Christ, he did not predestine me from them as regards the whole predestination, nor as regards that which is formal and chief in it. Especially because that calling is not properly an effect of predestination, except insofar as it proceeds from such an intention — on account of which Augustine usually calls it the calling "according to purpose": for otherwise a similar congruous calling, as regards its proximate effect, is usually given to the reprobate, yet because it is not "according to purpose," it is not an effect of predestination. But to merit predestination, it is at least necessary to merit that calling, not merely materially (so to speak), but formally, under that aspect of being an effect of predestination: therefore as proceeding from such a purpose; therefore it is necessary to merit that purpose as regards the free determination to choose such a man for eternal life. Hence it is more clearly established that, for Christ to be called the cause of our predestination, or election to glory, it is not enough that he merited for us that executing will, by which God decreed to give man glory on account of his already foreseen merits, because before that will, man was already elect, and consequently also predestined to glory, at least in the order of intention.

21. *Third conclusion. — First confirmation.* — Third, we say that it is not probable that the election of predestined men was made from the foreseen merits of Christ, under the formal aspect, and by comparison, of the election and love of these rather than those, and the separation of these in particular from the mass of corruption. This is proved, first, because for election in this sense to be made from the merits of Christ, it is necessary that the merits of Christ already be foreseen as applied in a special way to these men rather than to those; but this cannot probably be said: therefore. The major is proved, because if they were foreseen only in common, as merits to be offered for the salvation of men, then by their force the will of God was not determined to these rather than those. Indeed, by force of those merits he could have efficaciously ordained men to beatitude, making no election among them; and conversely, that merit of Christ being thus foreseen, God could have preordained no one efficaciously to glory, but only sufficiently all: because neither such a merit, nor anything else, imposed on him the necessity of such an

election. Finally, not only as regards exercise (so to speak), but also as regards specification, or determination, to choose these rather than those, that election was free to God, notwithstanding such a foreknowledge of the merits of Christ: because merit, as thus foreseen, is in itself indifferent. Therefore it would have been necessary to foresee the merit as applied to these rather than to those. But this cannot be said, because this very thing chiefly depends on the divine calling: therefore.

22. *A response. — It is dissolved.* — They respond by denying the major, because to merit the election and separation, it is enough that the merit of Christ was absolutely foreseen as offered to the Father for the salvation of men, and that in view of it the Father chose some. For this suffices, that the grace of election be given on account of Christ, and that the merit of Christ be a necessary cause for their being elected. But here is another equivocation, on account of which the dispute on this point is merely verbal. For in this assertion we are not now treating of election insofar as it concerns the benefit conferred on the one elected, but we are treating formally of that comparison, and of the determination of the divine will to this one rather than to that one. For example, if a testator should order an heir to give a hundred virgins of this city in marriage at his own expense, it is clear that that gift is the effect of such a will, and that the will by which the heir executes the precept is an effect of the testator's will, and in this sense it can simply be said that such virgins owe such a benefit to the testator. Nevertheless, the heir conferred something of liberality and grace there which did not flow from the will of the testator — namely, that those hundred virgins are these rather than others, for this depends on the will of the heir alone. Hence, if the testator had not absolutely bequeathed for a hundred virgins, but for such virgins to be given in marriage, etc., without doubt he would have conferred a greater grace upon them, and would have been the whole cause of their election, as compared with others, and preferred to them — which cannot be said in the prior manner of bequeathing. So, then, in the present case it must be said: if the eternal Father, in that sign in which he chose the predestined, had only foreknowledge of the merits of Christ as to be offered absolutely for the salvation of men, and not for these rather than for those, then on account of Christ indeed he had that decree by which he loved such men, and in fact chose them, yet he did not have the particular determination to these rather than to those from the merits of Christ, but from his own will alone. Just as, on the same principle, it excellently follows that it was not from the merit of Christ, but from the will of God, that the multitude of the elect should be in such a number, and not in a greater or lesser one, and that it should be to such

degrees of grace and glory, and not to others, and the like — of all of which the reason is the same.

23. *An evasion is sought. — But it is not found.* — Others respond otherwise, denying the minor — namely, that in that sign the merits of Christ were not foreseen as applied by him, and offered specially for these men, that they might be elected to such a calling, and congruous grace; for in time we read that it was so done, John 17, when Christ particularly asked for his disciples the gift of perseverance, and added: *I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me*, signifying his particular will and application of his merits. And it is similar to what Luke 22 says he said to Peter: *I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not.* But in this response one always labors in an equivocation, and we remain stuck in the same point: that election to glory does not precede the executing will in the order of intention and predestination. Although, then, it is true that Christ in time particularly prayed for the predestined, and applied his merits in a singular way to the execution of their election, and although it may rightly be inferred from this that this prayer, or application, of Christ was foreseen from eternity, before the executing decree of predestination, nevertheless it does not rightly follow that the applied merit of Christ was foreseen before the election of the predestined. For this is to argue from eternity to the first sign of eternity, which is frivolous: for the merits even of the predestined man himself were foreseen from eternity, and it does not follow from this that they were foreseen in the first sign, before the predestined man was elected to glory.

24. It is also declared by reason, that Christ's praying in a particular way for such men, and applying his merits to them efficaciously, had its first cause and origin in the divine will, in such a way that it was not the choice of Christ's human will. For who would even dare to think that the profound mystery of the election of men, and the whole reason and manner of the predestined, as to their number, and the difference of their dwellings, and degree in grace and glory, was ordained by the will of God as approving, and conforming itself, to the human will of Christ — rather than that Christ specially applied his merits to the execution of such effects, and to the consummation of such saints, and in such a number, weight, and measure, because he knew this to have been predefined and preordained by the will of God? Surely the Apostle *refers this to the counsel of the divine will*, Ephesians 1, and therefore, in Romans 8, he exclaims: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!*

25. *An evasion. — It is dissolved.* — But, they say, even if the election of the predestined did not precede, in foreknowledge, the foreseen merit of Christ

specially applied for them, nevertheless Christ, in that application, conformed his will to the divine will, because he foreknew it to be the will of God that he should so pray for them. But I ask, of what will of God do they speak: of the mere simple affection and ineffective desire, or of the will of good pleasure and efficacious will? They cannot say the first with probability, or consistently with their doctrine. For either that affection is free in God, or natural: if natural, why is that simple affection placed toward these rather than the efficacious one? Or what change does that simple affection cause in the creature, such that a special relation of reason should result in the divine affection, more toward these persons than toward those? For this argument is the very one usually used against the efficacious decree of electing the predestined without merits, as was seen above. But if that will of God, which Christ as man knew, was the will of good pleasure, it supposes the election of the predestined, or at least begins their predestination, because it prepares for them one of the first and highest benefits, by which they are most certainly delivered, namely, the particular prayer of Christ, and the application of his merits. Therefore such a will of God could not have arisen from a special prayer, or application, of the merits of Christ, as it is from his human will, because it is rather the cause of such a prayer, and application: therefore that particular prayer of Christ is not supposed foreseen before the whole predestination of the elect.

26. *A corroboration.* — This is confirmed, because when Christ prayed efficaciously for these rather than for those, he did this without doubt from a particular motion of the Holy Spirit, as even the authors of the contrary opinion do not dare to deny: because in all matters, and especially in such grave ones, Christ operated from a particular and efficacious, or congruous, motion of the Holy Spirit: why, then, did the Holy Spirit so move Christ's soul, unless because he had already decreed to save those men? Therefore that decree was not made in view of that particular prayer of Christ, but was rather the cause of it. Likewise, that inspiration made to Christ's soul was the greatest benefit of the predestined man, and an effect of his predestination, as has been proved; but it was not from Christ's particular prayer: therefore neither does election to glory, or to all the benefits of grace, suppose foreknowledge of that particular prayer, or application: therefore that God chose these rather than those cannot be referred to the merit of Christ, and his human will.

27. *Another confirmation.* — This is further confirmed: for this negation — namely, that God did not preelect all men efficaciously, or that some are not predestined — cannot in any way be attributed to the merits of Christ, or referred to his will as its first root, even negatively: therefore neither is the

election of men, as it is formally election, from the merits of Christ: therefore much less, as it is the election of these rather than those, is it from the same merits. The antecedent, as regards the prior part, is known of itself, because Christ did not come to destroy men, or hold them back from salvation, but came that *they might have life, and have it more abundantly.* Hence he merited for them nothing except what is good, and useful for eternal salvation; but to not be preelected, and not be predestined, is not good for man, nor useful for salvation — indeed it rather removes the certain and infallible means of salvation, or at least does not provide them, nor does that negation contribute to those means: it is not, then, fit to fall under the merit of Christ. Hence the other part is also easily clear, namely, that that negation is not to be reduced to the human will of Christ: because that lack, and its effect, depends principally on the divine will. But that which depends on the divine will can only depend, even from the will of Christ, by means of merit, or impetration, or some other similar causality, or reason, which cannot be accommodated to such an effect, or privation: therefore that negation cannot be reduced, as to a cause, into the human will of Christ. And this is confirmed, because that negation will not pertain to the office of Christ, which was that of universal redeemer, but to the higher universal providence of God: therefore it took its origin and reason from the divine, not the human, will of Christ. The first consequence of the principal argument is proved: because election, as election, implies a relation to that negation — for if all were efficaciously loved to glory, there would be no election, but only love. And similarly, if God had decreed that all should be redeemed not only sufficiently, but also efficaciously, there would be no separation of some from the mass of perdition, but a restoration of all: therefore the fact that that decree of God was by way of election and separation, according to this relation and formality, is not from the merits of Christ. And from this the other inference, which supposes the reason of election, is easily clear.

28. *It is pressed. — Response to the first.* — But they press: Christ the Lord merited that these be efficaciously redeemed, but did not merit for others that his redemption be efficaciously applied to them: therefore, just as that affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, so this negation is the cause of this negation: therefore, adapting each to each, it arose from the merits of Christ, and from the manner in which he offered his merits, that these were predestined, and not those, and consequently that these were elected rather than those. I respond, first, to the first part of the antecedent, by distinguishing it as concerning efficacious redemption as to execution, or as to preparation, or predestination. In the former sense I grant that part, and admit that that

affirmation of the merits of Christ was the cause of such preparation. I add, however, that Christ merited for these men the efficacious application of his merits because they were elected by God, and because Christ knew that it was the Father's will that he should pursue them with special benevolence. Christ signified this in that whole prayer in which he prayed in a particular way for the predestined, John 17: *I have manifested thy name to the men whom thou hast given me out of the world: thine they were, and to me thou gavest them*; and below: *I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me*; and below: *Holy Father, keep them in thy name, whom thou hast given me*. There he often repeats those words, *Whom thou hast given me*, in order to signify that he prays for them, with a particular and efficacious prayer, because he understood them to be specially loved and elect by the Father. The general reasoning also demands this, because Christ as man, in all his actions, followed the will of the Father: therefore much more so in this most grave business of procuring the salvation of men, with greater or lesser efficacy.

29. *The other negative part of the argument is explained.* — As for the other, negative, part of the argument, granting that part of the antecedent, the inference is denied: because *thy perdition is from thee; thy help is only in me.* This, just as it is true with respect to God, as God, so it is also true with respect to the merit of Christ: for it is the cause of the whole good use of grace which is in us; yet that merit, or its absence, is not the cause of our abuse of grace, but we ourselves are the first origin and cause of it. Hence that affirmation is not so adequate a cause of the affirmation, that the negation should also be an adequate cause of the negation, because for the negation of the good use of grace, the freedom of choice suffices, to which sufficient help, founded in the merit of Christ, is never lacking; and the fact that it is not efficacious is not because Christ did not merit it, as far as it depends on him, but because man hinders it. And finally, the fact that Christ did not so efficaciously offer his merits for these men has its foundation in a prior negation of God — namely, that he himself did not specially preelect them.

30. *It is further confirmed.* — We can press the point further. Because it follows that the merit of Christ on behalf of the election is an effect of their election and predestination, and accordingly that Christ is not the meritorious cause of the predestination of the elect — just as we said a little above that Stephen's prayer was not the cause of Paul's predestination, because it was one of its effects. The inference is clear, because Christ merited for the predestined in such a way because he knew this to be the Father's good pleasure, as he himself elsewhere professes, saying: *I confess to thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth*,

etc. The reason this was the Father's good pleasure was that, from his own free will, he had chosen such men, willing at the same time that that election should be committed to execution through this means of the merits of Christ: therefore that merit of Christ was the effect of such an election.

31. On account of this argument, the said authors deny that this merit of Christ supposes the election of men in the mind of God, or proceeded from a particular ordination of the divine will, but only from the human good pleasure of Christ. And consequently they deny that Stephen's prayer is an effect of Paul's election. But this latter point has already been sufficiently impugned, and the former (as I said a little above) is in itself incredible, and alien to the manner of speaking of Christ himself, and to the perfection of his works, which is taken chiefly from conformity to the divine will; and it also seems to be against the depth of divine providence. For why is it credible that the eternal disposition of heavenly beatitude, and of all the means through which it is to be obtained with effect, was not discovered (so to speak) by divine reason, and predefined by the will, prior in reason to any created will, even that of Christ, approaching the execution of that providence?

32. I respond, then, by distinguishing the consequent: for there is one thing to consider in Christ — the supreme love of God, and a general affection for seeking the glory of the Father in all things — and another thing to consider — particular actions of praying for this or that person, in this or that way, and of offering some action of his for this benefit to these men rather than to those. If, then, that consequent is understood of the merit founded in Christ's prior acts, the inference is denied thus: for such merit is not an effect of the particular election of the predestined, but is innate and connatural (so to speak) to Christ himself. Hence, by the very fact that God predestined Christ to be the natural Son of God and head of all angels and men, he predestined him to love God supremely, and to merit well of him, infinitely, on behalf of all angels and men — from whom God, on account of such merit of Christ, efficaciously destined to eternal salvation those whom he willed, in a certain prior sign of reason; while in another, later sign, he ordained that Christ should pray more particularly for such men, and for their efficacious salvation, or do something similar. And thus, if that consequent is understood of this special reason of Christ, we grant that it is an effect of the predestination of such men, or angels. We deny, however, the other part of the inference, namely, that from this it follows that Christ is not the cause of the predestination of the elect — because before this effect, a merit of Christ, foreseen and sufficient for such predestination, or election, is supposed in him. And therefore the case of Stephen's prayer for Paul is not similar.

33. *The final confirmation of our opinion. — An evasion.* — Finally, this opinion of ours is confirmed, because just as Christ the Lord merited all the grace and all the supernatural helps given to the ancient saints who preceded the Incarnation, so too he merited for them predestination, and the efficacious love of them, toward glory, and did not merit for them their election before others according to the proper relation and comparison which these words imply: therefore he was in the same situation with respect to the other just and holy men who lived after his coming in the flesh. To this the said authors seem to respond by admitting the antecedent and denying the consequence. And they give the reason: that Christ could merit for later saints that preelection, or preference, over others, by particularly praying and entreating for them; but Christ could not in this way merit it for the saints who preceded him, because he could not pray for them in this way, by way of petition, or entreaty, since in this way prayer is not made for a thing already done and past. Nor could he merit it through thanksgiving for such a benefit conferred on them before others, because this thanksgiving supposes the benefit already done, and is in some way its effect, since the merit concerning which, and the object moving to that thanksgiving, is a benefit already done.

34. *It is attacked. — A response.* — But against this, first: if anyone should decide to confer on someone some anticipated benefit, because he foresees that he will be grateful, then the foreseen future thanksgiving would itself be the reason for willing to give such a benefit; therefore in the same way, the future thanksgiving of Christ, foreseen by the Father, could have been the reason for choosing the ancient Fathers in that way, if there were no other obstacle. They respond that grace and helps could indeed have been given to the ancient Fathers on account of the merit of Christ foreseen, founded on a future thanksgiving for that same benefit, because this is not properly its effect, but only supposes it as an object, or necessary condition. But Christ could not merit in this way, such that for the same thanksgiving such grace was given to this one rather than to that one, because for this it would have been necessary to foresee that God would have it that Christ the Lord would give thanks more for such a benefit conferred on Peter than if it had been conferred on Paul; otherwise there would be no reason, on the part of Christ, why it should be given rather to Peter than to Paul, if Christ had been foreseen as equally grateful for both. But this inequality could not have been foreknown on the part of Christ, because Christ would have been equally grateful for a similar benefit bestowed on any other man whatsoever: the foreseen thanksgiving, then, could not have been the reason for that comparison. As if I should foresee, or hope, having made a

comparison between Peter and Paul, that Peter would be more grateful to me, that hope could move me to confer the benefit on him rather than on Paul; but if I hoped for no such thing, but rather conceived the same hope of both, I could not take from this a reason for conferring the benefit on one rather than the other: so, then, it must be said of Christ.

35. *It is dissolved.* — But although it is true that the future thanksgiving would have been equal on the part of Christ, given equality of benefit and person, nevertheless one could think of some inequality in that very human and free affection of Christ, such that God would have foreknown that it would be more gratifying to Christ as man that Jacob should be sanctified than Esau — that is, that this would be more in conformity with his will, because he himself, as man, would be more inclined toward Jacob than toward Esau. I see indeed that, absolutely considered, this could seem said without reason; nevertheless, arguing ad hominem, I do not see why one who supposes that the human will of Christ was the first root and cause of God's choosing this thief for efficacious calling rather than that one, because Christ himself had a certain greater affection for this one than for that one — why (I say) he could not say, and should not say, the same of Christ's affection toward men who existed before him — namely, that by way of desire, or simple affection, he willed, of himself, efficacious helps for this one rather than that one, and that God was moved thereby, through foreknowledge, to make that difference. But if this cannot probably be thought, it is not because Christ, through the freedom of his human will, could not have had this varied affection, but because that is not the first root of the mystery of divine election and predestination as regards the determination of persons. Or also because that effect ought not to have been in Christ merely human, but from a higher motive of the divine will, which had so disposed things as it willed; and thus election, as regards that comparative relation, is always reduced to the divine will alone.

36. *An objection from Paul to the Ephesians. — Three expositions.* — But they object to us the testimony of Paul, Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world.* This testimony either proves too much against these same authors, or it is irrelevant to the point of the present assertion. For Paul is speaking there not only of men who lived after Christ, but simply of all who are to obtain salvation through Christ, of whom he says that *they were elected in Christ before the foundation of the world.* Therefore those words must be verified of the saints of the Old Testament: therefore either they also prove, of them, that Christ merited that these rather than those be elect, or, if they do not prove this of them, neither do they prove it of the others, since they are universal, and

equally embrace all. There are, then, three expositions of those words, even granting that the phrase "in him" refers to Christ as man, and signifies some causality, which is far more true, and in keeping with the opinions of the Fathers, as we showed against Adam in the place cited.

37. *The first exposition. — It is not satisfactory.* — The first exposition is that by that phrase only the final and exemplary cause is signified, so that the sense is: he chose us for the glory of Christ, or in him as in the most perfect head and exemplar. In this sense, not only is it not proved, from this word, that Christ was the meritorious cause of the election as regards the comparison of one with another, but also not even as regards the free determination of God's efficacious love toward such a person. This exposition, however, is not satisfactory to us, because it is more usual with Paul to signify, by such a manner of speaking, the meritorious cause, as we have shown in the same place.

The second exposition. — Finally, the other exposition is objectionable. — The second exposition is that that phrase "in him" does not refer to the election on the part of the divine act, but on the part of the object of such an act, so that the sense is: God did not have a relation to the merits of Christ in that determination of his act of choosing such men, but chose them by his own will, while also willing that that election, both to grace and to glory, should be fulfilled in Christ and through Christ. The Greek Fathers seem to interpret those words in this sense, and the scholastics do not dissent, when they say that Christ merited for us predestination on the part of its effects and means, but not on the part of the act.

The third exposition is that, on account of the foreseen merits of Christ, God willed to give glory efficaciously to such men, which will is their greatest love, and is in fact election, precisely because it does not extend to all, but to these alone, leaving others in the mass of perdition. And for this reason God is said to have chosen men in Christ, even though he did not merit either the abandonment of others, or the love of these rather than those, as regards that comparative relation.

38. *What degree of certainty the assertion has, is explained. — One who held the contrary of this truth would assert something not only rash, but erroneous.* — From this it is easy to settle what was proposed above, in the second place — namely, what degree of certainty this assertion has: *Christ was the meritorious cause of the election and predestination of men.* For the aforesaid authors assert that this is Catholic doctrine, because they are speaking of election to glory from merits already foreseen, and they rightly assert this, since this is the election of justice, of which it is most certain that it is on account of Christ, and to deny this

seems to me not only rash, but even erroneous. For to will to give such a reward to a man having such merits, is on account of Christ, and with respect to Christ that act is one of strict justice. Otherwise the effect itself could not be given on account of Christ, which, however, cannot be denied according to the faith. Hence no Catholic, as far as I know, has ever denied this. For Adam, and others who deny that the election of the predestined to glory was made in view of the merits of Christ, are speaking of the gratuitous and liberal election with respect to those same elect, which they believe, with Augustine, precedes the whole predestination by way of intention.

39. *The same must be judged of the assertion denying that Christ merited predestination for us.* — The same must be said of election to grace as a whole, from the first calling up to the final perseverance. For to the same degree that it is certain that all this grace is given to the predestined in time on account of Christ, to the same degree it is certain that God had some eternal will, in view of the merits of Christ, by which he willed to give such grace to his elect: because (as has been shown above) this effect cannot be separated from the will of God. Hence whoever denies that election to grace is simply from the merits of Christ, on this foundation, that the first calling, or other dispositions to grace, are not given to us on account of the merits of Christ, teaches not only a rash, but even an erroneous assertion, against Paul as cited above, and against the doctrine of the Councils, as I have shown in the place cited. And on this point, Adam, who on Philippians 1 and 2, and 1 Peter 1, so explained his opinion, can rightly be reproved. And in the same way must be judged the assertion denying that Christ merited predestination for us. For if it speaks of predestination as regards its effects, and rests on the error that Christ did not merit for us the particular and internal graces which are, in the elect, the effects of predestination, the doctrine is erroneous, and more than rash; but if this is denied only because they include among the effects of predestination the Incarnation itself, or other similar benefits, then it is not a matter deserving censure, but is debatable, and almost a matter of manner of speaking — although the affirmative opinion is far more probable.

40. But if the discussion concerns election to glory as purely gratuitous with respect to the man elected, as it is understood in God prior to the foreknowledge of the works and merits of that same elect, then there is no greater certainty in that assertion than that of a more probable opinion. For, first, the doctors with whom we are disputing most constantly defend that no one is elect to glory in this way by the sole liberal and gratuitous will of God: therefore they themselves cannot assert that Christ merited for them such an

election to glory, which preceded their foreseen merits, since no such election exists, according to them: therefore by no reasoning can they condemn those who, although they place such an election in God, deny that it was from the merits of Christ. Moreover, this assertion is not defined, nor is it sufficiently certainly gathered from Scripture, as has just been seen, and as will be said again shortly. Nor, finally, are there lacking grave authors who have held this from a probable foundation. Nor is the contrary assertion so received that it is asserted as certain by other theologians, but only as more pious and probable. Finally, that opinion depends on uncertain principles, which are altogether matters of opinion — namely, whether the election of the predestined was made before, or after, foreseen original sin, and whether the predestination of Christ preceded the foreknowledge of original sin; likewise, whether all the predestined were predestined simultaneously with Christ, without any priority of reason, or, even if the predestination of Christ preceded in some sign, whether it is enough that his merits were foreseen in that sign before our election, such that they could be the cause, or reason, of our election — all of which has been treated and explained more fully in the said first volume.

41. *An added objection is forestalled.* — Nor does that text, *he chose us in him*, stand against this censure: because, as I said, that phrase "in him" can either signify another reason of a final or exemplary, and not meritorious, cause; or it can signify the cause through which the election is to be fulfilled, not on account of which it is first made. And that phrase, *He predestined us through Jesus Christ*, can be understood as meaning that this is among the objects of predestination, not that it is the reason for it. For God could have predestined the salvation of man by his mere will, although he predestined that it be given through Jesus Christ: just as, gratuitously, and without proper merits, he predestined men to obtain glory through merits. And thus also God is excellently said, 2 Timothy 1, *to call us with his holy calling according to his own purpose* (which he distributes from his mere will) *and grace* (which he gives us gratuitously), although he gives it from the merits of Christ, and decreed from eternity to give it thus, on account of which Paul concludes, of that grace, *that it was given us in Christ before the times of the world.* And although the first two passages are better, and more probably, explained of the meritorious cause of our very election and predestination on the part of Christ, nevertheless, since that sense has not been defined by the Church, nor received by the common consent of the Fathers, it does not make the matter certain, but at most more probable. The last passage, however, is fittingly enough explained in this way, and otherwise sufficiently proves the distribution of congruous calling — as regards that comparison, that

it is given to this one rather than to that one, not from the merits of Christ, but from the liberal purpose of God.

CHAPTER XXV
WHETHER ANY CAUSE, OR REASON, IS GIVEN ON THE PART OF GOD FOR THE ELECTION OF THE PREDESTINED

1. *In this difficulty four things must be distinguished. — The reason for the doubt.* — Thus far we have spoken of the causes of this election which can be thought of outside God, as God; now it remains briefly to inquire whether, on the part of God himself, and of his wisdom and goodness, some reason for this election can be given, or thought of. In this matter four things must be distinguished. The first is that God efficaciously elected some, that they might be infallibly saved; the second is that he did not so elect all who were to be created, but only some of them; the third, that they were in such a number, and not a greater one; the fourth, that they were these persons, and not those. I shall speak briefly of each, noting here that we are seeking some reason beyond the sole freedom of the divine will: for that God did all these things by his own freedom alone, by the counsel of his own will, is manifest; but whether pure freedom was the single reason of all his just decrees, or whether God had, beyond it, some other reason — this we inquire; for it seems to belong to the highest wisdom and goodness, that in all his free determinations, and in their circumstances, he should be led by some particular reason, and that the will should not be the sole reason — for here it seems to be a more reasonable and prudent manner of operating. On the contrary, however, it does not seem that such a reason can always be found, or thought of.

2. *First assertion.* — Concerning the first point, it must be said that God was not lacking in several reasons on account of which, by his efficacious will, he destined some, infallibly, of himself, and before their merits were foreseen, to the attainment of glory. Those who think that this election was not made in the case of the angels, nor would have been made in the case of men in the state of innocence, give the whole reason for this assertion from the fall of human nature through original sin, and from the debility and fragility of strength which it thence contracted. For unless God had chosen, from the corrupted mass, some to be infallibly saved in such, and so great, a degree of perfection, few, or none, would be saved, and, with many imperfections and failures, scarcely anyone would attain an excellent degree of sanctity; and therefore it was most fitting that God, by reason of his wisdom, should choose an abundant number,

and distribute degrees of glory, with a most fitting and suitable variety and excellence. This reasoning is not to be despised, and is in keeping with Augustine, the book *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapters 14 and 12.

3. *Election has a place, of itself, in the angels.* — But supposing, as we believe, that election has a place, of itself, in every state, both of angels and of men, its reasons must necessarily be taken from the other divine attributes, which of themselves shine forth and are manifested in the works of God; these we touched on above, in the first book, in explaining the necessity of divine predestination. The chief reason, however, is the manifestation of divine grace, freedom, and lordship. Paul touches on this with those words: *To the praise of the glory of his grace.* For in nothing does God more show that he confers these supernatural gifts not from any debt, or merit, of man, than by choosing whom he wills efficaciously to glory. Then, because it can be said that, for the perfection and beauty of the heavenly kingdom, it was fitting that, by a direct and efficacious divine intention, in such a number, weight, and measure, the whole should be constituted from such members, under such a head, in such degrees, or dwellings, established, *that God might show the riches of his glory in the vessels of mercy*, as Paul says, Romans 9. Moreover, from the part of divine mercy and goodness, a reason can be given, because this act is one of greatest mercy, and greatly displays divine goodness — for it is ordered to a great communication of it. Likewise it declares the great perfection of divine wisdom and prudence, when it so joins the infallibility of the divine decree with the mutability of human freedom that the one does not destroy the other, and the other does not impede the one.

4. *Second assertion.* — Concerning the second point, it must be said that, on the part of God and his infinite wisdom, some causes, or reasons, can be given on account of which he did not preordain all men, or angels, efficaciously to the attainment of eternal salvation, but elected only some from all of them. So St. Thomas teaches, the question cited, 23, article 5, reply to 3. And for now that general reason suffices, of the manifestation of grace, and of God's supreme lordship and liberality. For all these things would not be shown so evidently, and so wondrously, in the love of all, as in the love of some, in preference to others, with no reason, or inequality, on their own part. To this is added that, for the special manifestation of vindicative justice, it was necessary not to love all in this way: but this pertains more to the reasons of reprobation than of predestination, and will therefore be better treated below, in Book Five.

5. *Third assertion.* — Concerning the third, and fourth, points, it must be said that no reason can be given by us, even taken on the part of God, beyond

his free will, why he chose men, or angels, to be saved and efficaciously called, in such a number, rather than in a greater, or lesser, one; and why he chose precisely these persons in number, rather than others, either from those possible, or from those whom he now creates and reprobates. On this point too theologians agree, for although they may perhaps differ in their words, or in the manner of explaining this election immediately in relation to glory, or to efficacious or congruous grace, nevertheless they absolutely agree on this: that that gratuitous election, which has no reason on the part of men, has, on the part of God too, no other reason known to us, beyond the divine will. For no one has hitherto given it: this is, then, a sign that it cannot be known by men. Likewise, what reason can be given by men why God, from the infinite angels he could have created, willed to create these rather than others? Likewise, why, from infinite possible human natures, he chose this one rather than another for the hypostatic union? Was there not another possible humanity, as perfect in natural endowments, and as capable of that benefit, and as fit and suited to all the ends of that mystery, as that one? Likewise, why, in creating men and angels, did he will to create them rather at this moment than at another, in this order of things rather than in another? Or why (which is St. Thomas's example) did he, from two portions of first matter, in the first creation, create this one under the form of fire, and that one under the form of water, rather than the converse? Certainly, just as in these and similar cases no reason can be given by man, so neither can one be given concerning the gratuitous election of the predestined, as regards the number of persons, both formal and material.

6. It can be doubted, however, whether this is so because in reality there is no other reason, or whether it arises from the weakness of the human intellect, which does not comprehend all the reasons of divine providence. For some think that there really is not lacking some reason on the part of God, even if it now escapes us. For Augustine, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 95, says: *Then it will not be hidden, what is now hidden — namely, in beatitude, why this one rather than that one was taken up, when the cause was one and the same for both.* But St. Thomas, Part 1, question 23, article 5, reply to 3, plainly teaches that in reality there is no other cause, or reason, underlying it, beyond the will of God. For the reason and examples given seem to show not only that another reason is not known to us, but also that in reality it cannot be found. Because, if on the part of those among whom the election is made there is complete equality in relation to all the possible ends of divine providence, then even on the part of all the attributes of God there will be equality, the will alone excepted, because it alone is free. And there is no doubt that God, by his freedom, can, from two objects

entirely equal in every respect, choose one by his freedom, and not the other, because this belongs to the perfection of freedom, and is not unreasonable, because reason itself dictates that it cannot, and should not, be otherwise. Hence it seems most probable to me that this is how it happened in the business of divine predestination. Nor does Augustine signify the opposite, but only says that this very thing, which is now hidden, or obscurely known — namely, that the sole will of God was the reason for this variety — is then to be seen clearly, and without any doubt.

END OF BOOK TWO

BOOK THREE
ON THE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION, AND THEIR HARMONY WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

After the disputation on the causes, in fitting order there follows the disputation on the effects of predestination, through which also what was said about the causes will become clearer. For in us the knowledge of causes for the most part arises from the knowledge of effects. We shall therefore speak first in a general way about the effects, and then individually about each one — first about the supernatural effects of grace and glory, afterward about the goods of nature, and finally about evils, or rather the permissions of them, if in some way they can arise from predestination. And at last we shall exclude the false effects, and we shall set forth the true harmony of predestination with freedom.

CHAPTER I
WHETHER PREDESTINATION HAS ANY EFFECTS, AND IN WHAT KIND OF CAUSE

1. *The conclusion of St. Thomas. — It is established by reason. — In two points a difficulty remains.* — St. Thomas treats this question in the First Part, question 23, article 2, under another title, namely, whether predestination posits something in the predestined; and he responds that formally it posits nothing, but causally it does posit something. The former of these parts was sufficiently explained in Book One; the latter pertains to the present discussion. For the sense of it is that predestination is the cause of certain effects which God produces in the predestined person himself. And in this assertion all theologians agree, on Book I, distinctions 40 and 41, and it is expressly stated by St. Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 10, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14. And all draw it from Paul to the Romans, ch. 8, as we shall explain more fully below. The reason, moreover, is that in order for men to attain eternal salvation, it is necessary — as is self-evident — that many benefits be conferred on them and many effects be produced in them. But God is the cause of these effects through intellect and will, as he is of all other things: therefore he is the cause through those acts in which predestination consists. For it has been shown that predestination consists in acts of intellect and will, by which God efficaciously decreed something future in order to supernatural

Beatitude: predestination, then, is rightly called the cause of such effects. Two points, however, remain to be declared, one on the side of the cause, the other on the side of the effect. On the side of the cause it must be explained in what kind of cause predestination is the cause of those effects attributed to it; on the side of the effect, what conditions are required for something to fall under predestination.

2. *On the first point, a first assertion.* — On the first point it must be noted that we can speak of predestination either with respect to its effects, or with respect to the act of God's knowledge and will, in which it formally consists. In the former way it must be said that one effect of predestination can be the cause of another, according to every kind of cause, in keeping with the requirement of the gifts, or the very things, conferred through such causality. This is easily proved by induction, because glory, which is the last effect of predestination, is the final cause of the other effects; and justification is the end of vocation; whereas, on the other hand, merits are in their own way the efficient cause of glorification, grace is the final cause of justification and of the remission of sins, and contrition, as a disposition to justice, is reduced to a material cause; and so on for the rest: therefore in the effects of predestination every kind of causality intervenes; therefore, on the side of the effects, predestination has effects in every kind of cause. The reason, moreover, is that just as all kinds of causes concur toward natural effects, so too toward the effects of grace and glory. And so, just as God provided in the order of nature the effects of all causes, and all the causes necessary for such effects, so too in the order of grace he foreordained similar effects and causes, with due proportion: all these, then, fall under predestination: predestination, therefore, has effects according to every kind of cause.

3. *On the other point, a second assertion. — An objection. — It is excluded.* — On the latter point it must be said that predestination, as it formally exists in God, is the cause of its effects in the kind of efficient cause. This is proved because God himself is the cause of these effects in the kind of first and principal efficient cause; but he is such a cause through those acts by which he foreordains, or predestines, such effects: therefore those acts are the efficient principle of such effects; but predestination consists in those acts: therefore. Likewise, predestination is not an intrinsic cause, as is self-evident, and accordingly is neither a formal nor a material cause. And among the extrinsic causes, the final cannot be attributed to predestination, for God does not confer such effects in order to predestine them, or for the sake of predestination as for an end: therefore only the efficient cause remains. You will say that God also

brings about the predestined effect in order to fulfill his own will, and under that aspect has the character of an end. I respond that the fulfilling of God's will does not pertain to formal predestination but to the effect of predestination, and so from this it is only proved that predestination is the efficacious cause of the predestined effect. Besides which, that end seems to be more reflex than direct, unless it is reduced to the general end of divine works, which is the manifestation and display of divine power and of the other attributes: for it is on this account that God wills his predestination to be fulfilled infallibly, namely, that his power and goodness may be displayed; but this display is an effect of predestination, not predestination itself. Predestination, therefore, is not an end, but the efficient cause of its effects.

4. *A certain difficulty is proposed. — The reason for the doubt. — The decision. — The first part is explained.* — Someone may doubt, however, how this can agree with the will that predefines free acts, or the effects depending on them — the will to which we said predestination properly pertains, and which we distinguish from the executing will. And the reason for the doubt is that to effect *ad extra* pertains to the executing will. I respond briefly that both wills pertain to complete predestination, and that each, in its own way, has effective causality with regard to the effects of predestination. The first point is evident, because although predestination is begun — in our manner of speaking and understanding — by the predefining will according to the order of intention, it nevertheless also requires the executing will, by which God from eternity is ready to produce infallibly in time such an effect, or, as far as is in himself, already produces it, although the production *ad extra* begins in time.

5. *The second point is declared.* — The second point is declared because in the effective causality of God we must understand whatever there is of perfection in physical, moral, and artistic causality, all of which pertain to the kind of efficient cause. The executing will, then, applies or exerts physical causality, as it were, proximately. The predefining will, however, insofar as it intends the end and chooses the means, pertains to moral causality, because (as I declared above) this will is required on the part of the agent, that he may act in a fitting manner for the sake of the end. Hence, from the force of that will, the execution of the means follows, though more remotely or mediately. Just as in us, the intention of the end has a certain efficacy even with regard to the execution itself, insofar as it brings about the choice, and through the choice proceeds even to use of the means. Finally, artistic causality pertains to knowledge, as applied through the will, which we have likewise said is included, in its own way, under predestination.

CHAPTER II
WHAT CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR SOME BENEFIT TO BE AN EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION

1. *A twofold reason rendering the question doubtful. — The first. — An evasion. — Against this evasion the second reason for doubting rises up.* — That we may have a certain general foundation for determining, in particular, which of God's benefits conferred on the predestined are effects of predestination, it is necessary first to inquire universally into all the conditions by which the proper character of such an effect can be known, and consequently the effect of predestination can be discerned from what is not its effect. Now the reason for the difficulty can be twofold. First, because either all the benefits that God confers on the predestined are effects of his predestination, or they are not. The first cannot be said, since otherwise creation, conservation, and all the effects of providence regarding the predestined would be effects of predestination — which cannot be said, as I suppose; but if the second is said, it is necessary to assign the conditions by which the effects of predestination are distinguished from other benefits. Some say that indeed all the benefits of grace conferred on the predestined are effects of predestination, but not the natural benefits. Against this, however, a second difficulty arises, because many benefits of grace are common to the reprobate and the predestined: therefore in themselves they are not effects of predestination, and therefore neither will they be such in the predestined.

2. *First conclusion. — Nothing can be an effect of predestination that is not an effect of God.* — At the outset it must be established that nothing can be an effect of predestination which is not an effect of God. Thus the first condition necessary for an effect of predestination is that it be comprehended among God's own effects. This is proved, first, from Augustine, who very often says that God predestined what he himself was going to do, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 10. Where he consequently says that foreknowledge extends more broadly than predestination, because God foreknows also those things which he himself does not do, such as sins; but he does not predestine except what he does. The reason, moreover, is that predestination either is an absolute and efficacious act of the divine will and good pleasure, or includes such an act: therefore whatever proceeds from predestination, as its effect, proceeds from that will of God: therefore it is an effect of God, since God causes his effects

through a will of this kind. Therefore the effect of predestination must be an effect of God.

3. *Second assertion. — The effect of predestination pertains to the supernatural providence of God.* I say, second: the effect of predestination must pertain to supernatural providence, and consequently must be contained in some way under the order of grace. This is taken from the same Augustine, in the place cited, where he says: *Predestination is the preparation of grace, while grace is the effect of predestination itself.* And it can be sufficiently proved from the definition of predestination given in Book One. For we said that predestination includes an ordination to a supernatural end, according to the particular use of that term in this matter: therefore its causality is in order to that same end: therefore its effects must pertain to the order of grace. In what way, however, it must participate in the character of grace will be established from the following chapters.

4. *Two points are called into question.* — Here, however, two things are usually inquired into: one, whether it is necessary that such an effect pertain to the grace of Christ's redemption — that is, be an effect of his death; the other, whether it be from the merit of Christ. For some think the first to be necessary, because wherever Augustine treats of the effects of predestination, he attributes them to the grace of Christ, as may be seen in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, and most clearly in Letter 95. *He calls* (he says) *this apostolic doctrine grace by this name, by which we are saved and justified through faith in Christ.* And in the Councils of Mileve and Orange the discourse is in the same way about the necessity of grace through Christ; therefore it belongs to the nature of the effect of predestination that it be a benefit of grace conferred through Christ. Now in Augustine it is the same thing for some effect to be from the merits of Christ as for it to be from his death and redemption, since through it, or in order to it, he completed the whole of his merit.

5. *Conclusion of the incidental doubt.* — I say, however, that it is not necessary for the effect of predestination, formally speaking, that it be an effect of the death, passion, or redemption of Christ. For I think a great distinction must be drawn between the merit of Christ, simply so called, and his death, passion, blood, and redemption. For I think he did not merit only for those whom he redeemed, or for whom he died, and consequently his merit is not limited to his death or his passion as such, but is found also in acts which abstract from the state of mortality, such as love, prayer, mercy, and the like. Hence, although the necessity of death and passion arose from sin, just as did

the necessity of redemption as redemption, yet the usefulness and excellence of the merit could be considered in itself, and extended more broadly. Thus, then, I judge that the grace and righteousness given to Adam in the state of innocence was an effect of predestination, though it was not from the death or redemption of Christ as such; for as Augustine says, *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 11: *Adam, in those goods of the state of innocence, did not need the death of Christ.* The same must be said of the angels, whom we have shown above to have been predestined: there were, then, in them effects of predestination, even though they were not redeemed, nor did Christ properly die for them. Moreover, it was shown above that predestination as such does not presuppose guilt, which redemption and death do presuppose: therefore neither does the effect of predestination as such — that is, taken in its formality and generality — imply an order to Christ as redeemer. Although with respect to fallen man such effects are indeed from redemption, of which man Augustine was speaking in the cited Letter 95, and in other places.

6. *The other point that is called into doubt. — Decision of the doubt.* — Another doubt is whether, at least abstracting from death and redemption, and speaking simply of merit, it belongs to the nature of the effect of predestination that it be grace not only of God but also of Christ — that is, arising from faith in Christ, or from his merits. For this is more frequently read in Augustine, so that he often presses the point against Pelagius, that one must confess not only grace, but the grace of Christ, and through Christ. It must be said, however, that it is one thing to speak formally of the nature of predestination in itself, or as it is possible, and another to speak of it as a matter of fact. In the former way, it is not of the nature of the effect that it be grace given through Christ. For it is enough that it be an effect of supernatural providence, in order to the attaining of eternal life, attained with effect, as we shall soon say. For God could have predestined men or angels, and given them effects in keeping with that end, from his sheer will, without any order to the merit of Christ. Indeed, many think this actually happened in the case of the angels. And concerning Adam I judge it more true that the first grace which he had in the state of innocence was an effect of his predestination, though it is controverted whether it was from the merits of Christ. But speaking of the matter of fact, we believe, on probable grounds, that every effect of predestination, both in angels and in men, is an effect of the merits of Christ — either as redeemer, with regard to the effects of reparation conferred on fallen men, or as the head and universal source of righteousness with regard to all, as touched on above and proved more fully in the third part of the first volume. Therefore, as a matter of fact, it is rightly said

that it is necessary for the effect of predestination that it be in some way the grace of Christ, or from it.

7. *Third conclusion. — Reason for the conclusion.* — Third, it must be said that not all effects of grace, or of supernatural providence, are effects of predestination, but it is required that they be conferred from an efficacious intention of bringing such a man to eternal life. This, then, is the first difference between the grace, or vocation, conferred on the predestined and on the reprobate: that with respect to the reprobate it is not given from an efficacious intention of his salvation, whereas in the predestined it has its origin from precisely that. This is what Augustine signifies whenever he establishes a difference between vocations, one of which is born from God's purpose, and not the other — for by God's purpose he understands that intention, as we showed in Book One. The reason, moreover, is that the first foundation of the whole of predestination is that intention, as we saw above: therefore it is necessary that all the effects of predestination proceed from it. Likewise, for this reason theologians say that the end, although last in execution, must be first in intention, because the intention of the end is the root of the whole providence which is ordered to the attainment of that end: therefore the effects of that providence must necessarily be effects of that intention. Now this providence, in the business of the salvation of the elect, is predestination; and the effects of this providence are those by which such an intention is carried into execution: therefore it is necessary that the effects of predestination presuppose that intention, and proceed from it.

8. *General means and benefits, and causes of grace which are common to the predestined and the reprobate, are not effects of predestination.* — Hence it is understood, in passing, that the general means, benefits, and causes of grace which are common to the predestined and the reprobate are not, as such, effects of predestination. Of this kind are the Incarnation of Christ, the Passion, the institution of the Sacraments, and the like. The reason is that these are not ordained in a particular way from the efficacious intention of saving the predestined, but from the general providence of grace and the antecedent will of saving all. It is otherwise, however, with the particular application of these means, with their special usefulness and actual efficacy toward the procuring of final salvation; for such application proceeds from a special, efficacious intention of giving glory, and therefore is an effect of predestination.

Final conclusion. — Lastly, it must be said that it belongs to the nature and necessity of the effect of predestination that it conduce with effect, in some way, to the attaining of eternal salvation. For if the conferring of grace does not reach

as far as the attainment of glory, it is not an effect of predestination, properly and perfectly speaking, which is what we are now treating — as may be seen in the reprobate, who sometimes attain true righteousness, as the Council of Trent defines, session 6. It is not necessary, however, that this very effect of predestination remain forever in glory; otherwise only the habits of grace which are infused along with it in this life would be effects of predestination, since in this life scarcely any other gifts of grace are given which endure perpetually in beatitude — which is plainly false, as we shall see. It is enough, then, that the benefit of grace conduce with effect to the obtaining of glory, whether immediately, as the gift of perseverance and final grace do, or mediately, insofar as one effect of grace is a means to another, and so on consecutively up to the obtaining of the grace which reaches as far as the state of glory. Thus efficacious vocation, for example, does not in itself endure perpetually; yet because it conduces to a perpetual effect, it is an effect of predestination. But if some help of grace were given to the predestined which, as a matter of fact, had no efficacy or fruit in order to glory, on account of the resistance of the free will, that would not be an effect of predestination, but of the common providence of grace, as it is in the reprobate.

Objection. — It is rejected. — You will say: it can happen that this very help is given to the predestined from a special providence and intention of God: therefore it cannot fail to be from predestination. I respond that, if God did not give these helps with certain foreknowledge of their efficacy or effect, this indeed could happen; for then it would be necessary for God to apply one means to attain the intended end in such a way that, if that means did not succeed, another would be added. In our view, however, that has no place, because God in his predestination, from an absolute intention of the end, applies certain and infallible means, which he has in his conditioned foreknowledge: therefore when such means are not such, they do not proceed from that intention, and therefore are not effects of predestination. This, however, is to be understood when the means is entirely frustrated of every effect that conduces efficaciously to the attaining of glory; for if it is not entirely frustrated — provided either its power remains in some other effect, or there is some reason or moral occasion for another grace producing the man with effect unto eternal life — that is enough for it to be an effect of predestination. All of which will become clearer as we descend to particular effects.

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III
WHETHER GLORY AND PERSEVERANCE ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION

1. *The effect of glory is last in execution, but first in intention.* — We begin with the effect of glory, because, although it is last in execution, it is nevertheless first in intention and more excellent in dignity; and we join with it perseverance, because these two are so connected with each other that they cannot be separated. Durandus, then, on Book I, distinction 14, question 2, no. 10, held that glory and beatitude are not effects of predestination. The reason is that predestination concerns only the means, not the end; but glory is the end, not a means, of predestination. Hence, just as for this reason he believed (as I related above) that beatitude, or glory, is not comprehended under the object, or matter, with which predestination is concerned, so here, for the same cause, he excludes beatitude from the effects of predestination.

2. *The assertion is established. — A foundation is laid. — An exposition of some authors. — The said exposition is rejected.* — It must be said, first, that essential glory, and consequently all the goods which follow upon it in eternal life, are effects of predestination. This assertion is St. Thomas's, in the question cited, article 2, and article 8, and is the common view of theologians, on Book I, distinctions 40 and 41. Its foundation is taken, first, from the words of Paul to the Romans, ch. 8: *Whom he predestined, these he also glorified.* This reading alone has been retained in the Latin Vulgate recently published by pontifical authority; for another reading had: *Magnified.* And so some have expounded that passage not of the glory of beatitude, but of a certain renown through fame and good name. For thus Christ prayed: *Glorify me, Father.* John 17. And the Greek word corresponding to both passages is the same. But this is an exposition contrary to the Fathers and contrary to Paul's intention, both because he is speaking of the glory which is by its nature owed to justification and is most especially intended through predestination — whereas that accidental and extrinsic glory either does not, in itself, pertain to the order of predestination, since it can exist in the reprobate, and can be absent in some of the predestined; or, if it is taken as pertaining to the accidental glory of beatitude, it presupposes essential glory and is born from it; and so if accidental glory is an effect of predestination, much more is essential glory.

3. *Another exposition.* — Others have expounded this passage of the increase of grace and of the virtues, and of the divine adoption, because the Greeks — Chrysostom, Homily 15, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and Theodore, in their exposition of that Epistle, found in volume 1 of the Library of the Saints — expound it thus: *He magnified through charisms and gifts, and through adoption.* None of these Fathers, however, excluded glorification; rather, when they speak of *adoption*, they seem to understand perfect adoption, which is through consummated grace. Concerning which Paul says in the same place: *We groan within ourselves, awaiting the adoption of the sons of God.* For adoption, begun (so to speak), comes about through justification, and had already been named by Paul. And so Anselm and St. Thomas expressly join the two together, namely, the increase of the virtues, together with perseverance up to glorification. And Augustine specifically expounded it of beatitude, Book I, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 17, and Sermon 17, *On the Words of the Apostle*; and Fulgentius, Book I, to Monimus, chs. 8 and 11; and Cajetan, Adam, and the other commentators follow them. Finally, other words of the same Paul, immediately following, ch. 9, agree with this, where he calls the predestined: *Vessels which God prepared unto glory.* Of which, in 1 Corinthians 2, he said: *Eye has not seen,* etc., *what God has prepared for those who love him.*

4. *The reason for the assertion is established. — An example is adduced.* — The reason, moreover, is that in every deliberation the attainment of the end itself is the last effect, and the one most intended throughout the whole course, or execution, of the chosen means; and so it stands with glory in the present matter. This can easily be shown by the example of a man intending and seeking health, for health itself is the principal effect of that pursuit. Likewise, because glory is the effect of grace and of merits, and these proceed from predestination, as we shall presently say, therefore so does glory itself. Hence, although Durandus denied that glory is contained in the object of predestination, because he places predestination in the providence of the means alone, he ought not, on that account, to have denied that it is an effect, since, although providence concerns the means, these very means bring about the attaining of the end: therefore it necessarily follows that such providence is the cause of the attaining of the end itself — just as the physician's art is the cause of health by applying means to it, even though it does not produce the intention of health, but presupposes it. This is especially so since it was shown above that glorification falls under the object and matter of predestination.

5. *Second assertion.* — Second, it must be said that final grace, as final, is an effect of predestination. This assertion follows from the preceding one, for glory

is grace consummated; but in order for grace to be consummated, it is necessary that it endure to the end of the present life, which is what it means for grace to be final: therefore, just as glory is born from predestination, so too it is born from it that grace in this life should endure to its end, which is to be final. And this can be confirmed from Paul, to the Ephesians, ch. 1, saying: *He chose us in him, that we should be holy and immaculate before him in charity.* For we are holy and immaculate before God through grace, which begins to have that condition and perfection most especially when it is final; but this it has at the close of the present life, which is the beginning of the life to come. For as long as this life lasts, grace does not make us entirely immaculate before God. Lastly, final grace, as such, is a benefit of grace and of supernatural providence, and is not common to the reprobate, but proper to the predestined, and contributes greatly — indeed is even necessary for attaining eternal life efficaciously: therefore this benefit is conferred on the predestined by virtue and benefit of that love by which God elected him beforehand unto beatitude; it is, then, an effect of predestination. Gabriel and Ockham are usually cited against this assertion, because they place predestination in the will alone that is efficacious for giving glory, and therefore recognize no other effect of predestination besides beatitude. But that view is plainly false, as we shall see below. And perhaps on this particular point it is not opposed to ours, since (as I was saying) final grace must necessarily be comprehended under glory, for in the end it is consummated.

6. *Third assertion. — Without the gift of perseverance no one can enjoy eternal glory.* — I say, third, that the gift of perseverance is one of the principal effects of predestination. This assertion follows also from the preceding ones, and Augustine especially intends it in his books *On the Predestination of the Saints*, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, and *On Rebuke and Grace*, chs. 12 and 13. Prosper and Hilary, in the Letters mentioned, presuppose the same. And the reason is that this is a supernatural means, and thoroughly efficacious, for attaining eternal glory: for (as Augustine says) by it is given not only the power to persevere, as was given to Adam, but perseverance itself is given; and whoever shall have persevered to the end shall be saved. I add also that it is a necessary means, without which no one is saved, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 13, and canon 22. Therefore all the conditions necessary for an effect of predestination apply most especially to this gift. And this is confirmed because this gift, beyond sanctifying grace, consists in special internal and external helps of grace, by which God guards and directs the elect, that he may not turn away from the path of salvation, at least finally; but it has

been shown that final grace is an effect of predestination, and we shall show below that these helps are effects of predestination: therefore [perseverance is an effect of predestination].

7. *Objection. — Response.* — You will say that this assertion holds only in the case of adults; for infants, since they can neither act morally nor sin, do not seem capable of similar helps, nor in need of the gift of perseverance. I respond that, according to their capacity, this too is accommodated to them, since for them death in grace itself takes on the character of perseverance, in keeping with that saying: *He was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding.* For even that proceeds from that love by which God loved such persons unto such a degree of beatitude, and does not happen to them without God's special care and providence, and therefore pertains to the effect of their predestination.

CHAPTER IV
WHETHER FIRST JUSTIFICATION, AND ALL HABITUAL GRACE GIVEN IN THIS LIFE TO THE PREDESTINED, IS AN EFFECT OF HIS PREDESTINATION

1. *The first opinion. — This opinion is supported.* — Those who place predestination in the will alone that is efficacious for giving glory deny absolutely that justification is an effect of predestination. So must all think who hold that justification and future grace are presupposed as foreseen prior to predestination, as we related above of Gabriel, Ockham, Major, and others. But this view rests on a false foundation, as was proved above, and cannot generally be defended. For Paul, to the Romans, ch. 8, expressly places justification among the effects of predestination, saying: *Whom he predestined, these he also justified.* And Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 10, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14, says that grace is an effect of predestination, which he understands especially of sanctifying grace.

2. *A twofold justification of the predestined. — The first is stable. — The second is temporal. — The first is an effect of predestination.* — That it may appear clearly what is certain, and what may yet be called into controversy, let us distinguish a twofold justification of the predestined. One can be called stable and firm — following Paul's manner of speaking — because, once made, it is never afterward lost; the other can be called temporal, following Augustine's manner of speaking, because its effect lasts for some time, but is eventually lost. The first is necessary in every predestined person, since it is necessary that he

attain grace at some point in this life, and preserve it for some time up to death; otherwise he will not be saved. The other justification, although not so necessary, undoubtedly also has a place in the predestined, since they can lose grace once acquired, according to the certain teaching of the faith. Of the first justification and grace, then, it is at the very least certain that it is an effect of predestination, since it is at least with regard to it that Paul's words must be verified. Likewise, because this is a singular and proper benefit of the predestined, and simply necessary for the execution of their election (from which it proceeds): it is, therefore, an effect of their predestination. Finally, the reasons which we shall adduce in the following point prove this all the more forcibly. In short, even if we should grant that efficacious election unto glory does not, in the order of intention, precede this, nonetheless the will to give a man such justification that he should never afterward fall from it is a virtual will to give him glory, and a sufficient one, so that it is rightly judged to pertain to predestination: this, therefore, is enough for it to belong to the effect of predestination.

3. *Concerning the other justification the question is doubtful. — The opinion of certain authors.* — Concerning the other justification and grace, then — that which is lost through sin — a difficulty remains, whether it too is an effect of predestination in all the elect. And indeed, if it were true that grace lost through sin is not restored through penance, it could probably be said that it is not lacking the effect of predestination, since in the end and ultimately it does not contribute to glory or to an increase to be attained with effect; but it stands as does the grace which is given for a time to the reprobate. We, however, suppose that all that grace is restored through penance (we do not speak of the same grace numerically, but of the same degree), and even granting this supposition, the difficulty posed still proceeds. For some say that, although that grace, as restored through penance, is an effect of predestination — for this is evident from what has been said — it is not such, however, as it preceded and was lost.

4. *Foundation. — An example is adduced in favor of this view.* — Their foundation is that predestination, on the side of its effects, consists in a certain series of means, by which the elect is infallibly led to eternal life: therefore it belongs to its nature that this series of means be continuous, so to speak — that is, that it not be interrupted by mortal sin: therefore, whatever grace the predestined obtained, if he loses it through sin, was not an effect of predestination. The first consequence is proved because God does not permit the sin of the predestined from an intention of repairing it, as was touched on above and will also be said below: therefore, by force of that sin, and by force of

the whole providence which preceded, that grace is entirely lost and remains without fruit for eternal life. But that it is restored is, as it were, from a new providence and a new divine will; therefore, as it preceded, it is not an effect of predestination, but a merely temporal grace, like that which is sometimes given to the reprobate. It is, then, an effect only insofar as it has been restored. They confirm this with the example of Adam, for the grace which he had in the state of innocence, as it preceded sin, was not an effect of predestination, although it was such as later restored. This assumption is evident, since every effect of predestination given to Adam was given to him from the merit of Christ, insofar as it had the character of redemption and was founded on his death; but the grace given in the state of innocence either was not at all an effect of the merits of Christ, as some hold, or at least not as the merits of a redeemer, which is certain: therefore.

5. *Conclusion. — The common exposition. — The conclusion is strengthened by reason.* — Nevertheless, I judge it must be said that all that grace, even as it precedes sin, is given from predestination, and is an effect of it. This is, first of all, more in keeping with Paul's saying: *Whom he predestined, these he also justified* — which the Fathers and commentators understand indistinctly of the justification of the predestined, including that which occurs in the predestined through baptism; for although we take that word "justification" indefinitely, it is equivalent to a universal, and indifferently comprehends every justification that occurs in the predestined. Next I argue by reason, because that grace which preceded remains forever, either in itself or in its effects, and has the effect of glory: therefore nothing is lacking to it for being an effect of predestination. The consequence is clear, since the remaining conditions are not lacking to it, as is self-evident. The antecedent, moreover, is proved, because that grace was regularly the principle of merits, or at least conferred a right to glory — a right which is not entirely lost through subsequent sin, but is only impeded; and so, once the sin has been removed, that same right which had earlier been acquired, and the merits, if they were living ones, remain in God's acceptance, and on account of them the eternal reward of glory is given: therefore the fruit of that earlier grace endures unto eternal life: therefore that grace was an effect of predestination.

6. *It is further confirmed. — An evasion is rejected.* — This is confirmed because, in order for some grace to be an effect of predestination, it is not necessary that it itself, in itself, remain in eternal life — otherwise efficacious vocation would not be an effect of predestination, since it itself does not endure in eternal life. It is enough, then, that its effect endure for it itself to be an effect

of predestination, as we have also said above. This is so especially since such grace formally endures forever; for although it does not endure in the same numerical entity, this is a material point, of little relevance to the effect of predestination. You will say that it does not endure forever except as restored. But on the contrary, this restoration does not occur, properly speaking, except by the power of the prior grace and its infusion and of the merits, whether of the man himself or of Christ, which had been applied to him. For penance for the sin committed only concurs toward that restoration as a cause *per accidens* removing the impediment: therefore this restored grace rests, in itself, on the prior benefit, or merit: therefore that prior benefit also, and consequently the prior grace as well, was an effect of predestination. Finally, God's intention of bringing this elect person to so great a degree of glory does not attain its effect apart from that grace as it preceded, because, had it not preceded, so great a grace — sufficient for so great a glory — would not have been given to that man as he did penance: therefore that grace concurs as a means toward attaining the last effect of the divine election: therefore it is an effect both of it and of predestination.

7. I add, moreover, that grace and righteousness once lost could have been an effect of predestination even if it were not to be recovered through penance, provided it contributed in some way to attaining that degree of beatitude which is in fact obtained. This is easily evident from the principle laid down, that the effect of predestination is not only that grace which remains in eternal life, but also whatever contributes in any way to the attainment of eternal life, even though that grace itself should pass away. It can be understood, moreover, that grace once had may, in many ways, contribute to the attainment of eternal life, even if it is not restored. For, first, it can be of service as an occasion exciting a man — when he later rises again — to have more merits enduring unto eternal life, whether because thereby he is excited to a graver sorrow and repentance, or to a greater act of thanksgiving for so great benefits received, or to other similar acts. And especially, the memory of that grace, and of the loss incurred, could serve to spur him on more fervently to repair the damage with new diligence and fervor — just as a merchant who has lost his riches, although he cannot recover those very riches, is wont diligently to procure similar ones, being moved to this by love and esteem and memory of his former riches. Hence it often greatly contributes to the exercise of such diligence to have once experienced the former state and its riches: thus, then, it can be understood in the present case. Moreover, past justification often contributes to a man's returning to his heart more easily after a fall, and to his not growing hardened in

sin; it also tends to leave behind some facility for good works, whether on account of an acquired habit, or on account of good mental images that remain notwithstanding the sin: therefore, by reason of this benefit, it could be an effect of predestination, since all this eventually bears fruit, in some way, unto eternal life. And all this, moreover, now is joined together with the restoration of all the preceding grace and merits, and this very fact increases gratitude toward God: therefore on many counts such grace must be numbered among the effects of predestination.

8. *The foundation of the contrary view is exploded. — The example is answered.* — Nor does the foundation of the contrary view stand against this. For, first of all, I deny the consequence; otherwise not even one's own merits would be effects of predestination, which is surely not plausible, as I shall now say. Nor do I see what is the necessity of that continuation of means, explained in that sense. For this could only be necessary if the sin that supervenes entirely and perpetually extinguished whatever had been built up; but now (as I have said) it is not so. We easily understand, then, that God, from the special providence of his predestination, gave the elect such grace, because, although he knew that it would be impeded through sin, he nevertheless also foreknew that it would in the end bear eternal fruit. Hence, although we grant that God does not permit the sin of the predestined from an intention of reparation (of which more later), we say nonetheless that he does not permit it without a purpose of reparation. For he does not permit that evil as something that will be everlasting, but as something temporal, since he always retains the formal or virtual will of removing it — which is enough for him to have given the prior grace from predestination. As to the confirmation taken from the example, the assumption is denied. For I said above, and it is true, that the first grace of Adam in the state of innocence was an effect of his predestination — which the reasons given here equally prove. I also said that it is not of the nature of predestination that it be formally from redemption, but it is enough that it be from the grace of CHRIST, which is broader than redemption; and such was that first grace of Adam, of which elsewhere.

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V
WHETHER ALL SUPERNATURAL ACTS, IN WHATEVER WAY MERITORIOUS, WHICH THE PREDESTINED PERFORMS, ARE EFFECTS OF HIS PREDESTINATION.

1. *The first opinion. — Reason.* — The first opinion absolutely denies that human acts, however supernatural, and useful for attaining eternal life with effect, are an effect of predestination. The reason can be given thus: only those are effects of predestination which proceed from God's absolute predefinition and foreordination; but human acts, even supernatural ones, do not proceed from such an intention of God: therefore. The major is evident, because predestination implies an efficacious and infallible providence, not only from foreknowledge, but from divine foreordination, as St. Thomas teaches, Part 1, question 23, articles 7 and 8, and question 6 *On Truth*, article 3, and often elsewhere: therefore effects which do not come from such providence of God cannot be called effects of predestination; but of this kind are all effects that proceed without a special predefinition of God. Now that all free effects are of this kind, many hold, because they think such predefinition repugnant to liberty. Hence all who maintain that view seem capable of being cited for this opinion — though in fact not all of them assert it.

2. *The second opinion.* — The second opinion distinguishes between, on the one hand, acts which are remote dispositions to justification, and, on the other, those which are either the last disposition to grace, or the fruits of righteousness already obtained: and of the former it denies that they are effects of predestination, but affirms it of the latter. Bonaventure seems to have held this view, Book I, distinction 41, article 1, question 2, for he posits only two effects of predestination, namely, justification and glorification. Under justification, however, he seems to comprehend the last disposition to it, and the subsequent works by which one perseveres and grows in the righteousness obtained. The earlier dispositions, however, even though he admits they proceed from assisting grace, he thinks are not an effect of predestination, since he says they are its cause — at least as a merit of congruity, for in this way a man can, from assisting grace, merit of congruity justification, and all the other things that accompany or follow it.

3. *St. Bonaventure is excluded from this opinion.* — I do not, however, find this view, or its foundation, expressly stated in Bonaventure, or in any other

author. For it is difficult to give a reason why the effect of predestination in this life should begin only from justification itself, as it includes the infusion of habitual grace, and all the preceding graces not be effects of predestination. For if someone should say that those earlier effects are common to the reprobate, we shall say the same of justification itself. But if justification has something special in the predestined, on account of which it can be an effect of predestination, the same can easily be considered in the earlier and more remote dispositions. And if one should say that only those graces which God alone produces pertain to the effects of predestination, then neither the last disposition, nor the merits, or fruits, of righteousness will be effects of predestination, since God does not produce these alone, but together with us — which is also how he acts in the remote dispositions. Someone could indeed say that the effect of predestination must be, of itself, permanent, and so in this life must be habitual, or at least must be such as leaves behind some habit, or trace of one, which does not apply to remote dispositions; but this is too weak a foundation, as will appear.

4. *The third opinion. — Reason.* — The third opinion distinguishes otherwise — not among acts, but in the consideration of any supernatural act whatsoever. For it considers two things in such an act, namely, the concurrence, or influx, of grace from God, and the cooperation of free will. It says, then, that the supernatural acts of the predestined, with regard to the influx of grace and of God, are an effect of predestination; but with regard to the cooperation of free will, they are not — indeed, that from this some character or condition of predestination can be assumed. So Henry holds, Quodlibet 4, question 19, and Quodlibet 8, question 5; and the former part of his view we now suppose to be true, for it will be proved all the more by what follows. The reason for the other part can be that the cooperation of free will, as such, is not an effect of God: therefore neither is it an effect of predestination. The consequence is evident from what was said in Chapter One. The antecedent, moreover, is evident, because that cooperation, as such, expresses precisely a relation to the free will, and flows from it alone — just as, on the contrary, the influx of grace is from grace alone, and not from free will: for the reasoning is the same.

5. *The truer opinion.* — The true view, however, is that all the supernatural works of the elect which contribute with effect something to the attainment of eternal life are an effect of predestination, with regard to the whole of what is found in such works, and under every relation, whether to God, or to a prior grace, or to free will. This truth is presupposed by the other theologians, who teach that no reason, on the part of the predestined man, can be found for the whole of predestination with regard to all its effects, founded in a work

proceeding from grace, considered under whatever aspect. Which they gather from the fact that every such act, and whatever is in it, exists as an effect of predestination. This truth, however, must be proved by reason, point by point and part by part.

6. *It is supported by reason.* — And first of all, that it is not repugnant for a free act, as such, to be an effect of predestination can easily be proved against the first opinion. First, because it is not repugnant to liberty for such acts to be predefined by God; indeed it is more probable that all acts which with effect lead to eternal life are foreordained in themselves and beforehand by God, by an absolute and efficacious decree, as we showed in the books *On Helps*. Second, because, whatever may be the case regarding the special predestination of such acts in themselves — that is, whether they themselves are effects of predestination — it is enough that they be gifts given to man by God from a special intention of beatifying him, and so that this intention be efficaciously fulfilled. For even granting the view of those who say that such an intention does not necessarily entail the predestination of such a means in particular, that is, of this or that disjunctively — so that if one did not succeed, another might have effect — nevertheless, whenever such an act occurred, it would be an effect of predestination, because it is an effect of that intention of giving glory, by means of a special grace flowing from the same intention, which is in the end efficacious and contributes something to the attainment of eternal life: therefore this would suffice, strictly speaking, for it to be an effect of predestination. Hence, formally speaking, something is not called an effect of predestination because it proceeds from a special, absolute will by which that effect, or act, is in particular predefined with all its circumstances — for this is another question, about the predestination of the act itself, which we are not now treating, but rather about the predestination of the man. A supernatural act, then, is said to be an effect of predestination either because the means, or the principles necessary for it, are given from the efficacious intention of saving the man, or certainly because they proceed from such providence of God toward the man, by which he is at last led with effect to final salvation. For this providence is predestination, and from it, without doubt, such acts proceed, with regard to the whole of what is in them, as will be established from the following point.

7. *Second assertion.* — I say, then, second: supernatural acts are effects of predestination not only with respect to the influx of grace, or of God, into them, but also with respect to the cooperation of free will. This is proved because those acts are, simply speaking, gifts of God according to the whole of what is in them: therefore in the predestined they are, in the same way, effects of his

predestination. The consequence is clear, because these gifts are the means by which salvation is so prepared for the predestined that he infallibly attains it. They are, then, effects of predestination, according to the definition of Augustine: *Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which all who are freed, whoever they are, are most surely freed — On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 14. The antecedent, moreover, is evident from the same Augustine, who often says that when God confers a reward on our works, he is rewarding his own gifts: *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 20; *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 13; *On Grace and Free Will*, chapters 5, 15, and 16. Pope Celestine likewise used this manner of speaking, in his First Letter. Therefore our merit itself is a gift of God; but merit, as such, includes the free cooperation of man. And this reasoning holds both for merit of strict right and of congruity, and for any free supernatural disposition whatever; for all these are gifts of God, and include free cooperation.

8. Second, man's own free cooperation is, per se, efficaciously intended, predefined, and prepared by God through predestination: therefore it is an effect of the grace prepared through predestination, and adapted to obtaining such cooperation; therefore it is an effect of predestination. The consequence is evident from what was said in Chapter One. The major, likewise, is certain, since God simply wills the predestined to be converted, or to believe, or to do penance: therefore he directly wills, and efficaciously intends, his cooperation, since he cannot otherwise be converted, except by cooperating. This is explained, since in these acts God not only wills to concur with them, but simply wills that the man should have them, and should will them, and should be determined to such an object, in such a manner, and at such a time, by cooperating with his grace: therefore the very cooperation of the predestined is intended and willed by God as one of the necessary means for attaining the end of predestination. The minor, likewise, must be most certain, since this very cooperation is an effect of efficacious grace, which is without doubt an effect of predestination, as we shall presently say. The assumption is declared, first, with regard to moral causality, for God, through vocation and exciting helps, draws a man morally, that he may will and cooperate, and in this way brings it about that we will and act: therefore our very cooperation is an effect of exciting grace, which by its nature passes into assisting grace when the effect follows. As regards physical causality, it is proved because that cooperation is something real, pertaining to piety, and exceedingly necessary for salvation: therefore it cannot be from us without God and his grace, according to the saying: *Without*

me you can do nothing, and: *What have you that you have not received?* — which are true also according to real and physical efficiency.

9. *Henry's foundation is rejected.* — Hence (to answer Henry) although that cooperation is from our will, and under that name, and denomination, expresses only a relation to our will, nevertheless that whole relation, if it is real, and its foundation, is an effect of God's grace, and consequently, in the predestined, is an effect of predestination. For that cooperation is something in reality: therefore it cannot be without God's influx; hence, since it is directed toward a supernatural act, that influx will be one of grace. Indeed, in that cooperation the will does not operate by its own natural power, but through an obediential potency, and as a free instrument elevated by divine power: therefore in that cooperation also God is the principal agent, and he operates through supernatural providence with a certain and infallible attainment of the end: therefore through predestination.

10. *Objection. — Response.* — You will say: if the cooperation of free will is by the very action of God, as its author and supernatural provider, then the action of God antecedes our cooperation in the order of causality and of nature, which we do not admit. Likewise, if that cooperation is an effect of grace, then it is absolutely true to say that God produces our cooperation, and therefore makes us cooperate, and therefore determines our will to cooperate — all of which contradict our doctrine on the helps of grace. I respond to the first part by distinguishing the consequent, for it has two senses, and in one of them the inference must be granted, in the other it must be denied. Thus (as we have said elsewhere) there is a twofold grace which concurs in man's act: one by way of principle, the other by way of concurrence. Of the former it is true that God, by a new action, brings about our very cooperation in us and with us: for thus, through vocation, God makes our willing — that is, makes us will — as Augustine often says. For what is it to make us will, except to make us cooperate? Likewise, our cooperation is a thing distinct from the operating grace, which is the principle of our act, and therefore is most properly its effect, through an action distinct from the operating grace itself, by which God operates the free act in us. Of the other grace, however, it must be said that in reality it is not distinct from our cooperation, but only by reason and denomination. Hence it is true that this cooperation itself is an action of God, and in this sense comes about through an action of God, or rather is an action of God, in the way that an action exists by itself, and in which one and the same action is wont to be the action of the instrument and of the principal agent. Hence, in form, the response is that a twofold action intervenes in our works of

grace: one preventing, and of this it is true that it precedes, in the order of nature, our cooperation; the other concurring, and of this we deny that it is naturally prior, according to proper causality, since it is not, in reality, distinct from our cooperation.

11. *To the other part of the objection a response is given.* — To the other part of the objection, granting everything else, the final inference is denied: because through preventing grace — that is, grace which is the principle of the free act — God most properly produces our cooperation when it exists, and likewise brings it about that we cooperate, not by efficaciously predetermining, but by first inducing, and then assisting. Through concurrence, however, he does not so properly bring it about that we cooperate, but rather produces the cooperation itself in the manner explained. Which is enough for that cooperation to be an effect of predestination, since it is not required that it have the same relation to God and to man's will, nor that it receive the same denomination from both, but it is enough that whatever is in that act be, in some way, from grace prepared through predestination.

12. *Third conclusion. — It is proved, first.* — Third, it must be said that every supernatural act which, with effect, contributes to the predestined obtaining some habitual grace, is an effect of predestination. This is proved, first, because it is more probable that every act of this kind, at least in the elect, is specially predefined by God; and this predefinition pertains to predestination, and from it the cooperation of free will derives its origin. Second, because it was shown that every habitual grace of the predestined remains unto eternal life, and accordingly contributes, or pertains in some way, to the final effect of predestination: therefore, if such an act is such that it contributes with effect to the obtaining of some habitual grace, by means of it, it contributes to the attaining of final happiness in the degree in which it is predestined: therefore this is enough for it to be an effect of predestination.

13. Hence it follows that all meritorious acts of strict right concerning the increase of grace are effects of predestination, because the effect of such merits in the predestined is never frustrated, since in them the condition which the Council laid down — *if they shall have died in grace* — is always fulfilled; and so an effect always corresponds to them, and they always remain alive in God's sight; for although they are for a time mortified, they revive at last forever. This same reasoning proves the same of the last disposition to grace, for through it, at least of congruity, we merit that same grace, and of strict right, glory, and that effect is infallible. The same holds for the worthy reception of a Sacrament, for that too has a perpetual effect of grace.

14. *The same must be said of remote dispositions to grace.* — I add, further, that the same must be said of remote dispositions to grace, if they are such as to actually cooperate in some way toward the attainment of justifying grace — whether by obtaining from God greater helps, or lesser dispositions, or by preparing the way in some other manner, or by giving a moral occasion either of attaining justifying grace, or of progressing in it. For it is not required that the effect of predestination cooperate immediately toward its final effect, but it is enough if it conduces immediately, and in any way whatsoever; for this is enough for it to be an efficacious means, and consequently to proceed from an efficacious intention and providence, and this is what it is to be an effect of predestination.

15. Hence it is likely that when Paul said: *Whom he predestined, these he also called, and whom he called, these he also justified*, he comprehended under vocation all the remote dispositions, and under justification all the proximate ones, with all the merits by which a man is more and more justified day by day. Or, if by vocation we understand only the first calling, which is the beginning of justification, then under justification are comprehended all the acts of piety flowing from that vocation and preparing the way to righteousness — for the Council of Trent, session 6, chapters 5, 6, and 7, sufficiently signified that all these in some way pertain to righteousness.

16. Finally, hence it is likely that all the supernatural acts which the predestined performs in this life are effects of predestination, because either they all conduce in some way to obtaining essential beatitude, according to some degree of it, or else some accidental reward in glory always corresponds to them, even if perhaps they were performed outside the state of grace; for predestination is not only to bare essential glory, but to glory adorned with its accidents and properties: therefore all acts which contribute to glory are effects of predestination, and most especially those which conduce to essential glory.

17. *Final conclusion.* — Lastly, it must be said that sometimes the good act of one person is an effect of the predestination of another. This is easily evident from what was treated in the preceding book. And it can be explained from those words of Paul, 2 Timothy 1: *I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they too may obtain salvation.* For the patience and the will given to Paul to bear those labors were effects of the predestination of those who profited by those means and were saved. So too the application of a Sacrament, insofar as it is the action of the minister, can be, and frequently is, an effect of the predestination of him who is saved through the Sacrament, as is self-evident enough. In this way too theologians say, and St. Thomas treats, in the question cited, article 8, that

predestination is helped by the prayers of the saints, because by the prayers of Stephen Paul's efficacious vocation was obtained from God: those prayers, then, were an effect of Paul's predestination, for it was from the intention of saving Paul that God inspired them, and gave the help necessary for them. Nor is it an obstacle that they were also an effect of Stephen's predestination, since this could come about from a special providence concerning each of them. And this is confirmed, since that prayer was not the cause of the whole of Paul's predestination, as we showed above: therefore it must have been an effect. The consequence is evident, because that prayer would not have been an effect if Paul's predestination, with respect to its effects, had begun from his vocation: therefore Stephen's prayer would have been the cause of the first effect of Paul's predestination: therefore of the whole of it. For this consequence is common among theologians, since from the first effect the second is derived, and from the second the third, and so on up to the last, when these have between them the connection of cause and effect, in the manner that vocation is related to conversion.

CHAPTER VI
WHAT VOCATION AND PREVENIENT HELPS ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION

1. *The reason for the doubt.* — That vocation is an effect of predestination Paul taught quite plainly, to the Romans, ch. 8, saying: *Whom he predestined, these he also called.* The difficulty, then, is only about which vocation is meant, and what is comprehended under vocation. The reason for doubting, on the first point, is that vocation is twofold — one efficacious, or congruous; the other inefficacious. Both of these, however, have a place in the predestined and in the reprobate. Since, then, it is certain that neither vocation is an effect of predestination in the reprobate, it must be seen why, in the predestined, it is an effect of predestination, and whether this is true of every vocation, or only of the efficacious one, and whether of every efficacious vocation, or only of some.

2. And indeed we frequently find in Augustine that that vocation which is *according to purpose* is an effect of predestination, as may be seen, Book 2, *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, ch. 10, and *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chs. 16 and 17, and Book I, *To Simplicianus*, question 2. And Prosper, in the books *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, and Fulgentius, Book I, to Monimus, and Anselm, on Romans 8, follow him, and it is taken from those words of the same chapter: *All things work together for good for those who love God, for those*

who are called saints according to his purpose. For these words are understood not of man's purpose, but of God's, as has been said more fully elsewhere; and the same Apostle explained this more clearly, 2 Timothy 1: *He called us with his holy calling, not according to our merits, but according to his own purpose and grace.*

3. *The true exposition.* — What, however, this purpose of God is, Augustine never declared sufficiently. For it can be the purpose of giving glory, or of giving the proximate effect of vocation, such as faith, or repentance, etc., or only of giving such a vocation as God, through conditioned foreknowledge, had foreseen would be congruous, if it were given. And so there are various opinions about this, which have been touched on above. To me, however, it seems much more probable, from Augustine's mind in the places cited, that this must be understood of the purpose of election, or love, unto glory. For Augustine means that vocation according to purpose is proper to the predestined, which cannot be true unless it proceeds from such a purpose. For the purpose of giving a vocation which will, for its proximate act, be congruous and efficacious is common to the reprobate; for God often calls them in this way, and it is certain that he does not call them without foreknowledge, nor without that purpose. Similarly, the purpose regarding the free act itself, on account of which the vocation is given, has a place in the reprobate; for although someone may not be efficaciously foreordained to glory, he is often efficaciously destined to temporal righteousness and to faith, and so is often called according to God's efficacious purpose, that he may believe, or do penance. For it is credible that when God called Judas to the apostolate, he called him in a congruous manner, according to a purpose, that he should consent and become with effect a disciple of Christ, even granting that there was no effect intended for his perseverance in that state. Therefore only the vocation that proceeds from an efficacious purpose of glory, or of final grace (which amounts to the same thing), is a proper effect of predestination.

4. *Every vocation of the predestined which is efficacious in order to some act or consent is an effect of his predestination.* — And from this it further follows that every vocation of the predestined which is efficacious with respect to some proximate act or consent is an effect of his predestination. This is proved, because such a vocation is always from a purpose — not only of the proximate effect of the vocation, but also of the final effect of the whole of predestination, that is, of the purpose of election unto glory. For that consent on account of which such an efficacious vocation is given is also efficaciously predefined for the sake of glory. This is confirmed because such a vocation always conduces

with effect, at least mediately, to the attaining of the effect of glory; and this is enough for it to be an effect of predestination, as has already been declared. The assumption is evident, because every good act of the predestined, especially one proceeding from a special supernatural vocation, always has some fruit unto eternal life, either by way of merit, or by way of proximate or remote disposition, as has already been explained. And this is confirmed by that saying of Paul to the Romans, ch. 8: *All things work together for good for those who love God, who are called saints according to his purpose.* For if this saying of Paul is extended to other lesser goods, indeed even to evils, as many hold, much more certainly will it have a place in all supernatural acts which proceed from vocation, and consequently in every efficacious vocation to some supernatural act.

5. *A probable opinion. — The elect are often called inefficaciously. — Inefficacious vocation in the predestined is an effect of predestination. — It is proved.* — I add, moreover, that it is probable that every supernatural vocation of the predestined, even if it is not actually efficacious with regard to obtaining the consent or act to which the man is called, is an effect of predestination. This can seem difficult, because Augustine seems to place only efficacious and congruous vocation as an effect of predestination. But, first of all, it is certain that the elect and predestined are often called inefficaciously: for example, Paul, before he was called with that most efficacious and congruous vocation, had perhaps often before been called with a common and sufficient vocation; the same is credibly true of many Jews who heard Christ preaching and calling, and resisted him, and were afterward converted through the Apostles and saved, because they had been predestined. And it happens to us daily that God calls us to perfection, or to the religious state, and we often resist, but at last consent — either to a similar vocation, or at least to some other vocation, sufficient for attaining eternal salvation. There is, then, often in the predestined an inefficacious vocation. That such a vocation, nevertheless, is an effect of predestination is shown, first, because such a vocation also proceeds from the efficacious intention of giving glory, and accordingly from the purpose: therefore it is an effect of predestination. The consequence is evident from what has been said, since election unto glory is the fount and origin of the whole of predestination.

6. The antecedent, moreover, is evident from a certain teaching adduced above from St. Thomas, that God often calls the predestined that he may not fall, not absolutely and determinately, but as it were conditionally, or disjunctively — that he may not fall, or, if he has fallen, that he may rise again. For according to this teaching, even when the vocation against falling is not entirely efficacious

and congruous, it is given from the purpose of predestination, because it is given from the intention of its final effect, as far as is on God's part, and with the disposition of supplying the defect, if an impediment has been placed on the part of man. Just as in human providence, when from an efficacious intention of health I take a medicine, in case it should help — although I do not know for certain that it will help — and even though it should not in fact be of effect, nevertheless the taking of it is an effect of that intention; so God, although he is not unaware whether such a vocation will have effect, but foreknows that it will be impeded by the predestined, nevertheless, on his own part, gives it from an absolute intention of saving him, desiring, as far as is in himself, that that intention be carried out through such a vocation.

7. *An efficacious argument.* — There is added besides (and it is an efficacious argument) that such a vocation in the predestined is never without some fruit in order to the attainment of eternal life: and this is enough for it to be an effect of predestination. The antecedent is declared because, although that vocation does not obtain its proximate end or effect, as is supposed, it can nevertheless in some way prepare the way, so that that vocation — which the predestined now spurns — being later brought to mind through another congruous vocation, becomes an incentive to humility, gratitude, or some other similar good, which is in that way efficaciously obtained, and remains unto eternal life. In these and similar ways, then, even those vocations which seem inefficacious cooperate unto eternal good for those who are called saints according to the purpose, and accordingly are effects of predestination. Now such a vocation, considered in this way, can be called in some respect congruous and efficacious — for although it does not have congruity with regard to the proximate act for which it was given, with respect to the other fruit which it eventually obtains, it is congruous, and in its own way efficacious; and under that aspect it can be comprehended under the vocation according to purpose.

8. *Final resolution.* — Hence I conclude, lastly, that all preventing and exciting helps given to the predestined, however common and merely sufficient they may seem, are effects of predestination and of their election. This is proved because these helps belong to the divine illumination in which divine vocation consists, as the Council of Trent, session 6, chapters 4, 5, and 7, declares: if, then, such helps are efficacious, they pertain to congruous vocation; if they are inefficacious, they pertain at least to vocation as it is an effect of predestination in the elect: therefore the same must be judged of all the said helps. Indeed, the same must be said not only of internal helps, but also of external ones, such as the preaching of the Gospel, external signs, miracles, examples, the presentation

of good objects, and any other divine guardianship. For although, without the internal spirit of grace, these are not sufficient — as Augustine treats at length against Pelagius, in the book *On the Grace of Christ*, and Letters 90 and 95, and as the Council of Mileve, ch. 4, defines — nevertheless they are supernatural benefits, and necessary, in their own order, for works of piety: and therefore, when they are given in such a way as to be of effect, with profit, unto salvation, they are from predestination, according to Augustine's rule, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14. Moreover, although these do not always profit proximately, or at once, they nevertheless eventually bear fruit, in some way, in the predestined, for whom all things work together for good; and so it is likely that all these things are present in them from the special providence of predestination, and accordingly are effects of it.

9. *Objection. — Response.* — You will say that it is not necessary that all these benefits always have some manner of efficacious cooperation in order to the attainment of eternal life, even in the predestined. For why could there not be, in the predestined, some calling, or excitement, which neither, when it is given, has some free and good effect, nor afterward cooperates toward it, but simply passes by and is given over to oblivion, as if it had never been? For no efficacious reason seems able to prove the opposite. I respond by granting that we cannot certainly demonstrate that all these preventing helps, given to the predestined, are effects of predestination, properly and strictly taken; because it is not impossible that some of them arise from the mere general providence of grace, if they are in no way efficacious — that is, if they do not contribute with effect to the fruit of eternal life — which, in some cases, is not repugnant, as the objection proves. We say, however, that it is not incredible that all these helps are in some way useful to the predestined for eternal life, not only in themselves, which is clear, but also with effect, since this is easy for God, and consonant with his love and providence toward the predestined, and agrees with that saying of Paul: *All things work together for good for those who love God.* Hence it seems at least certain that this is regularly and ordinarily so, and accordingly it can simply be laid down as a general rule that these helps are effects of predestination — whether this rule sometimes admits of some rare exception, or not, which is uncertain.

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VII
WHAT GOODS OF NATURE, AND IN WHAT WAY, ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION

1. *The view of certain authors. — It is urged, first.* — Some hold that no natural good, or benefit, conferred on the elect, is an effect of their predestination. And this view can be supported, first, from Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 10: *God's predestination, which is in the good, is the preparation of grace; but grace is the effect of predestination itself*; but the goods of nature are distinct from the gifts of grace: therefore. It is added that Augustine, in refuting Pelagius, everywhere distinguishes the benefit of creation from the benefit of grace and predestination. For Pelagius, to conceal his error, called nature itself — the natural gifts — grace, because they are given gratuitously by God. Hence, although in reality he held that all the gifts of supernatural grace, even the first vocation, fall under merit proceeding from free will alone, operating by its own natural powers, nevertheless he took refuge in saying that this merit was from grace, because it was from free will, which he called grace. Augustine, however, in refuting this error, distinguishes these two, saying that grace must not be made subject to nature, or to free will, but the reverse, as is evident from the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 2, and Letters 90, 95, and 105, and the whole of Book I, *On the Grace of Christ*. From these, then, it seems to be concluded that no natural benefit can be counted among the gifts of grace, and consequently neither among the effects of predestination, since the whole of it pertains to the natural gifts which are given, or co-created, along with nature itself.

2. *It is corroborated, second.* — Second, because otherwise the whole of Augustine's argumentation collapses; and it would follow that moral acts proceeding from a good natural disposition would be meritorious of the whole of supernatural grace, even of the first vocation to faith. The sequence is evident, because through an act proceeding from a prior grace we can merit a later one, and through one effect of predestination previously conferred on us we can merit another; but those acts proceed from a prior effect of predestination, namely, from the natural gift of a good disposition, or a facile temperament: therefore such acts can, for this reason, be said to be from a prior grace: therefore they can be meritorious of all the subsequent effects. Yet this cannot be said, because otherwise God would give a man efficacious vocation to faith on

account of a good temperament, or a disposition apt for virtue, which is plainly false, and is refuted at length by Augustine, Book I, *To Simplicianus*, question 2, from that text in Philippians 2: *God has chosen the weak things of the world, to confound the strong*, and other similar passages. The sequence, moreover, is evident, because the effects of predestination are so interconnected with each other that by reason of one another is given: therefore, if that natural disposition is an effect — being prior in the path of execution — by reason of it the other, subsequent effects will be given.

3. *A contrary view pleases others. — The reason is established.* — Others judge the contrary view to be true universally — namely, that all the goods given to the predestined, if they are such as to contribute in any way to his eternal salvation, are effects of predestination, even though they do not exceed the order of natural goods. This seems to be the common view of theologians, taught by St. Thomas, expounding those words to the Romans, ch. 8: *All things work together for good for those who love God.* And in the same sense he says, Part 1, question 23, article 8: *Whatever advances a man toward salvation falls under the order of predestination.* The reason, moreover, is that these goods, considered under this aspect, pertain to supernatural providence, as is self-evident, and in the elect pertain to those benefits by which they are freed and saved: therefore the preparation of such goods, under that aspect, is part of predestination: therefore those goods, carried into execution, are effects of predestination.

4. *This view is chosen as true. — The goods of nature are reduced to five headings.* — And this view, speaking absolutely, is approved by me; it needs, however, some further explanation. To provide this, let us reduce the goods of nature to four, or five, headings, and speak of each. The first is being itself, or the substance, of the predestined man, and consequently his creation, or generation. The second is having such natural powers as necessarily accompany such a nature and substance, in such a degree of natural perfection. The third is receiving such a temperament of body, with such a constitution, or proportion of humors, as is more or less helpful to virtue — in which good there can be some variety, even while the order of nature is preserved with respect to the same individual person. For although, according to the principles of philosophy, each individual demands something determinate in this respect, nevertheless it does not consist in an indivisible point, but has a range within which the same man can have a temperament more or less apt for virtue. The fourth kind of natural goods contains the various circumstances of this life, from its beginning to its end — to be born at such a time, or place, or of such parents; likewise to be brought up amid these or those circumstances, to be preserved, or to die, at this

time rather than that. The fifth and last kind of goods is that of the morally honest works themselves, and of the natural occasions which excite to them. With regard to these goods, it must be considered, in two ways, that either of them can contribute to the end of predestination — namely, either as the subject in which other effects of predestination are to be received, or as a means useful in some way to the end of predestination.

5. *Of the first there is a conclusion.* — I say, then, first: the whole being of the predestined man, even as to the very substance of his nature, and as to his creation, or generation, is an effect of predestination. I take this proposition from St. Thomas, Part 1, question 23, article 8, insofar as he says that the conception of Jacob was an effect of his predestination — for the same reasoning applies to the rest. It is also declared by reason, from a certain principle laid down above. For I said that by the same act of divine election by which the predestined is predefined to be blessed, it is also efficaciously foreordained that he should exist, and that he should be created, or generated, since the very existing, or being created, of such a person is willed for the sake of that end efficaciously intended: therefore, just as glorification is the last effect of such predestination, so the procreation of such a person is, as it were, the beginning of the execution of that same predestination; for that very creation comes about for the sake of that end, and by force of that intention. Moreover, it does not seem doubtful that the generation of one person can be an effect of the predestination of another, just as the conception of the Virgin was an effect of the predestination of Christ, because through it the way was prepared for the execution of his predestination. Therefore, by the same reasoning, the generation of one person can be from the predestination of that same person. Finally, it is likely that other works of creation, or of the disposition or governance of the universe, are an effect of the predestination of the elect, as St. Thomas plainly holds, in the places cited, and as is gathered from that text: *For the sake of the elect those days shall be shortened.* Moreover, death and its circumstances, or birth, can be effects of predestination, as I shall presently say: why, then, will not generation itself also be such, insofar as it serves the execution of predestination?

6. *The foundation of the prior view is dissolved. — The work of creation, considered in itself, does not pertain to predestination.* — Nor does the foundation of the prior view stand against this. Otherwise it would also prove that no natural good at all is an effect of predestination, which is plainly false, as will be established. It must be said, then, that the work of creation, considered in itself, does not pertain to predestination, and that this is what Augustine

especially intends; nevertheless, insofar as it founds the intended end of predestination and the other benefits of grace (not as a merit, but as their subject), and insofar as it occurs from that special intention, it is comprehended under the benefit of predestination. Just as in human acts, abstinence, for example, does not in itself pertain to religion, but as it is done from a vow, and from the intention of fulfilling it, it does pertain to religion. Nor does it follow from this that a moral work proceeding from nature alone can be meritorious of the subsequent gifts of grace, as already preceding from some benefit of predestination, since it does not proceed from it as such. For although the procreation of a nature, with such an end in view, pertains to predestination, nevertheless that nature in itself does not pertain to that order; and so, if it afterward operates, not according to what it has from that end, nor from any help given in order to it, but only from what it has, and would have, in itself, even if it had not been created for that end, then it does not act as pertaining to predestination, but only as belonging to the order of nature.

7. *Second conclusion. — It is strengthened by reason.* — I say, second: the natural perfections which follow, by necessity of nature, from such a body and soul are not special effects of predestination — any more than the existence or creation of such a person is — but are reckoned, by reduction, or concomitance, as it were one and the same effect with that nature itself. This is proved, because by the same act of election, or love, by which Paul, for example, was efficaciously foreordained to be blessed, and consequently also to be, by that same act, I say, he is ordained to have all the properties which necessarily follow from such a nature — intellect, will, and the like. For he who wills the form wills the consequences of the form; and since these properties come about by the same action by which the nature comes about, much more, then, by the same will by which the person is foreordained to exist, are such properties co-ordained, so to speak: therefore there is no other predestination of the person to having such properties besides that by which he is predestined to exist. For this reason, then, we say that these perfections are not special effects of predestination, but are joined concomitantly with the nature or person itself, and are reckoned as one and the same effect with it.

8. *Natural properties fall under predestination not as means, but as subject, or condition. — Objection. — It is dissolved.* — Hence it follows that these properties also do not fall under predestination as means to it, but as its proximate subject, or as a condition necessarily following upon it. This is evident, because the predestination of these properties is contained in that very first efficacious ordination of such a person to such an end. Likewise, because

when Paul is foreordained to beatitude, it is not Paul's substance alone that is foreordained, considered as it were metaphysically, but as physically capable of final happiness, which includes his properties, and especially his will, which are, as it were, the proximate subject for receiving beatitude. You will say that afterward, in the course of life, such a perfection, or property of disposition, is wont to contribute much to the effect of predestination: therefore such a natural perfection is given also as a means apt for attaining the end of predestination. I respond, granting the antecedent, that it does not follow that such properties, as conferred on such a person, were given from predestination as means to its execution, but it follows only that, once they were given, or are foreseen as to be given, they are ordained to serve the execution of predestination: and thus it is rather the use of such faculties, than the faculties themselves, that is the effect of predestination.

9. *Third conclusion. — It is explained in the humanity of Christ. — It is further declared in the Most Blessed Virgin. — It is confirmed by reason.* — I say, third: a good constitution, or disposition of nature, which does not follow from mere natural resultance, but is provided by God's special care — even if it is in itself natural — is an effect of predestination, not only as a subject, but also as a means. This is shown, first, in the humanity of Christ, which, on account of the union to the Word, to which it was predestined in the best manner, was fashioned and disposed by God's most special providence, even in its bodily aspects. Hence it can not undeservedly be said that this benefit was an effect of the predestination of that humanity to the hypostatic union. Likewise, because Christ was predestined to be redeemer, he therefore received a passible body, according to that saying: *But a body you have fitted to me*; therefore that bodily disposition, which otherwise was natural, was also an effect of Christ's predestination to the office of redeemer. The same must be believed of the Most Blessed Virgin, for she too was conceived through special providence, and received the best temperament by force of that predestination by which she was elected to be the Mother of God. The same is likely of certain saints procreated by a special miracle and providence, or obtained from God through pious prayers, as St. Thomas, in the article cited, signified regarding Jacob. The reason, moreover, is that such a benefit is an effect of God, and in the cases mentioned is not merely natural, for insofar as it comes about from God's special providence, and in order to a supernatural end, it pertains to the benefits of grace, and is useful, and in fact contributes to obtaining the supernatural end intended by God: therefore it has all that is necessary to be an effect of predestination, and to be counted among its means.

10. *A good disposition, or constitution apt for virtue, serves predestination.* — On this account, also, a good disposition, or constitution apt for virtue, insofar as it depends on a special providence, and is given and procured for the elect that he may use it with effect for salvation, can rightly be called an effect of predestination. This is proved because this is a benefit of God, and does not follow upon nature — even this individual nature — by natural necessity, but depends on circumstances which God has provided by special providence and will, by force of that further love by which he foreordained such a person to eternal life: therefore such a benefit is an effect of predestination. And by the same reasoning, the circumstances of birth, or of conception, can pertain to the effects of predestination, insofar as the attainment of such a temperament, more apt for virtue, depends on them. The same holds of an upbringing suited to virtue, of conservation, and of progress up to death. For all these presuppose that first will of saving this man, and are ordained to its fulfillment: therefore it is a sign that they come from that intention, and pertain, under that aspect, to the providence of grace — not the common providence, but a special one, accommodated to such a person — and accordingly are effects of predestination.

11. *Vocation, or grace, is not given to a man on account of his disposition, but is a disposition by which he is rendered fit for such grace.* — Nor does it follow from this that vocation, or congruous grace, is given to a man on account of a good disposition, or temperament, etc., but rather it follows that the disposition, or temperament, was given to such a man, in order that he should be capable, or fit, for receiving such grace. For it is not necessary that there be, among all the effects of predestination, that connection whereby the second is given on account of the first, as on account of a merit, or as for its own proper end, but two means, or two effects, can be given for the sake of one third thing, and have between themselves only a proportion and a certain connection in order to producing that effect — just as light, for example, and the species are given for the sake of vision, but between themselves are only joined together to complete the integral principle of vision. So, then, the nature suited to predestination is given by way of subject, or foundation; to it, however, is joined, from the same predestination and liberality of God, a fitting help, by which it is elevated and constituted, as it were, an integral principle of a meritorious work, or one disposed to the other effects of predestination. Nor is this foreign to Augustine's teaching: for, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14, he says that in the dispositions of certain men there are these or those properties, or reasons, by reason of which they are so disposed that, if such signs are applied to them, they

are moved to faith, and not so with others; and God applies to them such fitting signs, if he loves them — not indeed on account of their disposition, or temperament, but from his own grace and liberality, accommodating (so to speak) grace to nature, not from the merit or debt of nature, but from God's benevolence.

12. *Final conclusion. — Authors explain this conclusion differently.* — Lastly, it must be said that good moral acts, although they belong to the natural order, if nevertheless they contribute with effect to attaining eternal life, are effects of predestination. This assertion is common; on it may be seen Durandus, Book I, distinction 4, question 2, and there, Capreolus, Gregory, and others. The manner of explaining it, however, is not the same among all. For some think that all moral works which conduce in some way with effect to the end of predestination are from grace, and therefore from predestination, because grace, thus efficacious, is an effect of predestination. The antecedent, moreover, is proved because moral works, when they are from free will alone, are worth nothing in order to eternal life, as was proved above: therefore, in order to be of some worth, they must be from grace, and thus will also be from predestination. This reasoning, however, is not universal, because a morally good act can be useful for the effects of predestination not only by way of merit, or impetration, or disposition — concerning which causalities the reasoning given holds — but can also be of benefit by impeding an evil act, by which an impediment might be set against God's grace; and this is enough for them to be able to be effects of predestination: therefore. Likewise, although such a work is done through natural causes and free will, with general concurrence, nevertheless, under that aspect, it can come about from God's special and supernatural providence, and from the efficacious intention of saving such a man: therefore this is enough for it to be able to be an effect of predestination. Likewise, other temporal goods, insofar as they can be, and in fact will be, instruments of virtue, can be effects of predestination, just as they can fall under merit, as St. Thomas attests, I-II, question 114, last article, and under infused hope, from the same author, II-II, question 17, article 2: therefore much more so good moral acts. Likewise, temporal hardships are often effects of predestination, as we shall presently say: therefore so too is a good moral act.

13. Nor do I find against this any difficulty of any moment. Sotus is usually cited in the contrary sense, Book I, *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 20. But there he says nothing about predestination, but only treats of the necessity of grace for these acts, and denies that they can be from grace, but only affirms that they can occur without grace; and thus he does not deny that they are sometimes from

predestination, either because they proceed from special grace, or because in whatever way they are from special providence and the intention of salvation.

CHAPTER VIII
WHETHER EVIL, OR ITS PERMISSION, IS AN EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION

1. *Two points are established as certain. — The first. — The death of a martyr is an effect of his predestination.* — Two things are certain. The first is that evils of punishment can be effects of predestination, and are such when they truly and effectively contribute to attaining eternal life. This is proved, because these evils are simply good, and therefore are not merely permitted, but are sometimes even intended and ordained by God in the state of fallen nature: hence they are absolutely effects of God and of his providence: therefore on this score they can be effects of predestination. From another point of view, these evils belong to the benefits conferred by God through Christ, according to that text of Philippians 2: *It has been granted to you for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him.* Therefore, when these evils come about in such a way as to be the occasion, or matter, of merit, or of some other fruit of grace abiding unto eternal life, they plainly arise from that will by which God chose the predestined, and accordingly are effects of predestination. This is confirmed, for the passion and death of a martyr is an effect of his predestination, because it is a singular and efficacious means of his salvation: therefore the same must be said of any evil of punishment by which God advances his elect toward salvation. Likewise, the remission of the punishment owed for sins, as conferred on the predestined in this life so that he may fly more swiftly to heaven, is an effect of his predestination: but this remission is most frequently obtained through evils of punishment. Finally, the punishment of one person can be an effect of the predestination of another, if it benefits that other, as is plain from the passion of Christ. In this assertion, then, there is no difficulty, except the one we shall treat concerning the evil of fault.

2. *The other point established as true.* — The second certainty is that sin, or the evil of fault, is not an effect of predestination: because it is not an effect of God, according to the faith defined in the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 7. And I hold not only that sin, as sin, is not predestined by God, but also that the act of sin, to which malice is intrinsically attached, is not so predestined: for although God concurs in that act, he does not for that reason intend or predefine it of himself, as I have treated at length in book two, *On Aids*, through the

first five chapters. Wherefore I hold it as most true that even of such an act it is not an effect of predestination, because what is not in itself in some way predestined, and willed out of the end of predestination, cannot be an effect of predestination.

3. *Where the difficulty lies. — The first opinion. — The opinion is proved. — The second point is corroborated.* — There remains, however, a difficulty concerning the permission of sin—which God can directly will and intend—namely whether it is sometimes an effect of predestination. Some indeed think that it can in no way be so. First, because the permission of sin cannot be called a grace, nor a benefit prepared for us from the merits of Christ, which is nevertheless required in every effect of predestination. Second, because the permission of sin cannot be willed out of the intention of giving glory to the predestined, which we have also said to be necessary in every effect of predestination. The assumption is proved, because that permission would be chosen from that intention either immediately or mediately. Not the first, because the permission of sin is not a means immediately joined to that end, for it brings no benefit that would lead to it proximately and of itself: but no means is immediately chosen by force of the intention of some end unless it has an immediate relation and benefit to it. Nor mediately either, because if there is some means between the permission of sin and glory, it is the commission of the sin and repentance for it, which can of itself and immediately contribute to grace and glory: therefore it would be necessary, out of the intention of glory, to will repentance immediately, and then, in order for repentance to have a place, to permit the sin: but we have said above that repentance cannot be pre-defined in this way prior to the permission of sin: therefore it is impossible to choose the permission in this manner from that intention.

4. *The first assertion. — It is supported by reason.* — I say, however, that the permission of sin both can be, and often even is, an effect of predestination. This opinion is more frequently followed at the present time by modern theologians, and it was suggested by Anselm and St. Thomas in expounding those words of Romans 8: *To those who love God all things work together for good,* where the Gloss added, *even sins,* and Adam said that this interpretation should not be proudly rejected, although Paul, in his primary intention, speaks of tribulations and evils of punishment. This is shown by reason from the conditions laid down above. For in the first place, permission, in the way that it can be, is an effect of God, because it is good and directly willed. I say, *in the way that it can be,* because, speaking formally, permission consists in the privation, or negation, of that aid by which God foresaw that the fault would have been avoided. But just

as God's will is the adequate cause of giving such aid, so too of not giving it: for he freely and voluntarily does not give it: thus, then, permission is an effect of God. But if permission sometimes includes something positive, such as the application of such an object or occasion, together with the foreknowledge that the man will misuse it, God is likewise the true cause of that positive effect, and can of himself and properly will it—not indeed directly intending the man's fall, but only foreseeing it and not preventing it, as Augustine rightly says, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book 11, and often elsewhere.

5. *The second assertion.* — Second, permission can be useful for the salvation of the predestined person himself. This is established first of all from Damascene, *On the Faith*, book 2, chapter 29, where he says that God sometimes wills to permit sin for the sake of his own glory, sometimes for the good of others, but often for the good of the sinner himself. Paul seems to have touched on the first end in Romans, chapter eight, saying: *That he might show the riches of his grace upon the vessels of mercy, he endured in much patience the vessels of wrath.* Thus too he permitted the sin of Adam, that he might manifest his wisdom in procuring the salvation of men. Augustine gathers the second end, in his book *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 20, from that text of 2 Kings 16: *The Lord commanded him to curse, etc. If perhaps the Lord may look upon my humility.* For Augustine notes that God permitted that sin of Shimei for the sake of exercising David's patience and humility. So too Ambrose, sermon 47, *On the Faith of Peter*, says that God permitted Peter's fall for the good of the Church. Finally, concerning the third member, which concerns us, Augustine says, *City of God*, book 14, chapter 13: *I dare say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, by which they may become displeasing to themselves.* And he gathers together passages of Scripture. And in the book *On Nature and Grace*, chapter twenty-eight, he expounds in this way the words of 1 Timothy 1: *I delivered him to Satan, that he might learn not to blaspheme.* For he does not understand this passage of the demon's bodily vexation, but of the spiritual vexation which the demon inflicts by tempting, when this is permitted, or when a man is deprived of God's special protection. Gregory has similar things in Homily 21 on the Gospels. Finally, what Bernard says is to the point, in Sermon 54 on the Canticle: that God sometimes withdraws or draws back grace from the elect, lest they be lifted up into pride. There is, then, sometimes a useful withdrawal of grace (which is a remarkable thing) for the very end of grace itself —either that perseverance in it may be more certain, which is more necessary than increase, or that what seems to be hindered in one way may be increased

the more by another path. Permission, then, has the second condition necessary for an effect of predestination.

6. The third and fourth conditions, indeed, are convertible with one another, namely that the effect of predestination be grace, and that it be given out of the intention of glory; for if it has this latter, it will also have the former, understood in a sound sense. For it is not necessary, for an effect of predestination, that it be a benefit of grace in such a way that it is in its entity and substance something supernatural, as has been shown above; nor that it be something positive, for even the hindering of an evil is, morally speaking, a great benefit. It is enough, then, that it be an effect of God, ordained by supernatural providence to a supernatural end actually to be attained, with such a means concurring in some way: and that permission has all of this, if it is willed out of the efficacious intention of glory.

7. It remains, then, only to prove that God permits sin in the predestined out of the very intention of glory, or grace, or virtue. This is shown from what has been said, because God does not permit sin except for the sake of some benefit or good which he can draw from it, as is frequent in Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chapter 11, *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 8, and other passages cited above: but one of these goods is the spiritual advantage of the predestined person himself: therefore, out of an intention concerning him, God can will the permission of sin, and therefore he does so will it. For this is the mode most consonant with divine wisdom and goodness. The best passage for showing this is Augustine, *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 24, where, treating of David's sin, he says that God permitted it *that this contrition might be, in a certain way, medicinal against pride; for he had said: "In my abundance I shall never be moved," and he attributed to himself what he had from the Lord, wherefore it had to be shown to him whence he had it, etc.* And he adds, chapter 25: *This the proud mind does not understand at all, but great is the Lord, who persuades in the way that he himself knows.* Here it is very much to be noted that he afterward calls that very permission a "persuasion"—a name by which Augustine is accustomed to call prevenient grace and the call itself.

8. *Objection.* — But it is said that God does not will, by an absolute and predefining will, the good that he can draw from sin, except on the supposition of a foreknowledge of that same sin as future, on the testimony of Augustine in the passages cited, especially *On Genesis according to the Letter*: but the will to permit sin precedes the foreknowledge of that same sin as future: therefore that permission cannot proceed from the intention of such a good.

9. *It is resolved.* — I respond that the foreknowledge of a future sin preceding the intention of that good of which the sin will be the occasion can be understood in two ways: namely, either of a merely conditional foreknowledge, or also of an absolute foreknowledge of the future sin. In the first way, what is assumed is true, and Augustine must be understood thus whenever he seems to presuppose such knowledge. And there is a clear sign of this, because he inquires why God willed to create angels whom he foreknew would sin: for that question, understood of absolute knowledge, would involve a contradiction, because that knowledge would already presuppose the will to create such angels: therefore it must necessarily be understood of a conditional foreknowledge, which precedes the decree of the will both to create the angel or man and to permit sin in him. This knowledge, then, is no obstacle—indeed, it is necessary —for the permission of sin to proceed from the intention of that good which is afterward drawn from the sin.

10. But if it is understood of absolute knowledge, it is indeed false. For prior to this knowledge, God has the will to permit sin; therefore he wills such a permission from some motive, and without a good. For permission, although it is not evil, is nevertheless not of itself and intrinsically so good as to be lovable for its own sake, but is of itself, as it were, an indifferent object, which is made honorable by its end: but God does not will permission except in the wisest and most honorable way: therefore he wills it from some honorable end intended of itself, which pertains to the manifestation of his glory; for this end God intends through every act of his will: therefore such an end can also be the eternal good of the predestined person himself. This last consequence is evident: because there is no greater incongruity in this end than in the others, nor less fittingness or wisdom in intending and attaining it through this means.

11. *An incidental question.* — This last point, in which the difficulty lies, will become more evident by examining the reasoning of the contrary opinion, for if it were valid, it would proceed in the same way against the intention of the divine glory, or of the manifestation of his grace, by means of the permission of sin. I grant, therefore, that the argument correctly proves that the permission of sin is not a means immediately joined with the glory of the predestined, but is joined to it by other means—acts of virtue, especially the act of repentance, of humility, or some other such act. I say, however, that this good too is intended by God before he wills to permit sin, and consequently before the absolute foreknowledge of the future sin. But just what this intention of God regarding such a good, to be obtained on the occasion of sin, may be, is not explained in the same way by everyone.

12. *The opinion of certain authors.* — Some hold this to be true even of an absolute intention through a predefining decree of repentance, for they hold that the act of repentance can be pre-defined and intended before the absolute foreknowledge of sin, and consequently before the will to permit it. For God is not thereby compelled to procure, or to will, the sin. Because, in order for that intention of repentance to be fulfilled, a permissive will suffices, on the supposition of a conditional foreknowledge. For it is at once infallible that that sin will occur, which is enough for that intention to be infallibly fulfilled. And therefore it does not follow either that that will of repentance is a virtual will of sin, because by force of such a will only so much of the sin is attained as is necessary for repentance to take place, for which it is enough that the permission of sin be virtually included there. Otherwise, even the will of repentance existing in God after the absolute foreknowledge of sin would be a virtual will of sin, since repentance always bears the same relation to sin. And thus there remains no reason why the act of repentance could not be pre-defined before the absolute foreknowledge of the future sin.

13. *This opinion is not approved. — First. — Second. — The matter is made clear by a moral example.* — Nevertheless, this opinion cannot please me, as regards those goods which necessarily presuppose sin, such as repentance. First, because this order does not seem consonant with divine wisdom: for those goods which necessarily require the evil of fault are not of themselves and absolutely lovable in themselves; indeed, as such, they are reckoned to be good only in a qualified sense, and therefore God does not will them of himself, or by an antecedent will, but only on the supposition, on man's part, of a necessity— just as a wise physician does not will absolutely to apply a medicine until the illness requires it. Second, and chiefly, because such a will would be a virtual will of sin, as I declared above, and as now appears from the difference that is morally discerned according as sin is, or is not, supposed. For after sin exists, or is foreknown as future, to will its repentance is only to will its destruction; but the will of the destruction of sin is in no way a virtual will of sin, but rather a hatred of it. When, however, sin is not supposed, the will of repentance is not only a will of the destruction of sin, but also of its positing, because what is not can only be destroyed once it is, and therefore, if its existence is not supposed, it is included and intended in that will that it first be, or that it be capable of being destroyed. This can be illustrated by a moral example: for the will, for instance, to counsel some evil, even a very small one, is always evil, if in the other person to whom the counsel is given a will toward some evil is not supposed; but if in him the purpose of some greater evil is supposed, the will to counsel the lesser

will not be evil, because it no longer tends toward evil, but toward the avoidance of a greater evil.

14. *Conclusion. — It is corroborated.* — But indeed, when a good is such that it does not necessarily presuppose sin, even though it can also come about on the occasion of sin, then it can very well be pre-defined and intended by God with an efficacious intention before the absolute foreknowledge of the sin which is afterward permitted for the sake of that good. I say, then, that this is what happens in that permission of sin which is an effect of predestination. For if anyone considers the matter rightly, he will find that, besides repentance, there always intervenes some good proximately intended by God through the means of the permission of sin, which has no necessary connection with the sin, since it can exist even without sin, and the sin itself does not bear an intrinsic relation to it, even though it can be its occasion. This is plain, first, in the good of humility, or of the diminution of pride, for the sake of which God is especially accustomed to will this permission, as is plain from what was cited above. For this good does not of itself require sin, especially sin actually committed, as is plain in itself: for the mere power of sinning would suffice, if man recognized it attentively and exactly, to keep him in the duty of humility. The same holds for the absolute hatred of sin, and for the resolve to guard against it and to remove its occasions, etc., which are goods most especially intended through the permission of sin, and which of themselves and intrinsically do not presuppose it as actually committed.

15. *An objection.* — But someone will press the point, because none of these goods is so immediately joined with the permission of sin that it can be obtained through it without the sin intervening: that, then, is a certain means between the permission of sin and that good intended through it: therefore the permission cannot be intended for the sake of that good except by the mediation of this means—which is repugnant to God. It is added, moreover, that that good cannot be elicited except on the supposition of sin: but this being supposed, that good cannot be fruitful, or useful for eternal life, unless the sin is first removed through repentance: therefore repentance also is another means interposed between that good and the permission of sin: therefore it is always necessary that, out of the intention of that good, one proceed to the willing of the permission through the will of repentance.

16. *It is rejected. — An evasion.* — It is responded that the same argument could be made for whatever end God might will to permit sin, and therefore either it must be denied that God can permit sin for the sake of any good end whatsoever—which can in no way be said—or that argument is not valid. This is

plain in the case of that end of showing forth his grace, which Paul set down. For this showing forth of grace does not occur except where sin has followed, which God freely remits to whomever he will: therefore between the permission and the showing forth of grace, sin intervenes. You will say that this is accidental, and only in relation to us, for in itself grace is sufficiently shown precisely in the permission itself, inasmuch as God gives congruous and efficacious grace to whom he will, and denies it to whom he will, by permitting sin—a difference which could be shown in the permission itself, if it were known in itself, even apart from the sin's consequence.

17. But assuredly the same response could be given in our case, for the permission alone, if it were known in itself, could suffice to lead a man into humility and fear of God, and similar ends intended through such a permission. Hence we too would say that the sin follows accidentally. Moreover, that response is not adequate and universal: for when God, from the permission of sin, intends the showing forth of his grace, this is not so much in relation to the blessed as to us who are still wayfarers. For to the blessed that means was of little necessity, since they know grace itself in itself. But we wayfarers cannot know that difference unless there is, in men themselves, a variety of good and evil actions. Furthermore, in the end of redemption, for instance—for the sake of which God permitted the sin of the Jews—not the permission alone but the action itself was necessary in order that that effect should finally be obtained: and many similar examples can easily be offered.

18. *The former part of the objection is answered.* — I say, then, to the former part of that objection, that although the sin, as actually committed, is sometimes necessary for the attainment of that good which God intends on the occasion of sin, it is not necessary that God himself intend or will the sin merely through permitting it. First, indeed, because sin is not the work of God, but of man: God, however, intends only what he himself is going to do. Furthermore, because such a sin, at least as sin, is not a means to such an end, but rather, as far as it is in itself, would be capable of hindering such a good. It is, then, only a certain occasion, which—because God, by his infinite power and goodness, uses it well—he employs for bringing about some good: and therefore, although that occasion intervenes between the permission and that good, it is not necessary that it be intended first, but only foreseen and accepted, or ordained to that end. From this it also follows that permission, considered in itself, is not always an efficacious means to such an end, but at most a sufficient one, and is of itself such that, as far as concerns the will of God, it is not necessary that the permitted action follow upon the positing of the permission; rather, it is only

from God's infallible foreknowledge that it is certain that that action will occur, the permission being posited. When a means is of this kind, it is not necessary that, prior to its election, all the means and occasions or actions that can intervene between that good and the attainment of the good intended be willed; rather, it suffices that, once the permitted sin has been foreseen, the rest be disposed.

19. *To the latter part the response is plain.* — And from this the response to the other part, concerning repentance, is plain. For I say that this too is not a means of itself and absolutely necessary to such an end, but only on the supposition of the harm inflicted by the sin; and therefore it can be called a remedy rather than a means simply necessary. But things of this kind are not prepared by an absolute will and pre-definition until their merit or necessity pre-exists, or is foreseen. And therefore God, when he permits sin in the predestined, has only a conditional will, prepared, as it were, to give him repentance if he should need it: but once he sees the sin in him, he then wills his repentance absolutely, because he then knows that means to be necessary for the end intended by himself.

20. And this suffices concerning the effects, from which each one can understand for himself what I referred above to this place, concerning the signs of predestination, for the effects themselves are signs of this kind. But because the same effect which in one person proceeds from predestination does not in another proceed from it, such signs do not afford certain knowledge. When, however, many such signs are joined together, over a long time, and with great fruit, they produce a highly probable conjecture. On this matter Bernard, Sermon 1 for Septuagesima, may be read, and Vega gathers much material, *On the Council of Trent*, book 12, from chapter 10 to chapter 20.

CHAPTER IX
THAT FROM PREDESTINATION THERE DOES NOT FOLLOW A NECESSITY OF HAVING, OR OF PRESERVING, GRACE

1. We have so far declared the true effects of predestination; it remains that we exclude certain false effects, and on that occasion explain the harmony between predestination and freedom of will. For all those false effects tend toward this, that predestination should bring in a necessity—either of having grace, or of acting well, or of not sinning—a necessity (I say) repugnant to liberty: which effect in fact not only does not follow from predestination, but is so repugnant to it that predestination would destroy itself if it brought about

such an effect, because it would remove the true reason of merit and of reward, which are the end and the chief means of predestination; and therefore these false effects cannot be better excluded than by showing the harmony between predestination and the use of freedom. This effect, or necessity, then, can be considered either in relation to sanctifying grace, or in relation to individual good works, and especially those which are necessary for salvation, among which we include abstaining from sins. In this chapter, then, we shall speak of the prior necessity, and in the following one of the latter. Now since liberty consists in the power of acting and not acting, or of having and not having sanctity, and since it is manifest that it is given to all the elect, by force of predestination, that they can become and be sons of God, the whole difficulty is how there remains in them the power also to become and be sons of the devil, and to cast away from themselves grace and the sonship of God, since a predestined person cannot fail to be saved. This difficulty can lie partly in the matter itself, partly in the manner of speaking, and we shall explain both briefly.

2. *The opinion of Wycliffe and Waldensis. — It is rejected as a heresy.* — Concerning, then, the justice and grace of the predestined, some have erred, saying that the predestined person is always, and necessarily, in grace in this life. So thought Wycliffe, as Waldensis reports, *On the Sacramentals*, book 2, chapter 160. He could have been moved to this because the predestined person is loved most by God; but whoever is loved by God is just. But this is a manifest heresy, for from it it follows that an unbaptized infant, if predestined, would already be just, and that an infidel would please God even without having faith, if he were predestined. Finally, it follows that no predestined person is conceived or born in original sin—all of which is contrary to the faith. They are also contrary to predestination itself, because not all who are saved at the end of life are foreordained to obtain perpetual holiness from the beginning of life. Nor is there any foundation of any weight here: for although the predestined person is loved according to the divine foreordination and foreknowledge, he is not therefore always loved according to present justice, or, what is the same, according to the actual execution of predestination: man does not become just through predestination except insofar as it is committed to execution with respect to the effect of grace.

3. *Another error. — It is refuted.* — There was another error among those who said that, although the predestined person can sometimes be in sin, nevertheless, once he is justified, he never again falls from grace. So Calvin held in our time, and this was the ancient error of Jovinian, who was moved chiefly by 1 John 2 and 3: *Whoever is born of God does not sin, nor can he sin, because*

his seed remains in him. On this matter, Bellarmine may be seen, *On Justification*, book 7, chapters 14 and 15. And it is expressly refuted in the treatise on charity and on grace, where it is shown that charity and grace, once possessed, can be lost. We have evident examples of this in Scripture, in David, Peter, and others. Likewise, because otherwise either the non-predestined person would never be truly just, which is heretical, or the predestined person would always have, joined to his justice, an infallible perseverance in grace through a special gift distinct from justice, which is groundless and vain, and contrary to the sense of the whole Church. Moreover, from that error it follows that everyone who sins mortally either is reprobate, or was never just: and to say either of these is heretical.

4. *An a priori argument. — Various expositions of the passage of John. —* The argument *a priori* which bears on the present matter is that such an effect is not necessary for the end of predestination: for even if a just man falls and rises again, time after time, he can be saved in the end. Not all, then, who are predestined to eternal life are also predestined to preserve grace without interruption from the time they first receive it. Indeed, St. Prosper, *On the Call of the Gentiles*, book 2, last chapter, says that it was the counsel of God that the predestined be permitted to sin and to fall from justice, and sometimes to remain for a long time in that state, so that the mystery of predestination might be hidden, and no one might despair, or trust too much. On this, Augustine may also be consulted, *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapters 6 and 13, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 14, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 6. As for that passage of John, it has various explanations, two of which are more probable, and either may be chosen. One is: *Whoever is born of God,* if he acts as such, *does not sin.* The other, in the composite sense: *Whoever is born,* so long as he keeps justice, *does not sin* mortally, *nor can he,* so long as he retains it, because justice and sin are formally incompatible with one another.

5. *A third opinion. —* There is a third opinion, of certain Catholics, who say that the predestined, by God's absolute and antecedent love, are necessarily saved, and consequently necessarily justified and made to remain in justice. So Ockham, Gabriel, and Catharinus think. Some, however, do not admit this kind of predestination, in order to avoid this kind of necessity; for they think it repugnant to liberty, at least in part, as John of Bologna, *On Predestination*, part 2, opinion 3. The manner of speaking of Augustine seems to favor this, *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 12: *Provision has been made for human weakness, that it might be moved unswervingly.* The same, *Against Julian* 5, chapters 3 and 4, and Fulgentius, *To Monimus*, book 1, chapters 11 and 12. Indeed, the manner of

speaking of Scripture also seems to favor this, Matthew 25: *That they may be led into error, if it can be done*—as if, since it cannot be done, the opposite is necessary. In this way that text of 2 Timothy 2 is explained: *The firm foundation of God stands: the Lord knows who are his*; and similar things are found in John 6 and 10, and 1 John 2, on account of which Fulgentius said, *On the Faith, to Peter*, chapter 35: *Hold most firmly that none of those who are predestined can perish.* The reason, indeed, is that the will of God is an efficacious cause, such that, once it is posited, it is impossible that the effect not be posited.

6. This opinion can be understood either of some true necessity which would change the mode of acting and of producing the effect, and consequently would remove liberty, whether as to exercise or as to specification—which is properly called the necessity of the consequent—or it can be understood of a mere necessity of the consequence, which is also said to be in the composite sense, and is repugnant to no liberty. The authors cited speak in the former sense, in which I judge that opinion to be false.

7. *The first assertion.* — I say, then, first, that from predestination, or from the divine election, there does not follow any true necessity of having or of preserving grace. This is proved, because two things are required for the predestined person to be saved. One is that he attain grace in this life (for I suppose that no opportunity is given after this life, if it is not obtained during the present life). The other is that, for some time of this life, he persevere in grace, so that from some justification up to death he does not sin mortally. Neither of these, however, need occur in the predestined with any true necessity (and I suppose the discourse to be about adults, for infants are not capable of liberty, or of the necessity properly opposed to it). The first point is proved, because the justification of an adult, according to the doctrine of the faith, does not occur without his free and human disposition: therefore the justification of the predestined occurs in this way too: therefore predestination does not bring in a necessity in regard to justification.

8. *An evasion. — It is forestalled.* — It will perhaps be said that this proves at most a necessity as to exercise, but not a necessity as to specification, since sufficient liberty for a moral act and merit stands together with the latter. But against this is the fact that, for justification, it is necessary to exercise such a disposition: therefore, if for this reason some necessity is to be inferred, it will be not only as to specification, but also as to exercise. And to press the matter further, let us suppose a predestined person placed at the very last moment of death and still existing in sin, for whom, in order to be saved, it is not enough not to sin, but it is necessary, here and now, to be converted: therefore if he must

necessarily be converted, this is not merely a necessity as to specification, but also as to exercise. Hence others, convinced by this argument, confess that both kinds of necessity follow from such a mode of predestination, and therefore that it is not to be admitted. But Augustine expressly refutes this in the passages often cited. And it will be established from the following chapter that predestination does not bring in a necessity for individual actions, even though they are to be performed in a predetermined manner and time.

9. As to the second point, concerning perseverance, this in the first place does not require necessity as to exercise, as even the authors named confess; but to posit in the predestined a necessity as to specification for that final time alone is not an error, since it conflicts openly with no dogma. To me, however, it seems false, because without this necessity too such an effect can be brought about infallibly by God, as will be established from the following chapter: therefore such a necessity is not to be posited without some other foundation, since it is preternatural, and not owed to anyone by reason of some superior excellence or dignity, as I shall explain further in the following chapter; and I shall there dispose of a brief difficulty concerning confirmation in grace—namely, whether it is conferred for some time on all the predestined.

10. *The second assertion.* — Second, I assert that predestination infallibly brings in grace, and the perseverance of the predestined in it for some time up to death, through a mere necessity of the consequence, which in no way impedes liberty. This is proved by the testimonies adduced above. And to indicate this certainty and infallibility, Scripture is accustomed to set forth the effects of predestination as already accomplished, according to Romans 8: *Whom he predestined, he called, he justified, etc.*—which St. Gregory noted, *On First Kings*, book 5, chapter 4. The reason for the former part is that the divine will cannot absolutely be frustrated. The reason for the latter part is that the divine will moves the created will in such a way that it accommodates to it means proportioned to it, by which it is moved both freely and infallibly: for this pertains to the infinite wisdom and power of God, as was touched upon above in book one, and will be explained again in the following chapter. Hence it is also confirmed, because liberty is not removed in general, except insofar as it is impeded in individual acts: but predestination does not impede liberty in individual acts, as I shall now show: therefore it does not simply impede the attaining or preserving of grace either, through which glory is obtained.

11. *Objection.* — In order that the manner of speaking and of formally responding to this common difficulty be further declared, I object as follows: given predestination, no one can be damned: therefore, given predestination, he

does not have the liberty to be damned; and that supposition is already posited: therefore in fact he no longer has this liberty. The first consequence is plain, because liberty consists intrinsically in the power of acting and of not acting; therefore, if, once the supposition is made, there is no power, there is also no liberty. That there is no power is plain, because the supposition is already posited, and thus there is also a composite sense, in which it is true to say that it is impossible for the predestined person to be damned. Now since that supposition precedes the use of liberty, because God, before all this foreseen use, efficaciously destines man to glory before any such act, it seems to follow from that supposition that there is a necessity simply speaking, inducing an absolute incapacity for the contrary effect, and accordingly repugnant to liberty.

12. *It is resolved.* — It is responded that, before all else, the first antecedent must be distinguished: for even given predestination, the word "can" may be taken either in the divided sense or in the composite sense; and in the divided sense the antecedent is false, while in the composite sense it is true. These are the common words by which this difficulty is dispatched; but the understanding of them must be this: that when it is said, "The predestined person can be damned," the composition can be made, as it were, in the object of such a power —namely, that liberty extends to this, that it can simultaneously join together predestination and damnation in one: and in this way the proposition is false and impossible, because it is repugnant to the divine foreknowledge, which has the will joined to it. But it can be taken in another way, namely, that that supposition is taken only on the part of the subject and the person: because, that is, even if predestination is supposed, he still truly retains the power of sinning and of persevering in sin, if he should so will, although this power is never to be reduced to an act contrary to predestination. And in this sense the proposition is true. The reason for this is that that supposition does not change the proper mode of acting of this power, nor is it an antecedent from every point of view, because it is not applied to the work except from the foreknowledge that the will is going to act freely, if it is moved in this or that manner. With the antecedent thus dispatched, the consequence must simply be denied, because for liberty, absolutely and simply, this power suffices which is called the power in the divided sense, because there truly and really remains in the predestined a power for either alternative, notwithstanding God's predestination. If any obscurity remains here, it will be explained more fully in the following chapter.

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER X
THAT FROM PREDESTINATION THERE DOES NOT FOLLOW A NECESSITY EITHER OF NOT SINNING, OR OF ACTING WELL, IN INDIVIDUAL ACTS: WHERE THE HARMONY OF PREDESTINATION WITH LIBERTY IS MORE FULLY EXPLAINED

1. *Predestination does not take away liberty.* — We presuppose the Catholic doctrine, against the heretics—especially Luther and Calvin—that predestination does not take away liberty, even of supernatural acts, through which it is committed to execution: nor does this place require that we dwell on proving this truth. From this, then, it is manifest that it does not pertain to the efficacy of predestination, but to its effect, to bring in a necessity in the mode of acting of all and each of the human acts, or of any of them, by which the final effect of predestination is brought about and obtained; otherwise predestination would take away liberty. What we are now treating, then, is how these two are reconciled, since predestination is infallible and immutable, and accordingly is a necessary cause, that is, one necessarily bringing in its effect.

2. *The opinion of certain authors.* — Some have said that the harmony here lies in this: that God does not predestine, or pre-define, individual acts, which are the means of predestination, by an absolute decree of his will preceding, in the order of reason, the absolute foreknowledge of such acts as future; but only determines absolutely to save and justify the man. And by force of this decree he offers means by which he is infallibly saved—yet not in such a way that this infallibility consists in some certain act, determined in particular with all its circumstances, but in this: that God so directs the will of the predestined that, in this or that act, he at length cooperates. And thus it happens that, in particular, God never moves the will of the predestined by a predefined decree, such that he wills altogether, here and now, that this be so; but rather by an antecedent will, or simple affection, that such an act be done: and if the will of the predestined does not resist, but cooperates, then that means is already certain; but if God foresees that the predestined will resist on that occasion, he provides another occasion in which he moves him, and so on, until the effect is obtained.

3. *This manner of speaking is rejected.* — We disapproved this manner of speaking in the third book, *On Aids*, and above, in book one, touched on something which it is not necessary to repeat here. This opinion displeases us,

first and chiefly, because it supposes that the pre-definition of a free act in particular, and with all its circumstances, is repugnant to liberty, and accordingly that a free act cannot be provided for or predestined by God in this manner—which seems contrary to the perfection of divine providence, and contrary to the manner of speaking of Scripture concerning God's power to change the hearts of men, even while they act freely. Second, because it supposes in God a knowledge so limited and imperfect that he cannot foreknow by what means the human will may be drawn so as to will, here and now and in particular, simultaneously and infallibly and freely. For if he foresees this, he will easily be able to predestine absolutely that the act occur in particular and occur freely. Third, because that confused manner of pre-defining a free act is imperfect and unworthy to be attributed to God: indeed, it can never attain that degree of certainty which is necessary for God's absolute decree regarding the end to be obtained by that means. All of which we have pursued at greater length in the passages cited.

4. *Another manner of speaking. — Its foundation.* — Others, then, in order to flee this extreme, fall into another, saying that God not only pre-defined within himself the individual acts by which the predestined are to be saved, but also pre-ordained to give to each of them such a previous motion, of itself so efficacious, that the human will cannot resist it so as not to consent to it, but is physically predetermined to consent here and now and in such a manner, both as to specification and as to exercise of the act. The foundation of this opinion in the present matter is that a similar motion is necessary for the certainty and efficacy of predestination. Some also commonly found it on this: that this manner of premoving pertains to the proper and necessary causality of the first cause. As for the harmony between this motion and liberty, some do not explain it, but say that it is to be admired and held by faith, even if not understood. Others say that, although that motion is so efficacious, it is nevertheless, by the wisdom of God, so gentle that, although it predetermines the will to one thing by its own force and efficacy alone, it nevertheless makes it act freely. Others have recourse to the object. They say that, by force of the object thus proposed through the intellect, the will is moved indifferently and without necessity, and that this suffices for the act to be free, even if the will itself is determined to one thing by an extrinsic agent. Others, finally, take refuge in the composite and divided senses. They hold that a necessity arising from a supposition, even one antecedent to the use of liberty, does not prevent the act from being free, but that it suffices that the will, of itself and taken nakedly without such a supposition, be undetermined toward such an act.

5. *This opinion is rejected.* — This opinion is not to be treated and examined here ex professo by us, for we have done this at length in the books *On Aids*, and some other time and occasion will arise for treating it more exactly. For now, then, we only assert that this opinion is not necessary for the matter of predestination, since the certainty of predestination can be safeguarded by another, easier way, more consonant with divine providence and wisdom, as we shall presently explain. And if it is not necessary, we do not think it should be admitted, because it has no foundation in the Scriptures, or in the holy Fathers, or in the ancient theologians, and it so depresses the freedom of the will that it can scarcely be conceived by the human mind, and is therefore also unsuited for resisting heretics. For to say that this harmony is ineffable and cannot be explained by us does not satisfy, both because the faith does not teach this—whence the harmony is rendered inexplicable by these authors—and also because, if someone were to say that God necessitates the will and nevertheless does not take away liberty, and that we must believe in a harmony of an actual necessity simply speaking with an actual liberty, he would be saying not merely something inexplicable, but something openly contradictory. That opinion must, then, declare how it is not the same thing to say that a predetermination to one thing brought in from without is joined with the indifference of liberty, since that predetermination seems to be a necessity simply speaking, since it is brought in from outside. Wherefore, the fact that such a motion is called gentle will indeed make the act proceeding from it voluntary, but not that it be free. And the mere proposing of an object, of itself indifferent, is indeed sufficient for a potential liberty, but not for an actual one, if necessity is otherwise imprinted from outside. Since, therefore, we do not find a way of reconciling liberty with a supposition antecedent to its use and physically determining the faculty of acting to one part, we do not, for the purpose of resolving this difficulty, make use of that opinion.

6. *The assertion.* — It must be said, then, briefly, that predestination does not impede liberty in individual good acts, even though it pre-defines them, because in the execution, and *ad extra*, it does not move toward their effective performance except through efficacious grace. This efficacious grace so moves the will that it does not impede its liberty, even as to use and actual determination, because it moves the will in a manner congruous, drawn from conditional foreknowledge; and therefore nothing remains in predestination that is repugnant to this liberty. The first part is St. Augustine's, wherever he speaks of this matter. For in this sense he says that those who are called according to the purpose do not reject the call, nor resist it. And it is very much

to be noted in him that he does not say "cannot resist," but "does not resist." Although, if he sometimes spoke in the former manner, he should be expounded according to the composite sense explained above, by means of conditional foreknowledge. The reason for this part is that this efficacious grace is necessary for the end of predestination, otherwise it could fail. And it is also an apt means, because, once it is posited, it is infallible that the effect must be posited: therefore [the conclusion follows]. The other part is briefly proved, because the efficacy of this grace does not consist in a physical predetermination which the will cannot resist: because the Council of Trent, session 6, defines that the will so acts, on the supposition of God's excitation, that it can resist it. It consists, therefore, in a motion congruous and accommodated to the will according to God's foreknowledge.

7. *Objection. — It is responded.* — Someone, indeed, will say: Therefore this grace of God is not efficacious in itself, but receives its efficacy from man's will—which seems very absurd, since the will's consent arises from the efficacy of such grace: otherwise man could glory in it, as something had from his own efficacy and not from the grace of God. The inference is proved, because unless man's will cooperates, God's grace will not be efficacious; therefore the efficacy of grace comes from the will. It is responded by granting the first consequence as to its former part, and denying it as to the latter: because free will is not compared to exciting grace, of which we are speaking, as its cause, nor does it confer anything upon it such that it could be said, on that account, to render it efficacious. Hence, as to the proof, the consequence is also denied: for it only proves that free will is a co-cause along with such grace in producing consent, which is far different.

8. *A certain notable point is added.* — In order that the matter itself be better understood, it must be noted that the efficacy of grace is sometimes taken for its actual efficiency: for every cause is denominated actually efficient, or efficacious, from its actual efficiency, which is nothing other than its action. Sometimes, however, it is taken for the power which such grace has of moving the free will and of bringing it about that it acts, according to that text, *I will bring it about that you do it,* and that other, *It is he who works in us to will,* because through this grace God brings it about that we will, as Augustine explains. Efficacy, then, taken in the former way, depends without doubt upon free will, because there is but one action which arises of itself from free will and grace together; and in this way free will can be said to elicit the action of grace concomitantly, that is, by co-producing one action together with it. It is not, however, said to give grace its own efficiency, because that action, insofar as it is

produced by grace, does not proceed from the causality of free will, although in reality that action is not without the causality of free will.

9. Speaking, however, in the latter way (in which we speak, with Augustine) of prevenient efficacious grace, in this sense grace in no way has its efficacy from free will; rather, grace itself elevates free will and gives it the power of acting—a power which such grace has of itself and from its own perfection. But because such grace, insofar as it is efficacious, signifies not merely a power of acting, but of acting in such a way that it infallibly has the action joined to it, this it does not have from its mere physical power, connatural to itself, but from the manner in which it is given by God, out of such a purpose and conditional foreknowledge—because God had already foreseen that that grace would have its effect, if it were given with such circumstances. And therefore, in this respect too, it has its efficacy from God himself, although not without reference to free will; and thus the harmony is also easily made plain, for this grace, however efficacious, insofar as it is prevenient, has no physical repugnance with the dissent of the free will—a repugnance which would arise intrinsically from the very entities or things themselves, which alone could harm liberty—but it has that efficacy from the presupposition of the future effect in God's foreknowledge, which is not repugnant to liberty, as has often been declared.

10. From this it is easily understood that predestination does not diminish liberty even as to perseverance in good acts without any admixture of mortal sin. This is proved in the same way, because even this effect comes about only through a manifold efficacious grace. For just as God moves toward the first act, so he also moves toward the second and the others in succession: therefore, just as grace operates efficaciously and freely in each individual act, so too in their collection, or continuation; nor do I find in this any new difficulty.

11. *A question.* — One could only doubt whether it must be granted that every predestined person is, for some time, confirmed in grace. For from what has been said this seems to follow, since every predestined person receives, for some time, the gift of perseverance, which is given to him so that he may infallibly not fall from grace: and nothing else does confirmation in grace seem to be. Nevertheless, authors commonly do not speak in this way, and they try to set a distinction between the gift of perseverance and confirmation in grace. And some say that confirmation adds a revelation by which a man is made certain that he is going to persevere. But this is very uncertain; for whence is it established not only that the apostles, whom we believe to have been confirmed in grace, but also that any others whatever, had this revelation? Or what does such a revelation contribute to the operation of grace, so that it should pertain

to confirmation? Others say that, to the confirmed, the divine concurrence to sin is denied, and therefore that they not only are not going to sin, but cannot sin—which is not necessary for the gift of perseverance, or in all the predestined. And indeed it can readily be believed that, after Christ the Lord, it was so in the Most Blessed Virgin, on account of her exceptional dignity, to which that whole perfection was, in a certain way, owed, and was, as it were, connatural. But concerning other confirmed persons there is no sufficient foundation for asserting this, and besides it is neither necessary nor connatural.

12. We can say, then, that the gift of perseverance is conferred of itself through the ordinary aids and gifts of grace, with God only seeing to it and providing that these be given at congruous times, and in that number, or multitude, of aids, which suffice for such an effect. Confirmation in grace, however, adds proper and peculiar gifts and aids, by which God forestalls man in individual acts, and especially in occasions of sinning, and moves his will, morally, most efficaciously, not only according to foreknowledge but also according to the power of the aids, which, although they do not determine the will so that it cannot even physically resist, nevertheless lead it, morally, most efficaciously. This efficacy, together with another congruity drawn from foreknowledge, affords confirmation. Confirmation in grace, then, adds something beyond the common gift of perseverance, by reason of which it does not necessarily follow from predestination, although it can be of service to it, liberty being preserved as well.

THE END OF BOOK THREE

BOOK FOUR
ON GOD'S SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE REGARDING THE ETERNAL SALVATION OF THE REPROBATE, OR THOSE NOT ELECTED

This is the second part of this work, in which we set out to speak of reprobation: but since the final effect or term of reprobation is the perpetual lack of beatitude, in order to understand how the reprobate are deflected from the attainment of beatitude, it is necessary first to understand how they are directed, or ordered, toward that beatitude by divine providence, which is to be treated in this book. And since providence presupposes some intention, or will, of an end proportioned to itself, [we shall speak] of that [will] which God had concerning the final salvation of all those whom he did not efficaciously choose for glory; and then of the means which he prepared for them toward that end.

CHAPTER I
HOW CERTAIN IT IS THAT GOD WILLED TO SAVE ALL MEN, EVEN THOSE NOT PREDESTINED

1. *Gregory simply embraced the negative position.* — This question is founded on that passage of Paul, 1 Timothy 2: *God wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.* Here he seems to settle the question, and to teach the affirmative position as a matter of certain faith. Nevertheless, Gregory, *1 Sentences*, distinction 46, near the end, simply denies that God willed to save those whom he does not in fact save: because what God wills, comes to be—especially when it is to be done principally by God himself. And Augustine favors this opinion, who is sometimes accustomed to restrict that testimony of Paul to the predestined alone, explaining it either by an appropriate distribution —that is, that it be understood of all who are saved, since no one is saved except him whom God wills to be saved—or such that the distribution is only by classes of individuals, since from every class, or condition, of men God wills some to be saved, as he explains in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 103.

2. *The conclusion. — It is corroborated by the testimony of Paul.* — But it must nevertheless be said simply that God from eternity willed to save all the men whom he decreed to create: and the same must be held of the angels. This is proved from the testimony cited: for if the context of Paul is sincerely

considered, it is plain that he speaks universally of all men. For he first urges that prayer be made for all men, and adds: *For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who wills all men to be saved.* But it is clear that Paul's intention is that we pray for all men simply, without any limitation: therefore, when he speaks with the same universality of all men, in giving as the reason that God wills all to be saved, [he means the same thing]. He confirms and declares this further with the following words, saying: *For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all of us.* In this last expression it is most certain that he speaks of absolutely all men: for it is of faith that God is the redeemer of all men: therefore he speaks in the same way of all in the preceding words. The consequence is plain, both because the context and the uniformity of the words, and the force of the reasoning, so require it, and also from the reason which is itself insinuated in the words. For God wills all men to be saved in just the way that he willed to redeem all, since redemption exists only for the sake of men's salvation: but the will to redeem all men is not limited to all the predestined, nor can it be limited in any of the ways mentioned: therefore neither must the will to save all men be so limited.

3. *Augustine's exposition. — But against the exposition an objection is raised.* — I know that this same Augustine, in his book *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 15, although he understands that distribution to be simply of all men, nevertheless explains, by a certain metaphor, that God wills to save all men, not because he himself has such a will, but because he makes us will and desire that all be saved—for this manner of speaking is customary in Scripture. But against this exposition stands, first, this very rule of Augustine: that a metaphorical expression, even one customary elsewhere, is not easily to be applied to another passage unless the necessity of the letter requires it, but the propriety and simplicity of the words is to be retained as far as possible, since otherwise we would have nothing certain from the words of Scripture. But here there is no necessity of resorting to metaphor, as will be plain. Indeed, I add further that that metaphor is not consonant with the context, because Paul says that prayer must be made for all, because God wills all to be saved: therefore Paul leads us to desire the salvation of all from the fact that God wills it: therefore he attributes this will to God, not because he produces it in us (otherwise he would already be presupposing what he is trying to persuade us of), but because he has it in himself.

4. Second, because if God makes us will and desire the salvation of all men, this is surely so because this is consonant with his own will: therefore this effect

of God—namely, that he makes us will the salvation of all—presupposes a similar will in himself. Third, because Paul also shows this very will of God from the fact that there is one God of all, who gave one mediator and redeemer to all: he speaks, then, of the will of God himself. It is added, finally, that the metaphor, or the propriety of the words, of one passage is, as far as possible, to be taken from the agreement of other passages: but in other passages no such metaphor is suggested in similar speech, but rather the propriety of the words, as will be plain from what is to be said.

5. *The true sense of the words of St. Paul.* — The true sense of Paul, then, is what the words, taken simply and properly, present: that God, as far as it depends on himself, wills and desires the salvation of all, in such a way that, on his part, he denies necessary providence to no one, nor leaves the way of salvation simply and of itself impossible. This sense was followed, on that passage, by Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, and other Greeks; Ambrose, Jerome, and other Latins, there; Prosper, *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, book 2, chapters 19 and 25 (otherwise 7 and 8); Athanasius, *On the Assumption of Man*, book 3. Likewise Chrysostom, Homily 1 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, but especially Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*, book 2, chapter 29; St. Thomas, *Summa*, part 1, question 19, article 6, and *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 159. And this is now the commonly received opinion. Augustine, finally, followed it too, in his book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 33, where he asks why, if the will to believe is a gift of God, it is not given to all men, since God wills all men to be saved; and he answers: *God indeed wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth; yet not in such a way that he takes from them free will, by the good or bad use of which they are most justly judged—and since this is so, infidels act against the will of God when they do not believe his Gospel, etc.* And in the book on the articles falsely imputed to him, the second was *that God does not will to save all*: to which he answers: *It must be most sincerely believed and professed that God wills that all men be saved, since the Apostle, whose this opinion is, carefully prescribes—what is most faithfully kept in all the churches—that supplication be made to God for all men*, etc. These words are found in Prosper, in his response to the Vincentian objections, second response.

6. Other testimonies of Scripture confirm this truth, in which God confesses that he *does not will the death of the sinner, but that he be converted and live* (Ezekiel 18 and 33). Likewise where he says that he *stands at the door and knocks* (Revelation 3), and that he *enlightens every man coming into this world* (John 1), and similar texts, which plainly show this divine will. The

commentators also gather it from Hosea 13: *Your destruction is from yourself; your help is only from me.* For it is as if he had said, "I willed to help you, I willed to bring you to salvation, and therefore your destruction had its origin from yourself, not from me"—which certainly would not be true if God did not will of himself to save even those who perish. Wherefore, although it is not altogether certain that those words of Paul admit only this sense—namely, that God wills, in some manner proper to himself, the salvation of all men without exception or limitation to the predestined, since the explanations given by Augustine are made somewhat probable by his authority—this, nevertheless, I think must be understood with the proviso that the other sense not be excluded as the true and most literal one, for this is what all that we have adduced effectively proves.

7. *It is explained by reason.* — Hence it is also plain that the conclusion laid down is to be taken as certain, and beyond all mere opinion, since it is sufficiently expressed in Scripture, and received by the common consent of the holy Fathers. It is declared by reason as follows: God created the whole of human nature (and the same holds for the angelic) for a supernatural end; therefore he willed that, as far as depended on himself, all men should attain that end. The consequence is proved, because the divine will was disposed otherwise toward human nature than it would have been had he willed to establish it in pure nature, and for the sake of a merely natural beatitude alone: for there can be no other difference, except that now, besides the will of giving man, or angel, such a nature, he also had the will of giving them such a beatitude, as far as depended on himself—from which end he excluded or excepted no individual on his own part, as will presently be declared.

8. *A difficulty arises. — The earlier opinion.* — For it can here be asked whether God had this will of saving all men before the foreseen fall of Adam, or also after it. For some say that God willed to save all men only in the former way —according to the first institution of human nature, in which Adam received, on behalf of all men, the justice by which they could be saved—but that God did not have a similar general will regarding all men after he foreknew them to have fallen in Adam, since he does not offer sufficient means of salvation to all, as seems manifest in the case of many infants, and seems probable in the case of some adult infidels. Driedo suggests this manner of speaking, *On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race*, treatise 1, chapter 4, ad 2.

9. *The decision of the difficulty.* — Nevertheless I judge it certain that God had this will in regard to men in both states, both prior and posterior to the fall. For as to the former, the argument made above from the ordination of the whole of nature to that end establishes it. It is also shown from the effect, because God

established the whole of human nature in Adam, and gave to him, as head, justice for the whole of posterity, with no individual excepted: and that justice, with the aids owed to it, was a sufficient principle for attaining supernatural beatitude; therefore it is a sign that it was given out of a will to save all. This is confirmed, because if anyone had been excluded from that will, he would equally have been excluded from participation in original justice, even if Adam had remained in it: therefore that person would not have contracted original sin in Adam, nor would the lack of original justice in him have had the character of a privation, but of a mere negation: but this cannot be affirmed of any man drawing his origin from Adam: therefore no one can be excluded from that general will of saving men either. And this argument, applied with due proportion, proves the same about the evil angels, for if God had not had this will toward them, he would not have ordained them to supernatural beatitude: therefore there would have been no fault in them for not striving toward it by the due means—which cannot be said.

10. As to the latter point—namely, the state of men in fallen nature—that passage of Paul, 1 Timothy 2, establishes it. For there he clearly speaks of all already fallen, since he commands that prayer be made for all of them, as they now are, and for those for whom Christ offered himself as redeemer. And the Fathers cited above speak chiefly of this will, in expounding Paul's words in this way. The same is taken from St. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, chapter 2, and *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, chapter 9; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, book 4, chapter 71, where he adduces other passages of Scripture, and the Scholiast there gathers other passages of the Fathers, and I shall cite more in what follows. Finally, it is proved *a posteriori* from the universal redemption of Christ the Lord: for God, after the foreseen original sin, ordained Christ for the redemption of all men; and this ordination, or this universal means, was the effect of that universal will by which God willed, as far as depended on himself, the salvation of all men: therefore he had this will even after the foreseen original sin. The consequence is plain: the will of God, insofar as it preceded the absolute foreknowledge of original sin, did not of itself call for the redemption of all, and that earlier will remaining as it was, God could have refrained from sending a universal redeemer: therefore he had a new will, in our manner of understanding, of freeing all men from the fall, and, to that end, of giving a universal redeemer. How this will applies to all will be established from what follows.

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II
WHAT KIND OF WILL THIS WILL TO SAVE ALL MEN IS IN GOD, AND WHAT PROPER OBJECT IT HAS

1. It is certain that that will was not an absolute and efficacious decree of the divine will—called by some the will of simple good pleasure, by others the consequent will—because what God so wills is infallibly fulfilled. For of this will it is written: *The Lord has done whatsoever he has willed,* and: *Who shall resist his will?*—but it is plain that this will is not fulfilled in all men: therefore it cannot be such an absolute, or predefinitive, will.

2. *A certain opinion.* — Hence some have inferred that that will is not by a proper, formal act of willing existing in God, since God does not have an imperfect act of will, which is called a "velleity"; and a perfect and absolute act, as we have said, it is not: therefore it is not, properly, an act of willing. They say, then, that it is a will of sign, which is merely metaphorical, or interpretive—namely, that God behaves toward all men in such a way as if he had that act of will. So Cajetan thinks, on 1 Timothy 2, and Marsilius, *1 Sentences*, distinction 45. Others say that God does not have such a formal, proper act of will, terminating in itself at the happiness of all men, for the reason given—that God does not have such a will as would attain that effect: but a will that can be frustrated of its effect is imperfect, and cannot fall to God. They add, nevertheless, that God has the will of giving sufficient means, which is proper and formal in God, and from which God is denominated as willing the salvation of all. So think many Scholastics, on *1 Sentences*, distinctions 45 and 46. The reason is that that will has its effect, and is thus perfect in its kind, and therefore has a place in God, and is a virtual will of the end, at least in universal means and causes, such as original justice, the redemption of Christ, the Sacraments, the word of God, general aids, etc. And therefore God can rightly be said, by reason of this will, to will the salvation of all.

3. *The first assertion.* — I say, then, first, that God has in himself a proper and formal act, or affection, of will, by which he wills and desires the salvation of all men. This is proved, first, by an argument taken from the words of Paul cited, joined to the general rule of Scripture that its words are to be understood properly, where the matter or circumstance of the letter does not compel a metaphor—which especially holds when Scripture often speaks in this way and nowhere explains the metaphor, as is also found here, as has already been

shown, and will be made plainer still from what follows. Further, the Fathers cited above so think, especially Chrysostom, Homily 7 on 1 Timothy and Homily 1 on Ephesians, and Damascene, *On the Faith*, book 2, chapters 29 and 30. Finally, it is declared by reason: for a will called metaphorical always presupposes some proper one: therefore even if in the present case we admit a metaphorical will regarding the salvation of the reprobate, a proper will is not to be denied.

4. *It is proved by reason.* — I explain the antecedent: for a metaphorical will is called a will of sign, that is, some external sign, by which something that God wills is indicated; but this sign always presupposes in God some affection. As, for example, the precept of God is called a will of sign of God, because it signifies that God wills what he commands—which must be true according to some proper will, otherwise it would not be a true sign. That will, however, is not always efficacious regarding the very work that is commanded, but is either a complacency in the goodness of such a work, or a will of obliging to do it. And this is always found in all signs of the divine will. So here, then, if regarding the salvation of the reprobate there is some will of sign, or some sign of the divine will, since it must necessarily be a true sign, it indicates in God some true will, from which those signs proceed—signs which indicate to us that God, as far as depends on himself, wills the salvation of such men.

5. *The second assertion.* — I say, second: this will of God is not only about the means, or effects of grace, which are truly going to occur regarding these men, but also about eternal beatitude itself, even if they are not going to attain it; indeed, in our manner of understanding, it is occupied first with that, and then with the other things. This opinion, with these assertions set forth, is (I think) that of St. Thomas, part 1, question 19, article 6, reply to objection 1, and of Durandus, *1 Sentences*, distinction 47, question 1. This second proposition is proved, because God confers on these men gifts of grace, whatever they be, for this end: that through them they may attain eternal life, if they will, or as far as it lies on God's own part: therefore it is necessary that some intention of that end be supposed in God: but intention is a true will, which is occupied with the end itself: therefore the first antecedent is self-evident, and is frequently found in Scripture. The consequence is plain, both because acting for an end implies a relation to the end, which implies an origin from the intention of the end; and also because God gives these same men the principles and concurrences by which they can be condemned—indeed, in fact, while they misuse them, they are condemned—and yet he does not give these for that end, because he does not intend it: therefore, for God to give something for an end, it is not enough to

will that object which can lead a man to that term, but it is necessary that God intend such an end, to which the other object is referred.

6. *An evasion is forestalled.* — Nor is it enough to say that the very means of grace, by their own nature, tend to that end, so that, in conferring them, God may be said to give them for the sake of that end. First, indeed, because this manner of acting for an end is not that of an agent acting deliberately, and therefore is not to be attributed to God. Further, because there are many means which, not by their own nature, but by the will of God, are referred to that end—for example, the Passion of Christ, the institution of the Sacraments, and the like, which, had God so willed, could have been ordained only to the salvation of the predestined. Finally, because, as I touched on above, God could even have given faith and charity itself to men, that they might act rightly in this life, without the will of giving glory and without ordination to that end on God's part: therefore that special intention is necessary on God's part. This is included in the very fact that God willed to ordain human nature, in all its individuals, to the attainment of supernatural beatitude, nor did he desist from that intention on account of the sin of the first man supervening.

7. *Certain points worthy of note are considered.* — In order that this act be better understood, and the foundations of the other opinions be resolved, some points must be examined. The first is whether this act is free or necessary in God. For some theologians indicate that it is a necessary act, for they think that all that must be posited in God from this is that the beatitude of each man, apprehended not only as possible but also as future, cannot displease God, since it is good, nor can the divine will hold itself merely negatively, as it were suspended, regarding such an object, as they suppose: therefore it is altogether necessary that God will such an object. This act, moreover, can only be a simple complacency, since it is not an efficacious act: therefore it is a necessary act, since God necessarily has the cognition, or representation, of such an object. This opinion also follows from another principle—that God cannot have a free act regarding a created object unless, by force of that act, some change immediately results in that object; but from this act no change results in the object: therefore it is not a free act.

8. I, however, judge such an act to be free in God. This opinion is (I think) that of the theologians and Fathers whom I cited in the preceding chapter. For they do not gather this will in God from some natural necessity, but from revelation and the manner of speaking of Scripture, and from the effects, which, just as they freely occur, likewise show a free will of God. Further, if this will were necessary, it would not be a special benefit of God, nor would man be

obliged to give thanks to God for this love which he had toward him in ordaining him to supernatural beatitude. Indeed, it would further follow that God could not have created man without ordaining him to supernatural beatitude—which, I suppose from the treatise on grace, is false. The implication is plain, because in creating him God could not but have that act of complacency regarding his beatitude, apprehended as possible, even if it were never going to exist, as is plain from the opinion stated and applying its reasoning to this case; but by this will alone is God said to ordain man to that end, for if another will is required, that one is free, and that is the one we are treating of. A similar argument is that, according to that opinion, God would not will the beatitude of the reprobate any more than that of a demon, because even Lucifer's beatitude, apprehended either as possible, or (which comes to the same) as possibly existing, abstracting from the question of whether it is to be future, does not displease God, since it is of itself good: therefore it pleases him equally—and similar examples could be multiplied. The reason *a posteriori* is that, whatever may be the case regarding that necessary simple complacency, whether it is truly asserted or not, beyond it there is a necessary act by which God truly intends such an end for this man. But this act cannot be necessary for God, for, by force of it, something is brought about *ad extra*, if the creature does not place an impediment: but no act of the will that brings in, of itself, an operation *ad extra* can be necessary for God, as is self-evident, and this argument will be further established from the following question.

9. *A second difficulty. — The earlier opinion.* — Second, it can be doubted whether this will in God is only a simple complacency, or also an act by way of pursuit. For Gregory and other theologians above make use of this distinction, and it can serve to explain the matter. For in the will an act can be understood by which the goodness of a thing pleases, whether known as possible or as existing, yet in such a way that the one who finds complacency in it does not intend to bring it about, or procure it; and such is called a simple complacency. But when the will somehow proposes to bring that thing about, or to obtain it, it is said to pursue the thing by such an act; and such are intention and the remaining acts that follow from it. Some, then, indicate that this will of God is only in the former way, because if it were of itself ordered to the work, it would either be absolute, and so would always have its effect, or it would be conditional, and so would not be, at present, a true will, but would then be future, when the condition were posited—as when someone says, "If Peter were to come, I would do this," he does nothing now, but, the condition being posited, the action would have to be posited.

10. *The assertion. — It is confirmed by reason. — It is further confirmed.* — Nevertheless, I assert that such a will is by way of pursuit, and, as far as it is in itself, induces operation. This is proved, because every intention of an end is an act of this kind, for, once it is posited, it is necessary that the will choose the means and execute them, as far as the intention requires—and this is for the act to be of a pursuing nature: but this act of the divine will is a true intention, as has been said: therefore [the conclusion follows]. And it can be made clear from the difference between man as he is now created and as he would be created in pure nature. For then in God there could be understood that simple natural complacency: but God, by force of it, would confer no supernatural means upon man so created; indeed, he could have the absolute purpose of giving nothing of this kind. But now he so wills that end for men that, by force of this will, he necessarily gives some supernatural means, as will be established more fully below: therefore such a will is not a pure complacency, but a pursuit somehow ordered to the bringing about of the thing. It is confirmed and made clear thus: for if in God there is some simple complacency, which does not presuppose the knowledge of vision of a thing already existing, or future, it is only of a possible thing. For although it is said to be of a thing apprehended as existing, this in reality is only insofar as its very existence is apprehended as possible, and so it is represented to God only through the knowledge of simple intelligence. Hence, by force of that complacency, such a thing is not ordered toward existing, and therefore such a complacency can perhaps be a necessary act. But the will of which we are now treating is not so disposed; rather, by it God wills, or, as Chrysostom says, "desires," that such a man's beatitude should be: and therefore, as far as it lies on God's part, such a good is ordered toward existing: therefore this act has more in it than simple complacency.

11. *The argument to the contrary is answered.* — Hence, to the argument to the contrary, I respond that that will is an act efficacious in some respect, insofar as it obligates God (so to speak) to posit the means that pertain to himself; it is not, however, an altogether absolute act, but includes a condition in its object, as theologians commonly teach—indeed even the saints: Ambrose, Chrysostom, and others, on 1 Timothy 2, say that God wills to save man if man will it, or, otherwise, from Chrysostom on Romans 9, that *God wills, as far as it lies on himself.* Nor does it follow that that act is not, at present, a true will, because the condition is not placed on the part of the subject—the way a condition normally suspends an act—but is placed on the part of the object, to limit it. For although God now wills that such an object exist, he does not will it in every manner, nor without that limitation, but only as far as the sufficient providence of God

himself can require. Whether that will should be called a will of good pleasure or not is a question of manner of speaking; for this term is taken by some for God's absolute and efficacious purpose, in which sense it is plain that it is not a will of good pleasure. More broadly, however, and quite properly, according to the force of the word, "good pleasure" can be said of whatever pleases God and which he desires to come about, as far as it lies on himself. In this way, then, that will is contained among the wills of good pleasure, and thus it is not necessary that every will of good pleasure have its effect—an absolute one always does, but a conditional one only when the condition is fulfilled. Nor does it follow that this will is imperfect, because it is not in God from an inability to have a greater will, if he willed; but from liberty—and therefore it rather pertains to God's perfection that he can will in this way.

12. *A final difficulty arises.* — Finally, it can be asked whether this will is equal with respect to all those in whom it does not have its effect. For the Fathers cited seem to speak in this way, and therefore they compare God to the sun, which of itself is equally ready to illuminate all, as may be seen in St. Ephrem, at the beginning of his works. They also compare him to a physician, who is ready to cure all (Ambrose, on 1 Timothy 2). On the contrary, however, the effects, or means, given to these men are not equal, as experience shows: but it was said above that a difference in the choice of means indicates a diversity of intention, since they preserve a proportion between themselves.

13. *The resolution of the question.* — I respond that the matter is uncertain, and either side can easily be defended. For in the first place, that equality of which the saints speak is not to be understood simply, as though they spoke absolutely of all men, but only insofar as God, as far as is in himself, excludes no one from the Kingdom, by an antecedent will. And further, within that mode of willing under condition, there is no contradiction in God's willing, as far as is in himself, to give one person ten degrees of glory, another a hundred, and so on. This indeed seems likely in the case of the reprobate angels, on the supposition of the common opinion that God gave them grace in proportion to their natural endowments: for from this it is probably inferred that he ordained them to glory with the same proportion, and so it is also commonly believed that unequal seats were prepared for them, to which predestined men were finally taken up. In the case of men, however, the reasoning is not entirely the same, because they do not have that inequality in nature, nor does God observe such a proportion in giving them grace. Nor does the reason touched on above, concerning the inequality of means among these men, compel this conclusion either, because that inequality could have arisen from other causes: for perhaps many aids are

given to the reprobate on the occasion of the predestined, rather than directly and of themselves for their own sake. Perhaps, then, God of himself willed to save these indifferently, although (as I have said) the other view can also easily be defended.

CHAPTER III
WHETHER GOD PROVIDED ALL NON-ELECT ADULTS WITH SUFFICIENT MEANS FOR ATTAINING ETERNAL SALVATION

1. *The reason for doubting.* — The reason for the difficulty is that what God from eternity proposes to do himself in time must come about with effect: but in time sufficient grace is not given to all the non-elect, since it can be given by God alone: therefore it is a sign that it was not provided from eternity for all. The consequence is evident. The minor is established by induction, because neither is sufficient grace given to the reprobate, once justified, to persevere in justice up to death, nor is the spirit of repentance given to all faithful sinners that they may be justified, nor are infidels supernaturally illumined in a manner sufficient, indeed necessary, for salvation. The major is also proved, because what God provides to be done through second causes can be impeded by God himself permitting it: but what is to be done by God himself could be impeded by no one, if he himself had decreed and provided to give it: therefore it is a sign that he did not provide what he does not give.

2. *The assertion.* — Nevertheless it must be said absolutely that God provided all these men with means in some way sufficient, that they might be able to attain salvation. This is the common opinion of the theologians I cited in the second chapter, both for our position and for the contrary one; and the conclusion is understood of all those fallen in Adam, for there is no difficulty about the earlier state. This is proved, first, because Scripture speaks of these men whenever it has these universal propositions without exception: *God enlightens every man coming into this world* (John 1)—which, although understood by some of the natural light of reason, must really be understood of the light of grace and faith, as Jansenius, Toletus, and Maldonatus there teach, from the common opinion of the Fathers, and as is sufficiently plain from the matter and context. This is also supported by that text of Christ the Lord, Matthew 11: *Come to me, all you who labor*, etc.; and that of 2 Peter 3: *Not willing that any should perish.* Wisdom, chapters 12, 13, and 14, may also be seen, where this truth is conveyed in various ways and words.

3. Second, Prosper, from these and other passages, expressly proves this truth, *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, book 2, from the beginning, and especially chapter 8 (otherwise 20) and following. The same is found in his response to the objections of the Gauls, response 8, and to the Vincentian objections, responses 2 and 7—a work usually attributed to Augustine under the title *To the Articles Imputed to Him*. The same Augustine also favors this, in *On Free Will*, book 3, saying that it is imputed to men that *they spurn God willing to heal them*—which he confirms, *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 67. Chrysostom also taught it, Homily 55 on Genesis and Homily 7 on John; Cyril, *On John*, book 4, chapter 11; and Basil most excellently, in the Long Rules, rule 2. Much else to confirm this can be drawn from Scripture and the Fathers from Cardinal Bellarmine, *On Grace*, book 2, chapter 5.

4. Third, I show this from this principle: *God deserts no one unless first deserted by him*—which is Augustine's, *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 26. Prosper agrees in this, response 7 to Vincent, and Fulgentius, *To Monimus*, book 1, chapter 13; and finally the Council of Trent proved it, session 6, chapters 11 and 13—although the Council speaks only of the justified, since it is more certain of them. Other Fathers speak generally, and the statement must be accommodated, with due proportion, to each state, or order, of men, as I shall declare below. Now from that absolute statement I conclude as follows: if God had, of himself, denied sufficient aid to some men, he would certainly have deserted them before being deserted by them, since there is no greater desertion in this life than the denial of sufficient aid: but if God wills this of himself, he does not wait for a cause on man's part: therefore man does not first desert God. Indeed, it cannot truly even be said that man deserts God: for in order that man truly desert God, sufficient aid must be presupposed. Finally, this can be confirmed by the argument made above from the universal redemption of Christ the Lord, which, along with other matters, and the manner of this sufficiency, I shall explain better, satisfying the reason for doubting set down at the beginning, whereby this truth will also be confirmed.

5. *Three difficulties are touched on in the argument made.* — Three difficulties, then, are touched on in that argument. The first concerns the reprobate once justified, since they are not given the gift of perseverance: for whoever receives this gift perseveres, on the testimony of Augustine, in the whole book *On the Gift of Perseverance* and *On Rebuke and Grace*: but these do not persevere: therefore they do not receive this gift: therefore they lack a means necessary for salvation, since such is that gift, for without it no one is saved, nor can be saved, as Augustine holds, *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 12, and the

Council of Trent, session 6: therefore these neither receive the power nor the sufficient aid for obtaining salvation.

6. *The first difficulty is answered.* — To this difficulty we grant, first, that a special aid of God, called the gift of perseverance by the Council of Trent (session 6, canon 22) and the Council of Orange (canons 10 and 17), is necessary for persevering in grace. We then say that this gift is, on God's part, prepared for all the just, if they do what they can with the aid they already have, and must do, in order to attain it. And so, even in this respect, all have ready a sufficient aid for salvation. The Council of Trent taught this plainly, session 6, chapter 13. And it follows from the principle stated, which holds most especially in just men, since they are not deserted by God, according to that text of Psalm 36: *The Lord loves judgment, and will not abandon his saints*; and 2 Chronicles 15: *If you seek him, you will find him; but if you abandon him, he will abandon you.* And the reason is manifest, because to persevere is nothing other than to keep the commandments and not sin: but the just person always has sufficient aid for not sinning, otherwise it would not be imputed to him.

7. *Objection. — It is resolved.* — You will say that he indeed has sufficient aid for avoiding individual sins, but not for the whole collection of them over a long time, which is necessary for perseverance. I respond, first, that perseverance for a very brief time can suffice for eternal life, as when justification occurs at the end of life. Further, the just person receives aid to avoid, say, the first sin, in such a way that, if he then does what is in him, and prays to God, he receives a greater aid for continuing his perseverance; and if he always prays, he will likewise always find a greater aid ready, and so it is always in his power to obtain this aid, even for the whole collection of sins and for a long time. Indeed, even the predestined often obtain this gift in execution in the manner just described, although sometimes one who would freely [persevere] is also forestalled by God, as is established from the *Summa*, I-II, question 114, last article, where this matter is treated more fully, and on which we have said something, book 3, *On Aids*, chapter 11.

8. *A second difficulty.* — The second difficulty concerns reprobate sinners, even believers, who in this life are so abandoned that they cannot be converted —as Augustine speaks of Pharaoh, in the unfinished commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, proposition 62, where he says that his impenitence was so great that disobedience was no longer imputed to him. The same, by the same reasoning, would have to be said of all the blinded and hardened, and consequently of all the reprobate, at least for some final period of life. Because sufficient aid for the conversion of a sinner begins from the excitation of grace:

but this excitation is not always given, but at certain times: therefore some final one is given; therefore, after it, the sinner remains without sufficient aid for the whole of the remaining time of his life.

9. *This difficulty is resolved.* — This difficulty is briefly resolved, because its chief part has been treated at length in the treatise on penance. I say, then, first, that all faithful sinners have, for some time in this life, an aid so sufficient for justification, and consequently for salvation, that it depends only on them that they not attain salvation; and this is, strictly speaking, enough for it to be truly said that God wills to save them, and to provide them with the means necessary for salvation. Further, I say that even for the whole of this life the reprobate have, in some way, this sufficient aid, because, although they do not actually receive it in themselves for every instant, or every part of the time, God, on his part, is ready to give it through the ordinary and suitable means of his providence—which is enough, as I have said at length in the volume on Penance.

10. *The last part of this same difficulty is resolved.* — Hence, as to the last part of the difficulty proposed, which proceeded against this, it must be granted that some final excitation is given in this life—something common, generally, to both the reprobate and the predestined. Hence the reprobate cannot, on this account, complain of insufficiency of aid, for sometimes—indeed often—they have sufficient aid, and it is their own fault if they resist it. For it pertains only to God's providence to give such a calling at opportune times. Hence, just as it happens, in the course of life, that between a first and a second excitation no opportunity occurs, so too at the end of life, from that instant in which the final excitation is given, up to the instant of death, an opportune occasion of calling may not occur. And perhaps, because God foresaw this, he did not therefore determine to give another calling, while otherwise being, of himself, ready to call at every opportune occasion; and hence it is that that excitation was the final one.

11. And in much the same way must be said about the other part, which pertains especially to hardened and blinded men. For on God's part sufficient aid at the opportune time is denied to no one absolutely, no impediment being placed: it is man who, by resisting, becomes incapable of attaining salvation, because he wills it so—as Augustine often says, especially in *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 12 and following. And so here too it holds true that they are not deserted by God except because they first desert God—which must always be understood of an actual desertion, and on the supposition of a voluntary impediment, not, however, of an utter desertion on God's part, as though God had determined either not to call certain men even at the opportune time, or not

to help them to avoid sinning and to avoid placing an impediment, if they themselves should will it. For in this way God deserts no one in this life, as we piously believe—a matter treated at length in the cited place on Penance.

12. *A third difficulty.* — The third difficulty concerns infidels never called to the faith. For there are many of this kind, for whom God does not seem to have provided a manner, or ordinary way, of obtaining a supernatural calling, since they themselves cannot prepare themselves for it, nor is it extrinsically offered, because no preacher has been sent to them: *How shall they hear without a preacher?* No calling, then, has been provided for them according to the ordinary law; but without a calling they cannot be saved: therefore sufficient provision for salvation has not been made for them.

13. *There are various manners of speaking on this difficulty. — The reason.* — On this difficulty there are various manners of speaking. Some think that all these never receive supernatural calling, or illumination, in themselves, and accordingly that all of them, considered in particular with the circumstances that occur, cannot believe, on account of impediments. Nevertheless, they hold that God, by an antecedent will, willed the salvation of all of them, and provided general and, of itself, sufficient remedies for them. And if, perhaps, these cannot be applied in particular, God is not bound to come to their aid in a miraculous way; for it would be a miracle either if faith were revealed without the ministry of man, Paul saying, Romans 10: *How shall they hear without a preacher?*—or if some man were brought there in an extraordinary and miraculous way. This opinion can be founded on Augustine, *Against Julian*, book 4, chapter 8, and other passages, in which, as regards this matter, he places infants and adults on an equal footing—but it is plain that God has not provided otherwise for many infants, as we shall see in the next chapter. Prosper holds the same view, *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, book 1, chapter 13, and book 2, through many chapters. Nor does St. Thomas dissent, *Summa* II-II, question 2, article 5, ad 1, where he says that some are deprived of the aid, or calling, to faith on account of the impediment of sin, and sometimes on account of original sin alone. The reason, finally, is that from the general statements of Scripture, *God enlightens every man*, and similar texts, nothing more is gathered than that God provides this to all through general causes. Hence it is understood both of infants and of adults, as Maldonatus noted on those words, John 1. Nor are other, more specific promises found made for these adults.

14. *This opinion is rejected.* — This opinion contains no error, nor rashness; nevertheless it does not satisfy me, both because theologians more frequently think otherwise, and also because it is too rigorous: for Scripture signifies more

about divine providence regarding adult men. For since they, through their own acts, can be both saved and condemned, it seems to belong to God's providence that he help individuals, not only in general, but also in particular, if they themselves do not place impediments.

15. *A second opinion.* — There is, then, a second opinion, extremely contrary, that there is no man using reason who is not at some time illumined in this life, in such a way that, by force of such an interior calling, he can, if he will, immediately believe with a faith sufficient for salvation, and indeed supernatural, both as to the material and the formal object. This opinion seems able to be drawn from the Fathers cited at the beginning of this chapter, for they have statements that seem probably to suggest this. And the reason is that it is not repugnant—indeed it seems easily able to come about—through the ministry of the angels whom God gave as guardians of such men, however infidel, in regard to their beatitude: therefore it is to be believed that it happens in this way.

16. *It is not admitted.* — This opinion carries a certain appearance of piety, but it cannot be sufficiently founded, nor easily believed. For I suppose that faith in some supernatural object is necessary for salvation. But it seems clear and certain that there are many men to whom such an object is not revealed in this life, as Scripture indicates of many heathen nations, and as men experience. Nor can it be said that they receive such a revelation, even though they afterward entirely forget it: because, although a man can be ignorant of the interior manner of operation in his acts—namely, whether it is natural or supernatural—he cannot, nevertheless, be ignorant of the objects proposed and apprehended, at least for the time during which they are actually proposed to him. Hence he could also retain them in memory, even though he did not give them his assent; otherwise such a revelation would be useless: for if it is forgotten, it would do little or nothing toward faith, and much less could it bring about an obligation.

17. *Some explain this opinion.* — Some, then, explain this opinion by saying that all infidels receive an interior calling of grace, that they may be able to believe supernaturally, at least those things which can naturally be known about God—as that God exists and is to be worshiped. Not that that faith suffices for salvation, but because, if a man receives it, he disposes himself, through it, to be illumined also regarding supernatural objects, and so is finally justified. This opinion is usually attributed to St. Thomas, but his opinion is otherwise, as I shall presently relate. It can, however, be attributed to Prosper, *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, book 1, chapter 5, insofar as he says: *These Gentiles received prophetic voices and legal precepts in the service and testimony of the*

elements—alluding to that text of Paul, Acts 14: *For he did not leave himself without testimony*—signifying that God made use of these creatures not only to bestow natural knowledge, but also to elevate man to a supernatural knowledge of those same things which can be known through creatures—as some also expound chapter 2 of the Epistle to the Romans.

18. *Even thus explained, this opinion is not approved.* — But this opinion too, although perhaps probable, is for me difficult to believe, both because I scarcely think it can be understood that someone is elevated to believe supernaturally some object, otherwise natural, unless he also receives a supernatural revelation of that same object; and also because many heathen are found who were utterly ignorant of everything, even of those things which can be naturally known of God, such that they had neither apprehension nor conception of them.

19. *The assertion.* — It must be said, then, that, although a man cannot, by his own powers, prepare himself for the divine calling, he can nonetheless place an impediment to it by sinning, and this is the cause why many infidels do not actually receive the supernatural calling—that is, one proximately sufficient for an act of supernatural faith. Nevertheless, God, as far as is in himself, is ready to call and illumine all. Hence whoever does not place an impediment will in fact be illumined, or called, either externally, through men—God so disposing human affairs that this can happen without a miracle, through another kind of gratuitous providence—or certainly interiorly, through the ministry of angels, which is not altogether miraculous, but pertains to supernatural providence, as is taken from Augustine, *To Simplician*, book 1, question 2. In this way, then, these men receive sufficient aid from God, at least by an antecedent will.

20. But if someone says that this very thing—namely, not placing an impediment—is not in the power of these men, it must be answered that, for this very thing, they are helped by God through some providence of grace, by which, although they are not elevated to operate something above nature, they are at least helped not to violate the law of nature; and that, by altogether resisting this grace, they become incapable of a higher one—whereas, if they made use of it, although they would not merit a supernatural calling, nor dispose themselves to it, they would at least not impede it, and so, at the opportune time, a sufficient calling would be given to them. And this opinion, thus explained, is that of St. Thomas, *On Truth*, question 14, article 11, ad 5, and is taken from *Against the Gentiles*, book 3, chapter 159, and *Summa* I-II, question 89, article 6; Alensis, part 3, question 69, member 3, article 1; Adrian, Quodlibet 4, article 1; and from other theologians cited in book two, if taken in

a sound sense. This is also the opinion of St. Prosper, in his book *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, especially chapter 8 (otherwise 20) and following. It is also gathered from the passages of Scripture cited above, and from the fact that Paul always attributes the ignorance of the Gentiles to their own fault, as in Ephesians 4: *Estranged from the way of God through the ignorance that is in them, on account of the blindness of their heart.* The only objection here could be that it follows that the ignorance of faith is not invincible in all these cases—but on this, elsewhere. For now, the inference must briefly be denied, because, although they in fact place the impediment, they are nonetheless ignorant of this very fact —namely, that this is an impediment—and therefore they do not sin specifically in this. And in this way, in these men too, that principle is preserved, that they are not deserted by God except because they themselves desert God.

CHAPTER IV
WHETHER GOD HAS PROVIDED ALL INFANTS, WHO IN THIS LIFE DO NOT ATTAIN THE USE OF REASON, WITH SUFFICIENT MEANS FOR SALVATION

1. *The reason for doubting.* — Concerning infants there is a peculiar difficulty, on account of those who seem so destitute of the remedy of salvation that it cannot be applied to them by human industry or diligence. This happens, in the first place, to all those who die in the maternal womb; then to those who are born in such circumstances and condition that they die before water, for instance, can be found, or a minister called who knows how to baptize. Finally, the same reasoning holds of all who, through no one's fault, die by some chance without the Sacrament. Concerning these, the argument can be formed thus: all these lack the remedy, and not on account of their own will, since they are not capable of it, nor on account of the will of a parent or other person, since there was not a will there but human powerlessness, since, as we suppose, no fault or negligence of a parent or another intervened: therefore that effect can be referred to nothing but the will of God, who so disposed matters that such a remedy could not be applied to such an infant—as Augustine holds, *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 8, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 12, and *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 12 as well: therefore it must simply be confessed that God in no way provided these little ones with a sufficient remedy.

2. This is confirmed by comparison with adults. For if God were to deny all aid for salvation to an adult man who places no impediment, we would plainly say that, by his sole will, he does not give it, and accordingly that he did not

provide him with sufficient means; but now, because he denies it only to one who places an impediment, we say that, on his part, he gives to all, and has provided for all: but those little ones do not place an impediment by their own will, as is plain, nor by the will of their parents, since it is not in their will—indeed, often, while the parents do all they can, the means of applying the remedy is lacking—therefore this cannot be attributed to human will, but to the divine will, which of itself did not will to provide them with a sufficient remedy against original sin, solely on account of the malice of original sin.

3. On account of these things, Gregory, *1 Sentences*, distinction 46, question 1, taught absolutely that God, positively and of himself, did not will to save more infants, so as to provide them with a sufficient remedy against original sin. Driedo inclines to the same opinion, *On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race*, treatise 5, chapter 3. St. Thomas, *4 Sentences*, distinction 9, question 1, ad 1, and Gabriel, distinction 4, question 2, article 3, doubt 2, and Richard, *1 Sentences*, distinction 46, article 7, and Soto, *On Nature and Grace*, book 2, chapter 10, at the end, are also cited for the same opinion. But in fact they do not say this; rather, they suppose the opposite, as I shall presently say. This opinion, indeed, can be confirmed thus: although God instituted the general remedy of baptism, if nevertheless God so disposed matters that, although the parents do what they can, they cannot apply baptism, and God confers no special aid for this purpose, it cannot be said that God provided those little ones with a sufficient remedy, since baptism is a remedy only as something to be applied, and, as such, is impossible, since the application is impossible: therefore it cannot be said that such little ones had sufficient aid, since they had it neither in themselves nor in their parents.

4. *The assertion.* — But although perhaps a great part of this controversy is in the manner of speaking, I think it must simply be said that God, on his own part, willed eternal salvation for these infants, and accordingly provided all of them, without any exception, with means in some way of themselves sufficient for eternal salvation. I think this is the more common opinion of theologians, which I explain as follows. For the first part of it pertains to that other general dogma treated above, *God wills all men to be saved*, under which all infants are included by theologians by the very fact that they are not excepted: thus St. Thomas, Scotus, and others cited above write of this, and commonly the rest, on *4 Sentences*, distinctions 4 and 6, and on *1 Sentences*, questions 45 and 46. In particular, regarding infants, Bellarmine speaks thus, *On Grace*, book 2, chapter 5, near the end, and Vega, *On the Council of Trent*, book 5, chapter 6, near the end. And this seems to be the express opinion of Prosper, *On the Calling of the*

Gentiles, book 2, chapter 8 (otherwise 32). This is grounded chiefly on that testimony of Paul, *God wills all men to be saved*, with everything that has been handed down above concerning it and similar texts.

5. *An evasion. — It is resolved.* — Some respond that those words of Paul are to be limited to adults, because Paul immediately adds, *and to come to the knowledge of truth*, which can apply only to adults. But this is of no weight: for Augustine, *Against Julian*, book 4, says even of infants who are justified and saved that they *come into the Kingdom of God, where the knowledge of truth is certain.* And in other places he often teaches that baptized infants *believe by habit*, although they do not believe by act: therefore they can in the same way be said to come to the knowledge of truth. Nor does the word "to come" stand in the way, which seems to signify a voluntary acceptance of faith, because infants too are said to come through the will of their parents, according to the Church's manner of speaking. Thus the later words do not limit the earlier ones, which, in strictness and propriety, are universal. And besides, the considerations made above extend to infants too—namely, that when Paul says prayer must be made for all, or that Christ is the redeemer of all, he includes infants under that distribution. And so the commentators understood that passage, and Augustine, above: *Are not infants men*, he says, *so that what was said does not pertain to them—'he wills all men to be saved'*?

6. *The response.* — From this principle, then, and from the first part of the assertion, we conclude the second. For whoever wills the end, if he acts prudently, also wills sufficient means to the end, at least in the manner in which he wills the end; otherwise, either formally or virtually, he would both will and not will. Therefore, if God of himself willed for all infants the end of eternal beatitude, he also willed, and prepared, sufficient means, as far as depends on himself. Some respond that this assumption is true of an efficacious and absolute intention of the end, but not of a will which is only a simple complacency, such as that will by which God wills all to be saved. The assumption is proved, because when someone, in a shipwreck, from fear of death, throws merchandise into the sea, he indeed has a simple affection of not throwing it overboard, which we are accustomed to express in these words, "I would rather not throw it overboard," and yet he applies no means toward not throwing it overboard, but rather is wholly occupied in throwing the merchandise overboard: therefore it is a sign that a simple affection does not entail the application of means: therefore, although God by a simple affection wills the eternal salvation of these infants, it is not rightly inferred from this that he gives them sufficient means to that same salvation; indeed, with that prior

affection there stands an efficacious and absolute will of not applying the necessary means, as the example adduced clearly shows.

7. *It is rejected.* — This response, however, is foreign to the mind of the ancient theologians: for all of them think that those wills are connected with one another, and therefore almost all infer the latter from the former, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Gregory, indeed, who dared to deny the latter, consequently also denied the former. And this is shown, first, by reason: for if that will which God has concerning the salvation of these infants does not, of itself, entail the conferring, or offering, of sufficient means, then God would not will the salvation of these infants, fallen in original sin, any more than he would have willed to save the evil angels after their fall into sin, since even in that object—namely, in the sanctification and glorification of those angels—he can simply find complacency, because, considered in itself, it is something most excellent. Although, then, he willed to apply no means to that effect, he could have that simple complacency: therefore the reasoning is the same. A similar argument is that one could, in the same way, say that God wills the hypostatic union of all natures, of men and angels, because, if a mere affection or complacency so simple as to neither entail means nor incline in any way toward the work, but only to regard the goodness or beauty of the object in itself, suffices for the truth of such a statement, then surely, with much greater reason, God finds complacency in that universal object of the hypostatic union, and is simply moved toward it, more than toward the universal salvation of all infants.

8. *The argument to the contrary is answered.* — Moreover, in that response, and in the example adduced in it, a certain equivocation lies hidden, and a transition is made from a simple and conditional will of giving means, as far as is on God's part, to an absolute and efficacious will. For we do not say that God absolutely and efficaciously wills to give, with effect, to all these infants, all the means proximately sufficient for salvation, but only that he is ready, as far as is in himself, to give them, and consequently that he wills this, at least by a simple affection and a will including a condition. And we say that only this will necessarily follows from the prior will of saving all, even though an efficacious will of giving the means does not follow, as is self-evident. And the example adduced proves only this last point.

9. In which it must also be considered that, in that imperfect will of throwing the merchandise overboard, which is called a "velleity," or simple affection, a condition is included formally, or virtually—on account of which it is also called a conditional will, since its object is this: "I will not throw the merchandise overboard, if I can escape the danger with it." Under this aspect,

then, that will has the character of an intention—not an absolute and efficacious one, but with that limitation, "if I can be saved." And so, by force of that intention, the means which can serve that end under the same condition are applied: for whoever has that affection procures, in every way he can, to escape the danger while retaining the merchandise. It does not, however, belong to that intention to apply means for not throwing the merchandise overboard at the risk of his own safety and of the ship, because that affection does not extend with such perfection to that end. But at most there is inferred, from that intention, a certain preparation of mind for applying those means and for resisting the throwing overboard, should the danger cease, so that the condition might be fulfilled. This consideration holds, and is most true, in every similar effect that concerns an object simply possible, and which, of itself, can be obtained through means.

10. In this manner, then, must one philosophize about that simple affection of the divine will regarding the eternal salvation of these infants, for it has the character of a certain intention of that end, insofar as it can be obtained through means. It is not, however, an absolute intention, but one including some condition, which we express in these words: *I will, as far as is in me, or on my part.* Under this condition, that will is efficacious, or has the power of efficacy, when the condition is fulfilled, since a conditional will, the condition being fulfilled, passes into an absolute one. Hence it happens that that will necessarily produces two things: one is that, if there are things necessary for salvation which depend on God alone, and which are accommodated to the capacity of infants, so that they can in some way be conferred on them, these are necessarily offered to them, and conferred as far as they themselves are capable. Thus Christ died for them, and offered his redemption for them equally as for the others. Likewise, he instituted baptism for them, and conferred it as far as is in himself, and so for the other means of this kind. And the reason is that in these means the condition, "as far as is in God," is fulfilled, since they depend on him alone: therefore, with respect to them, that will passes into an absolute and efficacious one.

11. The other thing this will produces is that, in those means which depend on second causes—such as the application of baptism, and the like—God, by force of that will which is supposed in this, cannot, by a special or direct providence, impede that application or execution of such means; otherwise he would already be acting against that condition, "as far as is in himself." Hence, by force of this effect, he is rather compelled (so to speak) to offer, as far as is in himself, the ordinary aid or concurrence necessary, on his part, for such

application. And this is enough for it to be said that he wills, of himself, to provide these means too, at least by an antecedent and simple will, proportioned to the intention of the end. He is not, however, compelled, by force of that affection regarding the end, to change the order of other causes, so that such means are applied with effect, because this would exceed the limitation of that affection and the condition included in its object.

12. And indeed Paul, not obscurely, confirms the first part of this discourse, when, immediately after those words, he adds: *For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all of us*—as if he were saying: he gave himself in redemption for all because he wills all to be saved. Hence the argument made above in a similar case is also concluded: Christ redeemed these infants sufficiently: therefore he also offered his death for them, which, in its kind, is a remedy of itself sufficient for salvation, and through it he merited for them, as far as is in himself, the remaining sufficient means by which salvation is usually applied.

13. *An evasion. — It is rejected.* — Some respond that Christ is called the redeemer of these infants not because he offered his Passion for them, but because the price of the Passion was of itself sufficient even for them, and their cause was common with that of other men. But this is not enough for Christ to be truly and properly called their redeemer, even as to sufficiency—which is contrary to the common opinion of theologians. Prosper expressly teaches this, in his response to the first objection of Vincent, and to the ninth of the Gauls, and it is taken from 1 John 2: *He is the propitiation for our sins—and not for our sins only, but also for those of the whole world*; and 2 Corinthians 5: *God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself*; and Romans 5: *As through the offense of one unto all men unto condemnation, so also through the justice of one unto all men unto justification of life.* The implication is plain, because it is not enough for the price to be sufficient unless it is offered: for the value of Christ's Passion was sufficient even for the demons, and Christ was not therefore their redeemer even as to sufficiency. And it would matter little that the cause be common, if the offering of the price had not been common for all. As if a thousand men were captives for the same cause, and some rich man, able to redeem them all, offered the price for only five hundred, and was unwilling in any way to free the others, he would not be called their redeemer, even as to sufficiency. Indeed, there would then be a clear exception and limitation, and a purely voluntary one.

14. They respond that Christ, indeed, by a simple affection desired that his merits should benefit these infants too, but that the Father did not accept or

ordain this. But this is not rightly said. First, because the divine will of God willed the salvation and redemption of all no less than Christ did by his human will, according to John 3: *So God loved the world*, and 1 Timothy 4: *God is the Savior of all*—as to sufficiency, *especially of the faithful*, as to efficacy. Hence, if Christ had that will, as he indeed had, he conformed himself in it to the divine will, by which he had received the office of universal Redeemer—an office which he carried out through that general offering. Hence he offered his Passion not only for those infants who lived after the coming of Christ himself, as some hold, but also for all who existed from the beginning of the world, since he was the universal redeemer of all, and that offering was necessary for redemption, as has been said. Nor does it matter that the fruit of the Passion could not be applied to them earlier, for it is enough that, in their own times, salvation was prepared for them on account of Christ, as far as is on God's part, and on account of the universal remedies which were instituted for this purpose—in which the reasoning is much the same as for adults who had been condemned in earlier times. It is sufficiently established, then, that general remedies necessary for salvation, which depend solely on the will and institution of God and of Christ, have been given to all infants.

15. The other part, concerning the means which depend on second causes, and are applied through them, has been sufficiently declared above. It contains two parts: one is that God did not have an efficacious and absolute will to give such means, which is evident from the effects themselves, and is best proved by the arguments made at the beginning. This, however, does not bear on the present matter, because from an intention of the end that is merely antecedent and inefficacious such a will of the means does not follow. The other part is that God, by a similar antecedent will, and as far as is on his part, desired that such means be applied even to these infants—not, indeed, in every possible way, for this would pertain rather to an efficacious will, but through ordinary causes, for this suffices for God's antecedent will, as a general provider. This, then, suffices for it to be said that God provided sufficient remedies even for these infants, and on his part placed no impediment for anyone, although he permitted it in many cases, where he foresaw, from other causes, that it would occur. This will become plainer still by responding to the objections made at the beginning.

16. The first concerned infants who die in the womb, on account of which Cajetan judged that such infants might be saved without baptism, through the prayers of their parents, or by some other remedy. And Gabriel and others indicate that this can be hoped for from divine mercy. It is certain, nevertheless, that they are not saved according to the law, nor have any other remedy: and this

is what St. Thomas, Richard, and, at length, Soto and Vega teach. The author here adds that they are not deprived of every remedy, both because they could be saved by the baptism of blood, if the mother were killed on account of Christ, and also because the parents can obtain from God, by prayers, that they come into this light before they die. I say, however, that it is enough that God willed baptism to be instituted in such a way that, by whatever means it is applied to them (whether the mother's womb be opened rightfully or wrongfully, she living or after her death, or by any other case whatever), it would benefit them, and that he ordained causes in which there was, of itself, a power sufficient for this effect. For although in particular cases it happens to be impeded, it does not pertain to general providence to alter their course, which (as I said) is enough for the antecedent will of God. The same must be said of any other case in which the application of baptism is morally, or in a human manner, impossible: for that impediment, as such, always proceeds from divine permission, not from a direct ordinance—a permission which presupposes foreknowledge, and adds a will not to remove those impediments, but to order them to higher ends of providence. And this alone is what Augustine says in the passages cited.

THE END OF BOOK FOUR

BOOK FIVE
ON REPROBATION

Since reprobation and predestination are opposed to one another in their own way, and in that opposition reprobation is compared to predestination as privation to habit, from what we have said about predestination it will be easy to dispatch briefly everything that pertains to reprobation, because privation is readily known from the habit, and one of a pair of opposites is readily known through the other. And so all those things we said about predestination we shall take up again in this book. We shall therefore speak first of the acts that concur in reprobation and in which it consists, and then we shall set out its causes and effects.

CHAPTER I
THAT REPROBATION EXISTS IN GOD, AND WHAT IT IS

1. By the name of the reprobate, all theologians mean those human beings or angels who do not attain eternal beatitude. This term in this sense is perhaps not found explicitly in Scripture: for wherever mention is made of the reprobate, that word can be taken absolutely for the wicked, as in Ecclesiasticus 9: *Many, having admired the appearance of a woman, have become reprobate,* that is, wicked; so too in 1 Corinthians 9: *I chastise my body,* etc., *lest I myself become reprobate*—although this passage could very well be understood in the strict scholastic sense, as Anselm expounds it. But whatever may be the case with the word, the thing itself is certainly a matter of faith: that there are indeed many reprobate human beings, to whom it is said in Matthew 25: *Depart, you cursed, into everlasting fire.* These are also called in Romans 9 *vessels of wrath*, and in 2 Timothy 2: *vessels unto dishonor.* Why God has permitted these men to be damned we shall see later.

2. *Whether reprobation exists.*—From this it is also evident, looking at the thing itself, that reprobation exists in the same certain manner: because the reprobate is constituted or denominated such through reprobation. Now to reprobate is to reject something, especially in comparison with something else. Hence two things can be understood in reprobation. One is the external separation and rejection of the reprobate, in the sense in which it is said of Christ in Psalm 117: *The stone which the builders rejected,* and in Mark 8 and

Luke 17: *He must suffer many things and be rejected by the nations.* In this way the external reprobation of those who are damned will take place at the last judgment, whether particular or general. Hence it is established as a matter of faith that reprobation, in this respect, exists. This external reprobation, however, presupposes an interior one, which is effected by judgment and will, according to that saying of Isaiah 7: *That he may know to reject the evil and to choose the good.* For this reprobation is the work of an intellectual agent, and must therefore originate from intellect and will. And so it is likewise established that reprobation is found in the divine mind, because God himself is the one who reprobates externally: but he reprobates from an interior judgment and will, and for this reason reprobation is signified in Scripture under the name of hatred, foreknowledge, or something similar, as we shall see. It is therefore of this interior reprobation that we are treating, for the other belongs to the execution of divine providence.

3. From this it follows, first, that this reprobation is eternal, as we said of predestination. This is proved because whatever God executes in time, he decreed and conceived in his mind from eternity: for he can neither will nor understand anything anew. But God executes this reprobation in time: therefore its reason preceded from eternity in the mind of God. From this it is also concluded that this reprobation is formally in God alone: whereas in the creature, that is, in the reprobate human beings, it posits only an extrinsic denomination. Formally, I say—because effectively it does posit certain intrinsic effects in the creature, as we shall see later. The reason is that nothing is eternal except in God: but reprobation is eternal, therefore it exists intrinsically in God alone.

4. *In God reprobation is not strictly speaking proper.*—Some theologians add, moreover, that even in God reprobation does not exist properly but only metaphorically, in the manner in which the will of sign is metaphorically called a will, as may be seen in Aureolus, on book 1, distinction 41, article three, proposition four. The reason can be that the acts of hatred or similar acts, which reprobation can signify, are not in God properly but metaphorically. Yet whatever may be the case regarding particular acts—which we shall consider later—speaking absolutely and simply, it is altogether certain that reprobation exists in God properly and not merely metaphorically. First, because it is probable that reprobation pertains more to foreknowledge than to will. Then, because it was shown above that metaphorical will always presupposes some proper will in God. Finally, because the effects of reprobation are most properly from God and from his providence: therefore they cannot but presuppose some

proper cognition and will from which they proceed, since this belongs to the necessity of all God's effects and pertains to perfection, involving no imperfection.

5. *Reprobation consists in some immanent act of God.*—Third, it follows from what has been said that reprobation is placed in some immanent act of God that is in some mode free, whether it be of the intellect, or of the will, or of both. This is proved because, speaking absolutely, reprobation could not exist in God: for if he had willed it, he could have so arranged all things that no human being or angel would be damned. Therefore reprobation does not belong to God with simple necessity: therefore it belongs to him freely. Now nothing in God is free and eternal except an immanent act of God with a certain respect to the creature: therefore such is reprobation. Again, an immanent act in God is nothing other than an act of intellect or will, as is self-evident: therefore. Moreover, the name of reprobation can be accommodated to both acts. For reprobation is opposed to approbation: and we approbate something first through the judgment of reason, by which we judge rightly concerning its goodness, truth, or worthiness; and conversely, we reprobate that concerning which we judge otherwise. And so in common usage we are said to reprobate that opinion which we judge to be false. In this sense can also be understood that saying of Psalm 32: *He reprobates the thoughts of the peoples.* Through the will too we are said to approbate something when we choose it as fitting. And conversely, the unwillingness opposed to this choice is customarily called reprobation. And in this way the reprobation of evil is opposed to the choice of good, in those words of Isaiah 7: *That he may know to reject the evil and to choose the good.* Therefore in divine providence the name of reprobation can be accommodated to both acts. For in God there is both an eternal judgment concerning the evil merit and unworthiness of wicked human beings, and a will to render condign punishment: therefore each act can be called reprobation, and it is certain that in the matter of reprobation both are required, as will be more fully established from what is to be said.

CHAPTER II
WHETHER REPROBATION IS PRINCIPALLY AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT OR OF THE WILL

1. *The common distinction of reprobation into negative and positive.*—This question does not seem to be of great importance, since it appears to pertain more to the use of a word than to any new matter. Nevertheless, in order to

know how we ought to speak, a certain common distinction of a twofold reprobation—positive and negative—must be presupposed. The present question concerns positive reprobation, for this without doubt consists in a positive act: for negative reprobation is preserved, strictly and in the proper sense, in the absence of some act. Which act it is whose absence is called negative reprobation will become clear in the following chapter. For from what is said there it will be easily understood that this negative reprobation is nothing other than the absence of divine election or of the singular love of the predestined. From this it will also be easily established that, just as the election of the predestined resides in the will, so this negative reprobation must be placed in the will: because privation and habit are concerned with the same thing in proximate terms. Therefore in the present chapter we treat of positive reprobation alone.

2. *The opinion of some. — Another opinion. — A third opinion. — This mode of speaking is preferred.*—Some have said, therefore, that reprobation consists equally from both acts of intellect and will, because it cannot exist without both. Alexander of Hales, part 1, question 29, member 2; Richard, on book 1, distinction 41, article 3, question 1; Marsilius, question 44, article 1, notes 4 and 5. Others attribute reprobation principally to the will, as Durandus in book 1, distinction 40, question 2, and others whom I shall cite in the following chapter. And St. Thomas seems to favor this, question 6 of the *De Veritate*, article 1, at the end. I shall present the grounds for this shortly. Others again place reprobation principally in the intellect. This is more the view of St. Thomas, part 1, question 23, articles 2 and 3, and of all his disciples. And the usage of theologians favors it, for perhaps it is for this reason that they call the reprobate, by something like antonomasia, the foreknown. This mode of speaking also commends itself to me, for two reasons. The first is that the very verb "to reprobate" is said properly and principally of the judgment of the intellect: for it is the intellect that first reprobates someone, when it judges him to be of little worth and unworthy of beatitude. The second reason is the matter itself: for I hold that the divine intellect has the primary role in this matter of reprobation, and that the will holds an absolute decree regarding it that is, so to speak, in some way bound by the judgment of the intellect. It will rightly be said, therefore, that reprobation pertains principally to the intellect.

3. *Objection.*—But someone will object: opposites are concerned with the same thing; but reprobation and predestination are opposites; therefore they must be located in the same faculty and in the same order. Furthermore, reprobation is a part of providence, just as predestination is: either, then,

providence principally resides in the intellect or in the will. If the first, then reprobation too will principally reside there, yet by the same reasoning predestination will also. If the second, both will likewise have to be placed principally in the will: therefore we do not rightly divide them.

4. *It is dissolved.*—I respond that the difference between predestination and reprobation must be noted and kept in view throughout this entire matter. For in predestination we distinguished two orders, namely that of intention and that of execution. The former can properly be called the preparation of the end and the means, and in this preparation the proper account of predestination is placed. The latter order of execution is more closely joined with the effect of predestination: and can properly be called approbation, which as such begins from the divine judgment foreseeing merits, and is consummated in the will to give a reward for them. Reprobation, therefore, strictly taken as positive reprobation (for of the negative, if such there be, it will be spoken of below) is opposed to predestination insofar as predestination is approbation, not insofar as it is preparation. For in reprobation there is not found an antecedent intention of God by which he wills damnation as an end toward which he directs proper means—as we shall now show—but there is found a judgment concerning the evil merit of a human being and his unworthiness, and a will to render what is owed to him. And therefore it is not necessary, if predestination begins from the will, that positive reprobation also begins from there; but just as approbation begins from judgment, so too does reprobation. And by this the principal difficulty has been responded to.

5. *To the confirmation it is responded.*—To the confirmation it must be conceded (indeed, it follows from what has been said) that reprobation is a part of providence, not properly as a subjective part, but as an objective and, as it were, integral part, as we explained of predestination. Because it belongs to divine providence not only to confer benefits and rewards upon those who merit well, but also punishments upon those who act wickedly: for both are necessary for perfect governance, though in a different way. The former is in itself fitting and necessary; the latter, however, is so only on the supposition of some evil, because it is not good in itself and absolutely, but only for vindicating some greater evil. St. Thomas adds, moreover, in part 1, question 23, article 3, that it also belongs to the universal providence of the supreme governor who directs things to their ends to permit some to fall short of attaining their end, because it belongs to universal providence to allow things to operate in the mode that is connatural to them, and consequently to be impeded or to fall short, if this is in

keeping with their nature. The reasons for this permission we shall consider elsewhere later.

6. Hence it comes about that not only does positive reprobation properly so called belong to providence, but also that which is necessarily presupposed for such reprobation, such as the permission of sin. But in a different way: for this permissive providence, in its own genus, does not of necessity rest upon any absolute foreknowledge of future things, but upon the divine will, as we shall see. Reprobation, however, always presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of some effect of which God is not the cause. And for this reason, whether the whole of providence be attributed principally to the intellect or to the will, nevertheless this part of it, which is positive reprobation, has its primary role in the intellect. For there is no inconvenience in the fact that, with respect to some whole, one act is more principal with regard to one part of it, while with regard to another part a different act is prior and preeminent—as is self-evident. But in order that all these things may become clearer, the acts of the divine will and intellect that intervene in reprobation must be explained in particular.

CHAPTER III
WHETHER GOD OF HIMSELF WILLED TO EXCLUDE SOMEONE FROM THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM IN THE FIRST MOMENT OF REASON IN WHICH HE DECREED CONCERNING THE SALVATION OF HUMAN BEINGS

1. *The prior opinion.*—Some theologians hold that God preserved the same order with respect to the reprobate in his will as he had with respect to the elect. And so, in the same moment of reason in which God efficaciously chose certain ones for glory, he also willed absolutely and simply that others should not attain glory. So thinks Durandus, in book 1, distinction 40, question 2, number 6, and Cordoba indicates this, book 1, question 56, note 2, opinion 5, though with some hesitation. The same is defended by some moderns, and it has been embraced above all by the heretics of this time, especially Calvin and Beza, who attribute it to Augustine, book 1, *Ad Simplicianum*, question 2, and book 14, *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 10, and to Prosper, book 4, *On the Calling of the Nations*, chapter 21—but without warrant, as I shall clearly show below. The principal ground is taken from those words in Romans 9: *Jacob I loved; but Esau I hated.* For that hatred was the opposite of love and no less efficacious than it: because it is as absolute an act of the divine will as the act of love: therefore it infallibly entails and virtually contains reprobation: for just as that

love concerns the good of glory, so the hatred concerns the evil of the absence of glory. And yet of both it is said equally: *before they had done anything good or evil.* Therefore in the same moment of reason God had both acts.

2. From this a further argument can also be formed: the will of God does not remain, as it were, suspended, nor does it hold itself in a purely negative mode with respect to any object. Therefore, to those to whom he did not will in that moment to give glory efficaciously, he willed absolutely not to give it: because the negation of one will is (so to speak) the positing of the other. And this is confirmed: for just as God of himself willed to give glory to the predestined for the manifestation of his grace, so he willed not to give it to others, either for the manifestation of his power and justice in them, or for the manifestation of his grace in others. For Paul indicated the former end in the same ninth chapter, saying of Pharaoh: *For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you,* that is, his might; and more universally of the reprobate he adds: *If God, willing to show his wrath and to make known his power, etc.* The latter end the same Apostle sets forth when he says: *the potter is free to make from the same lump a vessel for honor or for dishonor,* and that God made the reprobate in this way *to show the riches of his grace upon the vessels of mercy.* Therefore God of himself, and thus in the first moment of reason, when he had seen no inequality among human beings, had these ends of his general providence preconceived, and by virtue of them alone, just as he chose some, so he willed to cast others from his kingdom.

3. *The second opinion.*—The second opinion is more moderate: that God did not so conduct himself with respect to all the reprobate, yet with respect to some he had this will, which they prove not so much from Scripture as from effects. For some are so abandoned by God that they are not only not saved, but cannot even be saved, with proximate and particular power, as is most evident in those infants to whom baptism cannot be applied by human means: and the same holds in its own way for adults to whom the light of the Gospel has not come, nor perhaps any supernatural divine inspiration. For (as I have often said) means show the intention of the end: but these means are such that they have infallibly joined to them exclusion from the Kingdom. Therefore it is a sign that God intended this by an absolute will, at least with respect to human beings of this kind.

4. *The third opinion.*—Others finally moderate this position, saying that God of himself willed absolutely to exclude no one from the Kingdom, neither before nor after the foreseen fall of human nature in Adam; yet there is a certain difference between these two moments, or these two states, in that before the

foreseen original sin in human nature, God not only excludes no one from the Kingdom by his absolute will, but rather has toward all an inclination of simple will to save all. He conducted himself in the same way toward the angels before the foreknowledge of sin. But after the foreseen fall of human nature, although he did not immediately will to cast anyone from the Kingdom by an efficacious will, he nevertheless did not have that simple inclination of desiring eternal beatitude for all; rather, toward the greater number he had this simple inclination of will to give them the kingdom, as far as is from himself. Yet concerning some, they say, after the foreseen original sin God had a simple will and, as it were, a desire to cast them from the Kingdom on account of original sin, and from this will impeded that the remedy against that sin could be applied to them. This they affirm most especially of those infants to whom such a remedy cannot be applied. And the ground is that this incapacity or impediment, which occurs in time, does not come about without divine providence, which is not merely permissive but also ordering—because that effect frequently comes about without sin, and whatever is not sin is not merely permitted but also ordered by God. Therefore it is a sign that this means is willed by God on account of that end, intended at least by a simple will.

5. In order to explain the truth, therefore, I premise, or suppose, that there can be discussion either of all human beings before, or after, the foreseen sin of Adam. And in the prior consideration I include angels under human beings as well, since the account is the same for all. Under the latter, however, the sin of Adam (which is proper to human nature) can be considered either precisely as it was in Adam, in whom we all sinned, or as already communicated and participated in by individuals through the proper original sin of each one. These two considerations can be brought to bear on other effects to be treated below, yet in the present question they have the same account: and therefore we shall comprehend both accounts absolutely under the fall of human nature.

6. *First assertion.*—I say, therefore, first: Before the foreseen angelic or human sin respectively, God did not have an absolute decree to exclude any intellectual creature from the heavenly Kingdom. This truth I judge to be so certain that I consider its contrary to be improbable and alien to sound doctrine. It was taught by St. Thomas, question 6 of the *De Veritate*, article 4, at the end; by Scotus in book 1, distinction 41, question 1, toward the end, where he says that without cruelty nothing else can be thought. Likewise Basolis, distinction 40, question 1; Ferrarius, book 3 *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 161; and Cordoba above is not far from this position, which Catharinus defends so vigorously, book 2, *On Predestination*, at the beginning, that he calls the opposite horrible

and an offense to the ears of all pious persons, and says that Augustine himself detests it as impious, book 6 of the *Hypognosticon*. Horatius too, book 3 of *Catholic Loci*, chapter 8, says for this reason of Calvin that he fashions God as fierce and savage. Stapleton, in chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, verse 20, at "Now therefore," and at "Indeed," and the following sections, and below at verse 30, says this was the execrable opinion of Calvin, charging God with iniquity and injustice. Likewise Viguerius, in the *Theological Institutes*, chapter 20, paragraph 8, verse 2, says that opinion is repugnant to divine justice. John of Bologna, in his book *On Predestination*, scattered throughout, and Flaminio Nobilius, book 1, *On Predestination*, chapter 7, bring forward many similar and even sharper statements against that opinion. I cite these not in order to approve all these exaggerations and censures and make them my own (for I leave the judgment of them to others), but solely to present the mind of Catholic theologians, which cannot fail to move the reader greatly.

7. This position is proved first from those words of Wisdom 1: *God did not make death, nor does he delight in the destruction of the living,* along with similar passages cited above, in which Scripture always signifies that God of himself wills death for no one—especially spiritual death or damnation—which would not be true if, of himself and unprovoked by creatures, he had such a decree. Some say those testimonies are to be understood with respect to the punishment of hell, which includes punishment and the other disorders and miseries that are in hell, but not with respect to the simple absence of the beatific vision. For that vision is not owed to human nature: and therefore God could in his freedom deny it to whomever he willed. But this response is false, because the first and principal punishment, in which the second death of the soul consists, is the perpetual privation of that beatitude, and consequently also of divine grace; and in this consists proper damnation as to its substance. Hence infants who die without the application of the remedy against original sin are truly damned and die the second death, by reason of this privation alone. For such an absence no longer has the character of a mere negation in any human being, but of privation and punishment, because although eternal beatitude is not owed to nature considered in itself, it is nonetheless owed to nature as elevated to that end—if sin does not stand in the way—by divine ordination.

8. Second, this truth is taken from the Council of Orange, canon 25, and the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 17, insofar as they condemn those who say *that God predestined some to evil, just as he predestined others to good.* Although this is understood by some as referring to predestination to the evil of fault (which could suffice for us, as I shall say shortly), nonetheless the Councils,

if read attentively, also speak of predestination to eternal damnation—namely, that God decreed this from his will alone, without any preceding fault. This was openly declared by Prosper in response to the Vincentian objections, response eleven. From this too the Fathers whom I cited at the beginning of this work—who sometimes distinguish predestination to life and to death—establish the difference that God has the former of himself, but not the latter, until he foresees the sins of human beings, as may be seen in the Council of Valence under Lothair, chapter 5, and in Fulgentius, book 1 *To Monimus*, chapter 13. And Augustine plainly holds the same in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 11, where he cites that Psalm: *I will sing of mercy and judgment to you, O Lord,* because predestination to life is from mercy, the other from judgment. And therefore in letters 105 and 106, and in book 3 *Against Julian*, chapter 18, and in book 11 of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 11, and often elsewhere, he says that *God is not an avenger before a human being is in sin.*

9. *The argument.*—Hence, third, I argue from reason as follows: if God had a will to exclude some from the Kingdom, he would have willed to do this either by power alone or by justice. The first cannot be said according to faith, since otherwise those human beings would have to be excluded from the Kingdom even if they had sinned nothing, because God willed this absolutely from power and dominion alone. If the second is said, then since that justice is vindictive, God does not will it of himself, but on account of the sins of human beings, according to the teaching of Damascene, book 2 *On the Faith*, chapter 29, and for the reason touched upon above: because if God were to will absolutely to exercise this justice before fault is yet foreseen, he would by virtue of that will also will and ordain the fault itself, which is repugnant to God.

10. In this regard a difference and a similarity must be noted between the will to give glory and to exclude from it, if both are supposed to precede foreknowledge of future works. For just as the intention to give glory as the crown of justice virtually includes the will to give good merits, and therefore by force of that intention God must give and procure them, so the efficacious will to exclude from the Kingdom would virtually include the will to give and procure the evil merits that are necessary in order that this exclusion be carried out from vindictive justice, as is said to be pre-ordained. These virtual wills differ, however, in that the former is consonant with divine goodness, while the latter is not at all. For God cannot will or procure evil merits for a human being, nor even permit from such an inclination that a person fall and lose the kingdom, because such an intention, considered in itself, is unworthy of God, as is evident.

11. *Second assertion.*—I say, second: After the sin of Adam and the original sin that all human beings contract from him have been foreseen, God did not immediately, on account of that alone and in that same moment of reason, exclude from the Kingdom by an absolute decree of his will all the human beings who are in fact damned—nor indeed any of them. This assertion is also intended by the theologians and doctors cited above, for they speak of human beings in the present state of fallen nature, of whom I also believe the Councils and the saints speak. For this reason I judge this assertion to be no less true than the preceding one. But in order to prove it, especially as to the final part, in which we say that God excluded no human being from the kingdom by a definitive decision, it is necessary to distinguish between original sin precisely as contracted, or as persisting in a human being throughout life until death and as foreseen under that condition. For considering original sin in this latter way, there is no doubt that God willed from eternity to exclude many human beings from the kingdom on account of original sin alone: yet not in that first moment of reason in which he foreknew the fall of Adam, but after he foreknew that those human beings would persevere in it until death. For according to faith, God does this in time; and whatever he does in time, he decreed from eternity. And that will is most just, pertaining to vindictive justice, given the covenant entered into with Adam. But now we are not considering original sin in that way, but in the former way—that is, precisely as contracted—and stopping at that moment of reason in which such a fall of human nature was foreknown, in which, strictly speaking, human beings were only foreseen as fallen in Adam. For after that knowledge, in our manner of understanding and speaking, God decreed to redeem the whole human race as to sufficiency: concerning that same moment, therefore, we say that in it God excluded no one from the Kingdom on account of the fall of Adam alone, as thus foreseen.

12. *The assertion is proved.*—The assertion is proved first, because in that moment God willed, as far as is from himself, to save all fallen human beings: but with that will there is repugnant a decree to exclude from the kingdom all those who are not saved, if it is attributed to God from himself alone, together with only the foreknowledge of original sin. This is proved: for a simple will toward some good and an absolute unwillingness toward the same good are not repugnant when not both are held from the sole freedom of the one willing, without another cause or condition; yet that, given the same condition on the part of the person, someone should will from himself to confer some good upon that person and at the same time will absolutely and simply not to give that good to that person, is a manifest repugnance. Because one who absolutely does not

will, simply and as far as is from himself does not will; but to will from oneself and also not to will from oneself is repugnance. And so it is in the matter at hand: for given original sin, God absolutely willed to give to all the remedy of salvation, and thus to free all from that fall, as far as was in himself: therefore it cannot be that in the same moment of reason, and without another condition or foreseen cause, he also efficaciously willed not to admit so great a multitude of human beings to the Kingdom, because these two wills are plainly repugnant, as has been explained.

13. And this reasoning proves not only the first part of the assertion—namely, that God did not have such a will concerning all human beings who are in fact not saved—but also the second: that he had no such will concerning any of them. Because it was shown above that concerning all fallen human beings, with no exception, God had that will to save each one on his own part, notwithstanding original sin: therefore this will does not admit of another concerning anyone: therefore concerning no one at all did God have such a will. For if God had willed not to admit some persons to the kingdom after the foreseen original sin, he would have had that will as a punishment of the foreseen original sin: for such a will is said to arise from vindictive justice, and is therefore placed after the foreknowledge of original sin, and not before. But that cannot be universally true, because many of the reprobate are not cast from the Kingdom on account of original sin, as is established for all those to whom original sin is remitted in this life, who are not punished for it—especially with the punishment of eternal life to come: therefore concerning those persons God did not have that punitive will. For what is not in time, God did not efficaciously will from eternity: otherwise the absolute divine will would not be fulfilled, which is repugnant.

14. *Objection. — Response is given.*—You will say: some are damned on account of original sin alone: therefore at least those could have been excluded in that moment. I respond by denying the consequence: because that sin, precisely as contracted, is never in time a sufficient reason for perpetual privation of beatitude, but only as persisting in a human being until his death: therefore on account of it as thus foreseen, God did not have such a will. Otherwise, by force of that will, God would be bound to prevent such sin from being taken away from those human beings and to procure that it persist until death. And hence God would have virtually willed that persistence too through such a will—all of which are absurd; and this will be even more clearly established from the following assertion.

15. *Third assertion. — It is proved.*—I say, third: God of himself and by a simple will did not desire to deprive any human being of eternal glory, even after the foreseen original sin. This assertion is against the third opinion; and although it does not appear to be as certain as the preceding ones, since theologians do not speak of it so explicitly, it nonetheless seems to me entirely true and to follow in the same proportion from the foundations laid. First, because with that inclination of God to save all and each one as far as is from himself—which Chrysostom also called an ardent desire—with this (I say) there is repugnant not only an absolute will but also a similar contrary desire, or a desire for the contrary object, when both are held in the presence of the same knowledge and the same causes and reasons. This is especially so since we said above that this desire for salvation is not in God some sort of complacency, but a true pursuit by way of intention—efficacious to this extent, that it obliges God to give means that are of themselves sufficient: therefore it cannot be that God at the same time and of himself had a similar intention with respect to the contrary evil of the same person. Hence the authors of that third opinion posit in God this desire for the damnation of certain persons, especially infants, on account of original sin alone, because they think God had no desire for their salvation nor conferred any sufficient means upon them. Yet as false as that foundation is, as I showed above, so false is it that God had such a desire for the damnation of those human beings.

16. *It is corroborated.*—And this is confirmed: for if there were any reason for placing this act in God, it would principally be because in time many are in fact impeded from being able to obtain the remedy for original sin. But no argument is drawn from this, because it is not necessary—nor indeed credible—that such an impediment arises from a direct intention of God procuring this, lest those human beings obtain the remission of original sin. Otherwise it would have to be attributed to God that the impediment of salvation as such, and the perpetual duration in the state of sin, comes from him not only as permitting but also as procuring—which seems to me most absurd and contrary to those general rules: *Your destruction is from yourself; your help alone is from me.* And: *God abandons no one until he is abandoned.*

17. Nor does it matter that such an impediment often arises from an effect that is in itself good and blameless, an effect that God not only permits but also wills. For although this may be true of that effect considered in itself, or in relation to other ends of the universe, yet insofar as it is an impediment to salvation and to the remission of sin—or, what is the same thing, insofar as it is an occasion of persisting in a state of sin—it is only permitted, because it

involves in some way the malice of fault. Finally, if God had such an inclination, we would say in vain that it is a simple and not an absolute will. Both because it would include a condition neither virtually nor formally—for none can be assigned—and also because by force of it God is said to apply means by which infallibly that human being is not saved, which is a sign of an absolute will: therefore, if he does not have this, neither does he have a simple inclination or desire.

18. *Replies to the arguments.*—The foundations of the second and third opinions have been resolved from what has been said. But in order to respond to the foundations of the first opinion, it is necessary to explain what act of will God had concerning the reprobate in that moment—which we shall accomplish better in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV
WHICH ACTS OF THE DIVINE INTELLECT OR WILL INTERVENE IN REPROBATION

1. *The terminus of reprobation is some evil. — A twofold evil, namely of fault and of punishment. — Two certain points are established.*—The terminus of reprobation is some evil of the human being who is reprobated: for among other things, reprobation is distinguished from predestination in this, that predestination terminates in good, while reprobation terminates in evil. But just as predestination properly so called is only to supernatural good, so reprobation is said to be in relation to the evil opposed to it: and therefore both are judged to pertain to the order of supernatural providence—predestination as perfecting and, as it were, completing that order, reprobation as falling short of it in its object or terminus. The result is that here we must treat only of the acts of the intellect and will of God that are concerned with the evil of the reprobate himself: for the acts by which he wills good to him have already been treated in the preceding book. This evil is twofold, namely of fault and of punishment, concerning which two points are to be presupposed as certain. The first is that before any act of the divine will, foreknowledge of both evils precedes—both as possible and as future under a condition. For God foreknows every fault that the reprobate is going to commit if in this or that occasion he is left to his own freedom without any further special grace; and consequently he also foreknows the persistence of that fault and the punishment consequent upon it, if that condition too is permitted. Yet all this foreknowledge does not intrinsically

belong to reprobation, for God has similar foreknowledge of many of the predestined: it is therefore only presupposed for the whole of providence.

2. *The second point, proposed as certain. — Where the difficulty lies.*— Second, it is certain that the divine will conducts itself with respect to those two evils—of fault and of punishment—in such a way that it in no way wills the evil of fault directly and of itself, because this conflicts with his goodness, which is certain as a matter of faith, as I treated more fully in book 2, *On Auxiliaries*. But the evil of punishment God directly wills—yet not of himself but from the account of justice, given fault, as has often been said. Although God does not will the evil of fault, he nonetheless permits it. It remains to be seen, therefore, what acts of will God has, both concerning the evils of punishment and concerning the evils of fault, which are going to be in the reprobate.

3. *The opinion of Aureolus.*—At this point the opinion of Aureolus may first be cited, in book 1, distinction 41, article 3, where he says that God does not have any proper act of his will concerning the evil of the reprobate, and that whatever is attributed to God as willing or not willing such evil is attributed only metaphorically: because he so conducts himself in external effects as if he willed it. Durandus partly followed this, in book 4, distinction 47, question 7, saying that in God there is no proper displeasure at sin nor wrath against the sinner. And they seem to be grounded in this: that these acts concerning evil include imperfection. Yet although concerning certain specific acts it may be doubted whether they are found in God properly—such as, for example, hatred or wrath, on which we shall touch something below—still, regarding an act of will absolutely, it cannot be denied that God properly and without metaphor has some act of will concerning the reprobate. For at the very least he has an efficacious and absolute will to deprive him of beatitude and to punish with eternal punishment, at least after his sins are foreseen, because this effect is caused by God in time: therefore he willed it from eternity. Furthermore, that act involves no imperfection whatsoever, but rather possesses the perfection of vindictive justice. Concerning this act, therefore, there can be no doubt. Whether he also has other acts, and in what order of reason, must now be stated.

4. *The second opinion. — A foundation is established.*—The second opinion, therefore, is that of Scotus, in book 1, distinction 44, toward the end, who says that in the first and second moment—in which God willed for the predestined both glory as end and efficacious grace as means—he conducted himself in a purely negative manner toward the reprobate. Where he consequently indicates that he had no positive act of will concerning them, until, with sin foreseen, he willed to punish them. In this sense he distinguishes two reprobations: the

negative, which precedes foreknowledge of sin, and the positive, which follows it. His ground is: that in the first moment God did not, for example, have a will to give glory to the reprobate—otherwise they would be elect—nor did he will to deprive them of glory, because he does not will this of himself, as was proved above: therefore he conducted himself in a purely negative manner. Nor is this judged to be an inconvenience in one moment of eternity. For when it is said that the divine will does not remain, as it were, suspended—so as to settle nothing about whether some effects are or are not going to be—this is to be understood according to the real duration of eternity. In this way the will of God in the present matter does not remain suspended: because in a later moment from eternity it had the will not to give beatitude to these human beings; but in the prior moment, to prescind from both acts is not an inconvenience. Some moderns attack this opinion of Scotus; I judge, however, that in the true sense he spoke rightly.

5. *The opinion of Scotus is explained.*—And first, he does not deny there that in that first moment God had, concerning the reprobate, that antecedent and simple will to save them, which he admits in other places, as we saw above: but he is treating solely of the efficacious will to give or take away glory, and with respect to this, the argument made convinces that God had neither concerning the reprobate in that moment. Second, I judge it more probable that God in that moment did not elect the reprobate to glory in such a way that he had a positive act of will of not electing them—or of willing not to elect them—which did not escape Scotus. For in book 1, distinction 47, he explicitly posits this act under probability: he calls it, however, a reflexive act. Hence when he says elsewhere that God conducted himself negatively, he means this with respect to direct acts; yet this very negation is willed through a reflexive act. The reason for this is that although the will can not-will this or that by a mere suspension of act—as philosophers admit in our case—yet in that case the omission or absence of act is only virtually or interpretively voluntary, because the will can will but does not will while attending to something. But if a positive will of not-acting or not-electing supervenes, then that omission will be directly and formally voluntary. Now this mode of acting—or not-acting—is in itself more perfect. Therefore it is more probable that God so conducts himself in not electing the reprobate. This is especially so because through that infinite act of his will, God can formally and explicitly will this negation without any change or addition, but in the same way in which he wills other things.

6. Third, it must be said that God did not prepare for these human beings that special providence of grace which he confers on the predestined, and

therefore that before the absolute foreknowledge of future actual sins he did not elect them to congruous grace, and that he willed this very negation by a positive act. This is proved: because what God does not give in time, he does not prepare in eternity; but to these human beings he does not give this special providence in time, as we suppose: therefore neither did he prepare it from eternity. Again, what God does not do in time, he willed from eternity not to do —not only by the absence of an act but also by a direct voluntary act—for the reason given above: therefore God also had this will concerning these human beings. But this will does not necessarily presuppose fault on the part of the human being, because it is not a punishing will but one of a certain general providence of grace: therefore it is not necessary that it presuppose the absolute foreknowledge of future things: therefore God had it in that prior moment, after the will not to pre-elect those same human beings to glory.

7. *The opinion of some. — This position is judged probable.*—Some, however, hold that God did not have this will until he foresaw the sin of Adam, which is probable—above all on account of the opinion of Augustine, of which more below. Yet this position is not to be grounded in this, that sin is the reason or necessary condition for such a will: for in the angels who were not predestined, God had a similar will without foreknowledge of any sin. The sufficient reason for this will is therefore that God owes his grace to no one and can distribute it as he wills. Nor did the will of the end alone oblige to the conferral of greater grace, as is established from what was said in the preceding book. Granted that position, then, its reason is to be drawn from the mode of providence that God willed to have with human beings. For before the foreseen original sin, in the ordinary providence of grace he made no distinction but provided sufficiently for all through original justice; yet with the loss of that foreseen, he willed to give to those chosen for glory a special congruous grace: while to others he willed not to prepare it.

8. *Something worthy of note.*—In this, however, it must be carefully observed that when we say God willed not to give congruous grace, this is not to be understood as directly willing that the grace he does give should not be congruous—because this pertains either to the fault of the human being, namely to the evil use of grace and the resistance of free will, or certainly in the case of infants (extending the expression to them) it pertains to an impediment of salvation: and neither of these does God directly will or intend, as was said above. Two things, therefore, are included in that will. One is: that although God foresees that other graces would be congruous to these human beings if they were given to them, nonetheless he does not will to give them, because he does

not owe them and, according to the common mode of providence which he does not will to change, no occasion presents itself of bestowing them. The other is: that God foresees the graces to be conferred upon these human beings in the ordinary course, and in the way in which they are to be conferred, as not going to be congruous to them; and nonetheless he wills to give only those and permits the remaining deficiency. And in these acts is contained the reprobation that is customarily called negative, and which could fittingly be called non-predestination, because through it God does not yet exclude a human being, but only does not specially elect him to glory or grace.

9. *A passage of Paul is explained.*—Of this reprobation is to be understood the passage of Paul which I referred to this point above, Romans 9: *But Esau I hated.* For there "hatred" does not signify proper and formal hatred, concerning which it is said in Wisdom 10: *You hate nothing of what you have made*—because in that sense it is impossible for God to hate his creature, especially before he foresees any evil of fault in it, as is supposed in that passage of Paul, according to the interpretation given above. In those words, therefore, "hatred" signifies nothing other than the voluntary absence of that special love with which God pursued Jacob and the predestined. For this word often carries this meaning in Scripture: Luke 14: *Whoever does not hate his father or mother,* etc.—that is, whoever does not love them less than me. Just as God is also said to harden, only because he does not show special mercy, as Augustine said in book 1, *Ad Simplicianum*, question 2. It is true that Augustine sometimes expounds that passage as referring to the hatred of vindictive justice on account of original sin, which he says was foreseen in Jacob and Esau: because Paul says only *before they had done anything good or evil,* not *before they had contracted anything evil.* This interpretation is probable, but not necessary, as we shall see more fully in chapter seven.

10. *A difficulty remains in the words of Paul. — Response is given.*—But a difficulty still remains in the other words of Paul also left above: *For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power.* And: *If God, willing to show his wrath,* etc. For from these it seems to be gathered that, prior to the negative reprobation just described, God had an intention of some evil concerning these human beings. It is responded that God nonetheless did not have such an intention, nor is this gathered from the words of Paul, but rather the opposite—as is clear from those words: *He endured with much patience the vessels of wrath.* It supposes first, therefore, that human beings made themselves vessels of iniquity: and that God waited for them. Here too is to be added that saying from Romans 2: *Do you not know that the kindness of God leads you to*

repentance? Therefore he did not endure them in order to punish, but in order to spare: but seeing that human beings were by their impenitence storing up wrath for themselves, he finally willed to punish them. Hence the particle *that* in that passage does not signify a final cause but only a consequence given another thing being posited. This is frequent in Scripture, when the circumstance of place and matter demands it: John 10: *That those who see may become blind.* And Isaiah 6, and Luke 8: *That seeing they may not see,* etc. And this is the common interpretation of the Fathers on the cited passages of Paul.

11. Finally, after the negative reprobation described above, positive reprobation followed in the order of reason, which appears to be contained in three acts. The first is the absolute foreknowledge by which God foresaw the sin or sins that will be future in such human beings until the end of life—concerning which there is nothing new to add. The second act is also of the intellect and consists in the practical judgment and, as it were, the final sentence of God, by which God decrees that this human being is worthy to be excluded from the Kingdom and punished with a condign eternal punishment. For given the laws of divine justice and granted the foreknowledge described, this judgment naturally follows, which is also necessary in order that the will may rightly will. And in this act some place positive reprobation, because according to ordinary law, by force of it a human being will infallibly be damned—and this is probable. Yet because God's effect is not simply going to be future until God wills it, and because notwithstanding that judgment God could by his absolute power not punish the human being, a third act is therefore necessary for the completeness of reprobation: and this is the absolute will to damn the reprobate, which is the most powerful act of vindictive justice.

12. *A question. — An opinion. — Another opinion. — An opinion is preferred.*—Concerning this will, it is customarily questioned whether it is true and proper hatred of God toward such human beings. St. Thomas, book 4 *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 99, generally holds that it is not proper but metaphorical hatred. Others contend that it is proper hatred, because it is a will toward evil insofar as the punishment in question is truly evil. I hold, however, that the matter pertains to the mode of speaking. And the view of St. Thomas commends itself to me, part 1, question 20, article 2: that it is not hatred of the human being, because it does not arise from displeasure at the human being himself or at his nature; yet it is hatred of the sinner as sinner, for the contrary reason.

13. *Another question. — The latter mode of speaking is preferred.*—In a similar way it is customarily questioned, since Paul often calls this act *the wrath*

of God, whether that designation is proper or metaphorical. For Lactantius, in his book *On the Wrath of God*, contends at length that God has true and proper wrath against sinners. For wrath is nothing other than the appetite for vengeance on account of a harm or injury inflicted by another. But St. Thomas, part 1, question 20, article 1, reply to 4, says that wrath is not attributed to God properly, because it presupposes sadness, according to that saying of Aristotle in *Rhetoric* book 2, chapters 2 and 4: *He who is angered, grieves.* And this position is more received, because wrath even in us does not come about without some disturbance of soul. There is also a difference in the meaning of the word. Yet because this is to be taken from common usage, the latter mode of speaking commends itself to me. Provided we admit that wrath is not so derived metaphorically from God as sadness, repentance, and the like. For sadness is neither in God nor does it signify an act that is in God, but some effect similar to what customarily arises in us from sadness. Through "wrath," however, we signify some proper act of God having an analogous correspondence with the wrath of a human being in what is intrinsic to it—namely, in the appetite for vengeance. It differs only in that in God it does not have the cause it has in us, namely sadness: and because by force of that word the act is signified under a denomination derived from such a cause, it is said for this reason that that act is not proper wrath but proper vengeance.

CHAPTER V
THAT NO CAUSE IS GIVEN FOR NEGATIVE REPROBATION ON THE PART OF THE FOREKNOWN HUMAN BEING

1. *The error of the Manicheans.*—With the nature of reprobation explained, we must speak briefly of its causes and effects. Now from what we said about predestination, it is established that here we are treating only of the cause on the part of the human being, through which he in some way merited his own reprobation; and incidentally we shall also speak of the cause on the part of God. I first omit the error of the Manicheans, who referred the whole cause of those human beings who are damned to a certain supremely evil principle; and of the Priscillianists, who attributed this to fate and a certain natural necessity; likewise that of Calvin and his followers, who so attribute this to the divine will as to make it the first cause and root of all the fault and perdition of the reprobate. For against these errors there is explicit disputation in other places: and what we said in books one and two *On Auxiliaries* may be consulted.

2. *The opinion that denies it.*—Among Catholics, therefore, many have denied that any cause of reprobation is given on the part of the human being. St. Thomas appears to hold this opinion, part 1, question 23, article 5—for in the response to 3 he seems in this to equate reprobation with predestination. The same is held by Ferrariensis, book 3 *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 161; Durandus, in book 1, distinction 41, question 2, especially number 14; Gregorius, article 2, conclusions 4 and 5; Marsilius, question 41, article 2; Driedo in the *Concordia*, part 1, chapter 3; Adamus on Romans 9; and many modern writers. The ground is the passage in Romans 9, which has been treated at length. And the argument drawn from what was said about predestination is: if a cause of reprobation were given on the part of the human being, it would be in his free power to be reprobated or not reprobated: therefore it would equally be in his power to be predestined or not predestined—for these two are judged to be immediately connected: for all who are not reprobated are predestined. Therefore a human being could be the cause of his own predestination, namely by being the cause of his own non-reprobation. There is added also another argument: because the human being is not the cause of the first effect of reprobation, whether of the permission of sin or of the denial of congruous assistance: therefore he is not the cause of the whole of reprobation, and hence not of reprobation simply and absolutely.

3. *The second position, extremely contrary.*—Others held the position that is extremely contrary—namely, that from the part of the human being there is given a cause of the whole of reprobation, even as regards the negation of predestination. This is held by all the authors who affirm that a cause of their predestination is given in the predestined, such as Henry, Ockham, Gabriel, and others: and they speak consistently. Those who think that God by his will did not make the distinction of election among human beings who were equal from themselves, but chose those for glory whom he foreknew to be in some way more disposed—therefore, conversely, left some others on account of some cause on their part, which would be either their fault or the absence of that disposition.

4. *The middle opinion.*—Some, however, especially among modern authors, admit a cause of reprobation, though they deny one of predestination, and say it is original sin. For that sin was of itself a sufficient cause of divine abandonment: therefore those whom God abandoned, he abandoned on account of this cause, although he did not wish to abandon many others having the same cause—which in those is to be attributed to divine mercy, and in the others to just judgment. And so, absolutely speaking, a cause of reprobation is given in those

who are abandoned, although not a cause of comparison—namely, why these rather than those are abandoned. And in this way they interpret the position of St. Thomas, and they think it is also that of Augustine: because in many places he seems to speak thus of the separation of the elect from the mass of perdition through mercy, and of the abandonment of the others in their fall through judgment.

5. *First conclusion.*—Given, however, the principles we have now set out, the resolution of this question is easy. For one must speak differently of the cause of positive reprobation and differently of the cause of non-predestination, or negative reprobation: it is of this latter that we are now treating, while of the former we shall speak in the following chapter. I say, therefore, first: on the part of the reprobate, no cause is given of negative reprobation, nor any account of the will of God to not pre-elect such a person efficaciously to glory. In this respect the first position is correct, which Scotus and others also follow. And it is rightly grounded in the passage of Paul in Romans 9: *Before they had done anything,* etc., down to *But Esau I hated,* together with the interpretation we gave above. And according to this assertion is to be understood that admiration of Augustine: *Why he draws this one and not that one—do not judge,* etc., treatise 26 on John; and letter 165: *Why he frees this one and not that one.* And *On Correction and Grace*, chapters 8 and 13. For if we look at these effects in execution, a cause seems to be given on the part of human beings. And therefore some are not moved by this admiration of Augustine: for this one is drawn because he is moved by God and allows himself to be moved, while the other is not drawn because, although moved by God, he resists. Yet although this is true in execution, nonetheless, looking to the preparation and pre-election of God, it is a great object of admiration that he pre-elected this one rather than that one—for whose cause Augustine finds none in human beings. This understanding was learnedly noted by Soto, book 1, *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 15.

6. *Objection. — It is weakened. — A second objection. — A response is given.* —You will say: from this only it is proved that no cause of comparison of one over another is given, but not that absolutely no cause of non-election is given. I respond that this must be established by adding an argument. For in the moment in which the predestined were elected, they had no fault foreseen by God: therefore the others as well, who were not elected, had no fault foreseen in the moment in which they were not elected: therefore on their part they had no cause of their non-election. The first consequence is clear because in the moment in which the distinction between them was made, those persons were equal among themselves—as is also shown by Paul's example of the potter and

the clay. And this is openly confirmed in the angels, in whom no fault preceded before the divine permission, and *a fortiori* before the will of not electing to glory; as for human beings, those who think the election of the predestined was made after the foreseen original sin could think otherwise, as we shall say in an analogous case shortly—but we showed above that the election of human beings too was made before the foreseen original sin: therefore in human beings also no fault was presupposed in the moment in which God willed to elect these and not others. The second consequence is clear: because on the part of human beings or angels, no cause or reason of such a divine will can be conceived other than fault. Someone will say: a sufficient cause is that in such a creature there is no reason on account of which God must elect her. I respond: the discussion here is not about a negative reason of this kind, but about some moral cause that has been added on the part of the creature and can move God to such a volition. This is especially so because God elects no one because he is obliged to, or because such election is owed to the creature on account of her natural capacity: but where an affirmation is not the cause of an affirmation, neither can the opposed negation properly be called the cause of a negation.

7. *An objection from the words of St. Prosper. — The mind of Prosper is explained.*—Against this assertion, however, the words of Prosper can be objected, in response three to the Gauls, where he speaks of the reprobate as follows: *They did not have the necessity of being impious because they were not predestined, but for this reason they were not predestined—because such they were foreknown to be going to be from voluntary transgression.* Response seven has similar things. I say, however, that he used the term "not predestined" in a negative sense that is in fact positive—for from the context it is clear that he is speaking of positive reprobation itself. For because the latter is always conjoined with the negation of predestination, one is customarily used for the other outside of rigorous disputation.

8. *Second assertion.*—From this I further assert: it is not necessary that a cause be given on the part of the reprobate, on account of which God was unwilling for congruous grace to be given to him—or means infallible in his foreknowledge for obtaining salvation. This can be proved by the same argument, because no fault is necessarily presupposed on the part of the creature for this will of God. Likewise, because the first permission of sin cannot have a cause on the part of the reprobate, as the first opinion rightly says and as is manifestly established from what was said in the preceding chapter: but in the permission is included the denial of the said assistance. Finally, in the angels this is manifest, because in the same moment in which God willed to give to these

angels this preventing grace and to those that other, in the elect angels no fault had preceded: therefore neither in the others—for in that moment they were equal as to merit or demerit.

9. As for human beings, however, it can be said with probability that original sin was a sufficient cause for not giving this grace to those to whom God did not wish to give it: because we said above that the distribution (so to speak) of preventing grace, even in the divine will, was made after the foreknowledge of original sin. And although this was equal in all and therefore could not be the reason for giving congruous grace to these rather than those, it was nonetheless absolutely of itself a sufficient reason for denying congruous grace to those to whom God wished to deny it: therefore it is credible that God also looked to this reason when he had that will. For in this way that will shall not be from absolute power alone, but also from justice: and when it can be done fittingly, God wills and acts according to every account of virtue. And this is what Augustine often intimates in the distinction of human beings from the mass of perdition, whose passages I shall cite shortly.

10. *Objection. — It is dissolved.*—You will say: many reprobate human beings have original sin remitted to them: therefore in them this sin cannot be the cause of this denial of congruous grace, because God does not punish a remitted sin. I respond by denying the consequence, because although God does not punish remitted sin with the privation of glory, or of justifying or of necessary and sufficient auxiliary grace, he nonetheless often denies further grace—or special and non-owed providence—on account of a sin once committed, even if it has already been remitted. For from the matter of penance it is established that with fault, not every punishment is always remitted—which is most true of the punishments of this life and of extraordinary ones; and it is established in fact that when original sin is remitted through baptism, the punishment of death is not remitted, nor the other penal conditions of this life. Therefore God could in this way absolutely inflict this punishment upon whomever he willed on account of such a fault—a punishment that would never be removed, even if the fault is remitted. Just as it also happens that a just man who was receiving many special aids from God is deprived of that special grace on account of an actual sin; and although he is afterward restored to justice through penance, he is not thereby immediately restored to the former familiarity or special protection of God.

11. *A question. — It is explained.*—But someone will finally ask: is some cause given at least on the part of God for this will or negative reprobation? I respond: if we speak in particular of these human beings or angels in

comparison with those, there is none—or certainly none that can be assigned by us—as was said of predestination: for the account is the same, since the persons have equal dignity or unworthiness, and whatever God works in one to manifest his attributes, he could have worked in another. Yet in a general way, without doubt, God has many reasons on account of which he did not will to elect all in the same way, and consequently willed not to elect some. These reasons are to be drawn either from the manifestation of divine grace in the elect, or from the side of freedom—so that God might leave creatures to operate freely in all respects and show the fragility of their natural powers. Another reason, however, which is customarily drawn from the manifestation of God's vindictive justice, is not to be so taken as if, before the absolute foreknowledge of a future sin, God had an intention or absolute will to manifest this justice—because, as has been said, God does not have this will of himself, otherwise he would virtually will the fault itself. God therefore had that will only after the foreseen fault; but prior to that he foreknew that he could draw this good from sin, if it were committed by the human being, and he had only a conditional will to so conduct himself with the human being if the latter were to sin.

CHAPTER VI
WHETHER A CAUSE IS GIVEN ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN BEING FOR HIS POSITIVE REPROBATION

1. *The prior position.*—Those who posit in God a positive will to exclude from the heavenly Kingdom all the reprobate before their future evil merits are foreseen, consequently say that no cause of positive reprobation is given on the part of such human beings, because this reprobation consists principally in that will. And thus many understand the first opinion cited in the preceding chapter. Yet the foundation of this position was sufficiently demolished there, and the position thus explained is in no way to be approved.

2. *First conclusion.*—I say, therefore, first: a cause of positive reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate. In this the second position stated in the preceding chapter is correct, which Scotus and others follow. And it is the manifest position of Augustine, letters 105 and 106; and book 3, *Against Julian*, chapter 8; *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapters 8 and 14; and often elsewhere; of Prosper, responses 3 and 7 to the Gauls, and response 11 to Vincentius; of Fulgentius, book 1 *To Monimus*, chapters 13 and following—who teach that God predestined no one to the evil of eternal punishment except on account of fault. This is also held by the Council of Valence under Lothair, chapter 3. Also

relevant here is the teaching of Damascene, cited often, book 2 *On the Faith*, chapter 29: that God does not of himself will evil for human beings, but is provoked by them. This is also gathered from all those Scriptures that teach that God condemns no one except on account of his sin. For although we said above that in predestination or election to glory there is no valid inference from the cause of reward to the cause of predestination or election, nonetheless here the inference from the cause of eternal punishment to the cause of reprobation to such punishment is most valid.

3. *It is corroborated by reason.*—And the reason is that God prepares reward from mercy and confers it from justice: but he cannot prepare punishment from mercy; and therefore neither does he prepare it from himself by an absolute will. He therefore prepares it only through just condemnation: and in this preparation positive reprobation is consummated. Therefore, just as a cause of condemnation is given, so too of reprobation. This is finally manifest in the acts in which we said above this reprobation is placed: for the absolute foreknowledge of a future sin presupposes on the part of the object that it is going to be future. The final sentence likewise, which is pronounced against the reprobate, is founded in his demerits. And from this, finally, follows that absolute will to deprive him of the Kingdom and to punish him. Therefore all those acts in which positive reprobation can consist have their foundation on the part of the human being who is to be reprobated.

4. *Second conclusion.*—I say, second: original sin is not the adequate cause of the reprobation of all those who are in fact damned. This assertion is most evident in the evil angels, who were reprobated without original sin. Furthermore, it is also certain to me in all those human beings to whom original sin has been remitted in this life. For what is the cause of reprobation is also the cause of eternal punishment: and conversely, what is not the cause of eternal punishment is not the cause of reprobation; but original sin that is remitted in this life is not the cause of eternal punishment: therefore it is not the cause of the reprobation of those human beings to whom it is at some point remitted. The minor is most certain, because when original sin is remitted, the eternal punishment owed to it is remitted: but once such fault and punishment have been remitted, they never return, because the gifts of God are without repentance; therefore original sin, once remitted, is not punished with eternal punishment: therefore it is not the cause of eternal punishment. The major of the principal argument is easily established from what has been said, because in this respect the account of reprobation is the same as that of condemnation: because reprobation is not effected by God except by way of condemnation, for

it is an act of vindictive justice having eternal damnation as its intrinsic terminus and, as it were, object. For although God has other acts of vindictive justice concerning sins, willing to inflict other punishments in vengeance for them, yet until he absolutely wills eternal punishment, he does not reprobate a human being: and this punishment he cannot will for anyone on account of original sin which he has remitted or is going to remit.

5. *An escape route. — It is closed off.*—And this argument proves not only that original sin is not the adequate cause of the positive reprobation of those human beings to whom it is remitted, but also that it is not even a partial cause, nor any cause at all of such reprobation. This is proved by applying the same argument with proportion, because those human beings are in no way damned on account of original sin, not even as a partial cause: therefore neither are they reprobated—because in this matter the account of reprobation is the same as that of damnation, as was explained. It can be responded that original sin, even if it is going to be remitted, is the source and root of all the sins that are afterward committed; and likewise that it is a motivating cause on account of which God justly wills not to give those human beings the congruous aids for not committing such sins, or for not persevering in them until death. In which will God perseveres, even if he remits original sin. To this it is responded: even if all this be conceded, it does not follow that original sin is the proper partial cause of reprobation when it is itself remitted, but at most it is a certain remote occasion and a removing of the prohibition. For that denial of congruous assistance is not the cause of sin: therefore neither is it the cause of reprobation, of which sin is the proper cause: therefore neither can remitted original sin be called the cause of reprobation, even if it were the cause of that denial of assistance.

6. *Third assertion.*—I say, third: in infants to whom original sin has never been remitted, the cause of positive reprobation is original sin itself—not precisely as contracted, but as persisting and enduring until death, and as foreseen by God under that condition. The first part is clear, because the cause on the part of the reprobate human being of his own reprobation is the same as that of his damnation, as has often been said: but in these infants the whole cause of their damnation is original sin: therefore the same is the cause of their reprobation. And from this the second part is easily proved, because sin is not the cause of damnation except under that condition—*if it persists until death*—which is included in that conditional sentence pronounced by Christ: *Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the Kingdom of God.* Therefore likewise original sin is not the cause of reprobation except given that

condition foreseen—namely, that it will persist until death. For it has already been said many times that in this respect the account of the cause of reprobation and of condemnation is the same. What we shall presently confirm concerning actual sins.

7. *The opinion of some is not approved.*—Nor is the opinion of those to be approved who except certain infants from this general rule: because that exception is founded on no probable reason, and the argument made applies equally to all. For, as was seen above, God did not have an absolute will to exclude any infant from the Kingdom by force of original sin alone, until he foresaw from other general and ordinary causes that they would come to die in that sin and without the application of the remedy—he himself permitting it, which God decreed to permit from his general providence and free will. This permission pertains more to negative than to positive reprobation. But positively, God never willed antecedently, so to speak, and of himself not to apply such a remedy to any infant, or for that infant to persist in original sin until death—and therefore neither did he will to reprobate any positively, until he foresaw his perseverance in original sin, as has been said. From this the assertion can be extended to adults, in whom original sin is at times a cause of reprobation, at least partial, insofar as they persist in that sin together with others until death, and not otherwise: because, as I said, if it is remitted before death, it will in no way be a proper cause, even if one is reprobated on account of other sins.

8. *Final assertion.*—Finally, therefore, I say: in adults the cause of reprobation is final sin—whether one or multiple, whether original or actual mortal, or both together, if they are not remitted until death. So teach the authors cited above, and in particular Bellarmine, book 2, *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 16; Horantius, book 5, *Of Catholic Loci*, chapter 9—who say this is the opinion of Augustine. The reason is the same: because the cause of positive reprobation is the same as the cause of damnation; but adults are not condemned on account of original or actual sins except with that condition fulfilled: *If they persist in them until death*—which is contained in this: *Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish.* For just as merits are not in effect the cause of glorification except under that condition posited by the Council of Trent—*if one departs in grace*—so neither is any sin the cause of the perdition of an adult except under the said condition of its persistence until death: therefore it is the cause of reprobation under the same condition, and not otherwise. And just as the adequate cause of condemnation arises from the whole accumulation of sins that are not remitted before death, so too the cause of reprobation

embraces all of them, and that accumulation is signified by the name of final sin. And as we said of infants, so much the more is it to be said of adults: that God cannot of himself will the persistence of an adult human being in the state of mortal sin until death, because this would be to will of himself the evil of fault—as Augustine rightly indicated, *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 13, and Prosper in response 2 to the objections of the Gauls. God therefore foresees the state of the adult in sin until death, and then reprobates him: and in this way final sin is the cause of reprobation.

9. *The words of Paul are clarified.*—Nor do those words of Paul press against this doctrine: *Before they had done anything good or evil,* etc.—because, as I said, they are sufficiently explained as referring to negative reprobation, or non-predestination. Some press, however, by urging those words: *He made certain vessels unto honor, and certain ones unto dishonor.* For these seem to signify a positive ordination. And therefore Augustine, letter 106, thinks they necessarily presuppose fault, at least original. But in truth this is not sufficient in human beings, as I showed, and in angels it has no place. Therefore those words also must necessarily be understood negatively or permissively—that is: he made vessels unto dishonor, namely, he did not make them unto that honor for which he prepared the others; or he made vessels that he foreknew by their own works would be unto dishonor, and this he freely permitted. For Scripture is accustomed to speak of permission as if it were a positive action or command, to declare its certainty and that it wholly depends on the divine will.

CHAPTER VII
ON THE EFFECTS OF REPROBATION, ESPECIALLY ON THE PERMISSION OF SIN

1. First, it is certain that reprobation has some effects, because reprobation is a part of providence; and the providence of God has some effects *ad extra*—indeed, from certain effects we are compelled to attribute this part, or aspect, of providence to God. From this it is also, second, certain that the effects of reprobation are effects of God, because God is himself the very reason of his own providence, and he is the author of those effects of which providence is the cause. Therefore, nothing can be an effect of reprobation that is not also an effect of God.

2. *Sin cannot be numbered among the effects of reprobation.*—From this, third, all theologians conclude, together with the Master in Book 1, distinction 40, and St. Thomas, Part 1, question 23, article 3, that sin cannot be an effect of

reprobation, because it cannot be an effect of God, and nothing proceeds from reprobation that is not from God. Hence all establish this difference between predestination and reprobation: although merits are the cause of the final effect of predestination, and demerits are likewise the cause of the final effect of reprobation, nonetheless merits are effects of predestination, whereas demerits are not effects of reprobation—because merits proceed from divine intention and preparation, whereas demerits do not proceed from God in this way, since this is repugnant to his goodness and will.

3. Nor is it necessary to distinguish here between sin that is only guilt and sin that is also a punishment for a prior guilt, as some have distinguished—but not correctly, because sin under no aspect can be an effect of God, and consequently not of reprobation either. For even if we were to grant that in some sin a relation or denomination of punishment is added, such punishment taken in its particular sense would intrinsically include the aspect of guilt, which God can neither will nor ordain to exist. And therefore, even granting such punishment, one would have to deny rather that God is its cause. The truer view, however, is that guilt itself is not a punishment, but that the permission of guilt —or the denial of a congruous help for avoiding guilt—is the punishment, which is far different, as I shall now say. And the same must be said about the ordination to a state of guilt and about its duration: for all these things, insofar as they formally include the evil of guilt, cannot be effects of God, and consequently not of reprobation. The permission of them, however, is from God; but whether it is also from reprobation, we shall see. On this point one may consult what I treated at length in Book 1, 2, *On Helps*, chapter 4.

4. *The effects of reprobation are reduced to two headings.—Whether the permission of sin is an effect of reprobation.*—Fourth and finally, I gather from what has been said that all the effects of reprobation can be reduced to two headings, namely: the evil of punishment, and the permission of the evil of guilt —not that every evil of punishment or every permission of the evil of guilt is an effect of reprobation, for it is self-evident that this is not so; but conversely, that every effect of reprobation must necessarily be contained under one of these two headings. The reason is that reprobation is ordered toward evil, and every evil is either of punishment—which can be directly from God—or of guilt—which can at least be permitted or not prevented by God. It remains to be seen, then, which of these evils, or which permissions, arise from reprobation. The first and principal question, therefore, is about the permission of future sin. On this there is a first opinion simply affirming that every permission of the sin of a reprobate is an effect of his reprobation. So St. Thomas indicates in the said article 3, reply

to 2, and article 5, reply to 3; Durandus in Book 1, distinction 41, question 2; Gregory, question 1, article 1; Marsilius, question 41, article 1; Driedo in the *Concordia*, Part 1, question 3. The foundation can be: because this permission is an effect of divine providence, and it is not an effect of predestination; therefore it is of reprobation—because the whole of providence concerning human beings is concluded by these two parts. This can be confirmed, because although this permission is not the cause of sin, and consequently is not the cause of the final effect of reprobation either, it is nonetheless in some way an occasion, or, speaking more precisely, it is the removal of what could have impeded those effects; therefore as such it falls under the providence of the whole of reprobation, for this providence encompasses not only the proper causes of reprobation but also everything from which reprobation can in some way follow.

5. *This opinion is challenged.*—This opinion, however, has a special difficulty with respect to the first permission—one which in a human being presupposes no guilt—for that permission cannot have the aspect of punishment, nor can it in any way pertain to retributive justice; yet all of reprobation pertains to this justice, as we have said. Therefore that permission can in no way pertain to reprobation. And this is especially confirmed with respect to the first permission of the sin of human nature, for that permission was common to reprobates and predestined alike; just as that sin from its own nature equally harmed all, therefore that permission could not have been an effect of reprobation.

6. *The second opinion.*—Because of these considerations there is a second opinion, which distinguishes between the first permission and subsequent ones: and concerning the first it concedes that it is not an effect of reprobation, for the reasons given; but concerning the others it affirms that they are. Because the second permission (and so for the others) already presupposes guilt on the part of the human being, and thus can be a punishment for a prior sin, according to that text of Romans 2: *for which reason God delivered them up to a reprobate mind*; therefore it can be an effect of reprobation. And this is confirmed, because such a permission already begins to pertain to the hardening of the sinner; and hardening is an effect of reprobation, as is gathered from Romans 9 and frequently taught by Augustine, especially in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 14: *Just as the effect of predestination* (he says) *is the bestowal of grace, so in a certain manner the effect of eternal reprobation seems to be hardening.* Note there the phrase *in a certain manner*, which seems placed there to indicate a difference. For predestination is the proper and *per se* cause of grace; but

reprobation is not thus the cause of hardening, but only because it does not prevent it, insofar as it is *the cause of not having mercy*, as the same Augustine said in Book 1, *To Simplician*, question 2—and that *not having mercy* is to permit; therefore reprobation is the cause of this permission.

7. *This opinion is not admitted.—A twofold permission of sin is distinguished.*—This opinion, however, in the first place has no application to the reprobation of angels, in which there was not a first and a second permission but a single one, because they were damned on account of the first sin. Furthermore, it does not seem to apply to infants, who are reprobated on account of original sin alone; for just as in them there is but one sin, so also there seems to be but one permission. Yet in them a twofold permission can be distinguished: one of falling into or contracting original sin (for although these could be distinguished in strict terms, nonetheless according to the common law and apart from a special privilege they are not separated, and so I now count them as one), and another, which is the permission of remaining in original sin until death. It can therefore be said that, although the former is not an effect of reprobation, this latter one is. But this holds only with respect to negative reprobation, as I shall say presently—not with respect to positive reprobation, of which the said authors speak. And furthermore their opinion cannot proceed in the case of permissions of those sins which are entirely and completely remitted to many reprobates in this life. For I said above that an effect of predestination must necessarily, in the thing itself and in fact, contribute to eternal beatitude; therefore by a similar reasoning, and maintaining proportion, it will pertain to an effect of reprobation that the harm resulting therefrom endure perpetually; but sins that are entirely remitted do not inflict perpetual harm; therefore their permissions, even if they come after others, will not be effects of reprobation.

8. *Others make a different distinction.*—Therefore others distinguish differently concerning permission. For either the sin that results from it is the cause of eternal damnation, or it is not. If the former, that permission is an effect of reprobation for the prior reasons, and because nothing is lacking to it to fulfill the true aspect of an effect. Concerning the latter, however, they deny this, for the last reason given. But even the first member does not seem to be able to stand. For even if the guilt subsequent to the permission is the cause of eternal damnation, the permission itself is nonetheless not guilt; and although it is a non-impediment of the cause, it was not willed by God with the intention that guilt and damnation would ultimately follow. Now we said above that it belongs to the aspect of an effect of predestination that it come from the intention of eternal salvation, toward which predestination tends; therefore it will likewise

belong to the aspect of an effect of reprobation that it come from the intention of eternal damnation, which constitutes the proper and final effect of reprobation. Therefore neither can that permission be an effect of positive reprobation.

9. *A different distinction must be made.*—It therefore seems to me that a different distinction must be made concerning reprobation itself. For there is positive reprobation, and there is negative reprobation—voluntary in God through a positive act—which we have above called non-predestination. First, then, it must be said that the effect of positive reprobation does not begin with the permission of sin but with the punishment that remains in the future life on account of sin, or with another that is necessarily conjoined with it. The first part, concerning permission, follows necessarily from what has been said. For we have shown that this reprobation begins with foreknowledge of final sin; therefore whatever, on God's part, precedes this foreknowledge cannot be an effect of reprobation, because an effect does not precede its cause. But the will to permit sin, and the permission itself as foreknown, precedes the foreknowledge of future sin, because sin cannot exist unless it is first permitted; therefore the permission of sin cannot be an effect of positive reprobation. And this argument proves universally with respect to the permission of every sin, because it proves with respect to the permission of the final sin, and therefore *a fortiori* with respect to the others. Furthermore, the argument made above is also cogent to me, because nothing is an effect of this reprobation except what is done by God from the already deliberate intention of damning a human being on account of his sins—as has been said, with proportion maintained, concerning predestination. But the permission of sin does not proceed from this divine intention, since this intention is founded on human guilt, viewed not in just any way but as already desperate and final. Therefore.

10. *In this life there is no effect of positive reprobation.*—From this it is understood that in this life there is no effect of this positive reprobation, but that its effects begin in the future life, as soon as a human being begins to be punished, or to be handed over to tormentors for punishment. This is touched upon in the second part of the assertion. And it is confirmed, because after the aforesaid foreknowledge of the final sin, there follows a divine judgment against such a guilty person, or sinner, and then the will to punish him; but before this will the effects of this reprobation do not begin; therefore they begin from it. But from this will there follows *per se* only the punishment of the other life, which is purely retributive. For the punishments of this life, on God's part, can be

medicinal, if a human being is willing to be converted; therefore only the punishment of the other life is an effect of reprobation.

11. The sole exception that can be made to this rule is death itself in such a state, which death occurs in this life and is usually a punishment for preceding sins. For this reason I added the final part of the assertion, because this punishment is so joined to the eternal punishment that it can be counted as almost the same as it. It must be noted, however, that such death sometimes occurs from a special ordination and causality of God—as, for example, in the case of Dathan and Abiron—and then such punishment is most properly an effect of positive reprobation; for before that death was foreseen, we understand God to have decreed to damn this human being on account of such sins, and to have ordained that death to this end: which is like handing a person still living into the hands of his enemy and tormentor. Ordinarily, however, it does not happen this way, but death in such a state comes about from general causes, with God permitting it. And then, the absolute foreknowledge of the final sin does not as such precede that permission; because through death itself that sin becomes the final sin; hence only conditional foreknowledge precedes it—by which God foreknew that that sin would be the final one if he were to permit and not prevent such a person's death. And therefore in that case that death, or punishment, is not properly an effect of positive reprobation, because before that permitted death, foreseen as absolutely future, the sentence and decree of damning such a person is not yet understood to have been issued.

12. *The permission of sin is an effect of negative reprobation.—Two things are included in the permission of sin.*—Second, it must be said that the permission of the sin proper and specific to a reprobate is an effect of negative reprobation, or of non-predestination. In this sense I understand the opinion of St. Thomas and the others. Now, in order that this be understood and proved, it must be noted that two things are included in the permission of sin. One is positive, namely the concurrence that God wills to give to the will for bringing about the act of sin, if it wills to do so; and with respect to this, permission is never properly called an effect of any reprobation, because it is an effect of the common providence that God, as first cause and universal governor, owes in a certain manner to secondary causes. This is also evident because it is not an effect of positive reprobation, as has been shown; nor of negative reprobation either, because from a negation *per se* nothing positive follows.

13. *A twofold will of God is considered.*—The second thing in the permission of sin is the denial of help that God sees would be congruous for preventing such a sin, if he were willing to give it, and which he nonetheless

does not will to give—or rather, wills not to give. Here again a twofold will of God can be considered. One is the will that directly and immediately regards the permission itself, or the denial of help, as its object; and regarding this will it is established that such denial is an effect of that will, in the way that a negation can have a cause—not through a positive influx but through the withdrawal of influx. And this would suffice to prove the conclusion, because that will not to give such help pertains to negative reprobation, as was declared above; therefore if permission, in this respect, is an effect of this will, it is also an effect of negative reprobation. The other will is more remote, namely the will not to pre-elect this person to glory; and concerning this there could be greater doubt as to whether this causal proposition is true: *God permits this person to sin because he did not choose him for glory.* For since that prior negation is not an intention of an end but rather a negation of intention, it does not seem to have any causality over the posterior negation.

14. Nonetheless, St. Augustine frequently speaks in that way, as one may see in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 14, where he says that an efficacious calling is not given to the reprobate *because he was not set apart from the mass of perdition in a higher manner.* And this is probable, because this mode of causality is not positive but negative—in the way, namely, that a negation is the cause of a negation when an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation; and so it is in the present case. For election to an end is the reason for giving efficacious, or infallible, means toward it; therefore the negation of that election will in its own way be the reason for not giving means that are known to be congruous and infallible for attaining that end. Nor does any new difficulty remain on this point.

15. I said, moreover, that this is to be understood of the permission that is special and proper to the reprobate, for the reasons touched upon while reviewing the other opinions. For the common permission of original sin, or of Adam's sin, cannot truly be attributed to the reprobation of anyone; and there can be others also from common providence, especially when the sins that occur given such permissions in fact contribute nothing to the effect of reprobation—for with respect to these the arguments made against the second opinion proceeded correctly.

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER VIII
WHETHER REPROBATION IN SOME WAY TAKES AWAY THE FREEDOM OF THE REPROBATE

1. *In this question the discussion concerns adults only.*—The question applies only to adults, as is self-evident, because infants are not capable of freedom. And as far as the matter is concerned, it has no difficulty, given what we have said. For either we are dealing with freedom as regards the power of doing good, or as regards the power of avoiding evil or also of committing it, or of omitting a necessary good. Concerning the power of committing evil or of not doing good, there is no dispute: for such acts are without doubt found in reprobates, and therefore so is the power for them. Hence one might rather ask how, with respect to these acts, there is no necessity.

2. Therefore, as regards the other power—of doing good and avoiding evil—that it is not taken away by positive reprobation is proved plainly from what has been said: because this reprobation presupposes the evil use of that power, since it presupposes guilt that has been foreseen; therefore it is impossible that it take away the power for such use, since otherwise it would destroy itself. Likewise, with respect to this, the same reasoning applies to this reprobation as to God's foreknowledge, because this reprobation presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of a future event; and foreknowledge does not take away freedom or any power, because it presupposes the future effect and sees it as it is future. Therefore similarly, etc. Finally, this reprobation has no effect in this life upon the human being himself with respect to his human acts, as was shown above; therefore it cannot give or take away any power, nor alter the free mode of acting in this life.

3. The same can easily be demonstrated concerning negative reprobation, or the negation of predestination: because on account of it a human being is not deprived of sufficient help for doing good and avoiding evil, as was shown in the preceding chapters; therefore on the part of grace, freedom from sinning is not taken away. Furthermore, through the will not to choose or not to give a congruous calling, God does nothing positive in the human will, because God's volition concerns only a certain negation; therefore by force of that volition the natural mode of acting of the human will is not changed; therefore it is neither necessitated nor determined toward not doing good or toward doing evil. Freedom therefore remains intact, notwithstanding reprobation. Here, however,

there would arise a lengthy dispute with those who teach that a physical predetermination of the human will made by God alone is necessary for the works of sinners. But I have judged that this controversy is not to be treated in this work; see what was said in Book 2, *On Helps*.

4. Since, then, these things that concern the matter are true, there remains a difficulty concerning manner of speaking: whether it is simply true that it is in the power of a human being who is damned not only not to be damned but also not to be reprobated—indeed even not to lack predestination. For the affirmative part seems plainly to follow from what has been said. And to make it harder to understand, the word *Can* must be taken not only in the divided sense but also in the composite sense. With respect to this, however, there is a difference between positive and negative reprobation: for in positive reprobation the absolute foreknowledge of the future event is presupposed—namely, perseverance in sin unto death—and consequently the absolute will of God to damn the person is also included; and therefore in this reprobation it is manifest that, given that supposition, the contrary event cannot be compounded with it. Hence it follows that, in the composite sense taken from the side of the object, as I declared above, those locutions are false—and this without prejudice to freedom, because the supposition that is posited is entirely consequent and in no way antecedent, and thus takes away no freedom from the subject itself.

5. *The same is proved concerning negative reprobation.*—But in negative reprobation the situation seems otherwise, because it neither presupposes absolute foreknowledge of the future event, nor does it include the absolute will to damn the person; therefore by force of this reprobation there is no repugnance, nor does it imply a contradiction, that together with it the eternal salvation of the person be posited in reality, since this is neither contrary to God's foreknowledge nor to the divine will. Therefore, speaking of this reprobation, all those locutions must be admitted, even in the composite sense with the composition placed in the object. And if this is admitted, it further follows that it is in the power of a non-predestined person to bring it about that he be predestined, in keeping with what is customarily cited from Augustine (but is not actually found in him): *If you are not predestined, bring it about that you be predestined.* For the inference is evident: because if it is in the power of a human being not to be reprobated, then also to be positively predestined—since these two are immediately opposed and the lack of reprobation is not removed except by positing predestination. But the consequent conflicts with what was said above. For if it is in a human being's power to bring it about that he be predestined, then—as Augustine argues in a parallel case in *Retractions* Book 1,

chapter 21, and frequently elsewhere—it is in his will; therefore a human being can by his own will give cause to his predestination. For he can in some way give cause to his justification and glorification for this reason: that through his own power and will, with the help of divine grace, he can do something by which he is justified and glorified. Therefore if he can do something by which he is predestined, he will be able to be the cause of his own predestination—the contrary of which has been stated.

6. *Various ways of speaking about these locutions.*—Modern theologians dispute among themselves about these locutions. Some consider that they must be entirely denied, for the reason given, and because we have said that negative reprobation has no cause on the part of the human being but depends on the sole free will of God; and what is of this kind is not placed within the power of a human being. Others, however, consider that it is necessary to admit those locutions, because otherwise the ruin of a human being would not ultimately be resolved into himself but into God, who did not predestine him—and thus not to be predestined by God and to be positively reprobated would come to the same thing, because salvation, given non-predestination, would be equally impossible as given positive reprobation. Nor do they think it follows from this that one can give cause to the whole of predestination, because God's preventing help is always presupposed on his part—so that we can say that it is in such a person's power not to lack predestination. It only follows, they say, that it is in the power of a human being to bring it about that such help pertains to predestination and that its effect follow. And this seems altogether true to these authors, because it is in the power of a human being to bring it about that that help be efficacious, since it is in the power of a human being for it to have its effect or not; but if it is efficacious, it will be a help of predestination; therefore it is in the power of a human being to bring it about that it be such.

7. This latter opinion is rightly and consistently defended by those authors who do not admit conditional foreknowledge; and among them Catharinus followed it most of all. He consistently asserted that many who were not pre-elected, nor called by a determined intention of God so efficaciously as to be converted infallibly, do in fact convert and are saved. This opinion, however, presupposes many things that we cannot in any way prove. One is that there is no certain foreknowledge of future things under a condition. Another is that some people not pre-elected to glory are in fact saved prior to the absolute foreknowledge of future works. A third is that God does not absolutely and in particular predefine the conversion and perseverance of those who are to be saved, prior to his absolute foreknowledge of it. For unless all of these are

presupposed—or their contraries received as true—that opinion involves a contradiction, as the arguments given show.

8. *Conclusion.*—I say, therefore, that it is not in the power of a human being, together with divine non-election, or non-predestination, or (what is the same thing) together with negative reprobation, actually to posit or compound his eternal salvation. This resolution is easily established by more fully explaining the foundation of the first opinion and by responding to the foundation of the other. In order to grasp the reason behind that opinion, the distinction between positive and negative reprobation must be kept in view. For not being positively reprobated is in the power of a human being in the same way that not being condemned, or being saved, is—because we have already shown that in this matter the best argument is drawn from damnation itself to positive reprobation, since this reprobation is not immediately opposed to predestination but to approval or glorification. But negative reprobation is immediately opposed to predestination, and therefore no more can the one be in the free power of a human being than the other. From which it plainly follows that, given the supposition of non-predestination, the salvation of a human being—which befalls only the predestined—cannot be compounded with it.

9. *The difficulty is resolved.*—To the difficulty raised it is responded that, even though no absolute knowledge in God is presupposed, nor any decree to exclude such persons from the Kingdom, nonetheless conditional knowledge is presupposed—which, joined to the will of permitting the fall, or of not giving such help as is foreknown to be congruous, passes into absolute knowledge; and this is sufficient for the effect to be infallible. Nor does it follow from this that God from himself and by his own will reprobates such persons by positive reprobation; it follows only that from himself he does not predestine them, and that he wills to permit the guilt—which is true and involves no inconvenience. Finally, it matters little that it is in the power of a human being actually to act with God's justifying help, and that if he does so, the help will already be congruous and efficacious. For since God has foreseen that the person would not have made use of such power, together with that power it is infallible that such help will not be congruous or efficacious. Now, it is not in the power of a human being to bring it about that God prepare for him the help that he knows will be congruous—but this depends entirely on the free will of God.

END OF BOOK FIVE

BOOK SIX
ON CERTAIN COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE PREDESTINED AND THE REPROBATES, OR BETWEEN PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION

After treating predestination and reprobation separately, it remains, for the completion of this work, to compare them with one another—or rather, the persons who are determined as predestined or reprobate—with respect to certain conditions or properties that contribute to a perfect knowledge of supernatural providence. Now, in the predestined and the reprobate, three things arise in which they can be compared: namely, the gifts of grace in this life, the certainty of eternal salvation, and the number or multitude of persons in each order. In predestination and reprobation, on the other hand, one can consider the points in which they seem to agree and to differ, and how they are compared to the whole of supernatural providence.

CHAPTER I
WHETHER A PREDESTINED PERSON ALWAYS RECEIVES GREATER GIFTS OF GRACE IN THIS LIFE THAN A REPROBATE

1. *Reason for doubt.*—The reason for doubt is that gifts of grace are either sanctifying grace with the infused habits, or acts of the virtues pertaining to cooperating grace, or callings and helps of operating grace. In all of these, reprobates sometimes seem to exceed the predestined. The first is evident, because a reprobate sometimes attains greater holiness in this life for a period of time than a predestined person attains throughout his whole life. This will be easily apparent by comparing an adult who for some time of his life acts holily but then dies in sin, with an infant baptized and dying with only the grace of baptism. Hence the same is evident concerning good acts: for sometimes someone is saved with only a single act of contrition or attrition, while others are damned who for a longer time and through many periods of their lives performed outstanding acts of virtue. From this it is also clear that the same must be said concerning the helps of operating grace—both because those acts proceed from such helps, and because reprobates are sometimes efficaciously called to a state of perfection which, for example, a predestined person is not called to. Therefore, etc. For this reason, Soto, in Book 1, *On Nature and Grace*,

chapter 16, and Vega, Book 6, *On the Council of Trent*, chapter 9, seem to affirm this part absolutely. And this is especially the view of those who think that a cause of predestination can be given, or that some who are not pre-elected are saved—especially those who simultaneously deny conditional foreknowledge and do not admit physical predetermination.

2. *The argument on the contrary side.*—On the contrary side: the primary reason, in the order of execution, why this one is saved and not that one, is that God willed to show special mercy to this one and not to the other, according to that text: *He has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens*, Romans 9. Now this mercy consists in the conferral of some special grace, and hardening consists in the denial of a similar grace, as Augustine taught in Book 1, *To Simplician*, question 2. Therefore the predestined and the reprobate are always so unequal that the predestined exceeds in some special gift of grace. And this excess seems to consist in two things. One is that the will of the predestined is prepared in some special manner in which the will of the reprobate is not prepared, as Augustine treats at length in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapters 6, 8, 10, and 16, and frequently elsewhere; Prosper in Book 2, *On the Calling of the Nations*, chapter 8 (otherwise chapter 23); in his response to the Genoese, response 3; and in his response to the Gauls, response 5. Gregory likewise holds this view, homily 30 on the Gospels. The other is the gift of perseverance, which is given to the predestined but not to the reprobate; and this is a special gift of grace, as Augustine treats at length in the entire book *On the Gift of Perseverance*. And it was taught by Innocent I, Letter 91 (among the letters of Augustine), Celestine, Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, chapter 7, and finally the Council of Trent, session 6. For these reasons other modern theologians consider this part also to hold.

3. In order to give the true resolution of this question briefly, it is necessary to distinguish those things that follow *per se* and necessarily from predestination from those that are in some way accidental—insofar as they do not follow from the aspect of predestination as such—because, although from this or that more or less perfect predestination they can follow to a greater or lesser degree, they are nonetheless not *per se* necessary to predestination as such. Of the first kind are some justification (under which I include the efficacious calling, insofar as it is necessary for justice) and perseverance unto death in justice; for these two suffice for predestination to be completed. Of the second kind are more abundant gifts of grace, whether habitual or actual, because without these a predestined person can be saved, unless the terminus of his predestination is so excellent as to require all of them. The comparison, therefore, in order to be

instructive and capable of falling under knowledge, must be made with respect to those things that are *per se*; for in those that are accidental, great variety is possible.

4. *First conclusion.*—Hence, first of all, it must be said that in the latter gifts of grace a reprobate can surpass many predestined persons. This is proved by the reasoning set out first in the statement of the reason for doubt. And furthermore it is proved by induction. For Lucifer was created in greater grace than any of the holy angels. The same is per se clear in the case of human beings. The reason is already touched upon: because since those gifts are not necessary in that abundance and perfection for predestination as such, there is no need for them to be given to all the predestined; and since they alone do not suffice for eternal salvation without perseverance, they can by God's free judgment be communicated to reprobates—for although those persons are not simply and absolutely predestined, they can nonetheless be preordained and predefined to attain some degree of grace in this life. Therefore nothing prevents a reprobate from at times surpassing a predestined person in these benefits.

5. *Second conclusion.*—Second, it must be said that the predestined always receives some gift of grace that is not communicated to the reprobate, by reason of which the other gifts—even if they do not appear greater in their being, or even appear lesser—are in their order toward attaining salvation more efficacious, and thus greater in the aspect of grace and benefit. This assertion is proved by the arguments proposed in the second place. And it is furthermore briefly explained. For first, the predestined perseveres in grace unto death, and the reprobate does not; and this is a special gift of God, as is certain and has just been briefly proved. It must be noted, however, that from this it does not follow that the predestined necessarily exceeds in some intrinsic gift inhering in him; for this is not always necessary for perseverance, beyond the common justifying grace. Rather, it suffices that there be a special providence of God—either removing evil occasions and obstacles to salvation, or ordaining in some way that death befall the person in a good state—according to that text: *He was taken away lest evil alter his understanding.* And thus an infant is saved with only the grace of baptism and receives the gift of perseverance, not through some new intrinsic gift inhering in him—for it cannot be a habit or its intention, as is self-evident, nor an actual motion, because the infant is not capable of it and has no need of it—but rather it will be a special providence of God concerning his death, which in fact benefits him more toward attaining eternal salvation than many good works and a great increase of grace benefit some adult in whom they

ultimately do not persevere. The same difference among adults can easily be considered.

6. Second, pertaining to this distinction, there is some calling efficacious in a special manner that is given to the predestined and not to the reprobate, of which Augustine frequently speaks in the cited passages and elsewhere, calling it *lofty and secret.* An illustrious example of this is found among the angels: for in the first instant of creation all received a congruous calling to dispose themselves toward initial justice; but in the second instant, in which they were to deliberate fully so as to complete their course, an efficacious calling was given to the predestined, and was not given to the others; and from the difference in this gift there arose also the difference in eternal salvation. The same can be considered among human beings—especially in the case of two who are already near death and exist in mortal sin: for to one an efficacious calling to repentance is sometimes given, while to the other it is not, and then both die at once. This diversity is therefore necessary, because actual conversion (according to the true teaching) does not occur without an efficacious calling.

7. *A question.*—Here, however, there arises the question whether in these events it is necessary that the predestined exceed the reprobate in some greater intrinsic help of grace, or at least in some greater providence that removes the obstacles to conversion—so that it is simply true to say that the predestined on that occasion receives greater help. But because I treated this matter thoroughly in Book 3, *On Helps*, chapters 20 and 21, I respond by distinguishing between actual help that accompanies as a mode of concurrence or actual influx and help that precedes as a mode of principle. Concerning the former, it must be said that the predestined always exceeds in some such help, other things being equal, because he always exceeds in some conversion or final good disposition, which is not had without this help, nor is this help given without it. But concerning the other preceding help, it is not *per se* necessary, because if such a greater help were *per se* necessary on the part of the principle for actual conversion, one who did not have it would not receive sufficient help for conversion—since something is lacking to him that is *per se* necessary and is not in his power, given that it is said to pertain to the grace of calling. Furthermore, either the one who receives greater help can nonetheless not be converted, or he cannot. The latter cannot be said, according to the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 4, because such a preemotion would take away freedom, since it is antecedent. But if the former is said: then with that same help it is possible for one to be converted and another not; therefore greater help is not required in the one who is converted.

7. Nonetheless, as I intimated in the final part of the conclusion, such help in the one who is converted has the aspect of a greater benefit and a greater grace. For these two are very different: to be a greater help and to be a greater benefit. For greater help signifies being a greater and more powerful principle for acting—which a congruous calling does not always have, as I showed. But a greater benefit says only that such help is given from God's greater love, and is therefore conferred at the opportunity and time that God foreknew would be suited for it to infallibly produce its effect in that person. In this the predestined exceeds the reprobate with respect to that calling on which at least the final salvation depends.

CHAPTER II
HOW THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED AND THE REPROBATES IS CERTAIN

1. We suppose that each number is certain. For concerning the predestined Paul says in 2 Timothy 2: *The firm foundation of God stands; the Lord knows those who are his*; and the Church says in a certain prayer: *O God, to whom alone is known the number of the elect to be placed in eternal happiness.* And the same reason applies to the number of the reprobates, because the knowledge of God is eternal—whether goods or evils that are to come to pass in time are, from eternity, certain to him. Hence on this point there can be no dissent among Catholics, even though some attribute the contrary position to Catharinus and the Massilians. But they spoke in a different sense, as will be evident.

2. One may object, however, that predestination and reprobation are not certain and infallible; therefore the number cannot be certain either. The antecedent is evident, because what is infallible is unavoidable, what is unavoidable is necessary—but these cannot be attributed to predestination or reprobation; therefore neither can that. I propose this only to clarify the terms. For *certain* and *infallible* connote a relation to knowledge; and therefore they can and should be attributed simply and without distinction to predestination and to the number of the predestined. But *unavoidable* and *necessary* express a relation to causality and effect, and therefore are not to be admitted without distinguishing the composite and divided senses, in the sense declared in the preceding chapters. Hence what is certain is not always simply unavoidable in relation to its proximate cause, but only on the supposition that the cause that is foreseen as doing this thing already exists—which is that supposition of which Aristotle said: *What is, when it is, necessarily is.*

3. *Doubt.—First opinion.*—This being established, theologians raise a doubt about the mode of this certainty. Concerning this, Catharinus distinguished between the number of the predestined and the number of those to be saved, and said of the former that it is certain in the decree of the divine will—indeed even necessary, as we saw above; but of the latter he said it is not certain in the will of God but only in the foreknowledge of all human actions from the beginning of life to the end. In this opinion the Massilians seem to have been, as is gathered from the letter of Hilary to Augustine, in those words: *They likewise do not accept that they wish the number of those to be chosen and received to be fixed*—namely, in the decree of God's will, as Augustine taught. Hence these authors say the same *a fortiori* concerning the number of the reprobates.

4. *This opinion is challenged.*—This opinion in the first place presupposes a bad division between the number of those to be saved and the predestined, against which I showed above that all who are to be saved are predestined. It then presupposes two false principles. One is that not all who are saved are pre-elected; the other is that God does not foreknow contingent future things under a condition before decreeing anything concerning the salvation of human beings. And therefore there is no need to say more against this opinion.

5. Other modern authors, sharply opposing this opinion, fell into the other extreme, saying that each number—both of the predestined and of the reprobates—is certain in some decree of God's will that preceded all foreknowledge of future things, both absolute and conditional. This opinion, however, has been sufficiently challenged in the preceding chapters: because neither could God fittingly have such a decree concerning the reprobates prior to absolute foreknowledge, unless we wish to make God the author of all evil, nor does such a decree have application to the predestined prior to conditional foreknowledge, unless the freedom of the will is damaged. Finally, each person, according to the mode of predestination he posits, also admits such a foundation for this certainty; and therefore it is not necessary to go through each opinion in turn or to challenge them individually, because they must be challenged from their foundation—that is, from the mode of predestination.

6. *First assertion.*—We therefore, consistently with the mode of predestination we have set forth, say that in the number of the predestined two things can be considered: namely, that it not be greater, and that it not be lesser. I say, first: by force of that decree by which God elects such persons to glory, it is certain that the number of the predestined will be in such a multitude and not in a lesser one. This is proved because, since it is an absolute decree, it cannot fail. Now this certainty is not repugnant to the freedom of the predestined, on

account of the conditional foreknowledge that it presupposes, as I have often declared.

7. *Second assertion.*—Second, I say that with respect to the other part—namely, that that number will not be greater—the certainty is to be drawn from another will, by which God determined not to elect more persons nor to prepare efficacious means for others, because prior to this will there is in no principle an infallible negation of a greater number. Hence it consequently follows that in this latter will—given also the conditional foreknowledge and the will to create so great a multitude of angels or human beings—the number of the reprobates is also certain: not because of the efficacy of such a will in the positive sense regarding the effects of reprobation or regarding the guilt that is their cause, but because of conditional foreknowledge together with the decree of permitting the condition, as was also declared above.

8. From this, finally, the difference is understood that St. Thomas in this place, article 7, posits between the number of the predestined and that of the reprobates. For he says the former is certain *by a certain singular divine predefinition*—for so he rightly called the election of God. He also says the latter is not certain by such a predefinition. One may ask, however, whether it is certain by some predefinition. On this point a distinction must be made (with Cajetan in the same place) between the reprobates as human beings or angels, and as reprobates. For in the former sense their number is certain from some predefinition of God—that is, from some absolute will of God: for that effect is such that God will bring it about, and in large part he alone; hence it is also such that he can will it from himself and absolutely. I do not think, however, that in this there is equality between the reprobates and the predestined (although Cajetan holds the opposite), for the number of the predestined is predefined for its own sake, whereas the number of the reprobates is predefined for the sake of the good of the predestined themselves—as St. Thomas expressly teaches there, and which was the opinion of Augustine in Book 4, *Against Julian*, chapter 4; and therefore that prior will is rightly called a singular predefinition. But insofar as such human beings or angels are reprobates, their number is not certain from a predefinition of that effect, but from permission, given conditional foreknowledge, as was declared above. I say the number is not certain from a predefinition of that effect—for if someone were to call it a predefinition, the will that God had of not pre-electing these people and not preparing congruous means for them, then that number is also certain by force of such a predefinition. But this manner of speaking is improper and far from customary,

because since that will does not concern a positive effect but only a certain negation, it is considered to pertain rather to permission.

CHAPTER III
WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED IS GREATER THAN THAT OF THE REPROBATES

1. *All who depart from life in mortal sin are reprobates.—First comparison.* —I suppose that all who die or end their life in mortal sin are reprobates—so that there is no need here to challenge the errors of those who assert that all, or some, of the damned will at some time be saved and consequently are already predestined, from which the number of the predestined would be increased not a little. But what we have posited is of faith; and those errors are challenged in the material on Purgatory and elsewhere at length. This being established, several comparisons can be made here. The first is among the angels alone: whether more were predestined than reprobated. To this theologians commonly respond in the affirmative, with St. Thomas, Part 1, question 63, article 9, reply to 1—which in one probable sense is indicated in the Apocalypse where it is said that the Dragon drew a third part of the stars after him. I will suggest the reason below.

2. *Second comparison.*—The second comparison is among human beings, speaking absolutely of all who from the beginning of the world to its end have been and will be. And in this sense the common and true opinion is that the number of the reprobates is greater. This is drawn from Matthew 7: *Narrow is the way that leads to life, and few there are who enter by it.* For this reason the elect are customarily designated in Scripture by the name of *the few*. In this sense many understand Psalm 17: *From the few of the earth, separate them*; and Ecclesiasticus 17: *From your negligence purge yourself among the few.* Hence in 4 Esdras, chapter 8, it is said: *God made this age for many, but the age to come for few.* And below, more clearly: *Many indeed have been created, but few shall be saved.* This book, although not canonical, nonetheless has great authority. And the same is illustrated there by an example: *As the earth* (it says) *gives much material from which earthenware is made, but little from which gold and silver are made, etc.* For perhaps this is why in Scripture the elect are called *golden vessels* and are compared to gems and precious stones—because just as these are rare, so also are they.

3. Furthermore, this can easily be shown almost by induction. For if we consider the state of humanity up to the coming of Christ, knowledge of God

and sanctification were rare in it. After the coming of Christ, innumerable nations either do not believe or have not yet heard the Gospel; and of those who believe, a great part is condemned, as I shall say presently. Therefore, weighing everything, there is without doubt a far greater number of reprobates. The reason is given by St. Thomas, Part 1, question 23, article 7, and Part 1-2, question 71, article 2, reply to 3. First, from the condition of human nature, which is composed of appetites in some measure contrary to one another, and whose objects capable of inclining toward evil are more familiar and proportionate. To this is added the disorder left by original sin—on account of which we were saying above that original sin is in some way the cause or occasion of the reprobation of many human beings. Then a reason can be drawn from the height and excellence of the end toward which the human being is ordered—an end toward attaining which the means also far exceed human powers, especially those of fallen humanity. These reasons are excellent from the side of the human being; yet from the side of God this counsel of his wisdom is deep, and we can say nothing else except that by this God willed to show the excellence of his grace in the elect, as Paul indicated.

4. *Third comparison.—First opinion.*—The third comparison is among the faithful, or Christians: whether more are saved than damned, or the reverse. On this matter there are diverse opinions. Some piously believe that more of these are saved—which Sylvester held in the *Golden Rose*, around the Sunday of Septuagesima, at the end. And for this the parable of Matthew 21 is usually adduced, where at the banquet of the householder only one was found lacking a wedding garment; and in Matthew 21 five of the ten virgins were foolish and five were prudent. A congruent reason can be that of Christians, more die having received the Sacraments, by whose power they are easily justified; therefore it is probable that more of these are saved.

5. *The latter is truer.*—The contrary opinion is more common, namely that among Christians more are reprobates than predestined. This is plainly affirmed by St. Gregory, homily 19 on the Gospels, and by Augustine, Book 3, *Against Cresconius*, chapter 66, and Book 4, chapter 53, thus explaining the parable of wheat and chaff. For by the threshing-floor (he says) the Church is signified, and by the chaff the reprobates are signified; and it is evident that the multitude of chaff is greater than that of wheat. Chrysostom holds the same view, homily 40 to the people, and homily 65 on Matthew. The Gloss and the commentators commonly, regarding those words of Matthew 12 and 22—*Many are called, but few are chosen*—and regarding the parable of the seed, of which only a fourth part bore fruit, Luke 8. Finally, Cajetan, explaining the said parable of the

Virgins, says that even of those who live moderately in the Church and have some care for their conscience, half are damned—which is very rigorous. The reasons, or signs, of this excess are drawn from experience itself, from daily practice, and from the propensity toward depraved morals. For without doubt more Christians live badly, and they rarely persevere in the state of grace, and it is very probable that they die as they live.

6. The matter is indeed doubtful. It seems to me, however, that a distinction must be used. We can also understand by the name of Christians all those who glory in the name of Christ and profess to believe in him, even though among them there are many heretics, apostates, and schismatics. And speaking in this generality, it is probable to me that the number of the reprobates is greater; and in this sense I understand everything adduced in the second opinion. And this can be confirmed, because heretics and apostates have always been in great number; and adding the number of impious faithful who die badly, it plainly exceeds the number of those who die holily. But if by Christians we understand only those who die within the Catholic Church, it seems to me more probable that more of them are saved, under the law of grace. The reason is that, in the first place, of those who die before adulthood, the vast multitude departs with Baptism; and of adults, although the greater part of humanity more frequently sins mortally, they nonetheless more frequently rise again and thus spend their lives by falling and rising. Finally, in the end, few are those who are not prepared for death through the Sacraments and who do not sorrow for their sins, at least through attrition; and this suffices for them to be justified at that time. And once they are justified, they ordinarily tend easily to persevere through that brief remaining time without new mortal sin. Therefore, weighing everything, it is probable that more of these Christians are saved.

7. *Fourth comparison.*—A fourth comparison can be made between the total number of reprobates and predestined as constituted from both angels and human beings. A comparison can also be made of angels to human beings—either among the reprobates among themselves or among the predestined. But I consider all of this to be unknown to us, because neither in Scripture nor among the Fathers is there any principle for it, and conjectures can only be weak. The whole matter depends on that question of whether the number of angels God created is greater or lesser than the total number of human beings to be multiplied up to the day of judgment—concerning which I can affirm nothing certain or sufficiently probable. This is usually treated in the material on angels, and therefore I omit it.

CHAPTER IV
HOW THE ACCOUNT OF SUPERNATURAL DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS COMPLETED BY PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION

1. In this chapter I shall reduce to a brief summary what has been said in the course of this work, and I shall set before the eyes the whole account of supernatural providence concerning intellectual creatures, and I shall incidentally indicate certain other things in which predestination and reprobation agree or differ. At the outset, however, it must be presupposed that this account of providence is not understood to be in God until some free decree is understood to be in him: because providence expresses a relation to future effects, which are free and consequently come from God's will and his free decree. Therefore providence does not begin until God is understood to have some free decree.

2. *Divine providence presupposes perfect knowledge of all possible things.*—Then it must be established that divine providence presupposes perfect knowledge of all possible things, because the will presupposes knowledge; since, therefore, providence either includes or presupposes a free decree of the will concerning creatures, it must presuppose knowledge and cognition of them. Therefore it presupposes at least the knowledge of simple intelligence of possible things, for this is the most necessary of all, and the first of all the forms of knowledge God has concerning creatures.

3. *God's providence presupposes foreknowledge of future effects.*—It must be added, however, that God's providence also presupposes conditional foreknowledge of all future effects—or those that would emanate from any cause, even a free one, if it were applied to acting with these or those circumstances. For this knowledge belongs to God from the infinite perfection of his divine intellectual light, and it is necessary for the complete perfection of his providence; otherwise he could not from himself dispose and predefine those things that depend on free created causes, nor could he move the free will of a human being efficaciously and from absolute intention to a particular free act while preserving his freedom—which is absurd. Nor is it necessary to treat here of the mode of this foreknowledge—whether it is in possible physical determination or in some other mode—for that question belongs to a different consideration. For now we only suppose what no one can deny: that before every free decree God has in his middle knowledge things of which he certainly

knows that, if he were willing to apply them, such or such free effects would follow infallibly and efficaciously; and that those means are therefore such as not to take away freedom nor impede its use. But whether physical predetermination is of this kind is another matter.

4. *Theologians posit certain notional moments in the mind of God.*—Finally, from what has been said it is presupposed that, for explaining the mode of divine predestination and reprobation, certain notional moments in the mind of God are rightly distinguished by the more serious theologians. For although in God himself nothing is really prior and posterior in reality, nonetheless in the objects themselves there is found a certain order—by reason of which, just as we distinguish several acts in God according to our reason, so also we conceive one as prior to another. For example: because a creature is prior and more necessarily possible than future, the knowledge of simple intelligence is understood as prior to the will or to knowledge of a future thing. Likewise, because the will is not moved except toward a known thing, knowledge of a thing is in some way considered prior to the will for it. And finally, because God operates most perfectly for an end, the intention of the end is conceived by reason as prior to the election of means; and because he rewards for merit and punishes for fault, the foreknowledge or judgment concerning merit or fault is understood to precede the will to give reward or punishment. And thus Augustine speaks throughout, especially in question 2 *To Simplician*, and in the whole book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and Prosper in his letter to that same Augustine.

5. *A twofold order is distinguished in God: one of intention, another of execution.*—From this we finally gather and presuppose that in the divine will a twofold relation or order must be distinguished: one of intention and another of execution. For in things that are subordinated to each other as end and means, the end is prior in intention and posterior in execution, and the means themselves are also subordinated to each other; hence what works more proximately toward attaining the end is also prior in intention and posterior in execution than the more remote means. Because, therefore, God operates in the most perfect manner for an end, it is understood that before the will by which he executes the means he pre-intends the end; and consequently the intention of such an end is understood as prior to the attaining of it. And because the very execution of the end is also through God's will, it is necessary to distinguish in the very divine will itself the intending will from the executing will; and the same reasoning applies to individual means as they observe a similar subordination among themselves. And thus it comes about that the series of

intention is distinct from the series of execution, and prior by reason—which it is most necessary to observe for understanding predestination, because the account of predestination pertains chiefly to the order of intention, for from predestination arises that execution of means which infallibly has the attainment of the end joined to it.

6. *First conclusion.*—These things being established, we assert first that divine predestination took its beginning from the efficacious intention of God, by which he determined to order and destine so many and such human beings or angels to the reward and inheritance of beatitude, to be obtained infallibly in such a perfection, degree, and order. That God intended this end is established from what has been said, because for its sake he willed to confer means upon them. That this intention was absolute and efficacious, moreover, is sufficiently shown and declared by the mode of providence concerning the predestined, because it is an efficacious and special love concerning them; and the intention is proportionate to the election of means, because it is the foundation or reason of it. And Paul calls this act of God's will in Romans 8 *the purpose of God, according to which those saints are called, for whom all things work together for good.* The same act he calls the love of God, because *Jacob he loved*, Romans 9. The same he finally calls the election, by which *he chose us in Christ, that we might be holy and blameless in his sight in love*, Ephesians 1. Hence all the predestined—or all who are to be saved—are called in Scripture, as it were by antonomasia, *the Elect*, who cannot perish, as is gathered from Matthew 25, and as Augustine expounds in *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 7 and following, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 14.

7. *God conferred upon the beloved angels and human beings the means of grace that he knew would be efficacious in them.*—Second, from this intention God willed to confer upon all and each of the angels and human beings so loved those means of grace that through conditional foreknowledge he had foreknown would be efficacious in them—or infallibly about to have the intended effect, if given to them. For every wise governor, prudent craftsman, or agent acting by purpose, acts in this way; and much more therefore does God, whose intention and absolute will cannot be frustrated. And from this arises that well-known providence concerning the predestined which Christ indicated when he said: *No one shall snatch them from my hand*; and when he said: *So as to lead into error, if it were possible, even the elect*; and: *For the sake of the elect those days will be shortened*; and there are many similar texts in Scripture. And from the effects of divine grace, attentively considered, this can almost be known by experience.

8. From this it is also understood that in the very universal production, disposition, and governance of things, God chose that series and mode which was most apt and fitting for the infallible attainment of the intended end concerning the eternal salvation of the elect. For thus the Fathers frequently say that all things are for the sake of the elect, as Paul said: *that he endures all things for the sake of the elect, that they too may obtain salvation.* And in 1 Corinthians 3 he seems for this reason to have said that *all things belong to* the predestined, or the elect, or those who attain justice and persevere in it—because to this end all things are created and disposed by God. Since, therefore, God through the knowledge of simple intelligence foreknew the various and innumerable modes in which he could dispose and govern the things of this universe, he chose that mode which he saw to be most suited to the salvation of the elect. And in it he not only disposed the extrinsic and universal causes in their own order as sufficient, but he also elected and established in particular the mode of applying such causes to each individual elect person—through helps both internal and external, which he foreknew would infallibly have their effect. And thus he completed the predestination of all the elect, whose execution in time begins with the calling proportionate to each, followed by justification and its fruits—which are good merits—along with the gift of perseverance unto the attaining of glory. All these things are distributed to individuals according to the purpose of God's election, if we look to the primary root and intention; although in reality and in the order of execution, after the first calling, the rest are more frequently given according to each person's disposition formed from prior grace.

9. *Third conclusion.—God created not only angels and human beings for beatitude but also many others who do not attain beatitude.*—Third, God not only determined to create with certainty those angels and human beings whom he efficaciously loved and pre-elected, but also many others who in fact do not attain eternal beatitude. Concerning these God conducted himself in such a way that he also willed them—in a certain first notional moment, by a true and proper act of intention—to be created and ordered toward the attainment of beatitude. For it is certain that God from himself wills all to be saved, and therefore all human beings are ordered toward grace and glory, and no one is created to enjoy merely natural goods or natural beatitude. This ordering toward the supernatural end from the aforesaid will preceded—which accordingly must necessarily be a true and proper act of God's will. It is not, however, altogether absolute and efficacious, because God did not simply determine to beatify such persons, no matter what—but willed this only with this limitation and

condition, namely insofar as is necessary on his own part, or unless the human beings or angels themselves were to place an obstacle.

10. *Such an act in relation to God himself is absolute.*—Therefore, although such an act was not simply and in every way absolute and efficacious in relation to the end considered in itself and with respect to all causes and conditions on which the attainment of it can depend, nonetheless in relation to God himself it was in some way absolute—because in reality he intended such an end for those human beings on his own part, and consequently by force of that act God gives or offers to those same human beings means in some way sufficient and *per se* necessary on God's part for attaining that end. Otherwise such an act would in no way be a true will and intention of such an end; for one who wills an end necessarily wills (with a proportionate will) the means that are necessary and sufficient from their own side for such an end. Hence when Paul said that *God wills all human beings to be saved*, by the word *salvation* he comprehended not only beatitude but also justice, the remission of sin, and other means that are in the said way necessary for that end.

11. Therefore no one can even doubt that such an act of will is free in God, because it is a true supernatural love of such persons; and it is evident that God loves no created person with supernatural love by necessity, even if he has the will to create that person—because he could create that person for his natural beatitude alone, in no way elevating him to a supernatural end or order. Likewise, because God is under no necessity to give supernatural means of salvation to anyone; therefore he does not necessarily have that will either, which, once posited, makes it necessary for him to confer such means. Therefore that act of God's will was free.

12. *Fourth conclusion.—God in both states willed to give sufficient means.*—From these things it is therefore concluded, fourth, that God in a certain second notional moment—which we can also consider in the reprobates—willed to provide for them the necessary and in some way sufficient means by which they could attain salvation, if it should not be due to them. This is sufficiently evident from what has just been said in the preceding paragraph. I said *in some way sufficient* because these means are neither equal in all reprobates, nor sufficient in the same way—especially after original sin. For it must be considered that God had this will both before original sin was foreseen and after it was already foreknown, and in both states he willed to give sufficient, though different, means. For in the former—namely before original sin was foreseen—he willed to give original justice to all in Adam, if he were willing to obey; in the latter state—namely after the fall of human nature was foreknown—he willed first of

all to offer to all and to institute for all the general means, such as the redemption of Christ, the institution of Baptism and the other Sacraments, and the like. Then he willed not from himself to impede the application of such means, but rather to furnish his own help and cooperation for it, insofar as it lay in him and according to the requirement of free or natural secondary causes, insofar as they can in some way concur in or be necessary for such an effect.

13. But God foresaw that in many human beings—especially infants—such application would be impossible due to the deficiency of secondary causes; and nonetheless he permitted this, which he was able to do, notwithstanding the prior will—because, as we said, it was not absolute, nor did it bind God to work miracles or to change the order of secondary causes. In other human beings he foresaw that there would not be a lack of power, but of the will to receive the application of such means. In some he foresaw that the application sufficient for justification would not be lacking, but that perseverance would be lacking—not from a defect of divine help, but from a defect of free cooperation. And in each of these he permitted such a defect—in some more, in others fewer—providing greater helps to these and lesser ones to those; in all indeed sufficient in some way, but in none efficacious for final salvation, according to the counsel of his will and wisdom. Therefore, although through conditional foreknowledge God foresaw many means and helps by which these persons would infallibly be saved had they been given, he nonetheless did not will to give them, but only those which, according to the common order of things, he foresaw would be impeded or not accepted. And in this he made all the reprobates in some way equal. And in this will, negative reprobation—which they call negative—was completed.

14. *Final decision.*—Finally, after these two notional moments—which pertain to the order of intention, both concerning the predestined and concerning the reprobates—we understand a third moment pertaining to the order of execution, common to both in proportion. In that moment, therefore, God foresaw the callings of each of the predestined and their good cooperations, dispositions, and merits, together with perseverance unto the end of life; and then at last he willed to give each person the ultimate reward proportionate to his merits—by an effective will *ad extra*, through which in time he executes that effect by applying to it his omnipotence and the other necessary causes. And in a proportional manner he foresaw the sins of the reprobates and their persistence or hardening in them unto death; and therefore he willed to exclude them from the Kingdom and to punish them with due penalties in hell. In this will begins the proper reprobation that they call positive. This third moment, moreover, could easily be divided into several, according to the various acts of intellect and

will that we distinguish in it with some order; nonetheless, for the sake of brevity, we include all these things under one moment—both because that division and distinction is *per se* easy given what has been said, and also because it is now necessary for resolving no serious question or explaining any difficulty.

15. *How predestination differs from reprobation.—Predestination alone includes the whole of providence in some manner.*—From all of these things it is understood, first, how the complete account of divine and supernatural providence is composed of predestination and reprobation. For reprobation can be taken properly and precisely insofar as it expresses either the negation of some good or the ordination toward the evil of eternal punishment; and if taken in this way, it does not together with predestination constitute the adequate account of supernatural providence. Because that antecedent will by which God wills human beings—even reprobates—to be saved, and the disposition of means that arises from it, pertain to supernatural providence; yet this is neither predestination, since it does not include the infallible attainment of the end, nor reprobation, since it is *per se* ordered toward conferring good and not toward evil. Therefore, for it to be true that the whole of supernatural providence is contained in predestination and reprobation, it is necessary that under reprobation the whole of the supernatural providence that God has concerning the reprobates be comprehended—for insofar as that act is inefficacious and includes both permission of sin and damnation and concerns the same person and the same end, it can be comprehended under reprobation, even though such a signification of that name is improper and excessively broad. I add further that predestination alone in some manner includes the whole of God's providence—and especially the supernatural. For although providence directly and immediately concerns more things than predestination, as is self-evident, and it was for this reason said that predestination is a part of providence, nonetheless mediately and as it were obliquely, predestination encompasses the whole of providence; because whatever falls under providence is ordered toward the good of the predestined, as was noted above, following Augustine, who frequently said that reprobation itself, or the providence concerning the reprobates, is referred to the salvation of the predestined.

16. *The many differences between reprobation and predestination.—They agree in this, that each includes supernatural providence.*—Second, from what has been said many differences are gathered between predestination and reprobation. They agree in this: that each pertains to supernatural providence—which is manifest in predestination, because it is an efficacious ordination toward the supernatural end through certain and infallible means. In

reprobation, however, insofar as it presupposes the ordination toward the same end through sufficient means, it is also manifest that it directly and *per se* pertains to supernatural providence; but insofar as it includes either the permission of the evil of guilt or the ordination to the evil of punishment, it is referred to the same order in the way that privation and habit pertain to the same order—for that permission includes the negation of some efficacious grace, and that punishment consists chiefly in the privation of supernatural beatitude. Finally, for perfect providence not only reward is required but also punishment; and supernatural providence in its own order is perfect; and therefore it includes the ordination of each. Thus, not only predestination but also reprobation pertains to supernatural providence—in a different manner, however. For predestination is from the direct and primary intention of God; whereas reprobation is from a will that is, as it were, secondary, insofar namely as it includes the ordination toward the evil of punishment, which God does not will except as if compelled by the evil of guilt that precedes it in the human being.

17. *The most important difference.*—And this is the most important difference between predestination and reprobation, arising from their proper objects. For predestination is toward good, which God wills *per se* and from himself; reprobation, however, is toward evil, which God does not will from himself but when provoked by a human being. Hence this difference proceeds only with respect to the most proper and positive reprobation, which includes the will to inflict the evil of eternal punishment. For if we consider the antecedent will of God, by which he orders these creatures toward the supernatural end with sufficient providence so that they can attain it, this also is *per se* and directly from God's intention—for it arises from his benevolence and mercy. Indeed, even the permission of failing to attain that end is *per se* from the free will and intention of God, because it does not presuppose in the human being a guilt from which it could arise. For although such a permission does not pertain to the advantage of the person whose evil is permitted, it nonetheless pertains to the universal order of God's providence and can be ordered toward the good of the predestined, and contains in itself no deformity; and therefore it can *per se* and directly fall under the divine will.

18. *Another distinction.*—From this another difference is also understood: the whole of predestination cannot have a cause given on the part of the predestined, both because it begins from the efficacious love of God by which he pre-elected the predestined to glory, and also because the beginning of grace cannot be from a human being but from God. Moreover, predestination begins

to be committed to execution in the very beginning, which is taken from the congruous calling; and therefore the whole predestination of a human being cannot presuppose merits. But the whole of reprobation does have a cause given on the part of the human being, because the beginning of guilt is from the human being, and foreseen guilt is the reason for the ordination toward punishment, in which the account of reprobation consists. This difference, however, proceeds between positive reprobation and predestination, and does not apply to the supernatural providence that God has concerning the reprobates by ordering them toward the supernatural end. For this too cannot have a cause on the part of the human being, because in the order of intention it proceeds from the antecedent love of God, and in execution it takes its beginning from grace. In the same way, this difference has no application to negative reprobation—for of this too no cause can be given on the part of the reprobate, because permission always precedes, and that permission cannot be founded on guilt.

THE END OF THE TREATISE ON PREDESTINATION

APPENDIX
ON PREDESTINATION[1]

So profound and inscrutable has the mystery of divine predestination appeared to all the doctors, and so far beyond the weakness of our intellect, that the divine Doctor of the Gentiles, contemplating its greatness and as though terrified by it, burst forth into these words in Romans 11: *O depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments and unsearchable his ways!* Therefore we must proceed piously and modestly, as far as possible following the footsteps of the Fathers, lest we either inflict injury upon the divine goodness and his infallible providence or subtract anything from the freedom of our judgment concerning human acts.

Innumerable doctors dispute this matter, especially the scholastics, in Book I, distinction 40 and the following distinctions, with the *Master*; St. Thomas, First Part, Quest. 23; *De Veritate*, Quest. 3; *Contra Gentiles*, final chapter, and the opusculum *De Praedestinatione*; Faustus, bishop of Gaul, in the two books *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*; Soto, *Super Epistolam ad Romanos*, chapter 9; Córdoba, Book I of the *Quaestionarium*, Quest. 56; Catarinus, the

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[1] Manuscript 404 of the Colegio de Santa Cruz de Valladolid (formerly shelfmark 265), paper, 221 × 210 mm, parchment binding with traces of straps. Anonymous, non-autograph theological course; provisionally attributed to Suárez, though authorship remains unconfirmed. The first of the manuscript's two treatises, seventy-two folios, opening with the incipit "Prima Pars Sancti Thomae, questio 23, articulus 1" (i.e., the *Summa*'s question on predestination). Fr. Jesús Solano previously edited its fifth article ("Un manuscrito inédito sobre Predestinación," in *Actas del IV Centenario del nacimiento del P. Suárez [1548–1948]*, II, 179–198). Ed. José Martín Palma, "El manuscrito 404 del Colegio de Santa Cruz de Valladolid (continuación)," *Archivo Teológico Granadino* 35 (1972) 135–297.

opusculum *De Praedestinatione*; John of Bologna, also in an opusculum *De Praedestinatione*; Bartholomew Camera (sic), in the dialogues *De Praedestinatione*; Driedo, in the book *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii et Praedestinationis*; Molina, in the same work. Among the Fathers, Augustine treats it in many places, especially in the book *De Dono Perseverantiae*; likewise Jerome and Ambrose, *Super Epistolam ad Romanos*, chapters 8 and 9; Chrysostom, Homily 1, *Super Epistolam ad Romanos* 5.

ARTICLE 1
WHETHER MEN ARE PREDESTINED BY GOD

The conclusion is affirmative.

It must be supposed 1° in this disputation, with St. Thomas in the body of this article, as regards the question whether it exists, namely, that men are predestined by God; and the rationale is the same for angels, as St. Thomas teaches in the reply to 1. This conclusion is of faith, according to Romans 8: *Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son*; and Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world*; and below: *He predestined us to adoption as sons.* The COUNCIL OF TRENT teaches this in session 6, canons 12 and 16.

But in order to see what predestination is, we must begin from the etymology and interpretation of the name itself. For the verb *praedestino*, as Calepinus and other experts in the Latin language teach, is composed of the preposition *prae* and the verb *destino*. But the verb *destino* has two meanings. First, it is taken such that to destine is the same as to send. Thus in 1 Maccabees 1: *They destined some of the people*, that is, they sent them. Suetonius, in *Vita Galbae*, chapter 10, says that Galba "destined the Praetorian soldiers with mandates to the emperor," that is, sent them. Juvenal takes it in this sense in the verse: "The master of the timber and the skiff destines this monster for the Supreme Pontiff." But this usage is less frequent in Sacred Scripture.

Second, the verb *destino* is taken such that to destine is the same as to ordain, define, or establish. Thus Paul, 1 Corinthians 4: *He has placed us Apostles last, as though destined for death*, that is, ordained; and 2 Corinthians 9: *Not from necessity, but as each has destined in his heart*, that is, ordained. This usage is more frequent in Sacred Scripture. Since, therefore, the verb *praedestino* is composed of *prae*, signifying antecedence, and the verb *destino*, it can likewise signify two things, namely, to send beforehand toward some end and to preordain toward it.

The doubt, therefore, is in which of these meanings it should be taken in the present matter. St. Thomas, art. 1 of this question; Durandus, Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 1; and Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii et Praedestinationis*, chapter 1, say that it should be taken in the former way, such that to predestine is the same as to transmit and predestination is the same as the transmission of a rational creature toward an end. They rely on this reasoning: whenever something arrives at a point it cannot reach by its own nature and powers, it must be transmitted by another, just as an arrow is transmitted toward a target it cannot reach by its own powers. But the rational creature arrives at supernatural beatitude, which it cannot attain by its own powers. Therefore, it must be transmitted by another, that is, by God. But it is transmitted toward beatitude through predestination. Therefore, predestination is nothing other than transmission.

But although it is true that the rational creature is transmitted through the effects of predestination into eternal life, this usage is nevertheless metaphorical. Therefore the verb "to predestine" should be taken as the same as "to preordain" or "to predefine," and "predestination" as the same as preordination, that is, the predefinition of the means by which a rational creature is directed toward eternal life or toward punishment. Jerome takes this word in this way on Ephesians 1, *He predestined us*, and so forth, where he teaches that to predestine is the same as to predefine or preordain. Augustine takes it in this way in Book VI of the *Hypognosticon*, where he teaches that "to predestine" is said from preordaining or predefining. In Acts 13 those who are predestined are called preordained. Hence in Romans 8 and Ephesians 1, where the Latin interpreter translates "predestination," the Greek has "preordination." Alexander takes it in this sense in the First Part, Quest. 28, member 1, art. 1; Cajetan, on the *Epistle to the Romans*; Albert Pighius, Book VIII of *De Libero Arbitrio*, chapter 2. But insofar as to predestine is the same as to preordain, it is also taken in two ways. First, as it extends to the elect and the reprobate. Augustine takes it in this way in Book XV of *The City of God*, chapter 1, where he teaches that there are two cities in the Church of God: one predestined to the eternal kingdom, the other to the eternal kingdom; and Book XXI, chapter 24; and *De Praedestinatione*, chapter 1. Isidore takes it in this way in Book II of *De Summo Bono*, chapter 6, and Fulgentius in Book I *Ad Monimum*. In another way, however, "to predestine" is commonly taken by authors in a stricter sense, namely, insofar as predestination is the ordination of the means by which a rational creature is directed into eternal life. In this usage predestination extends only to the elect, who in effect attain eternal life itself. The rest, who are excluded from beatitude,

retaining the generic rationale of foreknowledge, are called foreknown, because, since foreknowledge is not the cause of the thing foreknown and God is not the cause of the perdition of the damned as through predestination he is the cause of the salvation of the elect, they are nevertheless called foreknown and not predestined. Henceforth, therefore, in this disputation only those elected to eternal life are to be called predestined, while those excluded from it are called reprobate, although in Sacred Scripture those who are elected are sometimes called elect, prepared for the kingdom, vessels of mercy, and vessels unto fragrance, while the reprobate are called accursed, hated, vessels of wrath, and vessels unto dishonor.

There remains a doubt whether the particle *prae* signifies antecedence of duration or antecedence of dignity. Catarinus, in the opusculum *De Praedestinatione*, part 1, teaches that it signifies only antecedence of dignity. For, as we shall see below, he thinks that all men are ordained toward eternal life, but that some of those who will infallibly attain eternal life are ordained before others, and only these are called predestined in Scripture, while the others are merely destined, because they will not infallibly attain eternal life; these are called destined but not predestined. His position will have to be judged later. The opposite position, however, is preferable in this matter: that the particle signifies antecedence of duration, so that predestination is an ordination existing eternally in the divine mind before the ordained things themselves came to be. Thus St. Thomas says in the article; Durandus, Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 2; Bonaventure, art. 1, Quest. 2; Alexander, in the place cited. Nevertheless, it must not be denied that it simultaneously signifies antecedence of dignity, so that the predestined are said to be ordained before others, that is, before the reprobate; or predestination is called the special ordination of man, because other irrational creatures are ordained toward an end connatural to them and are therefore called destined and not predestined, whereas man is ordained toward an end supernatural to himself and consequently is alone said to be predestined.

QUESTION 1
WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT OR OF THE WILL

All the doctors agree, in Book I, distinction 40, that both acts, namely of intellect and will, are necessary to complete predestination, because in the ordination by which God ordains man toward eternal life we understand several

acts. First, a judgment concerning the predestined person, the glory to be conferred, and the means by which it is to be attained. Then we understand the will to give glory; afterward, the choice of the means themselves; and finally, according to some, the command, which is an act of the intellect. Hence, because both acts are necessary, predestination is sometimes called in Scripture a *purpose*, Romans 8, or an *election*, Ephesians 1, which are acts of the will, while at other times it is called *knowledge*, 2 Timothy 2: *The Lord knows those who are his.* It is so called by Augustine in *De Praedestinatione*, chapter 1, and *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chapter 14, where he defines predestination as the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God. Reason also proves that both acts are necessary for predestination, because predestination is an efficacious act, but an act of the intellect has efficacy from the will; therefore, together with the act of the intellect an act of the will is required. Similarly, an act of the will presupposes the judgment of the intellect; therefore, together with the act of the will an act of the intellect is required.

The difficulty can only be whether predestination, whether it is an act of the will or of the intellect, concerns only the glory to be conferred upon man or concerns glory and all the means by which man is directed toward glory. Gabriel, in Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 1, teaches that predestination concerns only glory itself and not the means to glory. He proves this because predestination is that by reason of which the greatest good comes to the predestined person. But the greatest good comes to the predestined person by reason of the will to give glory, because glory is the greatest good. Therefore, that alone is predestination, namely, the predestination or will to give glory. It is proved second because predestination is efficacious and infallible, but it has infallibility only by reason of the conferral of glory. Therefore, predestination consists in the will to give glory.

But notwithstanding these arguments, it must be said that predestination concerns not only glory itself as the end, but also the means to glory, namely vocation, justification, perseverance, and so forth. Augustine teaches this in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter 10, where he teaches that predestination includes the purpose of giving grace in the present, where by the name of grace he understands the means required for glory. The Master agrees in Book I, distinction 40. It is also gathered from Ephesians 2: *Called in good works that God prepared*, together with Augustine's interpretation in that place, according to which to prepare works is to preordain or predestine. It is also proved by reason, because predestination is a species of providence, as we shall say; but

providence concerns the means, as St. Thomas teaches in Quest. 22, art. 1. Therefore predestination also concerns the means to glory.

To Gabriel's arguments it is responded that man is not sufficiently ordained toward glory through the will or ordination to give glory alone, since many other means are required for the attainment of glory. Hence his arguments prove that the will to give glory or the ordination of glory belongs to predestination, but they do not prove that it alone is predestination. Indeed, since that ordination concerns the end rather than the means, it possesses the rationale of predestination and providence less than does the ordination of the means to glory. For although with respect to the will of God, which is the ultimate end of predestination, it has the rationale of election or of the ordination of means, nevertheless with respect to glory, which is the proximate end of the predestined person, it has rather the rationale of intention or ordination concerning the end, and consequently possesses the rationale of predestination less than does the ordination of the means to glory.

The whole difficulty now remains in explaining whether predestination formally consists in an act of the intellect or in an act of the will. Scotus, in Book I, distinction 40, the sole question; Bonaventure, Quest. 2; and Gregory, Quest. 2, art. 1, assert that predestination formally consists in an act of the will. Scotus adds, however, that it can be maintained that it is an act of the intellect connoting or implying an act of the will. They prove this first because Sacred Scripture expresses predestination by an act of the will: Matthew 22, *Many are called, but few are chosen*; Ephesians 1, *He chose us in him*, and so forth; Romans 9, *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.* Second, by reason, because predestination is the efficacious cause of attaining glory, but all efficacy comes from the act of the will; therefore, predestination formally consists in it. This is confirmed because God's love toward us is the cause of all supernatural goods, but all supernatural goods come to us from predestination. Therefore, predestination formally consists in love, which is an act of the will. Third, because predestination and reprobation, since they are contrary acts, must belong to the same power; but reprobation is an act of the will, since it is hatred or rejection. Therefore, predestination must similarly be an act of the will.

Others, however, say that predestination formally includes both acts. They prove this only from the definition of predestination given by Augustine in *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chapter 14, where he says that predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, in which definition both acts are included.

Nevertheless, let the conclusion be: predestination is formally an act of the intellect connoting an act of the will, from which it has the efficacy to produce its effect; the same rationale applies to providence. Thus St. Thomas teaches in this article and in *De Veritate*, Quest. 6; Durandus, Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 1, no. 9; Gabriel, in the same distinction and question; Alexander, First Part, Quest. 28. It is proved by reason, because predestination is nothing other than the preordination from which a predestined person is denominated, but ordination is an act of the intellect. Therefore predestination is also. Second, because predestination is a species of providence, but providence is an act of the intellect; therefore predestination is also. Third, because in Sacred Scripture predestination is called the book of life, but the book of life pertains to the intellect, in which all the elect are written. Therefore predestination also pertains to the intellect. Augustine favors this position in *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chapter 17, where he teaches that to predestine is to preordain or predefine in foreknowledge; and Jerome, on Ephesians 1.

Hence it follows from what has been said that it does not matter for the truth of faith whether one teaches that predestination is an act of the intellect or of the will, since Scripture, as was seen, sometimes expresses predestination by an act of the intellect and sometimes by an act of the will. From this the response to the first argument is clear. To Scotus's second argument it is responded that the efficacy of predestination comes from the act of the will joined to the preordination that formally is predestination, which act of the will predestination connotes. Hence his argument proves only that an act of the will is required. To the confirmation it is responded that supernatural goods come to us not from God's love for us alone, but from love and the ordination of the intellect together, though in different ways: from the intellect as ordaining those means, but from the will as executing them. Thus it is not proved that predestination consists in an act of the will. To the third argument it is responded that reprobation is not an act properly contrary to predestination, nor is any act properly contrary to it except contradictorily, namely non-predestination, because God is not the cause of our perdition through reprobation in the way in which he is the cause of our salvation through predestination, as we shall later see. Meanwhile, however, it must be denied that reprobation is formally hatred. Rather, it is an ordination of the intellect excluding man from eternal life and directing him toward punishment.

QUESTION 2
IN WHICH ACTS OF THE INTELLECT AND WILL PREDESTINATION CONSISTS

Up to this point we have seen that predestination is an act of the intellect connoting an efficacious act of the will. But because, according to the position of St. Thomas in the First Part of the Second Part, Quest. 11 and the following questions, there are six acts in the intellect and will by which something is directed toward an end, first there is found the judgment of the intellect concerning the end itself; then the intention of the will; third, deliberation concerning the means, which deliberation is a judgment of the intellect; fourth, election; fifth, the command of the intellect expressed by the words *do this*; and finally, use, which is an act of the will executing the effect itself. We omit the inefficacious acts of the will.

The doubt, therefore, is which of these acts of the intellect is formally predestination and which act of the will it connotes. It must be supposed 1º that in God there is no deliberation formally insofar as it is an investigation of means accompanied by doubt, in the way in which it is found in us. For although, according to our manner of understanding, we conceive several acts of intellect and will in God, which nevertheless are in themselves one simple act, we do not attribute to God even according to our manner of understanding those things that imply imperfection, such as investigation accompanied by doubt. **2º** It must be supposed that in God there is no act of intention to give glory prior to the judgment concerning the means through which glory is to be conferred. Rather, before every act of the will there precedes in God a judgment concerning the man to whom glory is to be given, the glory to be conferred, the means, and the ordination of the means toward glory. For it arises from the imperfection of our intellect that judgment concerning the means does not always precede the act of intention, because we cannot always judge simultaneously concerning the means and the end, and therefore the intention of the end is sometimes prior to judgment concerning the means. Nor is it an obstacle if you object that the intention of the will is prior to election even in God, because election concerns the means; therefore it must similarly be prior to the judgment that concerns the means. This consequence is invalid, because intention is the cause of election in us in reality, and therefore we conceive it in God as the rationale of election and consequently as prior to it. Intention is not, however, the cause of judgment

concerning the means in us, and therefore we do not necessarily conceive it in God as prior in rationale to the judgment concerning the means. Indeed, if the intention of the end of giving glory preceded in God the judgment concerning the means contributing to glory, God would impose necessity upon our will, as we shall see below.

Concerning the present doubt there are two positions. One is that of St. Thomas in art. 4 of this question and Cajetan in the same place, together with the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part of the Second Part, Quest. 17, and of other Thomists, who assert that predestination formally consists in the act of the intellect that is command, connoting the preceding act of election from which the command obtains its causal efficacy. They prove it by reason because predestination must be an efficacious act of the intellect and consequently perfectly practical, but no other act of the intellect is perfectly practical except command, because no other presupposes an efficacious act of the will concerning the same means. Therefore, predestination essentially consists in the act of command and connotes the preceding act of election. But although this question is about a name, as Durandus, to be cited below, noted, because once we concede that all the acts of the intellect already enumerated are necessary for predestination it matters little whether we call this or that one formally predestination, nevertheless I think it must be said that the act of command after election is necessary neither in God nor in us. Therefore, the question concerns a reality and not a name. Hence it must be said that the act of command is not necessary, and consequently predestination formally consists in an act of judgment and connotes the subsequent act of election. Thus Molina teaches in Quest. 23, art. 2, disputation 2. That predestination is formally an act of judgment and not of command was taught by Durandus in Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 1.

Both points are now proved because the act of command is necessary neither in God nor in us. Therefore predestination does not consist in it, because if it is not necessary it must not be posited. The antecedent is proved because through acts of judgment the means are sufficiently judged as suitable or unsuitable, are ordered among themselves, and are also proposed to the will. Once this act has been posited, there immediately follows an efficacious act of election, which by its efficacy is able to move the executive power if the action is to be executed by another power. Therefore, the act of command is posited in vain. This reasoning is confirmed because the act of command is not of itself efficacious, but by reason of the preceding election; of itself it is only a certain ordination. But the means are already supposed to have been ordered by the act

of judgment. Therefore, the act of judgment together with the subsequent election is sufficient. It is confirmed second because, according to the opposite position, the act of command requires a subsequent act of use so that by reason of its efficacy the work itself may be executed. But before the command there is already presupposed an efficacious act of the will, namely election. Therefore, the acts of command and use are posited in vain. Second, because in a brute, once a simple act of judgment has been posited, the appetite is efficaciously moved, by whose efficacy the exterior members are moved to the work without any act of command. Therefore, apart from acts of judgment and the subsequent act of election, no other work is necessary. If you object that externally we signify something in two ways through words: speculatively, as when we say, "This is to be done," by which act we do not move another to the work; and practically, as when we say, "Do this," by which act we move someone to the work. But the first act corresponds to the act of judgment, whereas the second corresponds to the act of command. Therefore, since predestination must be an act moving toward a work, it follows that it consists in the act of command and not in the act of judgment. It is responded, however, that by the first act we do not move because we express only the intellect itself, which of itself does not move. By the second act we move because we express to another not only the intellect but also the will. But because inwardly it is not necessary to propose an act of the intellect or an act of the will to the will itself, but it is sufficient to propose the thing itself, therefore, once judgment is posited, there follows the efficacious election of the will and the execution of the work.

That this act of command is not specifically necessary in God is proved because it would be impious to say that, after an act of judgment by which God judges that something is to be done and the immediate positing of an efficacious act of election, God would not be able to put the thing into execution but would have to await an act of command and use, as though that act of judgment were not sufficient for judging or the act of will were not sufficient for executing. This must not be said. It is confirmed because in ourselves we experience inwardly an act of judgment by which we judge a thing to be suitable, yet we never experience this act of command, *do this*. Therefore, it is a sign that this act is not necessary or does not exist. Finally, because command would be necessary either to move the will or to move the inferior powers. It is not necessary to move the powers, because the intellect does not immediately propose something to any power other than the will. It is not necessary to move the will, which already has the object sufficiently proposed to it through the act of judgment. Therefore, an act of command distinct from the act of judgment is not

necessary, and consequently predestination essentially consists in the act of judgment.

To the argument made for the opposite position, the major is conceded and the minor denied, because just as the act of judging is efficacious not by reason of itself but by reason of the subsequent election, so also the act of command is efficacious not by reason of itself but by reason of the preceding election. Consequently, command is no more a practical act than judgment. Indeed, since according to the opposite position the act of command, in order to be efficacious, requires a preceding election and a subsequent use, whereas according to our position the act of judgment requires only a subsequent election, it follows that the act of command is less efficacious than the act of judgment. If you object that command presupposes election as prior and can receive efficacy from it, whereas the act of judgment does not presuppose an efficacious act of the will concerning the same object but is rather prior to it, and therefore cannot receive efficacy from it, otherwise it would participate in efficacy from what is posterior, it is responded that just as the act of judgment does not execute by reason of itself but by reason of the use of the posterior election, so the act of command does not execute by reason of itself but by reason of use. For this reason theologians acknowledge in every opinion that the proximate rationale of operating ad extra in God is the will. Especially because this alone is necessary in every practical act: that the work itself be done through intellect and will. Whether the will precedes or follows is irrelevant.

Someone will nevertheless object that through predestination the predestined person is distinguished from the reprobate, but through an act of judgment he is not understood as distinguished. Therefore, predestination does not formally consist in an act of judgment. The minor is clear because an act of judgment places nothing in the predestined person. It is responded, however, that if we speak of distinction according to an ordination extrinsic to the predestined person, according to esse he is distinguished through the act of judgment ordaining the predestined person toward glory and not the reprobate. But if we speak of predestination with its effect, it is true that he is not distinguished through the act of judgment alone; rather, according to our position the joined will is election, since Scripture says that the predestined are distinguished from the reprobate through election. Hence, according to the opposite position, command and use are posited in vain after election.

QUESTION 3
WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS A PART OF PROVIDENCE

Since it is certain that providence is an act of the practical intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in Quest. 22, art. 1; Durandus, Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 3, art. 1; and Marsilius, Quest. 41, art. 1, and that it connotes an act of the will, as we said of predestination, it is rightly doubted how predestination is related to it: whether it is a subjective part of providence or a species distinct from it.

St. Thomas, art. 4 of this question, and Cajetan in the same place teach that predestination is a subjective part of providence on the part of the objects, as though I were to say that the object of predestination is a subjective part of the object of providence, but that the act of predestination is not a subjective part of the act of providence. They prove the first because providence concerns both natural and supernatural things, whereas predestination concerns supernatural things alone. Therefore, the object of predestination is contained under the object of providence. They prove the second because the acts of providence and predestination are one simple act in God, in which there is neither genus nor species. Therefore, one cannot be a subjective part of the other.

But the opposite position is truer: that predestination, even according to the act itself, is a subjective part and, as it were, a species of providence.

Thus the same St. Thomas teaches in *De Veritate*, Quest. 6, art. 1, and in Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 1, art. 2; Capreolus in the same place, the sole question, art. 1; Soto, on the *Epistle to the Romans*, chapter 4. For its proof, it must be observed that prudence is a practical science concerning things that can be done, whether future or present. Under the object of prudence is contained the object of providence, which concerns future things that can be done, both natural and supernatural. Hence the object of God's providence is the whole universe insofar as it includes natural and supernatural things and their order among themselves. The object of predestination, however, is contained under the object of providence, because predestination concerns those things that are ordained toward attaining a supernatural end. Hence, just as the objects of these virtues are related as genus and species, so according to our manner of understanding we consider in God several acts of prudence concerning diverse objects, from which we abstract the rationale of a genus; and concerning the objects of providence we consider several acts, from which we abstract the rationale of the genus of providence contained under the genus of prudence;

and concerning the diverse objects of predestination we consider several acts, from which we abstract the rationale of a genus contained under the genus of providence. Consequently, predestination on the part of the act will be a subjective part and, as it were, a species of providence. This is proved because, if predestination could not be a species of providence, it would be chiefly because both acts are one and the same simple act in God. But this reasoning is invalid. For although intellect and will and the acts of each are in God one simple substance and one simple act, we distinguish them from one another as two powers and two acts and abstract from each the rationale of a genus. Therefore, although predestination and providence are in themselves one simple act in God, according to our manner of understanding they can possess the rationale of genus and species, or at least of inferior and superior. From these points it follows that providence is divided into natural and supernatural providence. The first concerns means in order to a natural end; the second concerns means in order to a supernatural end. This second is divided into predestination, which concerns supernatural means in order to an end actually to be attained, and supernatural providence, which is found in the reprobate in relation to a supernatural end that in effect will not be attained. From this follows the definition of predestination, omitting the other definitions given by Augustine and St. Thomas: predestination is the preordination or providence of means directing toward a supernatural end, together with the purpose of executing them.

QUESTION 4
WHETHER SOMEONE CAN BE CERTAIN OF HIS PREDESTINATION

Concerning the certitude of predestination, there was the heresy of the Lutherans, who asserted that without any revelation we can be certain of our predestination. They prove it first because we can be certain that we are in grace, and we are also certain that grace once possessed is never lost. Therefore, we can be certain that we are predestined, because the certitude of perseverance implies the certitude of predestination.

This position, however, together with its foundations, is manifestly opposed to faith. First, that we cannot be certain that we are in grace is not to be proved here; the theologians prove it in the First Part of the Second Part, Quest. 112, art. 5. They prove the second in the Second Part of the Second Part, Quest. 24, art. 11, and it is defined in the Clementine *Ad Nostrum*, *De Haereticis*. The

COUNCIL OF TRENT also teaches it in session 6, canon 23. It is gathered from Sacred Scripture, in which it is signified that Saul, already circumcised, sinned. The same is gathered concerning Peter, who was just at the Supper and afterward denied the Lord, and likewise concerning David. This position is refuted by reason because, after someone has acquired grace, he remains able to sin mortally, and through mortal sin grace is excluded. Therefore, grace once acquired can be lost. The minor is certain unless someone has been confirmed in grace.

Therefore, let the conclusion be: no one can be certain with infallible certitude of his predestination without a revelation specially made to him. Thus St. Thomas teaches in the reply to 4, and the COUNCIL OF TRENT in session 6, canons 12 and 15, where it is said that no one can be certain of his predestination unless it is made known by special revelation to certain persons whom God has chosen for himself. Bernard teaches the same in Sermon 10 *In Septuagesima*, where he says: *Who can say, "I am among the elect, I am among those predestined to life," when Scripture says that no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love?* Augustine teaches it at the beginning of *De Dono Perseverantiae*; Jerome, Book II of *Contra Jovinianum*. Proverbs 27 favors it: *Do not boast about tomorrow, not knowing what the coming day prepares for you*; and Ecclesiastes 9: *All things are kept uncertain for the future.*

It is proved by reason because no one can be certain of his grace; therefore, much less can he be certain of his perseverance in grace, and consequently not of his predestination. The antecedent is proved by the theologians in the place cited in the First Part of the Second Part. The consequence is proved because perseverance depends upon many future and contingent events that are not certain to us. Therefore, neither is perseverance itself certain. Second, because we could be certain of our predestination chiefly through its proper effect, namely perseverance, or through predestination itself, or through its cause. Not through the first, because perseverance, as was said, depends upon events unknown to us. Not through the second, because predestination is an action existing in the divine intellect and is unknown to us apart from revelation. Not through the third, because the cause of predestination, according to our manner of understanding, is the free divine will, which cannot be known to us. Therefore, predestination cannot be certain to anyone apart from revelation.

Someone will nevertheless ask whether at least we can be certain of our predestination with moral and fallible certitude. It is responded that we can be certain with this certitude from signs and conjectures, sufficiently to assent that we are predestined. Hence the saints present many signs for showing this moral

certitude of predestination. Gregory, Book XXXIV of the *Moralia*, chapter 23, says: "The most evident sign of the reprobate is pride, but of the elect humility." Bernard, Sermon 2 *In Octavam Paschae*, says that God did not leave his elect without consolation. Cyprian also teaches it in Sermon 3, *De Bono Patientiae*; Jerome, *Adversus Vigilantium*. This certitude is nevertheless insufficient to exclude all doubt, though it is sufficient to exclude the sadness or anxiety that commonly arises from uncertainty concerning predestination.

We said "apart from special revelation," because a general revelation is not made to all the predestined, nor should it easily be believed that this revelation has been specially made to anyone unless it is established either by sufficient reason or by trustworthy testimony. It is nevertheless certain that in fact a revelation was made to some, both in the Old and in the New Testament. In the Old Testament a revelation was made to Abraham, Genesis 15: *I am your protector*, and so forth; *You will be buried in a good old age.* It was made to Moses, Exodus 33: *You have found grace*, and so forth, *and I have known you by name.* It was also made to Elijah, as is clear from 4 Kings 2. The theologians gather that it was made to the Blessed Virgin from the words: *Full of grace, the Lord is with you. Blessed are you*, and so forth. In the New Testament a revelation was made to Paul, Romans 8: *I am certain that neither death nor tribulation*, and so forth. A revelation was made to him concerning the predestination of Clement and others in the words, *whose names are written in the book of life*, Philippians 4. It was also made to the disciples, Luke 10: *Rejoice because your names are written in heaven*; and to the other Apostles, Luke 6: *because your names are written in heaven.* All these were special revelations.

Whether someone can be certain of his reprobation will be seen below.

Concerning the reply to the first argument, there could be a difficulty whether God predefines our free acts. This, however, in general belongs to Quest. 19, art. 8. Concerning the acts that fall under predestination we shall dispute specifically below. Let this suffice for this article.

ARTICLE 2
WHETHER PREDESTINATION PLACES SOMETHING IN THE PREDESTINED PERSON

First conclusion: predestination according to itself places nothing in the predestined person but in the one predestining.

Second conclusion: predestination taken for its execution places something in the predestined person, because passively it is in the predestined person, but actively in the one predestining.

The meaning of the question is whether the denomination by which someone is denominated predestined is an intrinsic denomination coming from a form inhering in the predestined person himself, or an extrinsic denomination coming from an extrinsic form existing in another, namely in God. St. Thomas responds through the first conclusion that predestination according to itself places nothing in the predestined person, as though he were saying that the predestined person is denominated such from a form existing in another, namely in God, just as a thing known or understood is denominated such from cognition or intellection existing in another, namely in the intellect. But because the execution of predestination, which is called governance, is a transitive action, like the execution of an act through external works, and the action together with its effect is received in the patient, St. Thomas therefore teaches in the second conclusion that predestination taken for its execution is actively in the one predestining but passively in the predestined person. By these words St. Thomas does not signify that the transitive action exists in the predestined creature and in God who predestines as in subjects, but that the first active principle of that action, which is the action of predestining, is in God as in a subject, whereas the transitive action itself is in the predestined creature.

Concerning this article, in which St. Thomas disputes the effects of predestination, we must see how many and which effects there are. Hence let the first question be:

QUESTION 1
WHETHER VOCATION IS AN EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION

By the name of vocation we understand any cognition, illumination, or admonition, both internal and external, even one preceding our freedom, in order to a supernatural end. Ockham, in Book I, distinction 41, Quest. 1, and Gabriel, Quest. 1, first conclusion, assert that vocation is not an effect of predestination. For they think that predestination and providence concern only the end. They prove it first because nothing common to the reprobate and the predestined can be an effect of predestination, otherwise an effect of predestination would also exist in the reprobate. But vocation is common to the reprobate and the predestined, for all are called to eternal life. Therefore vocation is not an effect of predestination. Second, because what can coexist

with mortal sin cannot be an effect of predestination, because one who is under mortal sin cannot be efficaciously ordained toward eternal life, as he is ordained through predestination. But vocation can be in a man together with mortal sin. Therefore vocation is not an effect of predestination.

Nevertheless, it must be said that vocation is an effect of predestination. This conclusion is commonly proved from Romans 8: *Those whom he foreknew and predestined*, and so forth, *these he also called*, although this authority does not efficaciously prove the intended point. St. Thomas agrees with this conclusion in this article; Cajetan in the same place; Marsilius, Quest. 41; Camerarius, chapters 1 and 3; Molina, Quest. 23, arts. 1 and 2; Cartagena, discourse 3. This truth is proved by reason because whatever efficaciously contributes to the attainment of glory is ordained through predestination and is its effect, just as whatever contributes to attaining health is an effect of prudence directing the means toward health. But vocation efficaciously contributes to the attainment of glory. Therefore vocation is an effect of predestination.

If someone objects that every effect of predestination must be in our power, since through predestination God does not remove our freedom from us, but vocation is not in our power, since it precedes our freedom; therefore it is not an effect of predestination. By this argument several Thomists are compelled to assert that vocation according to itself, or insofar as it precedes our freedom, is not an effect of predestination, but only insofar as it is efficacious and dependent upon our free will. They also prove this second because the same vocation cannot come from two providences, just as the same sensible thing cannot come from man insofar as he is man and insofar as he is an animal. But vocation preceding our freedom comes from the supernatural providence common to the reprobate and the predestined. Therefore, the same vocation cannot be an effect of predestination.

Nevertheless, with all the doctors it must be asserted that vocation, even insofar as it precedes our freedom, is an effect of predestination. This is proved by manifest reason because from the efficacious will to give glory, which is proper to predestination, God willed not only that man be efficaciously called to eternal life but also simply willed to call him by the vocation to which he knew the man would respond; indeed, sometimes by a vocation to which he knew the man would not respond. But every ordination or will concerning supernatural means in order to the efficacious attainment of eternal life is an effect of predestination. Therefore, that vocation, even insofar as it precedes our freedom, is an effect of predestination. Hence, to the argument of this Thomist position it is responded by denying that every effect of predestination is in our power,

because the first cognition of any object is necessary in us and not free. Hence the first vocation, since it is the first cognition, is not in our power, not because it is predefined by God, as the argument assumes, but rather because it precedes our freedom. To the second it is responded by denying the antecedent, because the same effect, although not under the same rationale, can come from a universal and a particular cause as from subordinate causes, though not under the same formal aspect. Thus the same vocation can come from general supernatural providence as from a superior cause that also produces vocation in the reprobate, and from predestination as from an inferior cause that causes vocation only in the predestined. Similarly, the same sensible thing is produced by animal insofar as animal is a superior and inadequate cause in man, but by man as an adequate cause, who produces it only in himself.

But someone will ask whether every vocation is an effect of predestination. It is responded that, if the vocation is continued up to the attainment of glory in itself or in its effect, namely justification and perseverance, it is indeed an effect of predestination. But if it is continued neither in itself nor in its effect, at least in the predestined person's recollection, by reason of which he later responds more fervently, it will be an effect of general supernatural providence but not of predestination, because it does not efficaciously contribute to glory.

To Gabriel's arguments: to the first it is responded that, although a vocation of the same species and substance exists in the reprobate and in the predestined, it is nevertheless not in both an effect of predestination. In the reprobate it is an effect only of general supernatural providence joined to an inefficacious will; in the predestined, however, it will be an effect of this general supernatural providence and of predestination. If someone objects that vocation cannot be an effect of general supernatural providence because all who are called are justified and those who are justified are glorified, according to Paul in Romans 8: *Those whom he foreknew and predestined*, and so forth, *these he also called*, and so forth, it is responded that the antecedent is false. For it is false that the reprobate are not called and justified because they are not glorified. The opposite is taught by the COUNCIL OF TRENT, session 6, canon 1, and Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter 17. It is also false that all who are called are justified and that all who are justified are glorified. Otherwise, a man who had been called could not fail to respond, or one who had been justified could not lose glory or be damned. We said the opposite above, and it is gathered from Matthew 22: *Many are called, but few are chosen.* Hence Paul in that place speaks only of the predestined. To the second argument it is responded by denying the antecedent, because although through all the effects

of predestination together a man is perfectly ordained toward glory, and therefore all cannot exist together with sin, nevertheless he is not perfectly ordained toward glory through every individual effect of predestination, but only through justification and perseverance, which are incompatible with sin. Through vocation, however, he is ordained only remotely and dispositively, and consequently it is not necessary that vocation be incompatible with sin.

QUESTION 2
WHETHER JUSTIFICATION AND JUSTIFYING GRACE ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION

Because, according to the law established by God, justification does not occur without grace, the whole disputation is reduced to grace itself. By the name of grace we understand habitual justifying grace, the infused moral and theological virtues, the assistance finally disposing one toward glory, merits, perseverance, and universally the means between vocation and glorification. A twofold grace is conferred upon us: one that remains until glory, and another that is interrupted through sin. It must first be doubted whether the former is an effect of predestination. Gabriel, in Book I, distinction 41, Quest. 1, and Ockham in the same place teach that it is not an effect of predestination, because they think that glorification alone is an effect of predestination. They prove it because that without which man can attain glory is not an effect of predestination. But by God's absolute power man can attain glory without grace. Therefore grace is not an effect of predestination. But we must say that grace is an effect of predestination. This is gathered from Paul in Romans 8, where he enumerates justification without exception among the effects of predestination. Thus St. Thomas teaches in this article; Gregory, in Book I, distinction 40, Quest. 1, art. 1; Marsilius, Quest. 41, art. 2. It is also gathered from Augustine's definition of predestination in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter 10: predestination is the purpose of giving grace in the present and glory in the future. It is manifest by reason because whatever efficaciously assists toward glory is an effect of predestination, but among all other things uninterrupted grace especially assists. Therefore it will be an effect of predestination. To Gabriel's argument it is responded that we assert grace to be an effect of predestination only when the predestined person is brought through grace to glory, which always occurs according to the law established by God.

The greater difficulty concerns grace that is interrupted by mortal sin. Gabriel and Ockham, in the places cited, deny that it is an effect of

predestination. Cartagena seems to assent to them in discourse 3. For he says that grace, if taken insofar as it is a quality and is interrupted by sin, is not an effect of predestination; but if taken insofar as it is acceptance unto glory, he concedes that it is an effect. He proves the first because grace insofar as it is a quality, once interrupted by sin, does not rise again numerically the same through penance but as another grace. Therefore, that grace which was interrupted contributes nothing to glory and consequently will not be an effect of predestination. He proves the second because grace as acceptance unto glory does not entirely perish through mortal sin but remains in divine acceptance, is repaired through penance, and is rewarded in glory. Therefore grace as acceptance, even if interrupted, is an effect of predestination. Others prove it in this way: that grace is common to the reprobate and the predestined, just as vocation is. Second, because if this grace were an effect of predestination, it would be efficaciously willed and would never be interrupted, just as glory is not interrupted. Third, because the grace of innocence from which the first parent fell was not an effect of his predestination, because the first parent was predestined through Christ, whereas that grace was given before Christ was foreseen and preordained. Therefore, that grace was not an effect of predestination.

But we must say that even habitual grace interrupted through sin is an effect of predestination. Nearly all the doctors teach this, and it is gathered from the cited passage of Romans 8. It is also shown by reason because that grace interrupted through sin efficaciously contributes to the attainment of glory. Therefore, it is an effect of predestination. The antecedent is proved because either that grace was the principle of merits that remain after sin in divine acceptance and are afterward rewarded in glory; or at least from the disorder of the grace lost the predestined person rises more cautious, or to greater grace; or at least, as I judge truer, through penance he rises again with the same grace that was lost—not numerically the same, but because, in addition to the grace corresponding to the disposition in which the penitent rises again, as much grace as had been lost through sin is given to him by virtue of the prior grace, and consequently by virtue of it greater glory is given. Therefore it efficaciously contributes to glory and consequently will be an effect of predestination. Nor is it an obstacle if you say that grace which does not exist cannot efficaciously assist toward glory, but the grace that was lost no longer exists. It is responded that, although it does not remain in itself, it nevertheless remains either in merit as in its effect or in the grace given through penance by virtue of it. This is sufficient for it to be said to assist efficaciously toward glory.

To the arguments made, it is responded as follows. To the first argument of the first position, the response is clear from what has been said. The second, however, is not against us. To the first argument of the other position it is responded that it proves only that grace does not come from predestination alone, just as being bipedal does not come from man alone. But just as bipedality in man is caused by man, so grace in the predestined is caused through predestination, although in the reprobate it is an effect of general supernatural providence. To the second it is responded by denying the consequence, because glory is not perpetual and incapable of being lost on the ground that it is an effect of predestination, but because it consists in the clear intuition of God, which necessarily has rectitude of will joined to it. Hence it does not follow that grace is incapable of being lost because it is an effect of predestination. To the third a response must be given below, when we dispute whether our predestination presupposes the predestination of Christ. Meanwhile, however, it must be denied that the grace of innocence was not given to the first parent through Christ.

QUESTION 3
WHETHER GLORIFICATION IS AN EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION

By the name of glorification we understand the beatific vision, the endowments both of soul and body, and the light of glory itself, which is the cause of the vision.

Durandus, in Book I, distinction 41, Quest. 2, no. 10, thinks that glorification is not an effect of predestination. He proves it because predestination is a species of providence and providence a species of prudence. But prudence concerns only the means. Therefore predestination also concerns only the means. Glorification, however, is not a means but the end. Therefore predestination does not concern glorification.

Others, however, teach without qualification that glorification is an effect of predestination. Thus St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article; Gabriel and Ockham in the places cited. They prove it because perfect providence concerns not only the means but also the end, because perfect providence attains the end, and it arises from the imperfection of our providence that it does not always attain the end. But predestination is the perfect providence of God. Therefore, it always attains the end, which is glorification. Second, they prove it because all the supernatural goods of the predestined person come to him from

predestination, but glorification is the chief good. Therefore, the glorification of the predestined person is an effect of predestination. They also prove it from Romans 8: *Those whom he foreknew and predestined*, and so forth, *these he also glorified.* For although certain Fathers read "magnified" in place of "glorified," referring to this life through virtues and merits, the common reading is nevertheless "glorified" or "magnified" in glory.

Others think a distinction must be made in this difficulty. For there is a twofold ordination and will in God who predestines: one concerning the glory to be conferred, which pertains to the intention of the end, and the other concerning the means to be ordered toward glory. They say, therefore, that if predestination is taken as the ordination both concerning the means and concerning the end, glorification is in truth an effect of predestination, because neither the ordination nor the will concerning the means has glory itself as its object. But because only the ordination and will concerning the means, on the supposition of the intention of the end, is in truth predestination, this position therefore does not defend glorification as an effect of predestination. For this reason we must say otherwise: that glorification, insofar as it exists in execution, is an effect of predestination. For we conceive a twofold ordination and will in God concerning the means to glory, on the supposition of the intention to give glory. One concerns the means themselves in themselves, namely vocation, justification, and perseverance. Glorification is the remote and not the proximate effect of this ordination and will. The reason is that perseverance is an effect of this ordination, and glorification is an effect of perseverance. Therefore, from the first to the last, glorification will be an effect of this ordination and will. In another way, predestination can be taken insofar as it is the ordination and will to give glory in execution as the reward of merits and perseverance that are foreseen. Glorification in execution is the proximate effect of this will. Hence, because this ordination is included under predestination, it must be said absolutely that glorification is an effect of predestination.

Someone will nevertheless object: before both of these wills there preceded in God an efficacious will to give glory. Therefore, apart from that will no other will to give glory in execution is necessary, or the former will was not sufficiently efficacious. It is responded that the will to give glory that preceded in God by way of intention immediately places nothing in us. Rather, according to our manner of understanding, its efficacy consists in moving God to the choice of the means. Therefore, apart from that will, another will to give glory in execution was necessary, which pertains to predestination. The reason is that merits and perseverance are not the physical cause of glorification, as medicine

is the cause of health, but are only a moral cause; therefore, another will is required for executing glorification itself. Hence it follows that the two positions cited above, those of Durandus and the Thomists, are not contrary to one another. For Durandus takes predestination only for the ordination of the means and therefore denies that glorification is an effect of predestination, which is true when speaking of a proximate effect. The Thomists, however, take predestination for the ordination of the means together with election, and also for the ordination and will to give glory once the merits have been seen. Consequently, they rightly assert that glorification is an effect of predestination.

Concerning these three questions it must be noted that, when we say that vocation, justification, and glorification are effects of predestination, this must not be understood as though these three effects were found in all the predestined, because the first, namely vocation, is not found in infants. It must be understood that in all predestined persons in whom vocation, justification, and glorification are found, they are all effects of predestination. Second, it must be noted that among the three effects of predestination, some are produced by God without the cooperation of our free judgment, such as the first vocation and justification in infants; others are produced with the cooperation of our free judgment, such as the justification of an adult and perseverance in grace, according to what the SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE teaches in canon 20: "Many good things exist in man that man does not perform, but no good things exist that God does not grant man to perform."

QUESTION 4
WHETHER NATURAL GOODS ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION

The reason for doubt in this question is that the effects of predestination are either glory or what efficaciously causes glory. But natural goods are neither glory nor can they efficaciously cause glory, because natural things do not attain to the causation of supernatural things. Therefore, they are not effects of predestination. Second, because the supernatural end presupposes the natural end, just as grace presupposes nature. Therefore, it also presupposes the means and natural goods as already made. Therefore, they are not made through predestination.

Nevertheless, it must be said that many natural goods are effects of predestination. Thus Driedo teaches in *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii et Praedestinationis*, part 1, chapter 1; Durandus, Book I, distinction 41, Quest. 2,

no. 7; Scotus, Gregory, and Marsilius in the same place; Córdoba, Book I of the *Quaestionarium*, Quest. 56, section 6. Natural goods of this kind are favorable events, good parental education, the fact that a predestined person does not die in mortal sin, that he is not incited to sin, remembrance of death, and other similar goods. It is proved by a common reason because these natural goods are proximate occasions efficaciously contributing to the attainment of glory. Therefore they are effects of predestination. Hence St. Thomas, in the Second Part of the Second Part, Quest. 27, art. 2, reply to 2, teaches that natural goods are also the object of supernatural hope; and in the First Part of the Second Part, Quest. 114, final article, he teaches that these goods can fall under condign merit insofar as they are ordained toward eternal life, by which rationale they assume a certain spirituality. Hence they are requested by the Church through the common prayers of the Church. This conclusion is gathered from Romans 8: *For those who love God all things work together for good*, together with the interpretation of Jerome, Anselm, Cajetan, and Vigerius in the same place, who teach that for the predestined all things work together for good, both prosperous and adverse.

But the difficulty is whether these natural goods are produced according to their substance through predestination, or whether they are supposed to have already been made through natural providence and are elevated through predestination toward a supernatural end. Cajetan, in the Third Part, Quest. 1, art. 3, reply to 4, teaches that they are not made according to their substance through predestination but, having already been made otherwise, are ordered and elevated. He proves it because in relation to an end supernatural according to its substance, only those things that are substantially supernatural are produced according to their substance. But the end of predestination is supernatural according to its substance. Therefore, from it only goods substantially supernatural are produced according to their substance, while natural goods are only elevated and ordained.

But we must make a distinction. Natural goods are of two kinds. Some are things as distinguished from events or movements that they cause in our appetite and sense, by which we are stirred toward the good. Others are events or movements by which the appetite or sense is naturally moved toward the good. If we speak of the former, all agree that they are not made according to their substance through predestination, because these goods are remote occasions that assist toward eternal life. Therefore, it is sufficient that God use them in order to a supernatural end; it is not necessary that they be made according to their substance for the sake of a supernatural end. If, however, we

speak of the second kind of goods, very many theologians agree that they are made according to their substance through predestination. Their reason is that goods of this second kind are proximate occasions of a good ordained toward eternal life, and they do not seem to have been made for any end other than from the will to give eternal life. Hence, to Cajetan's argument it is responded by denying the antecedent. Rather, in order to a supernatural end there are produced according to their substance both means substantially supernatural and those that according to their substance are natural, whether they serve eternal life as a cause, as a disposition, or as a proximate occasion, in which manner natural goods serve it. To the first argument for the reason of doubt, the antecedent is denied. For it is sufficient that something be made in order to glory as a means that it be either a disposition or an occasion, as we said. To the last it is responded that supernatural things presuppose only those natural goods that were made for a natural end, but many were made for attaining a supernatural end.

QUESTION 5
WHETHER ALL EVILS ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION IN THE PREDESTINED

There can be a doubt concerning three evils: natural evil or the evil of punishment; second, the evil of fault; third, the permission of sin, which is joined to moral evil.

All agree first that natural evils or evils of punishment are effects of predestination. Such are any tribulation, illness, and other similar evils. The reason is that the evil of punishment is of itself a certain good and consequently can be willed by God so that we may live more cautiously or be stirred toward penance from the end of giving us glory. Therefore, they can be effects of predestination, although there are certain evils that cannot be effects of predestination, such as the eternal punishment of loss.

The difficulty concerns only the evil of fault, whether it is an effect. The reason for doubt is that natural goods and the evil of punishment are effects of predestination because they are occasions of merit and penance, which are means to eternal life. But the evil of fault is also an occasion of penance, since it often happens that someone grieves for a fault committed. Therefore, the evil of fault is an effect of predestination. Second, because on Romans 8, *For those who love God all things work together for good*, the Gloss, Anselm, St. Thomas, and

Cajetan assert that even sins work together for good. Therefore, sins also can be effects of predestination.

We must nevertheless say that evils of fault are not effects of predestination. All the doctors hold this position. The reason proving it is evident, because all effects of predestination must be made and willed by God. But the evil of fault can neither be made nor willed by God, according to the text: *God did not make sin, nor does he delight in the perdition of the dying.* Therefore, the evil of fault is not an effect of predestination. Second, because if the evil of fault could be an effect of predestination, this would be chiefly because it can be ordered toward good by God or can be done for the sake of good. But the evil of fault is not of itself ordered toward good; rather, it is of itself an impediment to good. Nor can it be done by God for the sake of good, because evils must not be done so that goods may result from them. Therefore, it is not an effect of predestination.

The SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE teaches this truth in its final canon by anathematizing anyone who says that men are predestined by God toward evil. Fulgentius also teaches it in Book I of *De Praedestinatione*, saying that men are not predestined by God toward evil.

For the solution of the arguments, it must be observed that, for something to be an effect of predestination, it must possess two things. The first is that it assist toward attaining eternal life; the second, that it be willed by God from the intention of giving glory. Because the evil of fault neither assists toward attaining glory nor is willed from the intention of giving glory to the predestined, it must in no way be conceded that the evil of fault is an effect of predestination. Nor must it be conceded that it is an effect of providence, because it is not preordained through providence. For although Durandus, in Book I, distinction 39, Quest. 3, no. 10; Alexander, First Part, Quest. 36, member 4, art. 1; and Ferrariensis, Book III of *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 71, said that sins fall under God's providence, they nevertheless say that they fall under it as things to be destroyed, just as we say that food falls under the object of the nutritive power; or they teach that they fall under providence as a first cause by which God ordains something, because once sin has been foreseen God ordains that the benefit of penance be conferred upon man. All nevertheless deny that sins fall under providence as its effects.

To the first it is responded that the rationale differs for a temporal good or an evil of punishment. For a temporal good or an evil of punishment is not of itself incompatible with attaining beatitude. Although according to their substance they do not pertain to the order of predestination, they can

necessarily and primarily be ordered by God toward a supernatural end. Evils of fault, however, can neither be ordered toward good nor be willed for the sake of good. Rather, once they have been seen and the sinner has been seen in the misery of sin, God wills to have mercy on him and to confer certain goods upon him from his excessive mercy, according to Augustine: "God is so good that he would not permit evils unless he could draw goods from them." To the second it is responded that the passage of Paul is understood by Ambrose, Jerome, and Chrysostom in that place as referring to the tribulations of this age. If, however, according to the cited doctors it is understood also of sins, so that sins too are said to work together for good, the passage must be understood in this way: not that sins of themselves or by their own worthiness work together for good, since sins of themselves are per accidens occasions for giving good, but that from God's mercy, as we said, it comes about that goods are conferred upon the sinner.

The difficulty now concerns the permission of fault, whether it is an effect of predestination. The reason for doubt is that, if it were an effect of predestination, it would be lawful for us to desire permission, just as it is lawful to desire other effects of predestination. But it is not lawful for us to do so, because this would be to desire the permitted sin itself. Therefore, permission is not an effect of predestination.

We must nevertheless say that permission is an effect of predestination in the predestined. This is clear from the fact that God sometimes wills a man to fall into sin so that he may rise again to greater grace and attain greater glory, according to Augustine, Book XIV of *The City of God*, chapter 13, where he says: "I dare to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some manifest sin, so that they may be displeased with themselves who had fallen by being pleased with themselves." He adduces Psalm 82: *Fill their faces with shame, and they will seek your name, O Lord.* It is also clear because God often permits sins in some so that the predestined may be exercised in works of virtue, according to Romans 11: *Their transgression is the salvation of the Gentiles.* Romans 9 must also be understood in this way: *God, willing to show his wrath*, and so forth.

To the argument made it is responded by denying the consequence. For it is not lawful for us to desire everything God can do. God can cause the death of parents and similar things, yet it is not lawful for us to desire them. If you say that at least it is lawful to desire permission for the sake of the spiritual good of the predestined, or for the end for which God wills it, since it is lawful for us to conform our will to the divine will in the final object willed, it is responded that not even under this rationale is it lawful, although it is lawful for God to permit

it. The reason for the difference is that sin does not follow from God's efficacious permission insofar as the permission is from the divine will, and therefore it is lawful for God to permit it; but sin follows from permission insofar as it is from our freely operating will, and therefore to desire permission would be to desire sin. Hence, although we can desire positive things, we cannot desire things necessarily joined to fault, and consequently it is not lawful to desire even the positive element of sin. If you object that to permit is nothing other than to leave a man in his freedom, but it is lawful for us to desire our freedom; therefore, it is lawful to desire permission. Many think that to permit is nothing other than to leave a man free, but this does not seem true to me, because perfect freedom is also found in acts of virtue, yet permission is not. Rather, to permit is nothing other than not to prevent sin when one has the power to prevent it through more abundant helps. Thus a judge externally permits sin when he does not punish or prevent it, although he could punish or prevent it.

ARTICLE 3
WHETHER GOD REPROBATES ANY MAN

The conclusion is affirmative.

QUESTION 1
WHETHER IT IS CERTAIN THAT SOME MEN ARE REPROBATED BY GOD OR WHETHER ALL ARE PREDESTINED

Since reprobation is in some way contrary to predestination, it seems that, if all men are predestined, no one is reprobate, and consequently it is false that some are reprobated by God.

It seems first that all are predestined, because, as is gathered from Paul in 1 Timothy 2: *God wills all men to be saved.* Also because Christ died for all. And 1 Corinthians 15: *As in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive.* But all die in Adam. Therefore all are to be made alive in Christ. Romans 2 and Acts 10 say: *With God there is no acceptance of persons.* But very many are predestined, as was seen. Therefore, if God relates in the same way toward all, no one is reprobate.

Certain modern doctors, because of these authorities and passages, think that all men without exception are predestined by God. Isidore Clarius held this in discourses 66 and 67 on the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount, Matthew 5; Camera, chapters 4 and 5 of his *Dialogus*; John of Bologna, parts 1 and 2 of his

opusculum; Osorius, Book IX of *De Iustitia Caelesti*; Catarinus, in the opusculum *De Praedestinatione Christi*. Catarinus asserts that all men are destined by God toward eternal life, but some are ordained through excellent and singular means by which they infallibly attain eternal life, and only these are called predestined. Others, however, are ordained through sufficient means by which, if they will, they will attain eternal life. He asserts that these are nevertheless called destined, and he himself calls them "to be saved." Of those who are to be saved, he says, some attain eternal life and some do not attain it because of their own demerits. The number of those who attain eternal life from among those to be saved is not, he says, certain in divine providence and predestination in the way in which the number of those excellently predestined is certain; it is nevertheless certain in divine foreknowledge.

Their position at first sight appears contrary to faith, at least in its words, but in reality it agrees with the Catholic faith. For when these doctors assert that all are predestined, they mean only that in God there is an antecedent and inefficacious will to save all, which Paul also taught in 1 Timothy 2 and which the theologians concede. Because from this will he confers upon all the supernatural means by which they are directed toward eternal life, they therefore assert that men are predestined, that is, ordained. Yet because these authors concede that of the men who are to be saved some attain eternal life and others do not, they in truth concede in a Catholic sense that some men are reprobate and others predestined. In this sense this position contains nothing against faith. Hence Córdoba, Book I of the *Quaestionarium*, Quest. 56, unjustly condemned this position by a most severe censure, calling it fantastic, erroneous, rash, and, if not utterly so, heretical. Nevertheless, the first thing taught by Catarinus is displeasing: namely, that the number of those who attain eternal life are not called predestined and are not predestined. The reason against him is that predestination is nothing other than the ordination of a man toward eternal life through means that God has seen will be efficacious; but those who attain eternal life from the order of those to be saved are ordained in this manner. Therefore, they are in truth predestined. Second, because according to Paul in Romans 8, *Those whom God foreknew to be conformed to the image of his Son* are truly predestined. But God foreknew that all those who attain eternal life from the order of those to be saved would be conformed to the image of his Son. Therefore, all of them are predestined. Third, because Revelation 20 says: *As many as were not cast into the lake of fire are inscribed in the book of life.* But those who attain eternal life from that second order were in truth not cast into the lake of fire. Therefore, they are inscribed in the book of life and consequently

predestined. The second point is also displeasing: namely, that the number of those who attain eternal life from among those to be saved is not certain in divine predestination and providence. This would chiefly be true either because they are not efficaciously ordained toward eternal life through supernatural providence or because the means depend upon their freedom. It is not true because of the first, because they attain eternal life in effect and therefore are efficaciously ordained toward it. But they attain it in effect; therefore, they are efficaciously ordained. It is not true because of the second, because the number of those excellently predestined is ordained through means that depend upon their freedom. For Paul, in 1 Corinthians 9, although he belonged to this order, said: *I chastise my body and bring it into servitude, lest, after preaching to others, I myself should become reprobate.* Yet according to Catarinus their number is certain not only in divine foreknowledge but also in predestination. Therefore, the number of those who attain eternal life from among those to be saved will similarly be certain not only in foreknowledge but in predestination.

This position, therefore, being set aside, which in its words seems opposed to faith, the conclusion of faith must be maintained: some men are reprobated by God, while others are predestined, so that the whole society of men is divided into the predestined and the reprobate. The conclusion is of faith. Malachi 1 and Romans 9 say: *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*, where the reprobate are signified by Esau and the predestined by Jacob. And 2 Timothy 2: *In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay*, where the predestined are understood by the vessels of gold and silver, and the reprobate by the others. Matthew 25 signifies Christ exercising the final judgment, placing some men at the right hand and into eternal life, and others at the left and into eternal fire. In Romans 8 and 9, the reprobate are understood by vessels of wrath and unto dishonor. In 2 Timothy 2 it is said of the predestined: *The Lord knows those who are his.* In Matthew 7 it is said of the reprobate: *I do not know you*, namely with the knowledge of approval. In 2 Corinthians 13 it is said: *Unless perhaps you are reprobate; but I hope that you will know that we are not reprobate.* The same is gathered from Paul in 1 Corinthians 9: *I chastise my body*, and so forth. In these passages some are signified as reprobate and others as predestined. The theologians teach the same in Book I, distinction 40. Augustine taught it in various places, especially in Book XV of *The City of God*, chapter 1, where he divides the whole human community into two cities: one predestined to the kingdom and the other to fire. The reasoning of St. Thomas also proves it, because it belongs to the providence directing things toward an end to permit some to fall short of the end. But men are ordained by God toward eternal life

through divine providence. Therefore, it belongs to providence to permit some to fall short of attaining eternal life. This permission is reprobation, and so too is punishing demerits, which is to reprobate.

To the two opposing passages it must be responded that they signify only that in God there is an antecedent will to save men, and thus, as far as depends upon God, all men are saved, just as all die in Adam. They do not, however, signify that all men are predestined by God. To the second argument it is responded that, even if God reprobates some, there is no acceptance of persons in him, because he grants everyone sufficient helps for attaining salvation. But the chief reason is that God is a debtor to no man, and therefore whatever he grants, he grants from his mercy. Anyone can properly distribute what belongs to him as he pleases, as is signified in Matthew 20 in the parable of those hired for the vineyard, in the words: *Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with what is mine?* Paul, speaking of this distribution in Romans 9, says: *Is there injustice with God? By no means.*

QUESTION 2
WHETHER REPROBATION IS AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT OR OF THE WILL

After it has been seen that reprobation exists, it must be seen what reprobation is. Some think that reprobation is an act of the divine will and not of the intellect. Thus Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii et Praedestinationis*, part 1, chapter 1; Gabriel, Book I, distinction 41, sole question, art. 1; Marsilius, Quest. 41. They prove it by this simple reasoning: to reprobate is nothing other than to hate or reject something as evil, but this pertains to an act of the will. Therefore, reprobation is an act of the will.

Nevertheless, from what we said concerning predestination, it is clear that it must be asserted that reprobation is an act of the intellect connoting an act of the efficacious will. Thus St. Thomas and Cajetan with him hold in this article; Alexander, First Part, Quest. 29, member 2. The reason is manifest because, just as predestination is the ordination of a man toward glory, so reprobation is the ordination of a man toward punishment, in each case with an efficacious will joined to it. Just as predestination is a subjective part of providence, so is reprobation. Therefore, just as predestination is an act of the intellect, so is reprobation.

If someone asks in which act of the intellect it consists, the response must be what we said concerning predestination: namely, it is an act of judgment

connoting an election of the divine will, through which men are ordained toward punishment. To the argument made it is responded that, although reprobation is an act of the intellect, as Matthew 7 and 25 signify in the words *I do not know you*, and Ephesians 1 in the words *The Lord knows those who are his*, namely with the knowledge of approval, nevertheless, because it connotes an act of the will, it is sometimes signified through an act of the will, as in Romans 9: *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.* When it is signified by the name of reprobation as an act of the intellect, it appears in 1 Corinthians 1: *I will reprobate the wisdom of the wise*; and Psalm 32: *He reprobates the counsels of princes.*

It must nevertheless now be doubted whether reprobation is a species distinct from predestination and directly opposed to it. Many think that it is directly opposed to predestination. They seem to prove this by the following reasoning: predestination is the ordination of a man toward glory, whereas reprobation is the ordination of a man toward eternal punishment, which is the punishment of loss. But these ordinations are directly opposed, like the production and corruption of the same thing. Therefore, reprobation is directly opposed to predestination.

But with Durandus, Book I, distinction 40, final question, and Molina, Quest. 23, art. 2, we must say that reprobation is not directly opposed to the whole of predestination, but rather to a certain act belonging to it, namely approval. For approval is the judgment by which, on account of his merits, a man is judged worthy of eternal life together with the will to give it. Reprobation, however, is the judgment of the divine intellect by which a man, on account of his demerits, is judged worthy of eternal punishment, together with the will to punish and execute the punishment. These two acts are to be expressed by Christ in the final judgment, Matthew 25, in the words: *Come, blessed of my Father, receive the kingdom*, and so forth; and in the words: *Depart, accursed, into eternal fire.* The first part is proved because predestination is an act of mercy, without any merits being presupposed in man, by which act man is ordained toward eternal life. Reprobation, however, is an act of justice by which a man is judged worthy of eternal punishment on account of his permitted sins. But an act of giving glory without merits or of ordaining someone toward it, and an act of excluding someone from glory or of punishing him on account of foreseen sins, are not directly opposed. Therefore, reprobation is not directly opposed to predestination.

If someone asks the reason why predestination and reprobation are not directly contrary to one another, although they are ordained toward contrary ends, it is responded that through predestination a man is made worthy of the

eternal life toward which he is ordained, whereas through reprobation a man is not made worthy of the punishment toward which he is directed, but is presupposed already worthy. Therefore, they are not directly opposed.

That reprobation is opposed to approval is proved because the will to punish a man on account of his own demerits by excluding him from glory is opposed to the will to give glory on account of his own merits. But these two acts are approval and reprobation. Therefore, reprobation is directly opposed to approval.

To the argument made above it is responded that predestination is not an ordination toward glory in just any manner, but by making a man worthy of glory. Reprobation, however, is an ordination toward punishment not by making a man worthy of punishment, but on the supposition of a worthiness arising from his own will, according to Hosea 13: *Your perdition is from yourself, O Israel*, and so forth. Therefore, it does not follow that they are directly contrary to one another, although they are ordained toward contraries.

QUESTION 3
IN WHICH ACTS OF THE INTELLECT AND WILL REPROBATION CONSISTS

All agree that in God there are several acts of intellect and will concerning the reprobate. First, in the intellect there is the act that is foreknowledge of sin; second, there is the ordination of a human being to punishment. In the will, however, first there is the will to permit sin; second, the will to punish the human being; third, there can be conceived in God a will not to give glory, or to exclude the human being from glory. The doubt, therefore, concerns which of these acts belong to reprobation.

All agree, first, that the ordination of a human being to punishment and the will to punish belong to reprobation. The reason is that each of these acts presupposes foreknowledge of the sin on account of which the human being is judged worthy of eternal punishment and unworthy of glory. The difficulty concerns only the will not to give glory and the will to permit sin, namely, whether they are acts of reprobation.

Scotus, in Book I, dist. 41, Quest. 1, in the paragraph beginning "Against this"; Gregory, in Book I, the same distinction, Quest. 1, art. 1; and Durandus, in the same place, Quest. 1, uphold the affirmative position. Saint Thomas also seems to hold this opinion in the body of the present article, where he says that to permit a human being to fall away from the end is to reprobate him, and in

the reply to 1 he says that not to will to give glory to some is to hate or reprobate them. Their reason is that the will not to give glory and the will to permit sin belong to supernatural providence; but they do not belong to predestination, because they concern the reprobate, nor to that supernatural providence by which God wills all human beings to be saved, because this providence ordains human beings to glory. It remains, therefore, that they belong to reprobation. The more recent theologians cited above, however, namely Isidore, Camerarius, John of Bologna, and Catharinus, in the places cited, together with many others, judge that in God there is no will not to give glory before final guilt has been foreseen. They prove this because such a will conflicts with the antecedent will by which *God wills all human beings to be saved* before sin has been foreseen, 1 Timothy 2, with the will by which *he wills no one to perish*, 2 Peter 3, and with the will by which *he does not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live*, Ezekiel 13 and 18. Therefore, before guilt has been foreseen, there is in God no will not to give glory. They also prove it by reason, because, considered in himself and with no guilt presupposed, God wills no evil to a human being; but to will not to give glory is to will the greatest evil and to have the greatest hatred. Therefore, there is no such will in God.

In this controversy, it must first be said with the authors just cited that in God there is no will not to give glory before final sin has been foreseen. This can be proved as follows: it cannot be understood that God, from himself alone, should as it were be moved to will contrary things for a human being; but to will all human beings to be saved and to will not to give glory are to will contrary things. Therefore, with no other cause considered on the part of the human being, God does not will not to give glory.

You may say that there is no conflict between willing by an antecedent and inefficacious will that all human beings be saved and willing by a consequent and efficacious will not to give glory to some, since these are different wills. But against this, if the will not to give glory is prior to foreseen guilt, as is supposed, it follows that it is an antecedent will, and thus by an antecedent will God would will both that all human beings be saved and that glory not be given to some, which is false. Second, it cannot be understood that God, from his goodness, wills evil to a human being; but to will not to give glory is to will the greatest evil of the human being. Therefore, God does not will this from his goodness and before guilt has been seen. You may say that God, from the motive of his mercy, wills all human beings to be saved, and from the motive of his justice wills not to give glory to some, and that these two do not conflict because they proceed from different motives. Against this, however, an act of justice, especially

punitive and vindicatory justice, cannot be understood unless guilt or injury is presupposed on account of which the human being is punished. Therefore, before guilt has been foreseen, there is no act by which God wills not to give glory from the motive of his justice.

Second, it must be said that, even after final guilt has been foreseen, there is in God no act by which he wills not to give glory except insofar as this act is included in the will to punish with the punishment of loss, which is the deprivation of the beatific vision. This is proved because in God there is a will to punish a human being with the punishment of loss, and this includes the will not to give glory. Therefore, beyond this will to punish, another will not to give glory is not necessary; and if it is not necessary, it follows that it does not belong to reprobation.

Third, it must be said that the permission of sin is not reprobation, although it is necessarily presupposed by reprobation. Yet it is not necessary that permission be in God a positive will to permit sins. The first point, that permission is not reprobation, is proved because reprobation already presupposes the permission of guilt; but the permission of sin is prior to the sin itself as foreseen. Therefore, permission is not reprobation. The second is proved because guilt is necessarily presupposed for reprobation, while permission is presupposed for guilt. Therefore, permission is presupposed for reprobation. The third is proved because to permit sin is nothing other than for God not to prohibit or prevent sin by conferring more abundant assistance, although he truly could prevent it. But in order not to prevent what one could prevent, a will not to prevent is not necessary; it is sufficient to stand negatively with respect to more abundant assistance. Therefore, permission in God is not necessarily a positive will.

From all this it follows that the ordination and will to punish in execution, together with the order of the means required for punishment, belong to reprobation. This is proved because the will to glorify in execution belongs to predestination; therefore, likewise, the will to punish in execution belongs to reprobation. That such a will is in God is proved because it belongs to God to punish sins; but from eternity God saw sins in his own present and saw the human being as worthy of punishment on account of sins. Therefore, from eternity he willed to punish such sins. This will is called by us reprobation. Hence it follows that reprobation and predestination are certain coordinate species immediately contained under supernatural providence.

QUESTION 4
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF REPROBATION

It must be presupposed as certain that reprobation, considered in itself, places nothing in the reprobate, just as predestination, considered in itself, places nothing in the predestined. But just as predestination taken with respect to its execution places in the predestined the effects of predestination, so reprobation taken with respect to its execution places in the reprobate certain effects of reprobation. The present difficulty concerns what those effects are.

For an understanding of this question, it must be noted that there are four things about which a difficulty can arise: first, the permission of sin, whether original or actual, permission being taken passively; second, guilt itself and hardening in guilt; third, eternal punishment; fourth, the non-attainment of glory. All agree, first, that guilt is not an effect of reprobation. The reason is the same as what we stated concerning predestination, because the effects of reprobation must be made and willed by God; but guilt cannot be willed by God, according to the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 4, where it says: if anyone says that human beings are predestined by God to evil, and so forth. Therefore, guilt is not an effect of reprobation.

Someone will object that all the means, or all the things conducive to the end of predestination, must be produced through predestination; therefore, the things conducive to the end of reprobation, namely eternal punishment, must be produced through reprobation. But guilt is a means, or at least something especially conducive, to the end of reprobation. Therefore, it is produced through reprobation. It is responded that, as all theologians teach, there is this difference between the means, or the things conducive to the end of predestination, on the one hand, and the means, or the things conducive to the end of reprobation, on the other: the means of predestination are by nature intended and ordained by God through a positive will, and thus are produced through predestination; but not all the means, or things conducive to reprobation, are positively intended and willed by God, and thus they are not positively produced, but only negatively, namely, by God's not preventing them through more abundant assistance although he could do so. The reason for this difference is that all the means of predestination are good, whereas not all the means of reprobation, or things conducive to the end of reprobation, are good.

From this difference another arises, namely, that the means of predestination are ordered among themselves. Calling is ordered to justification, justification to perseverance, perseverance to glorification, and glorification to the exaltation of glory as to the end. They also arise from one another, either as from an efficient cause or as from a disposition, as justification arises from calling, perseverance from justification, and glorification from perseverance. But the means, or things conducive to reprobation, are not ordered among themselves, because sin is not permitted for the sake of guilt, nor is guilt for the sake of punishment, as is manifest.

All agree, second, that eternal punishment is an effect of reprobation. This is evident because reprobation is the ordination of a human being to an evil belonging to him; but the greatest evil and the end for such human beings is eternal punishment. Therefore, eternal punishment is an effect of reprobation. Hence it follows that, because the non-attainment of glory is included in eternal punishment through the punishment of loss, just as eternal punishment itself is an effect of reprobation, so also the non-attainment of glory, insofar as it is included in that punishment, is an effect of reprobation, though not insofar as it is the object of a distinct will.

The entire difficulty now concerns the permission of falling into sin, namely, whether it is an effect of reprobation. Saint Thomas, in the present article, and Cajetan in the same place; Scotus, Gregory, and Durandus in the places cited; and Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, chapter 1, hold the affirmative position. Since these authors judge that a will not to give glory preceding the foreknowledge of guilt belongs to reprobation, they consequently judge that the permission of sin is an effect of reprobation. They prove it first because one who wills to withdraw the end also wills, by the prior will, to withdraw the means conducive to the end. But God has a will not to give glory to the reprobate. Therefore, from this will he wills to withdraw the means to glory, namely, the more abundant assistance by which the reprobate would not sin. But this is to permit. Therefore, permission is an effect of reprobation. Second, the things conducive to the end of predestination are produced through predestination; therefore, the things conducive to the end of reprobation are produced through reprobation. But the permission of sin is conducive to the end of reprobation, which is punishment. Therefore, it is an effect of reprobation. Third, the evil of the reprobate proceeds from the hatred with which God regards him; but hatred belongs to reprobation. Therefore, permission, which is an evil of the reprobate, proceeds from reprobation and will thus be its effect. Finally, according to Romans 9, *God, willing to show his*

wrath and make known his power, endured with great patience vessels of wrath, and so forth. Therefore, God permitted sins in the vessels of wrath, that is, in reprobate sinners, for the end of showing his wrath, that is, of punishing. But things done for the end of punishing are effects of reprobation. Therefore, permission will be an effect of reprobation.

The contrary position, however, must be maintained, namely, that permission of falling into the first sin is not an effect of reprobation. Gabriel, in Book I, dist. 41, Quest. 1, art. 2; Marsilius, in the same place, Quest. 41, art. 1, conclusion 5; and the cited John of Bologna, Camerarius, Catharinus, and Molina, Quest. 23, art. 3, hold this position. The argument for it is that every effect of reprobation must be ordained by God from the will to punish with eternal punishment on account of guilt already foreseen. This is evident because reprobation is an act of punitive and vindicatory justice, which presupposes guilt on account of which the sinner is punished, or an injury that is avenged. But the permission of the first sin does not proceed from a will to punish on account of guilt, since it does not presuppose guilt but is prior to it. Therefore, the permission of the first sin is not an effect of reprobation. Nor is it valid to say that the major premise must be understood of positive effects, such as punishment, and not of negative effects, such as permission, since it is sufficient for this to proceed from another negation, namely, the negation of giving glory. For although it is a negation or privation, it must be a punishment inflicted on account of guilt, and therefore must necessarily presuppose guilt. But permission does not presuppose guilt. Therefore, it will not be an effect of reprobation, whether it consists in privation or in negation.

To the arguments given, it is responded as follows. To the first: if we conceded in God a will not to give glory before the foreknowledge of sin, it would consequently have to be conceded that the permission of sin is an effect of reprobation. But because we deny that prior will in God, we consequently deny that the permission of sin is an effect of reprobation. To the second, the antecedent is conceded, but the consequence is denied. For the argument would likewise prove that guilt itself is an effect of reprobation because it is especially conducive to the end of reprobation, which is nevertheless false. Hence it must be responded that, as we have said, the things conducive to the end of predestination are positively willed by God from the will to give glory, and therefore they are a means and an effect of predestination. But the things conducive to the end of reprobation are not all willed from the will to punish, and therefore they are not all to be called means or effects of reprobation. Hence the permission of sin and sin itself are called prerequisites for the end of

reprobation, but not means or effects of it. To the third: the evil of punishment does indeed come upon the reprobate from the hatred belonging to reprobation; but the permission of the first sin, because it does not presuppose guilt, cannot be the evil of punishment. Nor must it necessarily be willed by a positive will, as we have said; rather, it is sufficient that it proceed from God's not loving the reprobate more. For from this it follows that he does not give the greater assistance by which he would prevent sin, and this is to permit. To the last: Paul in that passage is not speaking of the permission of the first sin, but of abandonment or continuance in a sin already committed, since he says that God endured vessels of wrath, that is, sinners. Whether this abandonment and hardening in sin are effects of reprobation must be considered below.

Someone will doubt, however, for what end God permits a human being to fall into sin if the permission of sin does not arise from the will to punish. It must first be presupposed that sins are not permitted precisely so that God may punish the human being himself, because it would be excessively cruel to will that God permit sins in order that he might have something to punish. For although God could licitly do this by the right of dominion, it would not be licit by the right of a ruler, moderator, and provider.

Others say that God permits sins so that he may leave the human being free. Thus Cajetan, in article 5, teaches that God does not permit sin in order to punish, but permits it for the good of freedom, and then ordains the sin, once committed, to punishment. But this opinion is unsatisfactory, because even if God were to give a human being more abundant assistance by which he would in fact avoid sin, God would nevertheless leave him free, just as he leaves the predestined free.

It must therefore be said that God permits sin for the sake of the excellence of future virtue once sins are posited. For from the sins of tyrants arise, as from an occasion, the patience of martyrs and the testimony by which they confess Christ. He also permits sins so that the riches of his glory toward the predestined may appear, as is evident from Romans 9: *God, willing to show his wrath, endured with great patience vessels of wrath, so that he might show the riches of his glory toward the vessels he prepared for glory*. For this end he permitted the human being to fall into sin.

QUESTION 5
WHETHER SIN, WHEN IT IS THE PUNISHMENT OF ANOTHER SIN, IS AN EFFECT OF REPROBATION

Because it happens that one sin is the punishment of another sin, as Augustine teaches in Book V of *Contra Iulianum*, chapter 3; *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chapter 25; and *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter 10; and Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, Quest. 87, art. 2; and as is gathered from Romans 1, *therefore God gave them over to a reprobate mind*, the doubt is whether the sin that is the punishment of another prior sin is an effect of reprobation.

The reason for doubting is that punishment can be willed and ordained by God. Therefore, sin, insofar as it is punishment, can be willed and preordained by God for the end of punishing, and thus will be an effect of reprobation.

In this difficulty, Cajetan, on chapter 12 of the Second Book of *Regum*, judges that although sin considered in itself cannot be willed by God, it can nevertheless be willed insofar as it is the punishment of another sin, and in this way, in the reprobate, it is an effect of reprobation.

But it must be said that sin, even insofar as it is the punishment of another sin, is neither from God nor an effect of reprobation. This conclusion is proved because no punishment that includes guilt can be willed or produced unless the guilt is also willed or produced. But sin, insofar as it is the punishment of another sin, includes guilt. Therefore, it cannot be willed or produced by God. The minor is proved because sin is guilt insofar as it deprives a human being of the rectitude of reason and of God as his ultimate end; but the very same thing is punishment insofar as that good is taken away from the human being and bears an order to guilt. Therefore, it necessarily includes guilt. But guilt cannot be willed or produced by God, even through reprobation. Therefore, sin, insofar as it is the punishment of another sin, is not an effect of reprobation.

Someone may ask by whom this punishment, which is sin, is imposed if it is not willed by God. It is responded that it is willed and inflicted by the one who sins through the very fact that he wills to sin. It is not, indeed, willed by him directly, but only indirectly, because directly he wills a good delightful to himself. You may object that God also indirectly wills sin through the very fact that he sees it and does not prohibit it but permits it. Therefore, it will be willed by God in the same way as by the human being. It is responded by denying the

consequence, because from the fact that God does not prohibit something that he could prohibit, it does not follow that he wills the sin. It follows only that the sin is voluntary with respect to him, but not that it is willed, even indirectly, because he is not bound to prohibit it. Thus the sinking of a ship is not willed by one who can prevent it and does not do so, unless he is bound to prevent it. But for one who is bound to prevent it, namely the sailor, the sinking is not only voluntary but also indirectly willed. This is especially so because God, as far as he is concerned, prohibits sin, since he gives sufficient assistance by which the human being could avoid it. You may object that Augustine, in the places cited, asserts that the sin that is the punishment of another sin is from God not only permitting but also willing and acting. Therefore, according to Augustine, God directly wills sin. It is responded that Augustine must be properly interpreted in those places. The meaning of his words is that the sin is not only from God's not conferring the greater assistance by which it would be avoided, but also from God's offering occasions in which he foresaw that the human being would sin, although he does not offer them for the end that the human being sin. From this the response to the reason for doubting is evident.

From all this it follows that continuance in sin is not an effect of reprobation. The reason is that sin and continuance in it have the same character and malice. But sin cannot be willed by God either directly or indirectly, nor can it be an effect of reprobation. Therefore, neither can continuance in sin.

But there is a doubt whether at least the permission of continuing in sin is an effect of reprobation. Many think that this permission is an effect of reprobation. They say that as soon as God sees the human being fallen into sin, he wills to withdraw from him the more abundant assistance by which the human being would rise from sin, so that in this way he may punish the human being with eternal punishment. Second, at least against certain notable sinners, such as the hardened and blinded, God specially wills to offer them an occasion in which he sees that they will sin. Therefore, at least in these persons, permission will be an effect of reprobation, because it does not seem to be willed otherwise than for the end of punishing.

But it must be said that the permission of continuance in sin, even if it is the punishment of a prior sin and is or could be willed by God, is not an effect of reprobation. This conclusion is proved because it cannot be an effect of reprobation unless it proceeds from the will to punish with eternal punishment. But the permission of continuance does not proceed in this way. The minor is evident because God never had a will to punish a human being with eternal punishment unless final sin had already been seen; but before the end of

perseverance in sin has been seen, final sin has never yet been seen, since the human being can afterward rise from sin through sufficient assistance, which is denied to no one. Therefore, the permission of perseverance in sin is not an effect of reprobation. It is also proved because the permission of perseverance is regarded as the same as the permission of falling into sin. But the permission of falling into sin is not an effect of reprobation. Therefore, neither is the permission of continuance. The major proposition is evident because the permission of sin and the permission of continuance in it are related as the production of a thing and the conservation of the same thing. Nevertheless, it must not be denied, but willingly conceded, that God could most justly, without any injury or injustice, as soon as he saw a human being fallen, have willed to punish him with eternal punishment and withdraw the more abundant assistance by which he would rise from sin, indeed even sufficient assistance. Yet it did not befit the divine mercy and goodness to will to punish a human being in this way. Rather, God granted him a certain respite, inciting him to repentance and not decreeing to punish him with eternal punishment until the final sin had already been seen.

To the arguments for the contrary position, it is responded that God does not have a will to punish with eternal punishment, or to reprobate, unless the final and last sin has already been seen. Hence the permission of continuance in sin is not an effect of reprobation, but proceeds from another end, namely, that of showing the riches of his glory toward the predestined, or that of punishing the human being with temporal punishment. Nor is it an obstacle to say that the permission of continuance in sin is a necessary means to the end of reprobation. It must be denied that it is a means, because it is not willed with the intention of punishing with eternal punishment, but is a prerequisite, as we said of the permission of falling into sin and also of guilt itself.

QUESTION 6
WHETHER BLINDING AND HARDENING ARE EFFECTS OF REPROBATION

The state of hardening is called by various names in Scripture. Sometimes it is called hardness of heart because of the inflexibility of the will toward the good; sometimes blinding because of the darkening of the intellect in perceiving the good; sometimes the heaviness of the ears because of the incapacity of the spirit or intellect to perceive the Word of God and its fruit. Properly, however, hardening is an excessive adherence of the will to evil and an inflexibility toward

the good. Thus Saint Thomas teaches in Book I, dist. 4, Quest. 4, art. 2. This question is closely connected with the question whether God is the cause of sin, the discussion of which belongs to *Summa Theologiae* I-II, Quest. 79, art. 3, and therefore it must be treated by us briefly.

It seems, first, that hardening and blinding are from God and effects of reprobation, because Sacred Scripture often seems to teach this: Romans 1, *God gave them over to a reprobate mind*; Romans 9, *he has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills*; Exodus 9, *the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart*; and Isaiah 63, *why have you made us depart from your way and hardened our hearts so that we would not fear you?* On account of these passages of Scripture, the Lutherans of the present time assert that God from eternity destined human beings to evil and in time impels them to perform it, and thus they do not hesitate to make God the author and cause of sin. Against these authors and their manifest heresy, however, Soto argues excellently in Book I of *De Natura et Gratia*, chapters 18 and 19; Roffensis, art. 36, *Adversus Lutherum*; Alexander, Part I, Quest. 29, member 4; Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, Quest. 79, art. 3; Bonaventure, in Book I, dist. 40, art. 3, Quest. 1; Castro, Book X of *Adversus Haereses*, under the words *malum* and *malitia*; Cano, Book II of *De Locis*, chapters 3 and 4; Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii et Praedestinatione*, Part II, final chapter, and *De Captivitate et Redemptione Generis Humani*, treatise 5, chapter 4. The contrary of this heresy is defined by the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 6, and the Second Council of Orange, final canon, which anathematizes anyone who says that God predestined human beings to evil. It is also gathered from the canonical Epistle of James, chapter 1: *God is no tempter of evils, for he himself tempts no one.*

Leaving aside this heresy, therefore, it must first be said that, if blinding and hardening are taken for the guilt in which someone long remains and to which he adheres, neither blinding nor hardening is from God or an effect of reprobation. This is proved first because they are from God neither directly nor indirectly, and therefore are not effects of reprobation. That they are not directly from God is evident because God does not impel a human being to evil, as the cited heresy seems to assert, nor move or assist him toward it, nor command or counsel it. But they cannot otherwise be directly from God. Therefore, they are not directly from God. Nor are they indirectly from God, because, although God does not confer the more abundant assistance by which the hardened person would be softened, he nevertheless confers sufficient assistance with the intention that the human being be softened. Hence sin cannot be imputed to God because he does not prevent it, both because, as far as he is concerned, he

does prevent it, and because he is not bound to prevent it, just as the sinking of a ship is not imputed to one who has no care of the ship because he is not bound to prevent the sinking.

Second, it must be said that, if hardening and blinding are taken for the permission of hardening and blinding, or for the non-conferral of the more abundant assistance by which the human being would be softened, although this permission is willed by God, it is nevertheless not an effect of reprobation. The first point, that it is willed, is evident because the permission of hardening is not an evil of guilt and therefore can very well be willed by God. Second, it belongs to the same will to confer more abundant grace and sometimes to deny it; but it belongs to the will of God to confer this more abundant grace. Therefore, it belongs to the same will to deny it, which is to permit. The second point, that it is not an effect of reprobation, is proved because the effects of reprobation proceed from the will to punish with eternal punishment, and this will was not in God until the end of the last sin had already been seen. But the permission of hardening and blinding was seen by God before the end of the last sin had been seen. Therefore, such permission is not an effect of reprobation.

For the passages of Scripture cited above to be interpreted in a Catholic sense, it must be noted that Scripture says in two ways that God hardens or blinds human hearts. In one way, by way of negation or permission, namely, by not conferring the more abundant assistance by which the human being would be softened. Thus Augustine teaches in Epistle 105, saying that God hardens not by imparting malice but rather by not imparting mercy, for which reason a master is said to harden a servant whom he does not punish. Thus Soto, Roffensis, and Castro teach in the places cited; Jerome and Theophylact on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans; Augustine, *De Praedestinatione et Gratia*, chapter 4; Chrysostom, Homily 3 on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans; Euthymius on chapter 15 of John; and, before all of them, Origen in Book III of *Periarchon*, chapter 1. Hence Damascene, Book III of *De Fide*, chapter 20, teaches that it is customary for Sacred Scripture to call God's permission his action, so that God is said to do what he permits to be done. In a second way, God is said to harden human hearts as though positively, namely, because he does something through which some become hardened. Thus, through the same scourge, assistance, or miracle by which God moved some to be converted, others become more hardened, not because God intends their hardness, but because from their own malice, taking occasion from it, they are more hardened. The theologians explain this by the example of the sun, which by the same ray softens wax and hardens clay. Thus, by the same miracles performed,

God converted the Israelite people to himself but rendered Pharaoh more hardened. Paul speaks in this way when he says, *we are the good fragrance of Christ, to some unto death and to others unto life*. Likewise, in John 6, through the same preaching of Christ concerning the eating of his body, some were enlightened and taught, namely the Apostles, whereas others said that the teaching was too hard to believe: *This saying is hard*. Thus Jerome teaches in volume 5, *Quaestiones ad Hedibiam*, Quest. 10, deriving it from Origen, Book III of *Periarchon*, chapter 1; Theophylact on Romans 9, *he has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills*; Driedo in the places cited; and Adam on Romans 1, on the words *God gave them over to a reprobate mind*. Augustine spoke in this way and sense in Book V of *Contra Iulianum*, chapter 3, volume 7, and *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chapter 21, where he says that God not only hardens human hearts by abandoning them but also by inclining their wills, according to Proverbs 21: *the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, and he will turn it wherever he wills*. In these words Augustine does not signify that God produces hardness, as his words seem to sound, but rather that he does not provide the greater assistance by which the human being would be softened, or that he offers occasions in which he foresees that the human being will be hardened, though he does not offer them so that he may be hardened. That this is Augustine's meaning is evident because he thus interpreted himself in volume 4, in the *Quaestiones in Exodum*, Quest. 18, using the example of Pharaoh and the Israelite people, and in *De Praedestinatione et Gratia*, chapter 4, where he says that the words *he hardens whom he wills* are not to be understood as though God produces hardness of heart, but because he does not soften, just as he is said to blind one whom he does not illuminate and to repel one whom he does not call. Likewise, in the cited Epistle 105, he teaches that God is said to harden hearts not by imparting malice but rather by not imparting mercy, as though he said, not by producing the guilt of hardening but by not offering more abundant assistance.

QUESTION 7
WHETHER GOD DENIES THE REPROBATE THE ASSISTANCE NECESSARY FOR SALVATION

The reason for doubting is that God denies the reprobate an efficacious will to save them. Therefore, he denies them what is necessary, because without the efficacious will of God no one can be saved. The antecedent is evident because, if God did not deny them an efficacious will, since that will is always fulfilled, it

would follow that all the reprobate would be saved. Second, at least he denies the reprobate the grace of Christ, because the grace of Christ is more powerful for saving than sin is for condemning, according to Romans 5: *where sin abounded, grace superabounded*. Therefore, if the grace of Christ is not denied to the reprobate, just as through sin all die, both the reprobate and the predestined, so through the grace of Christ all would be saved. Nor is it an obstacle to say that through the grace of Christ all are saved with respect to sufficiency, but not with respect to efficacy, because through sin all die not only with respect to sufficiency but also with respect to efficacy. Therefore, similarly, if the grace of Christ is not denied to them, it saves all with respect to efficacy; otherwise, the statement in 1 Corinthians 15 would not be true: *as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive*.

But it must be said that God denies no reprobate the necessary assistance, but gives it to all, so that, if the reprobate are not saved, they are not saved through their own fault. This is gathered from 1 Timothy 2: *God wills all human beings to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth*; from Romans 2: *do you not know that the kindness and humanity of God leads you to repentance, but you according to the hardness of your heart*, and so forth; from that passage of Paul [sic], *I stand at the door and knock*; and from the common axiom of theologians that God is lacking to no one who does what lies within him, unless the human being first fails himself. Therefore, if the human being wills to cooperate with God, God is never lacking to him.

Hence, to the argument given, it is responded by conceding that there was no efficacious will concerning the reprobate to save them, but we deny that anything necessary is lacking to them. For since the effect of the efficacious will adds nothing over the effect of the antecedent will except the operation that depends both on the free will of the human being and on the will of God, for the efficacious will to be lacking to the reprobate is the same as the operation by which he is converted being lacking to him. But this is not for the power to convert himself to be lacking to him. Thus, although the concurrence of the sun is lacking to a fire that is not burning, it does not follow that the fire cannot burn. Hence, just as this consequence is invalid: the concurrence of the sun is lacking to a fire that is not burning; therefore, it cannot burn—because this is the same as saying: operation is lacking to a fire that is not operating; therefore, it cannot operate—so also this consequence is invalid: the efficacious will is lacking to the reprobate; therefore, he cannot be saved. For this is the same as saying: the operation by which he converts himself is lacking to the reprobate; therefore, he cannot operate. This consequence is invalid, for it means nothing

other than that the power is lacking to him in the composite sense because he is not operating, which is to be lacking in a qualified sense. He nevertheless has power in the divided sense, which is to have it simply.

To the cited passage of Paul, it is responded that Paul there compares the grace of Christ with the sin of Adam not in effect but in power and capacity. In this respect the comparison is true, because the grace of Christ was so great that its merit was of infinite value by reason of the grace of union, which was infinite, whereas the malice and demerit of sin were not infinite. Therefore, the grace of Christ was more powerful than the sin of Adam. You may say that Paul there said that the grace of Christ abounded to more, which seems to signify an effect. It is responded that the comparative "more" must be taken positively, so that the meaning is that the grace of Christ abounded to many, as Augustine and the Greek codices also read it. The reason why the grace of Christ did not cause all actually to be saved was the will of Christ, because he willed his grace to be applied to human beings in a determinate manner: to infants only through the sacrament of baptism, but to adults through all the other sacraments and through the due disposition outside the sacrament, which through their own malice they do not always possess. Nevertheless, the grace of Christ is called more powerful than the sin of Adam because it destroys sin in all those to whom the sacraments of Christ are applied or who are duly disposed. To the other passage of Paul, it is responded that in those words, *as in Adam all die*, and so forth, Paul is not speaking of spiritual but of bodily vivification, that is, of the resurrection of bodies, because in that passage Paul proves that we will all rise because Christ rose from the dead. For since Christ is judge of the living and the dead, we must all be manifested before the tribunal of our Lord Jesus Christ.

QUESTION 8
WHETHER GOD GIVES EVERY HUMAN BEING THE ASSISTANCE NECESSARY FOR CONVERSION TO HIM

It must first be presupposed that not to give assistance is not the same as to deny assistance. To deny assistance is to have a will not to give it, so that the one denying it not only does not actually give it but is not even prepared to give it in second act. Not to give it, however, signifies only the negation of the effect of giving because of some impediment on the part of the recipient, while presupposing a will to give, or a preparation of mind in the giver to confer it in second act.

Concerning this difficulty, some say that God confers on all the necessary assistance by which they can be converted, but not the assistance by which they are actually converted, because beyond the assistance by which they can be converted, human beings also need another assistance by which they are actually converted, and they say that this actual assistance is not given to all. This opinion can be proved from Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter 8, and *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chapter 4. In these places Augustine teaches that we need not only assistance by which we can believe and love, but also assistance by which we actually believe and love. The same is evident from John 6: *no one can come to me unless my Father draws him*. If one objects to these authors that it follows that it is not imputed to a human being as guilt that he is not actually converted, since the actual assistance he needs for actual conversion is lacking to him, they deny the consequence. They respond that, for it to be imputed to a human being as guilt that he is not actually converted, it is sufficient that he have assistance by which he can be converted, especially because it is through him that God does not confer greater assistance. For God gives assistance in this order: first he gives lesser assistance; to those who use it rightly he gives greater assistance that moves more efficaciously; to those who use this rightly he gives still more abundant and more special assistance by which the human being is actually converted. But to those who do not rightly use the first assistance he denies the second, and to those who use the second badly he denies the third kind of assistance. The first assistance is said to be external goods themselves, such as wealth and poverty. The second consists in certain special events by which God incites a human being to repentance. The third consists in supernatural motions, both internal and external, by which God actually converts the human being to himself. By these three forms of assistance God gradually softens the human being, although sometimes God uses a most special assistance and suddenly converts a sinner, as happened to Paul on the way to Damascus and likewise to Magdalene. Yet this opinion, if understood to mean that beyond the assistance by which he can be converted, the human being needs another similarly prevenient assistance in order actually to be converted, is manifestly false. For since power signifies the ability to act, if a human being has assistance by which he can be converted, he can actually be converted; and if he cannot actually be converted, it follows that he does not have assistance by which he can be converted absolutely. Nor is it an obstacle to say that the human being places the impediment of sin and therefore it is through him that the assistance by which he would actually be converted is not given, and that this is not through God. Against this it is argued that, if the

human being cannot now be converted, it follows that if he does not now convert himself, he does not sin, because no one sins by failing to fulfill what he cannot fulfill. But at most he sins when he places the impediment, just as one who throws his breviary into the sea sins only when he places the impediment, especially because according to this opinion it is not in his power to remove the impediment. Thus the greater absurdity follows, that during the whole time in which he does not remove the impediment he is outside the state of salvation. But to satisfy this question, it must be noted that the assistance God gives a human being is of two kinds: one is in first act, the other in second act. Assistance in first act is nothing other than the divine will itself prepared to cooperate together with the human being, in the manner in which the sun is understood to be prepared to illuminate all bodies placed before it. Assistance in second act, however, is nothing other than the operation itself proceeding from the free will of the human being and from the will of God, whether this is understood in natural or supernatural actions. This action, insofar as it is received in the creature, is called a motion of God; insofar as it proceeds from the will of the creature, it is called the operation of the creature; and insofar as it proceeds from God, it is called assistance in second act. These two forms of assistance are sometimes greater and sometimes lesser, sometimes prevenient and sometimes accompanying. Yet the measure of the assistance God gives a human being cannot be known by us, nor is it our task to speculate about it, because sometimes God gives greater assistance to the more unworthy so that his mercy may shine forth, and sometimes gives lesser assistance so that his justice may appear.

It must be noted, however, that there is this difference between these forms of assistance: through assistance in first act, the human being is understood to be capable, just as what is hot is capable of heating through heat; but through assistance in second act the human being is already operating, just as through the act of heating what is hot is actually heating, because assistance in second act is the operation itself.

With these points presupposed, the question must be responded to as follows: God gives every adult human being at every time sufficient assistance in first act, but not in second act. The first part of this conclusion is the common consensus of theologians, because God is compared to the sun, which, as far as it is concerned, is prepared to illuminate all bodies, and likewise to a perennial fountain, which, as far as it is concerned, is prepared to give drink to all human beings if they will. Augustine taught this in Book V of *Contra Iulianum*, chapter 3, where he teaches that God is lacking to a human being at no time, but the

human being is lacking to himself. It is also gathered from Isaiah 65: *all day long I stretched out my hands to an unbelieving people contradicting me*; Revelation 3: *I always stand at the door and knock*; and Ezekiel 33: *as the Lord lives, says God, I do not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live*. The second part of the conclusion is proved more particularly because a human being is not always engaged in actual operation. Therefore, he does not always have assistance in second act. The consequence is evident because assistance in second act is nothing other than the operation itself. Some explain this second part of the conclusion by saying that, if "to give" is taken as correlative to "to receive," God does not always give assistance. The meaning is that God does not always give assistance in second act. They take this manner of speaking from Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, Quest. 2, art. 5, and Quest. 10, art. 1.

Let the second conclusion be that the fact that this assistance in second act is not always communicated to a human being proceeds from the human being's own fault and not from God. This conclusion is sufficiently shown by the authorities cited above for the first conclusion. Hence it follows that throughout the time in which the human being does not will to cooperate with God, his salvation is impossible, because, speaking according to the law, God wills to save no adult human being without his own cooperation. Thus his salvation will be impossible in the composite sense, but not in the divided sense, because although he does not operate, he can truly operate, just as one who is silent can speak. Understood in this sense, the prior opinion, as perhaps it can be understood, is entirely true.

From all this it follows that it is possible for every human being to be saved at every time, and that his own salvation is within his power. Thus the Council of Nicaea defines in canon 8, and the Roman Council gathered against Novatus, as Eusebius relates in Book III of *Historia Ecclesiastica*, chapter 8.

To the argument from Augustine, it is responded that in those places he intends only that twofold assistance is necessary to us, namely assistance in first act and assistance in second act. Assistance in first act is always conferred on us; assistance in second act, as far as God is concerned, is always conferred, and it is through the human being that it is not actually conferred. You may object that God's operating and conferring assistance in second act is prior to the operation of the second cause, because the concurrence of the first cause is prior to the concurrence of the second cause. Therefore, if God does not first give this assistance, it cannot be imputed to the human being that he is not actually converted. It is responded that our will can bring it about that it has assistance in second act, and thus it is within its power to be converted.

QUESTION 9
WHETHER, BEYOND PREVENIENT ASSISTANCE, A HUMAN BEING NEEDS ANOTHER ASSISTANCE IN ORDER ACTUALLY TO BE CONVERTED

To satisfy this question, it must be noted that the assistance by which God moves our intellect and will is twofold: one is prevenient assistance, the other accompanying assistance. Prevenient assistance, if taken for the reality it places in us, is nothing other than an actual motion or thought of the intellect, or an act of the will, insofar as these precede our operation, in relation to which they are called prevenient. Thus exterior preaching and the apprehension of a supernatural object are called prevenient assistance with respect to the assent of faith; these, together with the assent of faith, are called prevenient in relation to the supernatural love of God by which we are converted to God; and all these, together with love, are called prevenient with respect to perseverance. Accompanying assistance, however, is our operation insofar as it proceeds from God, with respect to which the prior forms of assistance are called prevenient.

If, however, we speak of assistance insofar as it is also considered on the part of God, it is twofold: one is sufficient, the other efficacious. Sufficient assistance is the divine will insofar as it is prepared to cooperate with the human being in this or that way, or at this or that time; and because this assistance precedes the operation for which the divine will is said to be prepared, it is also called prevenient. Efficacious assistance, however, is our operation insofar as it proceeds from God, or something prior to the operation produced in our power. Which of these it is must be considered below.

All agree that, for a supernatural operation actually to occur, efficacious assistance is necessary in addition to prevenient assistance. Thus the scholastic doctors in Book II, dist. 28; Vega, on the Council of Trent, Book XII, chapter 13, and Book XIII, also chapter 13; Ruardus, art. 7, *Contra Calvinum*; Driedo, *De Captivitate et Redemptione Generis Humani*, title 6, Part II, chapter 2; Soto, Book I of *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 16; Giles, in Book II, dist. 38, Quest. 1, art. 4; Gregory, in Book I, dist. 41. Augustine often taught this in *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, chapter 8; *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapter 12; and *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chapter 8. It is also gathered from the Council of Milevis, canon 28, where it says: there are many goods in a human being that the human being does not perform, but there are none that God does not provide for the human

being to perform. But a supernatural action distinct from prevenient assistance is also a certain good. Therefore, since the human being needs that action in order actually to be converted and the efficacy of assistance consists in it, it follows that beyond prevenient assistance the human being needs another, efficacious assistance in order actually to be converted. Hence it follows that what some say is false, namely, that once prevenient assistance is posited, our will elicits a supernatural operation by its own powers. This opinion is commonly attributed to Catharinus in his work *De Iustificatione et Providentia*. Others say that once prevenient assistance is posited, our will produces the operation by the power of that assistance, yet the application of the will to the work is from our own will. This opinion is commonly attributed to Henry, *Quodlibet* IV, Quest. 19, and *Quodlibet* VIII, Quest. 5. This opinion, however, understood in a sound sense, is undoubtedly true.

The entire difficulty concerns whether God's efficacious assistance stands antecedently to the act of our will or intellect, or concomitantly. Some judge that the efficacious assistance of God stands antecedently with respect to the action of our power, so that it is not only the cause of the operation of our power but also determines it to act, in the manner in which certain philosophers speak of natural causes, saying that the universal cause, prior by nature to the operation of the second cause, places something in the second cause by which it moves the second cause to act. They prove this from Celestine, Epistle 1, chapters 4 and 7, where he teaches that no one can use free choice well except through the grace of God; and from Augustine, Book I of *Quaestiones ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2, and Book I of *Retractationes*, chapter 23, where he teaches that the grace of God and his calling not only give the power to will well but produce a good will; and from the Council of Milevis, canons 9 and 23, where it is said that whatever we perform, God works in us and with us so that we may work rightly. It is then proved by reason because, if efficacious assistance were not something prior to the action of our power, it would follow that God concurs with a supernatural operation in no other way than he concurs with a natural action, if he does not produce something prior by which he determines our will to the supernatural action. The consequent is false. Therefore, so is the antecedent. The second premise is proved because God also concurs in a natural action with the action itself. Second, because from eternity God predefined and determined our actions, especially supernatural ones, he similarly predetermines our will in the effect itself in time. But he cannot predetermine it unless he produces something prior to the action; otherwise, our will would rather determine God's consent and will. Therefore, something prior that is efficacious assistance must be

posited. Third, it cannot otherwise be understood that our will moves or operates as moved, and that God concurs as the proper cause and our will as his instrument, unless God produces something in it through which the will operates. Otherwise, it would follow that our will elicits the supernatural action by its own powers, which must not be said.

Notwithstanding these arguments, let the conclusion be that God's efficacious assistance stands concomitantly or simultaneously with the action of our power, and not antecedently as something prior. Thus Vega and Ruardus teach in the places cited, and Molina, Quest. 14, art. 13, disputation 26. The meaning of this conclusion is that, when God produces the actions of our intellect or will together with our power, he does not first by nature produce something prior in the will or intellect before producing the action, but produces only the action together with the power itself. This conclusion is proved by reason because, in this respect, God concurs with supernatural actions in the same way as with natural actions. But he does not produce anything prior in a natural cause. Therefore, neither does he do so in a supernatural cause. The minor is proved because, if he produced something, it would serve either so that the cause would be proportioned to the effect, or so that it would have the power of producing. But it would not serve for this, because a natural cause has each of these through its own faculty. Or it would serve so that the natural cause might be aroused to act. But it would not serve for this either, because for this the presence of the patient together with God's cooperation is sufficient. Therefore, nothing prior is produced. Second, if something prior to the supernatural action were produced, which would be efficacious assistance, it would be either an act or a habit, since nothing else can be understood. It cannot be an act, because an act is produced only for the production of the terminus. Nor can it be a habit, because it would then follow that a supernatural habit is produced in us without a preceding disposition, and it would further follow that every supernatural action in us proceeds from a habit, which is false. Moreover, either the habit or that prior thing necessarily moves our will, and thus it follows that the will does not freely determine itself to the supernatural action; or it does not move necessarily, and thus it follows that, even when it is posited, the will still remains free to operate and not to operate, and is not determined, contrary to what the opposing opinion maintains. Therefore, efficacious assistance is not something prior to the act. Third, if efficacious assistance were something prior, it would follow that in the action of a sacrament God would produce something prior in the sacrament, and thus something supernatural would be produced in the words and the

water. Since this could not be something material, because nothing material would serve for a supernatural action, it follows that it would be spiritual, and thus something spiritual would be produced in a material subject, which is absurd. Fourth, once prevenient or sufficient assistance is posited, we can very well understand our will determining itself to the work and eliciting it through that sufficient assistance as an instrument of God. Therefore, nothing beyond sufficient assistance need be posited as a cause of the action. Finally, with respect to that prior thing, if it were given, our will would be merely passive. Therefore, it would not be within its power to render God's assistance efficacious. The consequence is evident because efficacious assistance would essentially consist in that prior thing. The consequent is false and impious, and therefore so is that from which it follows.

From this it follows that efficacious assistance is nothing other than the action of our intellect or will, which insofar as it proceeds from God is called efficacious assistance, and insofar as it proceeds from our power is called intellection or volition.

To the first argument taken from the authorities of Augustine, it is responded that in those places he signifies only that our will is moved by God by means of prevenient assistance and needs God's actual cooperation in order actually to operate. He does not signify, as the opposing opinion thinks, that efficacious assistance precedes our operation and is its cause. To the second, it is responded: I concede the consequence that God concurs in the same way, with respect to simultaneity, in an evil action and in a good action. Yet there is this difference: in the good action he concurs with the act and with its goodness, whereas in the evil action he concurs with the entity of the act but not with its malice. To the third, it is responded by denying the antecedent and the consequence. If by "to precede in the effect" you understand producing something prior to the action, we concede that the universal cause precedes the particular cause, but nothing follows against us. You may object that, if God produces nothing prior to our action that is efficacious assistance, it follows that God does not determine our will, because he cannot determine it through mere cooperation in the same action. It is responded that, just as the universal cause, with nothing prior produced in the second cause, determines the second cause in the genus of efficient cause with respect to exercise, while the second cause determines the first cause in the genus of material cause with respect to exercise and specification, although they concur only in one simple action, so it can be understood that God determines our will and that our will determines God's concurrence. But because the efficient cause is simply prior to the material

cause, God is simply said to determine our will. To the last, it is responded by denying that an instrument must be moved by an antecedent motion. It is sufficient that it operate in the power of another, so that the same action proceeds and depends principally on the principal cause and less principally on the instrument. Thus heat is understood to produce fire without any prior motion. Likewise, a second cause does not move insofar as it is moved in the sense maintained by the argument, but only insofar as it moves dependently on the first cause. Yet it differs from an instrument in this: although it depends on another cause, it does not operate in the power of that cause but in the power of its own form, whereas an instrument both depends on the principal cause and operates in its power.

QUESTION 10
WHETHER, WITH EQUAL ASSISTANCE, ONE OF TWO PERSONS IS CONVERTED WHILE THE OTHER IS NOT

This question can be understood proportionally of the act of faith, the act of conversion to God, and perseverance in grace: namely, whether with equal assistance one of two persons believes, is converted, or perseveres, while the other does not.

There are certain theologians of the present time to whom it seems not only false but Pelagian to assert that, with equal assistance, one of two persons is converted while the other is not. They prove this opinion because, if this were true, it would follow that the ground of the distinction and difference between the one who believes and the one who does not believe, and between the one who is converted and the one who is not converted, and so forth, would have to be taken from the side of the human being and not from the side of God. The consequent is false. Therefore, so is the antecedent. The consequence is proved because God bears himself equally toward each. The minor is proved because it would be contrary to 1 Corinthians 4: *who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?* For the human being could glory that he distinguishes himself from the impious person. Second, the one who is converted exceeds the one who is not converted in actual conversion itself. But this conversion is a certain assistance distinct from that in which they are equal. Therefore, it cannot happen that, if one is converted while the other is not, they have equal assistance. Third, conversion itself, which is a supernatural action, and the assistance preceding it, proceed only from God. Therefore, if God bears

himself equally toward both, there is nothing from which the difference can be taken such that one is converted while the other is not. Finally, they prove it from Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter 5, where he says: are human beings distinguished from human beings by common gifts? As though he were saying, certainly not. Below he adds: many hear the word of truth, but some believe and others contradict; yet because the will is prepared by God for some and is not prepared for others, it must be seen what belongs to mercy and what to judgment. In these words Augustine refers the difference between the one who is converted and the one who is not converted to the divine will and to a difference of assistance.

Before resolving the question, however, it must be presupposed that our will is freely moved by God in the supernatural actions by which we believe, are converted to God, or persevere in grace, so that the efficacious will of God leaves our will free, as we shall see below, and so that our will can absolutely operate and can absolutely resist the motion of God, as Pharaoh resisted, Exodus 10; and as 2 Timothy 3 says, *as Jannes and Mambres resisted Moses, so these also resist the truth*; and Acts 7 says, *you resist the Holy Spirit, as your fathers did*. The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 5 and canon 4, taught this truth, where it teaches that our will is not moved by God as an inanimate instrument, but as an animate and free instrument that can resist God's motion.

2º It must be presupposed that, once efficacious assistance is posited, it is not within our power not to operate in the composite sense, that is, once efficacious assistance is posited, which is nothing other than our operation. This truth is gathered from Aristotle, Book I of *De Interpretatione*, final chapter, who concludes that everything that is, for the time during which it is, necessarily is, although it is not absolutely necessary. Saint Thomas approves this proposition there, saying that it is founded on that most ultimate principle: it is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be. For if, during the time in which we cooperate, we could fail to cooperate, the same operation would simultaneously be and not be. Aristotle also taught this in Book I of the *Ethics*, chapter 12, in the proposition where he teaches that a power is simultaneously open to contraries, but not to the simultaneous possession of contrary acts. Hence it follows that a power is given only with respect to the future, and not with respect to the present, just as it is not given with respect to the past, in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense. Nor is it valid to object that a free power is one which, when all the requisites are posited, can operate and not operate; but efficacious assistance is one of the requisites. Therefore, when it is posited, we can operate and not operate, and the will is nevertheless free. It is

responded that this argument proceeds from a bad understanding of the premises. The major is to be understood of requisites on the part of the principle, whether passive or active, that precede the action for which they are required. In this sense the minor is false, because efficacious assistance, since it is our very operation, cannot be required for the operation, just as we do not say that speech is required for speech or for speaking. Hence it follows that, when we ask whether with the same assistance, and so forth, we are not asking about efficacious assistance, but about prevenient and sufficient assistance. For it is most certain that one who is converted, believes, or perseveres has greater assistance than one who is not converted, does not believe, or does not persevere, because conversion itself or the act of believing is a certain actual assistance not found in the unbeliever, just as one who has the habit of knowledge together with an act of understanding has more than one who has only the habit of knowledge, other things being equal. The question is whether, with the same sufficient and prevenient assistance, whether on the part of God, such as the will of God prepared to cooperate equally with each, or with the same motives on our part, whether internal, such as good inspirations and illuminations, or external, such as preaching and miracles, one is converted and the other is not. It must be presupposed, first, that it lies within the power of our will that God's sufficient assistance become efficacious in us, that is, that God cooperate with our will, or that it is within the power of our will, whether as an instrument or as a proper cause, just as we say that it is within our power that, by applying fire to the patient, God cooperate with it. This is gathered from Zechariah 1: *be converted to me and I will be converted to you*, and Lamentations 5: *convert us, Lord, to you, and we will be converted*. Thus the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 5, teaches that in the first passage we are admonished concerning our freedom, whereas in the second we profess that we are preceded by the grace of God in our actions.

With these points presupposed as certain, let the conclusion be: with equal prevenient and sufficient assistance, and with the same internal and external motives presupposed, one of two persons can be converted while the other is not converted. No one, as I judge, denies this conclusion in the sense explained. It is gathered from Augustine, *De Praedestinatione et Gratia*, chapter 15, where he says of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar: with respect to nature both were human beings, with respect to dignity both were kings, with respect to their cause both held the people of God captive, and with respect to their punishments both were mercifully admonished by the scourges of God. What, then, caused their ends to be different, except that one, feeling the hand of God,

groaned in remembrance of his own iniquity, while the other fought by his free choice against the most merciful truth of God? In the *Liber Cognitionum Trium Quaestionum*, Quest. 66, he teaches concerning those invited to the supper in Luke 14 that not all came because not all willed to come. In Book XII of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 6, he teaches that, when the same beauty of a woman has been seen, there is no other cause why one of two men is moved to act illicitly and the other is not except their own will. In these places Augustine seems to reduce the diversity of these two not to a diversity of assistance but to their own will. Gregory teaches the same in explaining the parable of those invited to the wedding, and Jerome in *Quaestiones ad Hedibiam*, Quest. 11, where he teaches that there is no other cause why some human beings are converted to the faith and others are not converted except that they are left to their own choice. It is gathered openly from Matthew 11: *woe to you, Bethsaida; woe to you, Chorazin, because if the mighty works and signs done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon*, and so forth. In these words Christ teaches that, with the same assistance given to the inhabitants of Bethsaida and Chorazin, the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done the repentance that the former did not do. It is further proved by reason because, once any prevenient assistance and any motive, whether internal or external, is posited, our will remains free so that it can believe and not believe, be converted and not be converted. Therefore, likewise, when equal assistance is posited in two persons, one can be converted and the other not. Second, with equal assistance and the same motives, the same human being can be converted at one time and not be converted at another. Therefore, much more can one human being be converted while another, with equal assistance, is not converted.

Nor is it an obstacle to say that, with equal assistance, one can indeed be converted and the other not, but in fact either both will be converted or neither will be converted, since there is no greater reason for one than for the other. Against this, if either of them can be converted and either can fail to be converted, there is no greater reason to conclude that both will be converted or that neither will be converted than that one will be converted and the other not, since all three of these alternatives stand in the same way. Third, although God is the proper cause of conversion or assent, our will is a free instrument capable of operating and not operating, and with respect to dissent or non-conversion it is a proper and free cause. Therefore, it lies within its power to exercise either alternative, namely, either to believe or not to believe, to be converted or not to be converted.

Second, it must be said that not only can one be converted with equal assistance while the other is not, but one can be converted with lesser assistance while the other, with greater assistance, is not converted. The reason for each is that God gives each necessary and sufficient assistance. Therefore, with that assistance the one who has less can be converted; and, once any greater prevenient assistance is posited, the will of the one who has it remains free to be converted or not to be converted. Therefore, one can be converted with lesser assistance while the other, with greater assistance, is not converted. Hence it follows that sometimes it is a greater benefit of God to give assistance lesser in substance when he knows that the human being will be converted than to give greater assistance when he knows that the human being will not be converted. Thus it is a greater benefit to correct one's neighbor less when he will thereby be withdrawn from sin than to correct him more when we know that he will not be withdrawn from sin.

Hence the arguments given above must be responded to. To the first, it is responded that the reason and difference belonging to this conjunctive proposition, namely, why this person is converted and this person is not converted, must be reduced not only to God but also to our will. For our will is the proper ground and cause of dissent in the one who dissents, while God is the proper cause of assent and our will is the instrument in the one who assents to the faith. Hence we will rightly say that this human being assents because God made him will to assent, and that this human being dissents because he himself did not will to assent. Hence it follows that God is the proper cause distinguishing the just person from the impious person, and our will is the instrument; but our will is the proper cause by which the impious human being is distinguished from the just. Hence dissent must be reduced to our will, but assent to God as its proper cause.

From this it follows that the opinion of those who assert that our will is an accidental cause of a supernatural act is false, because an accidental cause does not truly influence the effect, whereas a supernatural act is vital and cannot exist except from a vital power in the genus of efficient cause. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 4, defined: if anyone says that our choice, moved and aroused by God, cannot cooperate by assenting to God who arouses and calls it, let him be anathema.

To the other two arguments, it is responded that they prove only that the assistance is greater in the one who is converted than in the one who is not converted, if one speaks jointly of prevenient and efficacious assistance, which

we concede. They do not prove, however, that the one who is converted has greater prevenient and sufficient assistance.

To the passages of Augustine, it is responded that they prove only that the difference between the just person and the impious person must be reduced to God as proper cause. They do not deny that it must also be reduced to our will as a free instrument. The saints must be understood in this way when they frequently say that one human being is converted because he willed, while another is not converted because he did not will, since in dissent they assign the proper cause, but in assent the instrumental cause.

QUESTION 11
WHETHER SOMEONE CAN REACH SUCH A DEPTH OF EVIL THAT SUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE IS DENIED HIM BY GOD

Up to this point we have stated what a human being would have if sin were not presupposed. It must now be seen what he has once sin is presupposed.

First, it must be presupposed as certain that before sin God gave sufficient assistance to all human beings, because he gave the first parent the gift of habitual grace to be transmitted to his descendants, which would truly have been transmitted through generation if he had remained in grace, and by the same gift his descendants could have persevered.

Second, it must be presupposed that, once original sin was seen, God had a sufficient motive from justice for excluding all human beings from eternal life and denying them sufficient assistance for salvation. If afterward he gave sufficient assistance, he did so not from a debt of justice but rather from his own mercy, according to Titus 3: *not from works that we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us*. Hence, after original sin had been foreseen, he did not will efficaciously either to exclude all human beings from eternal life or to save all efficaciously.

Third, it must be presupposed with all theologians, Gregory excepted in Book I, dists. 46 and 47, Quest. 1, that after original sin had been seen, there was in God an antecedent will to give glory to all human beings and sufficient assistance both against sin and for attaining glory. Thus the scholastics teach in Book I, dist. 46; the Thomists, *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 19, art. 6; and Saint Thomas, Book I of *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 159. It is gathered from 1 Timothy 2: *God wills all human beings to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth*, where Ambrose adds: God wills all human beings to be saved if they themselves approach; for he does not will the unwilling to be saved, but he himself wills it if

they will. For he who gave the law to all excluded no one from salvation. Eucherius teaches the same on this passage; Damascene, Book II of *De Fide*, chapter 29, where he says that God wills all human beings to be participants in his glory because he made no human being for punishment; Augustine, *Liber Quaestionum ad Articulos Sibi Falso Impositos*, Quest. 2, where he says: it must be believed without exception that God wills all human beings to be saved; those who perish do so by the merit of those perishing, while the fact that others are saved is the gift of the one who saves; Jerome in the Epistle *Ad Ctesiphontem*; and Chrysostom on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans and on John 1, *he enlightens every human being coming into this world*. The same is gathered from all the parables in Luke 8 concerning the sower in every kind of soil, Luke 14 concerning those invited to the supper, and Matthew 20 concerning those called to the vineyard. It is also gathered from Ezekiel 18: *is the death of the sinner in any way my will, and not rather that he do repentance, be converted from all his evil ways, and live?* There is also an evident reason for this opinion, because, even after original sin had been seen, God willed to give us Christ, passible and mortal, as the reconciler and redeemer of all human beings without exception. This is gathered from 1 John 2: *he is the propitiation for many sins, and not only for many but for the sins of the whole world*; and 2 Corinthians 5: *God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself*. Moreover, just as sin diffuses itself to all unto condemnation, so the grace of Christ diffuses itself to all unto reconciliation. Indeed, the grace of Christ was much more pleasing to God than the guilt of Adam was displeasing. But Christ cannot be called the redeemer and reconciler of all unless God wills all to be saved. Therefore, after the sin of the first parent had been seen, God willed all human beings to be saved and to give them sufficient assistance.

The present difficulty concerns only those who have reached the depths of evil, who are called in Scripture hardened, blinded, or abandoned by God, namely, whether God gives all these persons sufficient assistance for attaining salvation.

Some judge that human beings are so abandoned by God that he no longer gives them sufficient assistance. Thus Roffensis, art. 36, *Contra Lutherum*; Ruardus, art. 7; Abulensis, on Matthew 4, Quest. 2; Cajetan, on John 12, on the words *they could not believe*; Henry, *Quodlibet* VIII, Quest. 5; and Gregory, in Book I, dist. 36, Quest. 1. This opinion is attributed to Armacanus, Book IX of *De Quaestionibus Armenorum*, chapter 27. It is gathered from Origen on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans; Gregory, Book XI of the *Moralia*, chapter 5, and Book XXXI, chapter 11, saying that the heart of Pharaoh was touched by no

sensitivity to fear infused from above; Augustine, in the exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, proposition 62, where he says that Pharaoh's heart was hardened by God so that he could not obey such evident signs; Isidore, Book II of *De Summo Bono*, chapter 15, where he says that many are so disposed by God that they cannot bewail their sins. It is also gathered from the history of Antiochus, 2 Maccabees 9, where it is said: *the wicked man prayed to God, from whom he would not obtain mercy*; Ecclesiastes 7, from the words *consider the work of God, because no one can correct the one whom he has despised*; and John 12, *the Jews could not believe because their heart was blinded*.

The reason for this opinion is that what these authors assert neither derogates from divine mercy, since it is a work of the greatest justice for God to take sufficient assistance away from those who have fallen into the greatest sins and are hardened in them, nor derogates from the antecedent will by which he wills all human beings to be saved, because this must be understood insofar as it is on God's part, or at least under the condition that human beings have not fallen into the greatest sins and become hardened in them. Therefore, it must be said that God takes sufficient assistance away from such persons.

To resolve this difficulty, it must be presupposed that this question is not to be understood of insane adults during the time of their insanity, because it is certain that no assistance is conferred on them for that time, as Driedo rightly observes in *De Redemptione et Captivitate Generis Humani*, title 5, chapter 3, because for that time they are no more capable of assistance than of free choice. Hence the question is to be understood only of adults who enjoy free choice, namely, whether because of the greatest crimes and sins into which they have fallen, God denies them sufficient assistance for salvation.

But this opinion, although it is not a heresy, as Soto thinks in Book I of *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 13, is nevertheless undoubtedly rash and dangerous in faith. For this reason Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 86, art. 1, condemns as erroneous the opinion of those who assert that in this life there is some unpardonable sin, from which opinion the one cited by us differs little or not at all.

Therefore, let the conclusion be: God denies sufficient assistance in this life to no human being, however hardened in sins. This conclusion conforms to Sacred Scripture and the sayings of the saints, and especially commends the divine mercy, in which one must hope. It is gathered from Ezekiel 33: *I do not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live*; and chapter 18: *at whatever hour the sinner groans, I will no longer remember his iniquity*; Matthew 11: *come to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh*

you; Paul, Romans 10, adducing the testimony of Isaiah 65: *all day long I stretched out my hands to an unbelieving people contradicting me*; Romans 2: *do you not know that the kindness of God leads you to repentance, while according to your hardness and impenitent heart you store up wrath for the day of wrath?*; and Isaiah 49: *can a woman forget her infant so as not to have mercy on the son of her womb? Even if she forgets, I nevertheless will not forget you*. Augustine follows this opinion, whatever the passages offered for the contrary may seem to sound like, for in the *Liber Responsionum ad Articulos Sibi Falso Impositos*, art. 15, he teaches that God takes the possibility of repentance from no one in this life. Jerome also teaches it on Amos 2, concerning the three crimes of Moab; Chrysostom, Homily 25 on various passages of Matthew, where he teaches that repentance is always within our power in this life. The Lateran Council defines, as is found in the chapter *Firmiter*, that every sin committed after baptism can be repaired through repentance. Saint Thomas teaches the same in the place cited; Driedo, *De Redemptione et Captivitate Generis Humani*, Part V, chapter 3; Soto, Book I of *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 18; Adrian, in Book IV, Quest. 1, concerning repentance; and Molina, Quest. 14, art. 13, disputation 11. This opinion can also be proved by reason because, as long as a human being is in this life, he enjoys free choice flexible toward each part, namely, good and evil, and he is bound by the precept of repentance, however hardened in sins he may be. But neither of these can be the case without sufficient assistance, because he cannot be held to the impossible. Therefore, as long as he is in this life, sufficient assistance is granted to him. Moreover, if anyone were to be said to have been abandoned by God, Pharaoh most of all would be, since he resisted so many wonders and miracles. But sufficient assistance was not lacking to him. This is gathered from the fact that he is punished by God in so many ways and that God so often reproached him for detaining the people. Pharaoh himself signified this in Exodus 9 when he said, *I have sinned, and the Lord is just, while I and my people are impious*. Origen, Book III of *Periarchon*, chapter 1, testifies that assistance was not lacking to Pharaoh; Augustine, *De Praedestinatione et Gratia*, chapter 15, and in *Quaestiones in Exodum*, Quest. 24, where he reduces Pharaoh's hardness to Pharaoh's own will and not to a defect of assistance, because he fought by his free choice against God's mercy. Hence it is gathered that Augustine and Origen do not support the opposing opinion but rather ours. From this it is gathered that, when the saints often teach that it is impossible for the hardened person to be converted, "impossible" must be taken for "difficult," just as it is taken when we say that it is impossible for one suffering from a deadly illness to be healed. Thus Saint Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-

II, Quest. 14, art. 1. That hardened persons are frequently converted, although this is almost miraculous, Bernard teaches in Book I of *De Consideratione ad Eugenium*, adducing Ezekiel 36: *I will take the stony heart from you*. To the authority taken from the history of Antiochus, it is responded that, as Saint Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 89, art. 1, he did not perform true repentance but grieved only over the severity of his illness. Or it must be said that the text says he would not obtain the mercy for which he hoped, namely bodily health.

To Ecclesiastes 7, it is responded that those words must be understood as meaning that no one can correct the one whom God has deprived of more abundant assistance, or that the expression is conditional, so that the meaning is: if God abandons someone, there is no one other than God who can correct him.

To John 12, the response is gathered from Augustine, tractate 35 on John, on the same cited words, *the Jews could not believe*. There he says that they could not believe because Isaiah had foretold that they would not believe, not because the prediction imposed necessity on the consequent, but only necessity of consequence, in the sense in which we say that future contingents cannot fail to occur because they are certainly known by God as future. From this no necessity is placed in future things. Hence Isaiah had foretold of the same Jews, *lest perhaps they see with their eyes, hear with their ears, understand with their heart, and be converted*. From this it is evident that the Jews were free to be converted to God.

Against all that has been said concerning assistance, it must be noted that, when God is said to give all persons assistance sufficient for salvation, this must not be understood as though he always gives assistance actually and without any interruption. It is to be understood as meaning that God gives assistance at fitting times as it seems good to him, while God is always prepared in mind to give this assistance at the due times.

QUESTION 12
WHETHER THERE IS ANY SIN UNPARDONABLE ACCORDING TO THE ORDINARY LAW IN THIS LIFE

It is certain that by God's absolute power every sin can be forgiven. The question is only whether, according to the ordinary law, there is some sin so wicked that it is not forgiven, not because repentance is unable to remit it, but

because true repentance by which the sin is destroyed cannot be had, God abandoning the human being.

There were certain heretics who asserted that some sin is unpardonable according to the ordinary law in this life. They say that this is the sin unto death mentioned in 1 John 5, consisting in the denial of Christ under torments, and the sin against the Holy Spirit mentioned in Matthew 12. This was the heresy of Novatus, as Eusebius relates in Book VIII of *Historia Ecclesiastica*, chapter 20, and Book XI, chapter 14. The Armenians followed it, as Prateolus relates under the word "Armenians," and it is attributed to Armacanus, Book IX of *De Quaestionibus Armenorum*, chapter 27. Origen seems to have followed it in tractate 25 on John. Henry, Roffensis, Ruardus, and Abulensis in the places cited, and Medina, *De Recta in Deum Fide*, Book III, chapter 1, approached it closely.

But this opinion must be rejected as open heresy, as Saint Thomas rejects it in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 86, art. 1. Its falsity is gathered from John 20, where the power of forgiving our sins was given to the Apostles without any exception, and from Ezekiel 18: *if the impious person does repentance for his sin, I will no longer remember his iniquities*. It is evident from what was said above that sufficient assistance for repentance is conferred on everyone. Moreover, the sin that these persons call unpardonable was forgiven in Peter, who denied Christ.

They object to us, however, with certain passages of Scripture. First, 1 John 5, where John says, *there is a sin unto death; I do not say that anyone should pray for it*. By these words he seems to signify that the sin unto death is without any hope of pardon. But, omitting the various interpretations offered by Augustine in *De Vera et Falsa Paenitentia*, chapter 4, and *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, chapters 43 and 44, and Ambrose in Book I of *De Paenitentia*, chapters 8 and 9, it must be said that in the present context "sin unto death" means a sin that lasts until death and is usually called final impenitence. It is said that prayer must not be made for such a sin, and rightly so, because a sin that is not forgiven in this life can never be destroyed. This interpretation is taken from Augustine, Book I of *Retractationes*, chapter 19, and *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapter 15; and from Gregory, Book XXXI of the *Moralia*, chapter 28. Jerome gives the same sense in explaining Jeremiah 14: *do not pray for this people, because I will not hear you*, where he teaches that it is foolish to pray for a sin unto death, that is, for one persevering in sin until death. Vega pursues this interpretation at length in his commentary on the Council of Trent, Book XIII, chapter 11. Second, they object with the history of Antiochus in 2 Maccabees 9, but this passage was already responded to above. Third, they object with Hebrews 12 concerning Esau, where

it is said that *Esau found no place of repentance, although he sought it with tears*. This seems to signify that his sin was without hope of pardon. It is responded that these words do not signify that assistance for repentance was lacking to Esau, but only that he could not obtain from his father a retraction of the blessing given to Jacob or bring him to repentance for that deed. Esau's sorrow, however, proceeded from the loss of a temporal good, from which it is evident that his repentance was insufficient. Fourth, they object with Matthew 12: *every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven human beings, but blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven; and if anyone sins against the Son of Man, it will be forgiven him, but if anyone sins against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him either in this age or in the future*. There are various interpretations of this passage concerning what the sin against the Holy Spirit is, the forgiveness of which Saint Thomas discusses in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, Quest. 14. But it must be said with Athanasius, *Epistola Prima ad Serapionem*, that the sin against the Holy Spirit is that sin committed against the Holy Spirit taken personally, that is, as the third person of the Trinity, or essentially, for the divine essence itself or the whole Trinity. He teaches that this sin is not forgiven in this life or the future. This interpretation seems conformable to the text, for the Jews blasphemed Christ, saying that he was a Samaritan, a glutton, and one who walked with publicans. Because this sin was against Christ insofar as he was human, Christ says that it would be forgiven them. But when they afterward said that he cast out demons in the name of Beelzebub, although they were in truth cast out by divine power, they committed sin against the divine power, or against Christ insofar as he was God. He therefore teaches that this sin was blasphemy against the Holy Spirit and thus would not be forgiven them, not because it could in no way be forgiven, but because it would not be forgiven without long and sorrowful repentance. Cyprian also gives this interpretation in Book III of *Ad Quirinum*, chapter 28, where he teaches that the sin committed against God is not forgiven in the Church; likewise in *De Lapsis* and Epistle 52. Basil also teaches it in the *Regulae Breviores*, response 263; Chrysostom, Homily 42 on Matthew, where he adds to this interpretation that this sin is properly committed when it is committed from malice; and Athanasius, Second Oration *Contra Arianos*. The whole interpretation of the scholastics saying that this sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin from malice, opposed to the principle of our sanctification and the remission of sins, coincides with this interpretation. Such is the sin of despair concerning the attainment of pardon. If someone asks why it is specially said of this sin that it is forgiven neither in this life nor in the future age, Chrysostom responds in the cited place that, although every sin deserves to be punished in

this life and in the future, God nevertheless punishes certain sins in this life so that he may not punish them in the future. This sin against the Holy Spirit, however, he punishes both in this life and in the future, as is evident in the sin of the Jews, who are punished in this life both in the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem and in the loss of their own kingdom, and are to be punished in the future life.

Finally, they object to us with Hebrews 6: *it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, tasted the heavenly gift, and afterward fell away to be renewed again unto repentance*. The complete interpretation of this passage is that Paul is not there speaking of renewal through the virtue of repentance or through the sacrament of repentance, but of the renewal through repentance that took place in the primitive Church together with the reception of baptism. Peter speaks of this repentance when he says, *do repentance, and let each one of you be baptized*. Paul calls those who are baptized "enlightened," because baptism is the sacrament of faith enlightening the intellect. He teaches that they cannot be renewed through the repentance of baptism because those who are baptized die and are buried together with Christ, who, after he rose from the dead, now dies no more. Therefore, just as death must not be repeated, so baptism cannot be repeated. In this sense the passage in Hebrews 10 is understood: *for those who sin voluntarily, no sacrifice for sins now remains.*

QUESTION 13
WHETHER THE OBJECT TO BE BELIEVED AS A MEANS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION HAS BEEN LACKING TO ANYONE IN THIS LIFE

Up to this point we have spoken of the assistance necessary for salvation in general. The particular difficulty now is whether the object of faith that must be believed as a means to salvation is proposed to all in this life.

It must first be presupposed that it was necessary for salvation to believe some supernatural object. Thus the scholastics teach in Book III, dist. 24; Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, Quest. 2, art. 3, and Book I of *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 5. It is gathered from Hebrews 11: *the one approaching God must believe that he is and that he is the rewarder of those who approach him*; and in the same place: *without faith it is impossible to please God*. According to the opinion of all theologians, the passage speaks of the reward of a supernatural prize and of supernatural faith, for this is the faith that pleases God. The difficulty concerns

only what this object is and whether it is proposed to all, even to those raised in forests and dwelling on the most remote islands.

From this it is gathered as certain that the opinion Soto followed in Book II of *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 11, in the Venice printing, is false. There he asserts that for those laboring under invincible ignorance a natural cognition of a natural object naturally proposed is sufficient for salvation. Victoria follows this opinion in the third part of the *Relectio* concerning one arriving at the use of reason; and Vega followed it in Book VI of his commentary on the Council of Trent, chapter 20, where he teaches that, although supernatural faith was a matter of precept under every law, it was never a means necessary for salvation. This opinion, however, is rightly rejected as erroneous in faith by all theologians. It is openly contrary to the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 3, where it is defined: if anyone says that without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit a human being can believe, hope, and love as is necessary for the grace of justification to be conferred on him, let him be anathema. The Council of Orange teaches the same in canon 7, and the Council of Milevis in canon 4, where they assert that assistance in the intellect and will is necessary in order to believe as one ought. Hence Soto rightly retracted this opinion in Book IV, dist. 1, Quest. 2, art. 3; and Cano rejects it at length in the *Relectio de Sacramentis in Genere*, chapter 2, where he says that the contrary is taught by the Apostle in Ephesians 2: *by grace you have been saved through faith, and this not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God, lest anyone glory.*

Therefore, others affirmed that God provides all persons with the object necessary for salvation without any miracle, because he interiorly enlightens the intellect by a supernatural light, from whose illumination the human being can follow the good of reason or the morally good, and this cognition will be sufficient for justification. This opinion differs from the prior opinion and from the error of the Pelagians because it posits supernatural assistance in the intellect as necessary for salvation, which the prior opinion denies, although neither posits a materially supernatural object as necessary. These authors prove their opinion because God provides all, even those dwelling on the most remote islands, with the credible object necessary for salvation without any miracle. But he cannot without a miracle propose a materially supernatural object to all, because faith in this object comes through hearing, according to Romans 10: *faith comes through hearing, and hearing through the word; how will they believe without one preaching?* Therefore, cognition of the morally good from supernatural light is sufficient for salvation. Second, as Saint Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, Quest. 89, final article, if one arriving at the use of

reason follows the good of reason by converting himself to the morally good, he attains the remission of original sin. But remission of sin does not occur without grace. Therefore, conversion to the good of reason from supernatural light is sufficient for attaining grace and consequently salvation.

But this opinion, although it contains nothing contrary to faith, is nevertheless judged false by all theologians. For all assert that it is necessary to believe some materially supernatural object, at least that which Paul expressed in Hebrews 11, namely, *that God is and that he is a rewarder*. Thus Saint Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, Quest. 2, art. 7, and III, Quest. 65, art. 3; the scholastics in Book III, dist. 25; Alexander, Part III, Quest. 29, member 2, art. 1; Soto, Book II of *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 11, and Book IV, dist. 1, Quest. 2, art. 4, and dist. 5, sole question, art. 2; Cano, in the *Relectio de Sacramentis in Genere*, Part II, Quest. 2. All these assert that it is necessary to believe some materially supernatural object in which faith in Christ, which is necessary for salvation at least implicitly, is contained. This is truly contained in the following credible object as in a universal principle: God is and is a rewarder, or provides for all through the ways pleasing to himself. In this is contained that particular way of providing and rewarding through Christ. Thus Augustine teaches in Book I of *De Gratia et Peccato Originali*, chapter 7; Book II, chapter 24; and Book III, chapter 4, where he teaches that all the ancient Fathers were Christians in reality and spirit because they had at least implicit faith in Christ, though not Christians in name, because the name Christian began under the evangelical law, according to Isaiah 62: *you will be called by a new name, which the mouth of the Lord has spoken*. It is proved by reason because a credible object is proposed to us through faith so that the will may pursue it in love as more lovable and be endowed by it with a supernatural reward. But the will cannot be directed to this object through a thought of the morally good, even from supernatural light. Therefore, it is necessary to believe some materially supernatural object. Second, the credible object in which faith in Christ is contained is necessary for salvation, because this faith is also necessary. But this faith is not contained in the formal reason for believing, but rather in the principles to which we assent. Therefore, some supernatural credible object in which faith in Christ is contained is necessary. Finally, the disposition necessary for attaining grace is supernatural love of God. But this cannot be had unless God is known as the supernatural end. Therefore, some good of reason is not sufficient, but a supernatural object is necessary, at least the object that God is and is a rewarder.

But it must be said that God provides all human beings with the means and credible object necessary for salvation through the very fact that he is

prepared to propose it to them, unless they resist at every point. Thus Saint Thomas teaches in responding to the argument concerning one raised in forests, *De Veritate*, Quest. 14, replies to 1 and 2, saying that it belongs to God's providence to provide all with the means and object necessary for salvation unless the human being impedes it. But if he does what lies within him, God will enlighten him either interiorly or exteriorly through external preaching, as he sent Peter to Cornelius, because God wills to provide for all according to this law if they do what lies within them. Thus Alexander teaches, Part II, Quest. 112, member 8, art. 1, and Part III, Quest. 78, member 3, art. 1; Bonaventure, in Book III, dist. 25, art. 1, Quest. 2; Soto, in Book IV, dist. 5, Quest. 1, art. 2, and Book II of *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 12. It is gathered from the common axiom of theologians: God does not deny grace to one who does what lies within him. Here by the name "grace" are understood the assistance and means necessary for salvation. If this axiom is understood of one doing what lies within him through supernatural assistance, he infallibly attains the grace due to the proportionate supernatural disposition. If it is understood of one doing what lies within him by the powers of nature alone, although he does not attain grace infallibly and by law, one must nevertheless trust in the divine goodness and mercy that God will enlighten his intellect through supernatural faith concerning the necessary object. I said that he does not infallibly attain grace because grace is not due to works of nature, which are disproportionate and only a remote disposition to grace. Decanus Lubaniensis, art. 7; Driedo, *De Captivitate*, and so forth, Part II, final chapter; Molina, Quest. 14, art. 13, disputation 10; and Roffensis, art. 30, *Contra Lutherum*, teach that this common axiom must be understood in this way. Roffensis teaches that John 1, *he gave them power to become sons of God*, must be understood in the same sense. But it must be added further that we must believe that God frequently gives assistance even to one who is not doing what lies within him, by arousing and knocking at his intellect, so that God would proceed to greater assistance unless the human being resisted at every point. These doctors teach that Revelation 3, *I stand at the door and knock*, must be understood in this way, and likewise Matthew 23, *how often I willed to gather your children as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you would not*, and Isaiah 65, *all day long I stretched out my hands to an unbelieving people contradicting me*.

To the first argument, it is responded that God provides for all without a miracle in the manner explained above, although, because few unbelievers live rightly according to the law of nature, it is not surprising if they labor under invincible ignorance of the things necessary for salvation. To the second

argument, it is responded that, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the place cited, if one arriving at the use of reason turns toward the due end, namely, to God as the natural end, by fulfilling the precept of nature, God will enlighten him concerning the true supernatural end, whom he can love supernaturally by fulfilling the supernatural precept. In this way he will attain the remission of original sin, but not through conversion to the good of reason alone.

QUESTION 14
WHETHER THE GIFT OF PERSEVERANCE IS GRANTED TO ALL

Perseverance is taken in two ways, as Saint Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, Quest. 109, art. 10, and Augustine in *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapters 11 and 12. First, it is taken for the conservation of grace until the end of life, which is usually called perseverance in second act. In another way, it is taken for the power of remaining in grace until the end of life, whether this power stands on the part of God, who is prepared to give perseverance in second act, or on our part by reason of some habit by which we can persevere. This perseverance is called perseverance in first act.

All agree that the gift of perseverance was given to all human beings in the first parent before sin, perseverance being taken in the second manner, by which gift the first parents and their descendants could remain in grace until the end of life. For the gift of habitual grace and original justice was given to them, and by it they could fulfill all natural and supernatural precepts, avoid all sins, even venial ones, and overcome temptations, especially since in that state the human being was not assailed by internal temptations but only external ones, while the appetite was restrained by God with the bridle of original justice. Thus Augustine teaches at the beginning of Book III of the *Hypognosticon* and in *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapter 10, where he says that the gift by which they could not fail to persevere was not given to the first parents, for this belongs properly to the blessed; rather, the gift was given by which they could persevere if they willed. Second, all agree that the gift of habitual grace, in the manner in which it is conferred on a human being after the fall of the first parent, namely, without the gift of original justice, is not sufficient for remaining in grace until the end of life, but that another assistance added to grace is necessary. Thus the Council of Trent defined in Session 6, canon 22, and the Council of Orange in canons 7 and 10, in these words: if anyone says that a justified human being can remain until the end of life in the justice received without special assistance, or that with this assistance he cannot remain, let him be anathema.

With these points presupposed, it must first be said that every just human being is given the assistance of perseverance in first act in this life, although not all receive it in second act. This conclusion is evident because assistance is lacking to no one in matters necessary for salvation. But in order to remain in grace until the end of life, a human being needs another special assistance beyond habitual grace. Therefore, no one is lacking assistance by which he can persevere and bring perseverance into second act if he wills.

Second, it must be said that assistance in second act and with its effect is conferred only on those who remain in grace until the end of life, or at least for a very long time. This conclusion is evident because, in order to avoid all mortal sins either for a very long time or until the end of life, a human being needs assistance added to habitual grace, since grace does not remove the rebellion of the flesh. Therefore, those who persevere until the end of life or remain in grace for a very long time are granted special assistance, which we call perseverance in second act. This consists not only in an interior principle but also in the removal of impediments and occasions of sinning.

If someone asks whether the assistance of perseverance against venial sins is granted to all, so that they not only do not fall into mortal sins but also incur no venial sins, it is responded that this assistance is not conferred on all, but rather is a special privilege that is read to have been granted only to the Blessed Virgin. Whether it was communicated to others is uncertain, and therefore it must not rashly be asserted of others. Thus the Council of Trent defines in Session 6, canon 23, where it says: if anyone says that a justified human being can throughout his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, without a special privilege, as the Church holds concerning the Most Blessed Virgin, let him be anathema. Thus the Council of Milevis teaches in canons 6 and 7, and the African Council in canon 81. Innocent I taught it in the Epistle to the Council of Carthage, which is Epistle 25, and Celestine I in Epistle 1 to the Bishops of Gaul. It is gathered from 1 John 1: *if we say that we have no sin*, and so forth; and Ecclesiastes 7: *there is no just human being on earth who does good and does not sin*. Paul also experienced these venial sins in himself when he said of himself in Romans 7: *I perceive another law in my members resisting the law of my mind and inclining me to the law of sin*, and so forth. Jerome teaches more concerning this gift in the Epistle *Ad Ctesiphontem* and Book I of the *Dialogi Contra Pelagianos*, and Augustine in *De Perfectione Iustitiae*.

Someone will object that, if this privilege by which all venial sins can be avoided is not granted to all, it follows that no one sins by committing venial sins, because no one sins in what he cannot avoid. It is responded that, although

the privilege of avoiding all sins collectively is not given, it is nevertheless within the power of every just person to avoid individual sins distributively, and therefore each of them in particular is imputed. Thus, although the just person through habitual grace alone cannot avoid all sins collectively, he can nevertheless avoid each sin individually, and therefore there is none that is not imputed.

QUESTION 15
WHETHER GOD GIVES ALL INFANTS THE ASSISTANCE NECESSARY FOR SALVATION

Up to this point adults have been discussed, and it has been stated that sufficient assistance is given to all of them. There is a special difficulty concerning infants, namely, whether God gives them the necessary assistance. The reason for doubt is that many infants die in their mothers' wombs, and the remedy of salvation could not be applied to them; many also, after coming forth from the womb, did not obtain an opportunity for baptism. Therefore, sufficient provision does not seem to have been made for them.

Because of this argument, Cajetan, *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 68, arts. 2 and 11, teaches that sufficient provision has been made for infants. If they have been brought forth into the light and baptism is available, they can be baptized. If it is not available, then, in a time of necessity, by making the sign of the Cross over the child and invoking the name of the Trinity, sufficient provision is made for the infant against original sin. If, however, they have not been brought forth into the light, in a time of necessity the same sign of the Cross and the same invocation of the Trinity are to be used, through which sufficient provision is made. This opinion of Cajetan, however, is rejected by all as erroneous or at least rash, for it is contrary to John 3: *unless someone is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit*, and so forth; and it is contrary to Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 8, where he says of a child to whom baptism could not be applied: let Pelagius absolve him and open the kingdom of heaven to him against the judgment of God, whom nevertheless the Apostle does not absolve. Hence those commentaries of Cajetan were rightly erased by order of Pius V in the edition printed at Rome.

Therefore, Gregory, in Book I, dist. 46, Quest. 1; Ruardus, art. 3, folio 256; and Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, title 5, chapter 3, assert that God provided sufficiently for all infants in the first parent, but that after their fall he did not have an antecedent will to give glory and the means to glory to all, at

least not to infants who die in their mothers' wombs or to whom baptism could not be applied after their departure from the womb. This opinion seems to be proved because, if some remedy had been left for these infants, it would have to be within the power of the parents or those who have care of the infants. But no such remedy existed for those who die in the womb through the intervention of natural causes alone, nor for those for whom after departure from the womb water was unavailable, nor for those born among unbelievers laboring under ignorance of baptism. Therefore, no remedy of salvation was left for all these.

But the excellent opinion that must be followed by us, with all theologians except those cited, is that a sufficient remedy for salvation was left for all infants, whether under the law of grace or before the law, whether before sin or after it, whether before departure from the womb or afterward. Thus the scholastics teach, and Ambrose in Book II of *De Vocatione Gentium*, chapter 8. It is gathered from the passages in which we proved that there was in God an antecedent will toward all. Thus it is gathered from 1 Timothy 2: *God wills all human beings to be saved*; 2 Samuel 14: *God does not will a soul to perish*; and Ezekiel 18 and 33: *I do not will the death of the sinner*, and so forth, and from the passages cited above. Moreover, Paul says that Christ died for all and commands prayer to be made for all. Therefore, God willed salvation and the means to it for all. Nor is it valid to say that these testimonies must be understood before sin and not after it, because the passage of Ezekiel is understood after sin, as is Paul's statement in Romans 5: *while we were still sinners, at the appointed time Christ died for all*. Moreover, if Christ had not died for all sinners, although his passion would be a sufficient price for all, he would not be the redeemer of all unless he had willed to apply his passion to all. Second, it can be proved because before the law of grace God instituted sacraments for all infants, and under the law of grace he instituted baptism. Therefore, he left a sufficient remedy for all and willed the salvation of all of them.

To what is said of children who die in their mother's womb, for whom no remedy seems to have been instituted, it is responded that, since these infants are not capable of a remedy through their own act and are not yet subject to the senses of adults, a remedy accommodated to their state has been provided for that time in natural causes. These causes are sufficient for the child to come forth from the womb and after departure to receive baptism. If the causes are sometimes impeded, this occurs with God permitting and not preventing it, just as he permits and does not prevent sins in adults. Especially, the parents could have used the remedy of prayer so that the natural causes would not be

impeded, just as we often use prayer to obtain natural effects, namely rain, fair weather, and other things of this kind.

To what is said of infants for whom, after departure from the womb, water was unavailable, it is responded that this happens very rarely and often through the negligence of the parents or of those whose duty it is to provide for the child's salvation. If it nevertheless sometimes occurs without the parents' fault, it must be understood that God wills to permit that defect as a punishment for original sin. Nor does it derogate from the antecedent will concerning adults that God permits many to be condemned. Whether in that case it would be licit for the parents to ask God for another remedy beyond baptism is a greater doubt, but it must briefly be said that it would not be licit. The reason is that every remedy other than baptism would be miraculous and beyond the ordinary law, but it is not licit to ask God for a miracle, as Augustine taught in Book I of *De Origine Animae*, chapter 9, and Book II, chapter 10.

To what is said of children raised among unbelievers, it is responded that, if the unbelieving parents do what lies within them according to the law of nature, just as they will be enlightened by God in matters pertaining to their own salvation, so also they will be enlightened in matters pertaining to the salvation of the child. To what is commonly objected concerning a child raised in the forests, it is responded that, if as soon as he arrives at the use of reason he turns toward an honorable end, he will be enlightened by God concerning the supernatural object necessary for salvation, and thus he can be justified, whether Saint Thomas's opinion concerning one arriving at the use of reason is true or not.

ARTICLE 4
WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ARE CHOSEN BY GOD

First conclusion: the predestined are chosen by God. Second conclusion: predestination is posterior to election, and election to love.

Concerning each conclusion, it must be noted that by the name "election" Saint Thomas understands the efficacious volition of giving glory to the predestined. For although glory is the end of the predestined person, concerning which intention is exercised, nevertheless, with respect to the first motive of God's volition, which is the divine goodness, glory itself stands as a means concerning which election is exercised. Therefore, Saint Thomas calls the efficacious volition of giving glory to the predestined "election."

Second, it must be noted that Saint Thomas asked whether the predestined are chosen by God and responded by assigning an order among predestination, election, and love. First, he asserts that love is prior to election according to reason. The reason is that for God to love someone is to will a good for him absolutely, whereas to choose him is to will a good for him in preference to others. Because to will a good is prior to willing it in preference to others, love is prior to God's election. Second, he asserts that election is prior to predestination. The reason, which Saint Thomas assigns in the text, is that the will to give glory, which is God's will of the end, is prior to the volition of those things ordered to glory. But the will to give glory is election, whereas the will and ordination of the means to glory is predestination. Therefore, election is prior to predestination. Third, he asserts that love in us is posterior to election. The reason is that our will does not produce the good in the thing loved, but presupposes it as already produced. Therefore, it first prefers the good it loves to others and afterward loves it. God's will, however, produces the good in the thing loved, and therefore to produce the good, which is to love, is prior to preferring the good once produced to others, which is to choose.

Few things are commonly disputed by the doctors concerning this article. Nevertheless, two sufficiently difficult questions present themselves for discussion by us. Let the first be:

QUESTION 1
WHETHER THE EFFICACIOUS WILL TO GIVE GLORY TO THE PREDESTINED WAS PRIOR IN REASON IN GOD TO THE ELECTION AND KNOWLEDGE OF VISION OF WORKS

This difficulty is the same concerning human beings and angels, and therefore it must be considered with respect to both.

All agree that before the knowledge of vision of our works there was in God an antecedent will to give glory to all human beings and angels, because 1 Timothy 2, *God wills all human beings to be saved*, must be understood not only of human beings but also of angels, concerning whom the same reason holds as concerning human beings.

Second, all agree that before the knowledge of vision of works there was not in God an efficacious will to admit all human beings to glory, because, since the efficacious will is always fulfilled, if this will had preceded in God, all would infallibly be saved, which is false, as we saw above.

Third, all agree that there was in God an efficacious will to give glory to the predestined, from the efficacy of which will all the predestined infallibly attain glory. The only difficulty is whether this efficacious will was prior to the knowledge of vision of works or posterior to it.

There are two opinions concerning this question. The first is followed by the more recent theologians, Camerarius, chapter 5 of his *Dialogus*; John of Bologna, Part I of his work; and Molina, Quest. 23, arts. 4 and 5, disputation 1, member 6. They assert that there was in God no efficacious will to give glory to the predestined before their merits were foreseen, but only after the foreknowledge of their merits. They say that the following order was observed by God in predestination. First, by an antecedent and inefficacious will he willed glory and the means to glory for all human beings. In the second sign he saw certain human beings dying in grace and others in sin. In the third sign he efficaciously willed to exclude the latter from glory in punishment for their demerits, and efficaciously willed to admit the former to glory as the reward of their good works. They prove this opinion first because an efficacious will is a necessary cause that is necessarily fulfilled. Therefore, if it preceded in God concerning the glory of the predestined, it follows that the predestined would necessarily persevere in grace, and therefore that necessity would be imposed on their will. Nor is it valid to say that necessity is imposed in the composite sense but not in the divided sense, because the will of God is an extrinsic cause, and the necessity proceeding from it is necessity from an extrinsic cause. Once that cause is posited, future glory necessarily follows. Yet not only glory but perseverance itself necessarily follows. Moreover, the predestined person must be free not only when God's efficacious will is not presupposed, but also here and now insofar as he operates here and now. This cannot be preserved once God's eternal and efficacious will is posited. Therefore, such a will did not precede the vision of works. Second, as Damascene teaches in Book II of *De Fide*, chapter 9, the will that is from God alone, that is, prior to foreseen works, is antecedent and inefficacious. Therefore, if the will to give glory to the predestined preceded in God the vision of our works, it will be antecedent and inefficacious, not efficacious as election is. Third, if in God there were an efficacious will by which he chose some before works were foreseen, no reason could be assigned why those who were not chosen are infallibly condemned. For this would not proceed from a lack of sufficient assistance, which was seen to be communicated to all, especially to the angels, who were created in grace; nor would it proceed from the fact that they were not chosen, because even if there were no election in God, many human beings and angels would be saved

through the sufficient assistance communicated to all, especially the angels, in whom there is no opposition of appetite and whose state of trial was completed in a single instant. Therefore, it must be said that the efficacious will did not precede the vision of our works. This opinion is also followed by the authors who judge that our foreseen works are the cause of predestination. Their opinions must be cited and rejected in article 5.

To respond to the question, it must be noted that, when we ask whether the efficacious will or election was in God before the vision or knowledge of our works, the question does not concern thought and the knowledge of simple intelligence by which works are known on the supposition of a determinate assistance. For if each kind of knowledge is admitted, it is certain that each is prior to the knowledge of vision and to the election of human beings to glory. The question concerns only the knowledge of vision, which presupposes a divine decree of the will concerning our works: whether the election of certain human beings and angels to glory is prior in God to this knowledge of vision and to the election of works.

Notwithstanding the opposing opinion, let the conclusion be: the election of certain human beings and angels was prior in reason in God to the knowledge of vision of our works; and election is the efficacious will to give glory to the predestined. Saint Thomas and Cajetan follow this conclusion in the present article; Scotus, in Book I, dist. 41, sole question; Durandus, Quest. 1, number 8; Corduba, Book I, Quest. 56, opinion 5; Soto, on Romans 9; and Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, chapter 3. Among the saints, Jerome and Anselm follow this opinion on Romans 9, *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*; Chrysostom, Homily 55 on Genesis; and Bernard, Sermon 55 on the *Cantica*. This opinion was approved by the ancient Fathers as the truer and more ancient. Although in the time of Augustine it began to displease the Fathers because it seemed excessively severe, it was shortly afterward received as more conformable to Sacred Scripture. Augustine therefore embraced it in *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chapters 3, 11, and 12. It is gathered from Romans 9: *he has mercy on whom he wills*, and below: *does not the potter have power?* and so forth. It is also gathered from Ephesians 1: *he chose us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy*. He did not say "because we were holy." Below: *he predestined us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ according to the purpose of his will*. He adds afterward: *in whom we were called by lot*, that is, by God's gratuitous election without our works, as Augustine explains in *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chapter 7. Likewise, 2 Timothy 1: *he called us with his holy calling, not according to our works but according to his purpose*; Titus 3: *not from*

works that we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us; John 15: *you did not choose me, but I chose you*; and Psalm 17: *he made me holy because he willed me*. In all these passages the salvation of the predestined is referred to the gratuitous will of God, not to foreseen works. But this conclusion is proved especially by Romans 9: *when they had not yet been born and had done neither good nor evil, so that the purpose of God according to election might remain*, and so forth; *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*. The opposing authors attempt to evade this passage by saying that Paul's words are not to be understood of Jacob and Esau themselves, but of the descendants of Jacob and Esau, so that by the name Jacob is understood the synagogue that was to be propagated from Jacob, while by the name Esau are understood Esau's descendants. They also say that Paul is not speaking of election to glory but of election to a temporal inheritance, to which Jacob was admitted while Esau was rejected. They prove this in several ways. First, Esau did not serve Jacob, as is said in the words *the elder will serve the younger*, but Esau's descendants, namely the Idumeans, served Jacob's descendants. Second, in the words *it was said by the one calling that the elder would serve the younger*, Paul refers to the words the Lord had spoken to Rebecca in Genesis 25: *two nations are in your womb, and two peoples will be divided from your womb; one people will overcome the other people, and the elder will serve the younger*. These words are understood not of the persons themselves, Jacob and Esau, but of the peoples who drew their origin from them, and only of bodily servitude. Third, the words *Jacob I loved*, and so forth, are referred by Paul from Malachi 1, where it is certain that the discourse concerns peoples, because Malachi speaks there of the Church that was to be propagated from Abraham through Isaac and Jacob, and not through Ishmael. But although this may perhaps be the literal sense, especially in the cited passage of Genesis, nevertheless under that letter Paul intends to express the spirit contained in it, namely the election of the gentile people to the faith. Paul teaches there that this election is not from their works but from the will of God, because the Jews thought that faith was owed to them on account of the works of the law. To exclude this, Paul adduces in confirmation the election of Jacob and the hatred of Esau without their works being seen, which he manifestly understands of election to glory. Thus Augustine teaches in Book I of *Ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2, and Chrysostom in the cited homily. It is further proved by reason because the election and vision of means and works presupposes the intention of the end. But the will to give glory to the predestined is the will of the end, while the election and vision of our works concern the means to glory. Therefore, they necessarily presuppose the will to give glory to the predestined

as prior in reason. Nor is it an obstacle to say with the opposing opinion that the will to give glory is presupposed, but it is inefficacious and antecedent, not efficacious as election is. Against this, however, the efficacious application of means presupposes an efficacious will of the end, from which it has its efficacy. Therefore, predestination, which is the efficacious application of means and works, presupposes an efficacious will concerning the end, namely glory. Second, if the efficacious will to give glory to the predestined did not precede in God the vision of our works, it would follow that the predestined would owe no more to God than the reprobate, which is false. The consequence is proved because many of the reprobate are preceded by greater assistance than many of the predestined. Therefore, unless the assistance in the predestined had an infallible effect from the efficacious will of God, which did not concern the reprobate, it would follow that they would owe no more to God than the reprobate. Third, it is proved by Augustine's argument in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chapters 22 and 23, because many infants are baptized and saved, while many are neither baptized nor saved. But the fact that the former are baptized and saved cannot be attributed to their works, since infants have no works, nor can it be attributed to the merits of their parents, because many children of unbelievers are baptized and saved while the children of believers are often left unbaptized. We also see the children of the just condemned and the children of the unjust not condemned, and again the children of both the just and the unjust condemned. Therefore, it must be said that those who are saved are saved by reason of God's efficacious will, because these were chosen and those were not. Fourth, it is proved because this efficacious will before foreseen works derogates neither from God's justice nor from his mercy nor from the freedom of our choice. Therefore, since from it it follows that a human being is infallibly to be saved, it must necessarily be conceded in God. The antecedent is evident. First, it does not derogate from justice, because the good of glory is God's own good and is owed by nature to no human being or angel. Therefore, God could communicate it according to his good pleasure to these and not to those. It does not derogate from mercy, because divine mercy shines forth especially in the fact that some are chosen to glory while others are left. It does not derogate from our freedom, because God does not predefine or efficaciously will our works except after he has first in reason seen those same works proceeding freely from our choice under the condition that he assists us. Therefore, this election in God before the vision of works must be conceded. Finally, the whole reason why the opposing authors deny this election before the vision of works is lest the freedom of our choice be harmed. But they concede, or are bound to concede,

this efficacious will concerning the works themselves. Therefore, if there is no difficulty in positing an efficacious will of God concerning the works, there will be no difficulty in positing the same will concerning glory itself. Some respond, however, that God does not predefine our works in themselves but rather assistance as the cause of the works, and therefore no necessity is imposed on my will. Against this, it would follow that that in which divine providence most shines forth, namely a free human act, would not be foreseen in itself but only in its cause. It would also follow that God immediately causes our free act while neither immediately ordaining nor willing it through practical knowledge. This is repugnant even in a human artisan, who cannot produce something ad extra that is not ordained through art unless he acts ignorantly and not by art. Nor is it an obstacle to say that, although divine predefinition is not immediately concerned with our act in itself, divine governance is immediately concerned with it. Against this, divine governance does not add another will concerning the act beyond that included in predefinition, but adds only the exterior execution that is our act. Therefore, to say that governance is immediately concerned with our act is to say that it is immediately concerned with itself, which is to say nothing. Moreover, if only assistance, which is the cause of our work, is predefined, it follows that, since efficacious assistance is not the cause of our work but the same work itself, that in which our salvation chiefly consists was not defined by God in itself. Moreover, it is false that our act was not predefined in itself, because from eternity God ordained that assistance be given in time. But the efficacious assistance given in time is the same as our act. Therefore, from eternity he ordained our act in itself. The minor is evident because God did not ordain to give sufficient assistance, which is the cause of the work, since sufficient assistance is nothing other than God's will prepared to operate with us. If God predefined this assistance, he would predefine that in time he would have the will to operate with us, which is false and absurd. Finally, against this opinion we can infer the difficulty inferred against Catharinus. For if God predefined only assistance, which is the cause of a just free work and from which our work does not necessarily follow, it follows that in predefinition he does not know our act, our perseverance, or our salvation, but knows them only through speculative foreknowledge. To assert this is more than false.

To the arguments given above, it is responded that God's efficacious will is not a necessary cause operating from a necessity of nature and as determined to one effect. It is called a necessary cause because it infallibly obtains the effect that it freely determined from eternity. But I deny that, because it has an

infallible effect, it imposes necessity on our will. Our freedom consists in the fact that we can do this or that, which is not opposed by the fact that this and not that infallibly occurs, as Aristotle falsely thought in Book I of *De Interpretatione*, chapter 8. To the objection, it is responded that freedom does not remain in the composite sense, as the argument proves, for once God's efficacious will is presupposed, our act is also presupposed, and once that act is presupposed there cannot be freedom for the opposite. Freedom nevertheless remains in the divided sense, even here and now. This proceeds from the fact that God did not otherwise efficaciously ordain our free act than by first in reason, before predefining it, seeing our act proceeding freely from our will, as we will say below.

To the second reason, it is responded that Damascene is speaking of the will that God has from himself toward all human beings. Because such a will is not election but a certain complacency, it is inefficacious and antecedent. But the will of which we speak concerns only some human beings and angels, while others are omitted and left, and therefore it is election, which is an efficacious will.

To the last argument, it is responded that, if one asks why these were chosen before the absolute vision of works and not those, no reason can be given beyond the free will of God. In this sense Augustine's words in tractate 26 on John are understood: why he draws this person and does not draw that person, do not judge if you do not wish to err. But if one asks why those who are not chosen are infallibly condemned, the difficulty is greater. There are some who deny this, and therefore another question must be discussed.

QUESTION 2
WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE NOT CHOSEN BEFORE THE VISION OF WORKS ARE INFALLIBLY CONDEMNED

Catharinus, whom certain theologians follow, judges that some human beings were predestined and chosen who infallibly attain glory, while others were neither chosen nor predestined but only ordained through sufficient means from an antecedent will. Among those who were not chosen, he teaches that some are to be saved and others not to be saved. First, he proves that some of the non-chosen are saved because in the non-chosen there remains a moral power to persevere in grace by the very fact that they are not excluded from glory and have sufficient assistance. Therefore, we must say neither that all of these are condemned nor that all are saved, but that some are condemned and others

saved, as the nature of their freedom demands. Second, if the non-chosen were not saved, this would be chiefly because those who are saved need perseverance, which, since it is most efficacious, must proceed from an efficacious will of God such as did not concern the non-chosen. But this reason is invalid. The minor is proved because an adult can be justified when near death, at which time he does not need the assistance of perseverance, since through grace alone one can remain in it for a short time. Therefore, this person is saved even if he was not chosen to glory before the vision of works. Moreover, infants once baptized do not need the assistance of perseverance. Therefore, if they depart in that state, namely infancy, they can be saved without a prior election. This reason is confirmed because, although there was no efficacious will to give glory before works were foreseen, there can be an efficacious will to give perseverance. Therefore, one who is not chosen can persevere in grace and therefore can be saved even if he was not chosen. Third, if the non-chosen could not be saved, this would proceed either because God takes sufficient assistance away from them, which is not the case, since God gives all sufficient assistance both before and after sin; or because God permits their final sins, which is not the case, because sin does not necessarily follow from God's permission, otherwise sin would be attributed to God; or because God foreknew that they would depart in sin, which is not the case because the election and likewise the non-election of those who were not chosen took place before the vision of works; or it would proceed from the will of the non-chosen, which is not the case because their will remains undetermined to one alternative, both of itself and by God, through the very fact that they were not chosen. Therefore, it follows that the non-chosen can be saved even if they were not chosen. Sixtus of Siena also followed this opinion in Book VI of *Bibliotheca Sancta*, annotation 243, but afterward retracted it.

Notwithstanding this opinion, let the conclusion be: all who were not chosen before the vision of works will infallibly be condemned. Saint Thomas follows this opinion with Cajetan in the present article, on Romans 4, in Book I, dist. 41, Questions 1 and 2, and *De Veritate*, Quest. 6. The authors cited for us in the preceding question also follow it. It can be proved by reason from the points determined in the preceding question. First, all who are saved are chosen to glory. But only the predestined are chosen to glory. Therefore, only the predestined are truly saved, and consequently those who were not chosen before foreseen works are not truly saved. Nor is it an obstacle to say that it is true that the chosen are saved, but not true that the non-chosen are not saved, just as it is true that the predestined are called and justified, but not true that the non-

predestined are not called or justified. Hence, just as the non-predestined can be justified from another will than election, so they can also be saved from another will than election, namely the antecedent will. Against this, however, for God to choose some is nothing other than to will a good for them in preference to others. But God wills for all who are saved a good in preference to others, namely the good of glory, which he does not will for the rest. Therefore, all who are saved were first chosen, and consequently no one not chosen will be saved. You may say, second, that for God to will a good for some in preference to others, it is sufficient that he choose them after works have been foreseen by giving them glory as the reward of their works, just as God wills evil for the reprobate in preference to others once their works have been seen. Therefore, it is not necessary that they were chosen before works were foreseen. Against this, the means through which those who actually attain glory attain it were seen by God as future and efficacious. Therefore, they were first efficaciously willed and proceed from an efficacious will to give glory. Such is election to glory before foreseen works. Therefore, whoever attains glory was chosen before works were seen, and the non-chosen do not attain glory. Second, it is proved because after sin nature remained inclined to evil and frail toward good. Therefore, if human beings are ordained inefficaciously to glory only through the general supernatural providence proceeding from the antecedent will, no human being will in fact attain glory. Therefore, for a human being to attain glory, he had to be chosen by an efficacious will before works were foreseen.

The passage of Paul in Ephesians 1 proves this truth together with the conclusion of the preceding question: *he chose us in him*, and so forth, and immediately adds, *he predestined us*. From this it is gathered that election took place before the efficacious predestination of works. Catharinus does not rightly interpret this passage by saying that Paul's words must be understood of the election of the Apostles to the apostolate. Against this, the word *chosen* or *he chose* is taken in Sacred Scripture for those who attain glory, as is evident from Matthew 24: *for the sake of the chosen those days will be shortened*; Mark 13: *so that even the chosen might be led into error, if that were possible*; and below, *he will gather his chosen*, and so forth. In these passages the word *chosen* is undoubtedly taken for those who will attain glory. This reason is confirmed because the first will against all those who are condemned, ordaining them to eternal punishment, is an efficacious will. Therefore, the first will concerning all those who attain glory must be an efficacious will ordaining them to glory. Therefore, those who are not efficaciously chosen before the vision of works are truly and infallibly condemned.

To the argument given in the preceding question, it must be responded that the reason why it is infallibly true that all are condemned through the very fact that they are not chosen is that this is what will truly happen. Why will this happen? Because they will depart in sin. Why will they depart in sin? Because they will so will. Hence their condemnation is reduced to their own will and to the will of God permitting their final sins. If you ask how God knows that all the non-chosen are to be condemned before he excludes them from glory, it is responded that God knows this because by at least conditional knowledge he knows that, if in a posterior sign he gives this assistance to the non-chosen at this time and on this occasion, they will truly depart in sin. He also knows that he will not give them the greater assistance by which they would not depart in sin. Therefore, he knows at least conditionally that they are all to be condemned. Once the will to exclude them from glory is presupposed, however, God knows their condemnation not only by conditional knowledge but by absolute knowledge, which is knowledge of vision.

To the first argument of this question, it is responded that it is true that there remains in the non-chosen a moral power to persevere in grace, but such a power will not be reduced to act. The reason why it is not reduced is not a defect of sufficient assistance but their own will. How it is known that the will will not be reduced to act has already been explained in the preceding response.

You may object that it follows that sufficient assistance was granted to the reprobate in vain if they are infallibly to be condemned through the very fact that they were not chosen to glory before the vision of works. It must be responded that, although sufficient assistance is in vain with respect to this end, namely the attainment of glory, not absolutely but in the composite sense, presupposing that they are not chosen, it is nevertheless in vain only through the fault of the human being himself. The reason sufficient assistance is not given in vain to the non-chosen is that in conferring that assistance God shows his mercy toward all and will be justified in his works on the day of judgment. Otherwise, the reprobate could respond that he had not been preceded by sufficient assistance and therefore could not avoid sins, so that they should not be imputed to him. This response will have no place once sufficient assistance has been granted to him.

To the second argument, it is responded that, although an adult is justified when near death, he nevertheless needs special prevenient assistance, both because at that time he is especially assailed by the temptations of demons, and because the fact that the adult then dies before falling into occasions of sin is a special protection of God and a particular benefit of God. For the same reason

an infant justified through baptism needs the special assistance of perseverance, because the fact that he dies and is taken away before malice changes his understanding and deceit deludes his soul is a special assistance. Thus the confirmation is resolved.

To the second confirmation, it is responded that an efficacious will to give perseverance is not possible unless an efficacious will to give glory is presupposed. For since the intention of the end is the cause of the desire for means, just as assent to principles is the cause of assent to conclusions, the desire for a means cannot be more efficacious than the intention of the end, just as assent to a conclusion cannot be more certain than assent to the principles. No one says that he desires a bitter medicine more than he desires health.

To the final argument, the response is evident from what we said in the response to the argument proposed in the preceding question.

From all this it is evident that Catharinus's opinion is false when he asserts that, although only the predestined were chosen before the vision of works, nevertheless many of those not chosen before the foreknowledge of works and many of the non-predestined are chosen after works have been foreseen. For it is evident from what has been said that every person not chosen before works were seen is infallibly to be condemned.

ARTICLE 5
WHETHER FOREKNOWLEDGE OF MERITS IS THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION

The conclusion that responds directly is negative; the remaining conclusions by which St. Thomas responds to this question must be discussed below together.

QUESTION 1
WHETHER OUR PREDESTINATION WAS MADE BEFORE ORIGINAL SIN WAS FORESEEN

Although it has thus far been shown that the election of the predestined was made before their works were foreseen, the difficulty nevertheless remains whether that same election was also made before original sin was foreseen. For there are some who think that the election of the predestined was made after the knowledge of original sin, by which the whole of human nature was infected, and they say that from it, as from a mass of perdition, God took and elected

some to glory according to his mercy, while according to his justice he left others in that same mass. Augustine holds this in Book I of *Ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2; in *Epistola 105 ad Sixtum*, after the midpoint; in *Epistola 157 ad Optatum*; in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 3; in Book VI of the *Hypognosticon*; and in Book II of *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 7. And this also seems openly to be the opinion of St. Thomas in the first argument of this question, reply to 3, where he teaches that the angels were predestined before they were wretched, but human beings after the misery of guilt; and in Book III, dist. 10, Quest., where he teaches that the terminus from which the predestination of human beings proceeds was guilt; and in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 1, art. 3, reply to 4, where he teaches that predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things. Hence, he says, St. Paul was predestined through the prayers of Stephen, which God saw would occur; so also Christ was predestined as a remedy for original sin, which God foresaw would occur. And this opinion is gathered from the teaching of St. Thomas as interpreted by the Thomists in Part III at the cited place, because according to St. Thomas there Christ would not have come unless sin had preexisted. Therefore, knowledge of sin was prior to Christ's predestination. But Christ's predestination was prior by nature to predestination and election, since it is the final, exemplary, and efficient cause of our predestination, and Christ is the first of the predestined. Therefore, from first to last, foreknowledge of original sin was prior to our predestination. This opinion is also proved by reason, because God's mercy appears more greatly in his having elected human beings after they had become enemies than if he had elected them before their enmity. Therefore, the election of human beings was made once original sin had already been foreseen. Second, it is proved because, if there were no original sin, many human beings could not attain so great a grace as that which they in fact attain through the sacraments instituted by Christ after original sin. Many also attain a greater grace than that in which they die, which is in reality less than the grace they would have received from the first parent. But all these things could not have been foreseen and preordained unless original sin had been seen. Therefore, the election of human beings was made after original sin had been seen. Third, because knowledge and election to glory presuppose knowledge of those who are to be elected to it. But this knowledge could not have been had unless sin had already been seen. Therefore, election to glory presupposes knowledge of sin. The minor is clear because many human beings would exist before sin, or if sin did not exist, who in reality are not now going to exist; and many human beings who will exist after sin arise through incest, sacrilege, and fornication, who in reality would not exist if sin did not

exist. But knowledge of these persons could not have been had unless sin had already been seen. Therefore, the election of human beings to glory presupposes knowledge of original sin.

But the opposite opinion is truer and more probable, because the election of human beings and angels to glory was made before the knowledge of vision of original sin. Thus Scotus in Book III, dist. 7, Quest. 3; Capreolus in Book I, dist. 41; Durandus, Gregory, Giles, and Marsilius at the same place; Molina, Quest. 23, arts. 4 and 5, disputation 1, member 2. This opinion can be proved by reason because the angels were elected before the knowledge of original sin, since their election did not depend upon original sin, and yet the angels were justified through faith in Christ, as St. Thomas taught in *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 64, art. 1, reply to 4, where he teaches that from the beginning of their creation the angels had faith in the mystery of the Incarnation. Catarinus also teaches this in the opuscules *De Praedestinatione Christi* and *De Gratia Angelorum*; Vigerius in ch. 3, paragraph 2, of his *Institutiones*, and ch. 20, paragraph 1; Dionysius the Carthusian also teaches it on those words of Isaiah 63, *Who is this who comes from Edom?*; the Dean of Louvain taught the same while explaining the cited words, 2 and 8; and Cajetan in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 7, art. 1. Therefore, Christ was predestined before sin was seen, the opposite of which is the foundation of the contrary opinion. Therefore, the election of human beings, which was made through Christ, was also made before original sin was foreseen. The consequence is also clear from the fact that the election of human beings and angels was made together. Second, because the first parent in the state of innocence had faith in Christ, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 1, art. 3, reply to 5, and II-II, Quest. 2, art. 7, and as almost all the Fathers teach concerning those words of Genesis 2, *This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh*, which Paul expressed in Ephesians 5, saying, *This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church.* Jerome bears witness to this while explaining the same words, where he says that Adam was the first prophet, who prophesied concerning Christ and the Church. Augustine does so at the cited place and in Book IX of *Super Genesim*, ch. 19, where he teaches that the sleep sent upon Adam was an ecstasy through which his mind knew the last things that he prophesied concerning Christ, saying, *This now is bone of my bones.* But the grace of innocence of the first parent was seen before original sin. Therefore, the election through which he had that grace was made before original sin was seen. Third, because one who wills and acts in an ordered way for an end first has in intention that which is last in execution. But the last of all things in execution is the kingdom of God and the glory of human beings,

because all the supernatural works of God ad extra toward creatures are ordered to it. Therefore, first of all God willed glory for the human being. They were therefore elected to glory before original sin was foreseen and permitted. Fourth, because the election of this person to glory was made from God's sheer liberality and without merit, just as the will by which he willed all human beings to be saved was gratuitous. But for this reason alone that antecedent will existed before original sin was foreseen. Therefore, the election of human beings to glory was made before original sin was foreseen. Finally, because the authors of the opposite opinion are consequently bound to say both that the angels did not have their first grace or their first glory through Christ, and likewise that the first parent did not have the grace of innocence from faith in Christ. All these claims seem unworthy of Christ, and also because it cannot easily be explained in their opinion how Christ is the head of the angels if they did not have glory through Christ.

Let the second conclusion be: the election of human beings to glory was not made before the conditional foresight of original sin, but after it. All who think that future contingents can be known before a divine decree concerning the future thing readily acknowledge this opinion. Molina teaches it in Quest. 23, art. 4, and disputation 1, member 7. The reason for this conclusion is that, before the election of human beings to glory, it was true that if God were to permit original sin, the first parent would sin, and it was also true that God was really going to permit sin, just as he really did permit it. Therefore, the future sin could be known by God under that condition. The consequence is clear because, if it was true, it was knowable in that prior instant in which it was true; and if it was knowable, it was knowable by God. The antecedent is clear because a proposition concerning the future does not begin to be true. Therefore, if once the election and decree had been posited it was true that Adam would sin, then before that election it was already true that Adam would sin.

To what is objected from St. Thomas, it is responded that perhaps St. Thomas is not against us, because we too assert that Christ would not exist unless original sin existed. Nevertheless, together with this we say that Christ was predestined and human beings elected before original sin was foreseen. The reason is that God ordained that Christ would exist in the best and most fitting way possible. Now, once the conditional knowledge by which he knew that original sin would occur if he permitted it had been presupposed, he saw that the best means was for Christ to come as a remedy for sin. Hence, if, while that knowledge remained, sin were not to occur, Christ would not come by virtue of this same predestination, because the best means that had been seen, namely,

the remedy for sin, would be absent. For by this same reasoning we know that God willed glory for us before merits, and because he willed to give it to us in the most fitting way, which was none other than through merits, if merits had in reality not existed after the conditional knowledge of merits had first been presupposed, he would not give us glory. But if God had not foreknown through conditional knowledge that original sin would occur, but had known some other means that would be best, by virtue of the same predestination Christ would truly have come even if sin did not exist.

Hence from these points the solution to what is objected from St. Thomas is evident. To the argument made on behalf of St. Thomas, it is responded that when St. Thomas asserts that original sin was seen before either our election or Christ's predestination, he must be interpreted in this way: original sin was seen beforehand through conditional knowledge, but not through absolute knowledge, which is the knowledge of vision.

To the first argument then objected, it is responded that to elect a human being both before sin and after it is a work of mercy. Nevertheless, because the election of human beings to glory was made from God's goodness alone, knowledge of sin through the knowledge of vision was not considered; rather, the election was made before it.

To the second, it is responded by conceding the major. To the minor, it is said that although all those things could not have been foreseen through the knowledge of vision before original sin was seen, they could nevertheless very well have been foreknown through conditional knowledge before the knowledge of original sin. The third argument is resolved in the same way.

QUESTION 2
WHETHER THERE IS ANY CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION ON OUR PART

This question is most serious and the most difficult of all that can arise in this matter. In its discussion little confidence must be placed in the powers of our own intellect, lest, as has happened to many, the depths of its abyss swallow us up. Therefore, we must use the boat of faith, which, even if it is battered by the breakers of human intellect, must nevertheless reach the desired harbor when God governs it.

But so that the procedure of this question may appear more clearly, it must first be noted that the question is not whether there is on our part a cause of predestination taken as an act existing in the divine mind, whether it is an act of

intellect or of will. For it is certain, first, that no efficient cause of this act exists, since it is identical with the divine power from which the act proceeds according to our manner of understanding. It is also certain that no final cause of it exists, because, as St. Thomas taught excellently in *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 109, art. 5, the final cause moves one to the election of means by an intention really distinct from the election; but in God election and intention are not really distinct. Therefore, no true final cause can be given for predestination taken as a divine act. Second, it must be noted that, although no true cause of predestination taken as a divine act can be given either on God's part or on ours, a reason can nevertheless be assigned on God's part for both predestination and reprobation in general. For the reason for predestination is the manifestation of the divine goodness through works of mercy, and the reason for reprobation is the manifestation of the same goodness through works of justice.

Thus St. Thomas taught in this article, reply to the third argument, and Durandus in Book I, dist. 41, Quest. 2, no. 8. I said "of predestination and reprobation in general," for why God predestined this person rather than that one, and reprobated that person rather than this one, is another question, as we shall see later. Third, it must be noted that, although on God's part a reason can be given for divine predestination taken as a divine act, no reason can be assigned on the part of creatures. For although God wills one creature for the sake of another as for an end, no creature is the end or motive reason of the divine will; rather, he wills all things for the sake of his goodness as the final reason. Thus St. Thomas taught at the cited place, and Durandus, section 5, no. 5; Corduba, Book I of the *Quaestionarium*, Quest. 56; Henry, *Quodlibet* IV, Quest. 19. All these points are true without controversy.

The entire difficulty is whether on our part there is a cause of predestination taken as the effects that divine predestination produces in the predestined. Concerning this, one thing is also certain, namely, that one effect of predestination existing in us can be the cause of another, whether truly efficient or dispositive. Thus vocation is the cause of justification, justification of perseverance, and perseverance of glorification. Conversely, however, glorification is the final cause of perseverance, perseverance of justification, and justification of vocation. Therefore, the sense of the question, in which alone the difficulty lies, is this: whether on our part there is some cause, whether efficient, final, or a necessary disposition, of all the effects that divine predestination produces in us, so that it is the cause of the entire collection of effects from the first vocation up to and including glorification; or whether the whole collection of effects must be reduced only to the divine will and goodness as its cause, and

to nothing else. St. Thomas had asked this difficulty under these words: whether foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination, where by the name "predestination" he understands all the effects of predestination, and by the name "foreknowledge of merits" he understands the foreknown merits themselves.

Concerning this difficulty understood in this way, there are various reasons for doubting. The first is taken from those words of 1 Peter 1: *Strive to make your calling certain through your good works*, where vocation seems to be referred to our works as its cause. And from Romans 8: *Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son*, in which place the cause of predestination seems to be referred to foreknown merits. And in 2 Timothy 2: *If anyone cleanses himself from these sins, he will become a vessel unto honor, sanctified for the Lord.* And in Matthew 25 we read that the talents were distributed according to the servants' own ability. But the talents are effects of predestination. Therefore, the own works of the predestined are a cause of predestination. Second, reason also presses because all things that occur in time were preordained and willed by God from eternity. But in time God bestows glory upon the predestined for the sake of their works. Therefore, from eternity he elected them to glory for the sake of the works that he saw would exist in them. Third, because justice and mercy are found together in all the works of God, as St. Thomas teaches above. But predestination is a work of mercy. Therefore, it is also a work of justice. Yet it cannot be justice unless it is ordered to foreseen future works. Therefore, God predestined human beings for the sake of future works as their cause. Fourth, because God wills to manifest his justice no less than his mercy. But in reprobation he manifests his justice together with his mercy by reprobating for the sake of foreseen works, namely, sins. Therefore, he similarly predestines human beings by manifesting his justice for the sake of foreseen future good works. Finally, because it seems unworthy of God's goodness and equity that, of two persons found equal in all things, one should be taken up to glory while the other is rejected and reprobated, and that an unequal reward should be given to those who have equal merits and demerits, or that they should be punished unequally. Therefore, lest we concede this inequity in God, it must be said that God predestines human beings for the sake of foreseen future good works and reprobates others for the sake of the evil works that he sees will exist in them.

Concerning this question, and concerning the reason and cause to be assigned for why God predestines some human beings, various errors have arisen. The first was that of the Manichaeans, who asserted that the cause for

which some human beings are predestined and saved, while others are reprobated and damned, is each person's fate, which is nothing other than a wholly inevitable series and order of natural causes on which each person's happiness or unhappiness depends. Augustine reports this error in Book I of *Ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2, and Ambrose in Book I of *De Vocatione Gentium*, ch. 1. Augustine rejects the error at the cited place from the case of Jacob and Esau, who, although conceived and born together from the same parent, nevertheless had different outcomes, which cannot be attributed either to fate or to a diversity of stars. Jerome also rejects it in vol. I of *In Epistolam ad Demetriadem*. And it is rejected by St. Thomas in his commentary on Romans 9 from those words: *When they had not yet been born*, and so forth. It is rejected still more openly from Jeremiah 10: *Do not fear the signs of heaven that the nations fear*, as though to say that the heavenly bodies impose no necessity upon us. This opinion is also refuted by reason, because natural causes and heavenly bodies do not have and cannot have an action immediately upon our free choice, but only directly upon our bodies. Yet after any change whatsoever has been made in our body, our free choice still remains free. Therefore, our free choice and our salvation do not depend upon a natural cause.

The second error was that of Origen, as St. Thomas teaches in this article. He asserted that all human souls were created together from the beginning, and that because of the works they performed before entering bodies they received different bodies, namely, bad or good ones; and then, because of those same works, some were predestined and others reprobated. This error is suggested by Origen in Book II of the *Peri Archon*, ch. 1, together with the last chapter of the preceding book. Leo I attributes the same error to Origen in *Epistola 11 ad Iulianum Choensem*. Priscillian also fell into it and was condemned in the First Council of Braga, canon 6. Plato followed the same error in the *Timaeus*, as Jerome reports in vol. III, in the epistle *Ad Hedibiam*, Quest. 3. Jerome mentions the same error on Galatians 1, *When it pleased him who separated me*, and on Ephesians 1, *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world*, and in the cited epistle *Ad Demetriadem*. Epiphanius mentions it in the epistle *Ad Ioannem Hierosolymitanum*, and Theophilus of Alexandria in Book I of his *Paschale*.

But this error was condemned in the First Council of Braga, canon 6, where it is said: "If anyone says that human souls sinned in a heavenly dwelling and for this reason were afterward cast into bodies," and so forth, "let him be anathema." It was also condemned in the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8; in the Council of Vienne under Clement I; and in the Sixth General Synod, action 12. It is rejected more openly from Job 38: *Where were you when the*

morning stars praised me? These words clearly signify that human souls were not created from the beginning, because asking "Where were you?" is the same as asserting that one existed nowhere. The same error is rejected from Romans 9: *When they had not yet been born and had done nothing good or evil, it was said, not from works but from the one calling*, and so forth; and from 2 Timothy 1: *He called us by his holy calling, not according to our works that we performed, but according to his own purpose and grace.*

The third error was that of the Pelagians, who asserted that a human being by his own powers can merit grace and glory in strict justice, enter into friendship with God, and persevere in that friendship, and therefore that some were predestined because of these naturally good works. Augustine himself formerly fell into almost the same error, asserting that a human being by his own powers can have faith and the works of faith, and therefore that some were predestined because of these works of faith, as he himself states in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 12, and Book I of the *Retractationes*, ch. 13. Against this error the same Augustine wrote almost the whole of his seventh volume, and St. Thomas wrote in Book III of *Contra Gentiles*, ch. 147.

But this error is openly rejected from Romans 11: *But if it is from works, grace is no longer grace*; and Ephesians 2: *By grace you have been saved through faith, not from works, for it is the gift of God, lest anyone boast*; and Titus 3: *Not from the just works that we performed, but according to his mercy he saved us.* This opinion is also refuted by reason, because no works of an enemy can merit a reward, especially a supernatural reward such as the effects of predestination. But works preceding grace are works of an enemy. Therefore, they do not merit a reward, especially a supernatural reward, namely, the effects of predestination. Hence this error was rightly condemned in the Council of Orange, canons 6 and 5; the Council of Milevis, canon 3; and the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 8, canon 3. Ambrose wrote against it in Book I of *De Vocatione Gentium*, ch. 8, and Fulgentius in *De Incarnatione Verbi*, ch. 18.

The fourth error was that of those who affirmed that infants were predestined because of the good works they would have performed if they had survived, and that others were reprobated because of the evil works they would have performed. Augustine says that this error belonged to the Pelagians; thus he reports it in *Epistola 105 ad Sixtum*, *Epistola 107 ad Vitalem*, and *De Bono Perseverantiae*, ch. 9.

But this error is rejected by the same Augustine at the cited places. First, because it would follow from it that the infant of whom it is said in Wisdom 4, *He was taken away lest wickedness alter his understanding or deceit beguile his*

soul, was reprobated. It would also follow that an infant dying with baptism and in grace would be reprobated and damned if he would in reality have performed evil works. Similarly, it follows that an infant dying in original sin would be predestined and saved if he would in reality have performed good works, which is impious. Moreover, as the same Augustine argues, merits and demerits that are never going to exist cannot be the cause either of damnation or salvation, because things that are never going to exist are no one's merits or demerits. Therefore, an infant cannot be damned or saved because of merits or demerits that would have existed if he had lived. Moreover, as 2 Corinthians 5 says: *We must all be manifested before the tribunal of our Lord Jesus Christ, so that each may receive according to what he performed in the body, whether good or evil.* Therefore, a reward must be granted or a punishment inflicted because of works actually performed, not because of works that are never going to exist. Finally, from this opinion it would openly follow that an infant dying with baptism and grace would acquire as much glory as would correspond to the merits he would have had if he had lived, and that an infant dying in original sin would be punished with as great a punishment as would correspond to the demerits that would have existed if he had lived. Consequently, it follows that the infant would be punished not only with the punishment of loss but also with the punishment of sense. All these claims are both false and absurd.

The final error is the one Prosper reports in his epistle to Augustine and which is usually attributed to Alexander of Hales, Part I, Quest. 28, member 3, art. 3. He asserted that the foreseen future good use of grace is the cause of predestination. For this opinion asserts that, foreseeing that some would make good use of the grace that was to be granted them, God predestined them because of that good use; but seeing that others would make bad use of grace, he reprobated them. Thus, he says, a king sometimes gives a soldier a horse and arms because he knows that he will make good use of them. But this opinion is rejected as an error from Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the foundation of the world so that we might be holy*, where Jerome notes that Paul did not say "because we were holy," but "so that we might be holy." It is also refuted by reason because works proceeding from grace are effects of predestination according to Ephesians 2: *Created in good works that God prepared.* But preparation is predestination. Therefore, works proceeding from grace are effects of predestination. Therefore, the good use of grace cannot be the cause of all the effects of predestination; otherwise, it would be the cause of itself. Second, because if we were called and justified because of merits proceeding from grace, it would follow that each predestined person merits vocation and

justification in strict justice, which seems Pelagian. The consequence is clear because he merits all these things through works proceeding from habitual grace, which are merits in strict justice. Finally, because no one can merit through works that which is the principle of meriting in those works; otherwise, the principle of merit and the reward would be lacking. But grace is included among the effects of predestination. Therefore, no one can merit through works proceeding from grace the collection of the effects of predestination. Therefore, no one is predestined because of the good use of grace that is foreseen as future.

With all these errors therefore rejected, there is no single opinion among Catholics in assigning the reason for predestination. Among them, Gabriel, in Book I, dist. 41, the sole question, asserts that on our part there is a cause of predestination, namely, merits that proceed from grace and are not included among the effects of predestination. For Gabriel thinks that glorification alone is an effect of predestination, as we saw above. If, however, he says, we say with the Master that works proceeding from grace are an effect of predestination, it must be asserted that in some persons there is a cause of predestination, namely, morally good works preceding grace. These are a cause in those who are called in such a way that they could fail to respond. But in those who are called in such a way that they could not fail to respond, as Paul was called, or in those who were called before the use of free choice, such as the Blessed Virgin, John, Jeremiah, and so forth, there is no cause of the effects of predestination.

But this opinion, as regards its foundation, namely, that glorification and nothing else is an effect of predestination, was refuted above. If, however, this foundation were true, his opinion would be true, because all theologians acknowledge that glorification is the reward and effect of merits proceeding from grace. As regards the second point, in which he asserts that works performed by free choice are a cause of predestination in some persons, this opinion must now be rejected together with the opinion of Javellus, who seems to remain caught on the same difficulty.

Another opinion is followed by Chrysostom Javellus in his treatise *De Praedestinatione*, ch. 5, where he says that there are three kinds of assistance by which God works with us. One is general natural assistance, which, although it is not sufficient for morally good works, is nevertheless, he says, sufficient for avoiding sins. Another is special natural assistance, which is necessary in fallen nature for performing morally good works that are dispositions meriting grace by fittingness. The third assistance is special and supernatural, necessary for works that merit glory in strict justice. He thinks that this assistance is nothing other than charity, grace, and the other virtues. With these suppositions, he

asserts that there is on our part a cause of predestination, namely, morally good works that merit the effects of predestination by fittingness insofar as they proceed from special natural assistance. Thomas of Strasbourg seems to have followed the same opinion in Book I, dist. 41, art. 2; as did Albert Pighius in Book VIII of *De Libero Arbitrio*. Camerarius in the *Dialogi de Praedestinatione* and Osorius in Book IX of *De Iustitia Caelesti* are not far from their opinion. Soto rejects their opinion as Pelagian in his commentary on Romans 9, but undeservedly, since it differs greatly from Pelagius. For Pelagius said that morally good works are merits of grace and glory in strict justice, whereas these authors deny this and say that they are only merits by fittingness. Bonaventure may be cited for this opinion in Book I, dist. 41, Quest. 1, art. 1, where he asserts that although on our part there is no cause meriting all the effects of predestination in strict justice, there is nevertheless a cause meriting them by fittingness, namely, morally good works antecedent to grace. Hence all these authors agree that morally good works performed by the powers of nature are a cause of all the effects of predestination. Their motives are these. First, because whenever the sacred Doctors speak of predestination, they assign as the cause of all its effects the good use of free choice that God foresees will exist in the predestined. Thus Jerome in the questions *Ad Hedibiam*, Quest. 10, where he says that God does not predestine without reason, but rather hardened the Israelite people and saved and anticipated by grace us who are not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles, because of certain preexisting causes. In assigning these causes he says that some willed to receive the Son of God, while others refused to receive him. Thus Augustine in *Liber Octoginta Trium Quaestionum*, Quest. 68, where he says that in the predestined most hidden merits precede, on account of which they are called, just as in the damned most hidden evils precede, on account of which they are damned; and in his commentary on Romans, chs. 61 and 62; and at the beginning of Book VI of the *Hypognosticon*, he says that some are predestined because God foreknew what sort of persons they would be. Ambrose seems to give the same cause in ch. 8 of his commentary on Romans, on the words *To those who love God*, and in ch. 9 on the words *When they had not yet been born*.

Second, they prove it from Ecclesiasticus 15, where it is said: *God from the beginning made the human being and left him in the hand of his own counsel; he placed before him precepts and commandments, saying: If you keep them, they will preserve you*, and so forth; and from Malachi 3, where it is said: *Return to me, and I will return to you.* In these places our good work is required from us beforehand for predestination. They then prove it by reason, because if God did

not predestine human beings after first taking account of their works, the faithful's hope of salvation would be greatly weakened, since they would think that good works profit them nothing if they have not been elected, and evil works harm them nothing if they have been elected, which is especially unfitting. All the arguments given above as reasons for doubting are usually brought forward for this opinion, as are others that will later be introduced and resolved.

But if this opinion is understood in such a way that morally good works performed by the powers of nature before every grace are a cause or necessary disposition for predestination, so that, once these works are posited, those who have them are infallibly predestined, while those who lack them or are foreseen to lack them are not predestined, and so that those works are merits according to which God bestows supernatural assistance, grace, and glory upon the predestined, then without doubt it is erroneous. Against it is this argument: although God grants sufficient assistance to all, especially to those doing what lies within them, he sometimes grants greater assistance to those who will cooperate less or who are not foreseen to act morally uprightly before receiving the assistance. This is evident from Matthew 11: *Woe to you, Bethsaida*, and so forth, where it is said that Tyre and Sidon were denied assistance by which they would have been converted, while that same assistance was given to the inhabitants of Bethsaida, who became more hardened through it. Moreover, there is no doubt that if the assistance shown to Paul had been given to many of the damned, they would truly have been converted and saved. Therefore, account was not taken of the use of free choice preceding grace; rather, God breathes where and how he wills. Second, because there is no doubt that greater grace was bestowed upon the Fathers of the Old Testament than upon the fathers of the Church of the New Law, as the Prophet signifies in Psalm 147: *He has not done so for every nation, and he has not manifested his judgments to them.* Moreover, there is no doubt that more persons were predestined from the Christian Church than from the Synagogue, and more from this part of the New Law than from that one, and to far greater grace and glory, as is signified in Matthew 20 in the parable of those hired for the vineyard, where the householder makes those who began to labor very late equal to the others. By this he signifies that the fruits of works proceeding from greater grace, such as the works of those existing under the law of grace, are more abundant. The cause given there for this distribution is not the labor of the workers but the will of the householder himself. Hence the householder responds there to the servant who complained: *Friend, I do you no injustice. Did you not agree with me*

for a denarius? Take what is yours and go. For I will to give to this last one as to you. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with what is mine? This is also signified in Genesis 48 in Jacob's mystical blessing, in which, crossing his hands in the form of a cross, he placed his right hand upon Ephraim, the younger by birth, and his left upon Manasseh, the elder by birth, signifying that the Christian Church, younger by birth than the Synagogue, was to be preferred to the Synagogue through the Cross of Christ. Christ signified the same to his disciples in Luke 10, saying: *Blessed are the eyes that see what you see. Amen, I say to you that many kings wished to see what you see and did not see it.* Furthermore, as Jerome teaches in the cited epistle *Ad Demetriadem*, it is certain that many Gentile peoples had a far more excellent use of free choice than many Christians, and yet more Christians with a lesser use were saved. In confirmation of this may be brought forward the nations discovered by the Portuguese, which, although they excel in intellect and naturally use free choice uprightly, have nevertheless not yet been illuminated in the faith. Further, it is evident that many among the damned were subject to fewer sins than Mary Magdalene, Paul, or the thief. Therefore, these persons were not predestined and those reprobated because of a use of free choice preceding grace.

Then, in confirmation of this opinion, many passages of Sacred Scripture are relevant. For in Ephesians 2 we are said to be created in good works that God prepared. If we are created in works, we are predestined from no works. And in Isaiah 65, as Paul reports in Romans 10: I was found by those who did not seek me, and I appeared openly to those who did not ask for me. And in Ephesians 1: He predestined us unto the adoption of the sons of God through Jesus Christ, not according to our works, but according to the purpose of his will, in whom we were called by lot. And in Colossians 1: Who made us worthy to share in the lot of the saints. If we were predestined by lot, then not from foreknowledge of works. And in 2 Titus 1: He called us by his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace. And in Romans 9: Not from works, but from the one calling, it was said, and so forth. And Psalm 17: He saved me because he willed me. Hence Luke 10 says: I confess to you, Father of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent and revealed them to little ones. And there the divine will is given as the reason, namely: Because thus it was pleasing before you. In these places our predestination is not reduced to our works, but rather to the divine will.

It is then proved by reason, because that which is given to someone as a gift and liberally has no cause on the part of the one to whom it is given; otherwise, it would not be a liberal gift. But every grace is conferred upon us

liberally and as a gift, as the Council of Milevis teaches in canon 4. Therefore, since the effects of predestination are grace, all are conferred upon us without a cause and gratuitously.

Second, because morally good works are neither a proportionate disposition for grace, nor its cause, nor is grace in any way owed to them. Therefore, once they are posited in us, it does not follow that we are predestined; nor, if they are lacking, does it follow that we are reprobated, since they have no bearing upon gratuitous effects.

Third, because if morally good works were the cause of predestination, they would already conduce efficaciously to glory, and it would consequently follow that they were effects of predestination and were included within the scope of the collection of the effects of predestination. Consequently, they cannot be the cause of the whole collection of effects.

But if against these points you object that God grants grace to one who does what lies within him, while before every grace no one can do what lies within him except by acting morally uprightly, therefore God grants the first grace, namely vocation, and the other effects of predestination, to one acting morally uprightly; therefore, moral works are the cause of the whole collection of the effects of predestination. It is responded that God does not grant grace infallibly and by law to one acting morally uprightly, nor does he grant it according to the measure of the morally good work. Hence a morally good work is neither a sufficient cause or disposition nor a necessarily required disposition for grace, and therefore it cannot be assigned as the cause and reason of predestination.

For this reason, there is another opinion, followed by Henry in *Quodlibet* IV, Quest. 19, and *Quodlibet* VIII, Quest. 1. He asserts that on our part there is some cause or reason for the whole collection of the effects of predestination, not indeed morally good works, but supernatural works preceding habitual grace, considered not insofar as they are from God, for in that respect they are effects of predestination, but insofar as they are from our free choice. Hence Henry thinks that our cooperation together with God in a supernatural disposition for grace, insofar as it is foreseen by God, is a cause of the whole effect of predestination. Sadoletus is usually cited for this opinion in Book VIII on Romans 9, as is Dionysius Ryckel at the beginning of Book I, dist. 41, Quest. 1. Others explain this opinion by saying that nonresistance to the vocation by which God calls us is a cause of predestination, because, although it is not a merit in strict justice, it is nevertheless a certain fittingness because of which those who do not resist are predestined by God. They explain this by the case of

a sick person to whom a physician promises health if he does not resist the cure. That nonresistance, they say, is a condition and fittingness for attaining health. They also explain it by the case of two persons who are called by God, one of whom does not resist the vocation while the other resists it. That nonresistance to the vocation, they say, is a condition and a certain fittingness because of which the former is predestined and the one who resists is reprobated.

But this opinion says two false things. The first is that the election of the predestined was not made before their works were foreseen. The second is that cooperation or nonresistance to vocation is the cause of predestination. The first was refuted above; the second must now be rejected. First, it is sufficiently refuted by Luke 10 and Matthew 11: *Woe to you, Bethsaida*, and so forth, where God saw that Tyre and Sidon would cooperate and would not resist vocation, and nevertheless they were not called or divinely drawn, as Augustine teaches in Book I of *Ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2. Therefore, cooperation or nonresistance to vocation is not a cause of predestination. Nor does it avail to say that God never saw that Tyre and Sidon would not resist, because he never ordained to call them with a vocation to which they would respond. Against this is the fact that it then follows that nonresistance to vocation and cooperation are reduced to the will of God predestining, and therefore will not be the cause of predestination. Moreover, there are many reprobates whom God saw would not resist vocation if they were called as the predestined are called, and yet they are in reality reprobates. Therefore, foreseen nonresistance or cooperation is not the cause of predestination. Second, because neither cooperation nor nonresistance to vocation is a motive cause of God's will for electing the predestined. Therefore, neither is a cause of the effects of predestination. The consequence is clear because that which does not move one to distinguish a predestined person from a reprobate is not a cause of the effects of predestination. The antecedent is proved because God elected human beings to glory before he saw the cooperation or nonresistance that he willed to be a disposition for grace and vocation, which are the operations with which our free choice cooperates, namely, those which it does not resist. Therefore, from first to last, he willed to elect human beings to glory before he saw cooperation or nonresistance. Therefore, neither is a cause or motive reason for electing the predestined. Third, that nonresistance to vocation is not a cause of predestination is proved specifically because a human being does not resist vocation from the fact that he consents to the vocation, for from consent it follows that the person is not irrational. But consent is an effect of predestination. Therefore, nonresistance will similarly be an effect and consequently cannot be a cause of predestination,

especially because an inefficacious vocation in us, which is an effect of predestination, preceded free nonresistance. Fourth, because from the will to give glory, God willed not only to call the human being with a vocation to which he would respond, but also willed that the human being not resist the vocation, because not resisting vocation is just as necessary for attaining glory as consenting is. But for this reason alone consenting to vocation is an effect of predestination and not the cause of all its effects. Therefore, similarly, not resisting will be an effect of predestination and not the cause of all its effects. Finally, this opinion is refuted from Romans 9: *When they had not yet been born or done anything good or evil, he loved Jacob*, and so forth. In this place Jacob is said to have been elected before every foreseen work, and it speaks of the knowledge of vision. What is defined in the Councils of Orange and Milevis also favors this opinion, namely, that our will is prepared by the Lord so that we may will, because *we are not sufficient to think anything from ourselves as from ourselves*, as 2 Corinthians 3 says. In these places it is signified that cooperation with vocation and nonresistance were prepared by the Lord through the special providence that is predestination, and therefore are effects of predestination.

Another opinion was followed by Durandus in Book I, dist. 41, Quest. 2, no. 11. He says that although on our part there is no cause of predestination that is a morally good work, some cause nevertheless exists, namely, glorification, which is the final cause of perseverance, justification, and vocation, and yet is not included among the effects of predestination.

But although this opinion of Durandus contains nothing prejudicial to divine faith, because it does not concede any cause of predestination arising from our powers, it nevertheless falsely teaches that glorification is not an effect of predestination. For it was proved above that glorification is an effect of that act of predestination by which God wills to give a human being glory because of already foreseen merits.

With all these opinions therefore rejected, the Catholic conclusion must be held by us, which is defended by all the sacred Doctors and Scholastics, namely, that on our part there is no final or efficient cause, nor any necessary disposition, that is either a merit by fittingness or a merit in strict justice with respect to all the effects of predestination. This is to assert that on our part there is no cause or motive and objective reason of God's will for predestining these human beings rather than those, but that the collection of the effects of predestination must be reduced to God's free will alone as its cause. Augustine held this in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15; *De Bono Perseverantiae*; *Responsiones ad Articulos Sibi Falso Impositos*; and Book I of the *Retractationes*,

ch. 23. Bernard and Hilary agree with him. At these places Augustine teaches that just as the union of the humanity to the Word was made with no preceding merits and no preceding cause on the part of the humanity, so human beings are predestined by God with no preceding cause on their part. The Master teaches the same in Book I, dist. 41; Scotus and Gabriel there, Quest. 1; Marsilius, Quest. 41, art. 2; Major, dist. 40, Quest. 2; Ferrariensis, Book I of *Contra Gentiles*, chs. 161 and 162; Soto on Romans 9; Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii et Praedestinationis*, Part I, ch. 3; Corduba, Book I of the *Quaestionale*, Quest. 56. St. Thomas especially follows it in this article, in Book I of *Contra Gentiles*, the final chapter, in *De Veritate*, Quest. 6, and on Romans 9. But before we prove this conclusion, it must be presupposed that the effects of predestination are glorification, perseverance, merits, justification, and vocation, and sometimes natural events, as was seen above in article 2. Hence by the name "predestination" we understand the whole collection of these effects. When Ambrose, Jerome, Chrysostom, Origen, and other Fathers with them often assert that merits proceeding from grace are a cause of predestination, it is because they take predestination for that effect alone, namely, glorification.

This opinion can be proved by reason from a sufficient enumeration, because whatever can be conceived in us as a cause of predestination is either works proceeding from grace, morally good works antecedent to grace, works that would have occurred if a human being had lived longer, or cooperation or nonresistance to vocation. But none of these is a cause of predestination, as was proved against the opinions reviewed above. Therefore, nothing remains in us that is a cause of all the effects of predestination. It can next be proved by authorities of Sacred Scripture. First, from Romans: *When they had not yet been born or done anything good or evil, so that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not from works but from the one calling, it was said that the elder would serve the younger, as it is written: I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated.* Here Paul proposes the election of Jacob to us as a type of all the predestined, and says that he was elected from the one calling, that is, from God's gratuitous will, with no preceding works. In this he excludes every cause on our part. Augustine discusses this passage extensively in Book I of *Ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2; Book II of *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 7; and also *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 7, where he says that one who assigns our works as the cause of our predestination nullifies the Apostle's statement, "not from works," and so forth. It is also proved from John: *You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.* Augustine in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 18, says that this passage must be understood of the apostles in this way: *You did not choose*

me because you chose me or believed in me; rather, I chose you so that you might choose me and believe in me. And 1 John 4: *In this is the charity of God, not that we first loved him, but that he first loved us.* Hence in Ephesians 2 we are said to be *created in good works that God prepared*, as though predestined from no work of ours; and therefore in Ephesians 1 Paul had said that he chose us *in Christ before the foundation of the world*. Innumerable Fathers also favor this opinion, but let us bring forward one, Augustine, in *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3, where he says that those will reign with Christ whom God by his gratuitous goodness prepared for the kingdom. For because he was preparing such persons according to his purpose by predestining them so that they might be worthy of the kingdom, he had prepared those who were to be called so that they might obey; he had prepared those who were to be justified so that, after receiving grace, they might believe rightly and live well; he had prepared those who were to be glorified so that, having become coheirs of Christ, they might possess the kingdom of heaven without end. Those reached that kingdom whom God saved gratuitously, with no preceding merit of good will or good work. It is then proved by reason because whoever wills an end for someone in an ordered way first wills the end, and then from that will he wills everything that conduces to attaining the end. But God wills glory for us as an end in an ordered way. Therefore, from that will he wills all things that conduce to attaining that end, namely, glory. But whatever cause might be assigned, if it is a cause, will necessarily conduce to attaining glory. Therefore, it will be willed from the will to give glory. But things thus willed are effects of predestination. Therefore, nothing can be assigned as a cause of all the effects of predestination. Therefore, nothing outside the scope of those effects can be assigned as a cause of all the effects of predestination.

Second, it is proved by an argument taken through all the genera of causes. First, because no final cause of all the effects can be given, since no other final cause can exist besides the divine goodness, which God manifests in predestining through acts of mercy. This is evident from the fact that glorification is the end of all the other effects, and yet glorification has no end on our part. Nor can an efficient cause be given in us, because the first effect of predestination is vocation, and no efficient cause of it exists in us that is a motive for predestining. Nor is there a formal cause, because, since the effects of predestination are certain forms and acts or habits, no other form of them exists. Nor is there a material cause, because nothing is presupposed in us for the effects of predestination except nature, powers, and morally good works. But nature and the powers are not a motive cause for predestining, since they are

common to the reprobate and the predestined. Nor can morally good works be a material cause, even dispositively, since, once they are posited, no supernatural effect is necessarily or by law given. Therefore, nothing can be conceived that is a cause of all the effects of predestination.

From all these points it follows that no cause of predestination in general exists on our part, but that the whole collection of the effects of predestination must be referred to the manifestation of the divine goodness through acts of mercy as the final cause, and to nothing else; and to the free and gratuitous divine will as the efficient cause.

Let the second conclusion be: no cause or reason exists either on our part or on God's part why, namely, he predestined this particular human being rather than reprobating that one; it can be referred only to the free will of God as its cause. Thus St. Thomas teaches in this article, replies to 1 and 3, and explains it with these examples. Although a reason can be assigned why, from the matter of generable things, which is one in species in all, one part is under the form of earth and another under the form of fire, namely, because it was necessary for the perfection of the universe that matter subsist under forms differing in species, nevertheless no reason can be assigned why this part of matter should be under the form of earth rather than under the form of fire, beyond God's free will. Similarly, although a cause can be assigned why stones in a building occupy the lowest place and not the highest, namely, because of the stability of the building, nevertheless no cause can be assigned why this stone should be in this part rather than that one, beyond the will of the craftsman. So also, although the manifestation of the divine goodness through acts of mercy and acts of justice can be assigned as the cause of predestination and reprobation in general, nevertheless no cause can be assigned why this human being was predestined rather than that one, beyond God's free will. Matthew 20 signifies this freedom of God concerning the predestination of this person and not that one in these words: *Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with what is mine?* This is what Augustine explains in tractate 26 on John, saying: "Why he draws this one and not that one, do not judge if you do not wish to err." Therefore, in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 8, and *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 8, Augustine refers the distinction between this predestined person and that reprobate as to its cause to the inscrutable judgments of God, thinking that no other cause of it can exist.

This conclusion is proved by reason because no cause exists on the part of any predestined person why he is predestined. Therefore, all human beings are equally presented in God's conception. But among equals there is no reason why

one should be taken up rather than another left behind, beyond the free will of the one taking it up. Therefore, no cause can be assigned why this human being was predestined rather than that one, beyond God's free will.

Let the third conclusion be: for the predestination of adults, the foreseen and known good use of free choice proceeding from grace is a necessary condition, not as known by the knowledge of vision, which presupposes a decree of the divine will, but by conditional foreknowledge, which exists before the decree. By this knowledge God knows that if he grants this assistance at this time, which in a posterior sign he grants to the predestined, they will persevere in grace and die in it. I do not understand this conclusion in such a way that the good use of free choice thus foreknown was a cause or adequate condition such that, once it is posited, all who are thus seen as going to use free choice well are predestined and those who are not thus seen are reprobated; nor in such a way that this good use is the measure of supernatural gifts, because in reality it is not so. Rather, I understand it thus: necessarily, whoever is predestined was seen by that conditional knowledge as going to use free choice well and to die in grace. This can be proved from Romans 8: *Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed*, and so forth; *these he also called*. It is as though he said: those whom he foreknew would use the grace to be conferred well, these he predestined, that is, elected; and those whom he predestined, he afterward called. And 1 Peter 1: *Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the elect strangers according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.* And Romans 11: *God has not rejected his people whom he foreknew.* In these places it seems to be signified that this conditional foreknowledge of the good use of grace was necessary before election to glory. Hence St. Thomas in this article teaches that the foreknown good use of grace is the final cause of the conferral of grace; and in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 5, art. 5, reply to 2, he teaches that Christ came at that time because he knew that at that time people would believe in him. Augustine teaches the same in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 9, and Book III of *Contra Paganos*, Questions 2 and 49; Chrysostom in homily 65 on Matthew, on the words *The kingdom of heaven is like a householder who went out*, and so forth, where he teaches that they were called at that time because God knew that at that time they would believe. This conclusion is proved by reason because whatever occurs in time was ordained by God from eternity and, on the supposition that it will occur, is necessarily foreknown. But in time it occurs that the predestined person will use grace rightly. Therefore, this use both was preordained by God and was necessarily known by this conditional knowledge before the preordination. Therefore, this foreknowledge of good use was a

condition without which he would not be predestined. Second, because that which is future is known by God through absolute knowledge once the decree of his will is presupposed. But this same thing was conditionally future before the decree. Therefore, it was known by God under that condition. But the good use of free choice in the predestined person is necessarily future once predestination is presupposed. Therefore, it was known by God through absolute knowledge once the decree was presupposed, and before the decree through conditional knowledge. Therefore, this foreknowledge is a necessary condition for predestination, not so much on the part of the predestined person as on the part of God, who necessarily knows through this knowledge whatever is conditionally future.

But that this use of grace foreknown through this knowledge is not the measure of supernatural gifts is proved because God saw through this knowledge that many would use grace rightly if more abundant grace were given to them than was afterward conferred upon them in time, and yet this greater grace was not afterward given to them. This is evident concerning the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, because they were known to be going to act rightly if as much grace had been given to them as was given to the inhabitants of Bethsaida and Chorazin, and yet it was not given to them. Then, because it cannot be denied that greater assistance was offered to the Jews when Christ himself preached to them than to the Gentiles, and yet many of the Jews were not saved, but rather were hardened by that greater assistance, although many of the Gentiles would have been saved if it had been offered to them, and yet it was not offered. Hence Christ complains of the Jews, saying: *All day long I stretched out my hands to an unbelieving people that contradicted me*; and in Romans 10 and Matthew 23 he says: *How often I willed to gather your chicks as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you would not.* Therefore, supernatural gifts are not given according to the measure of the use of grace known conditionally.

Nevertheless, nothing we have said prevents God from sometimes granting more abundant assistance to those whom he sees through this knowledge will use grace rightly. Hence in Matthew 25 and Luke 19, the talent taken away from one is given to another who had conducted himself well. Indeed, sometimes God takes morally good works into account, not because grace is owed to them, but because from his mercy he aids with more abundant assistance those who act morally uprightly. Hence we know from Acts 10 that Cornelius was called to the faith because of prayer and almsgiving; and in Genesis 22, because of Abraham's admirable obedience, it was said to him: *Because you have done this*

thing and have not spared your only-begotten son for my sake, I will bless you, and in your seed all the nations of the earth will be blessed.

From all these points it is evident what the difference is between Christ's predestination and ours. Christ was predestined without dependence upon his free choice because he was predestined to the substantial hypostatic union, before which no works of Christ could have been foreknown. But our predestination was made dependently upon our free choice as regards its effects, because we were predestined to attain glory through merits. Hence, just as in Christ no cause of that effect of his predestination preceded, so also on our part no cause of all the effects of our predestination preceded. Thus Augustine teaches in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15.

But the arguments made for the opinion of Javellus and the others must now be resolved. First, so that we may reconcile the ancient Fathers who speak of predestination in different ways, it must be noted, as Driedo rightly teaches in *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, Part I, ch. 2 and ch. 4, reply to 3; Ruard Tapper, art. 7 of *Contra Lutherum*, p. 245; and Molina, Quest. 23, art. 4, and disputation 1, the last member, that the ancient Fathers, when disputing against two opposite heresies that arose, also spoke in the best way. For when disputing against the Manichaeans, who removed the freedom of our choice and consequently our merits, the Fathers affirmed that God predestined no human being to glory unless his merits had already been seen. They speak, however, of predestination taken as the approval or retribution of glory. Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, and many others cited for the opposite opinion speak in this way. Hence the solution is evident to these passages and to similar ones that can be brought forward from these Fathers, in which our merits seem to be assigned as the cause of our predestination. But afterward, when the heresy of the Pelagians arose in the time of Augustine and Jerome, who affirmed that human beings were predestined because of morally good works antecedent to grace, the Fathers adhered to the opposite extreme and therefore affirmed that God predestined human beings before any works were foreseen. This opinion, which began with Augustine, seemed too harsh to many Fathers, especially Africans, who thought, as I judge, that Augustine was speaking of the approval or retribution of glory, although in reality he was speaking of the election of human beings to glory before which no works could have been foreseen through the knowledge of vision, of which Augustine and the Fathers speak. They could, however, very well have been foreknown through the conditional foreknowledge of which we speak.

To the opposed authority of Ecclesiasticus, St. Thomas responds above in Quest. 22, art. 2, reply to 4, that God's leaving the human being in the hand of

his own counsel was nothing other than his not imposing necessity upon human works as he imposes it upon the operations of natural agents. It does not signify there that our works were not predefined or predestined by God and therefore did not fall under the effect of predestination. Hence no cause of predestination on our part is gathered from this authority.

To the passage from Malachi, *Return to me*, and so forth, the Council of Trent responds excellently in session 6, canon 5, that in this passage no work is required of us that is not from God's assistance and an effect of predestination. Rather, we are admonished concerning our freedom, just as in the last chapter of Lamentations, *Convert us, Lord*, and so forth, we profess that we are anticipated by God's grace in supernatural works. To the argument then made, it is responded that the hope of salvation is undeservedly weakened among the faithful. Augustine inveighs against such faithful persons in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 10, saying: "I marvel that human beings prefer to entrust themselves to their own weakness rather than to the firmness of God's promise. 'God's will concerning me,' they say, 'is uncertain.' What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you, and do you not fear?" Therefore, since both wills are uncertain to the human being, why does he prefer to entrust his faith, hope, and charity to his own weakness rather than to the firmer will of God? Hence he warns that those expressions circulated among the common people—"If I am not elect, good works can profit me nothing; and if I am elect, evil works can harm me nothing"—must be uprooted from the hearts of the faithful as remnants of the Pelagians. But to satisfy this reasoning more fully, it must be said that, since before the election of human beings to glory God knew by conditional knowledge that a human being would cooperate rightly and persevere if he granted him this or that assistance at this or that time, and predestined no one without this knowledge of works that would freely be performed by the human being, it is manifest that both his perseverance in grace and his being saved depend upon the human being's free will.

Nor does it avail if you object that there are more reprobates whom God saw would act rightly and persevere if they were anticipated by grace than there are predestined persons, and yet they were not predestined. Therefore, those good works known through conditional knowledge profit them nothing. It is responded that none of those who are reprobated by God was seen as acting rightly through sufficient assistance and persevering in grace, although perhaps he may be seen as going to act rightly and persevere if God were to grant him more abundant grace than he grants to many of the predestined. Nevertheless, God did not will to grant some persons greater assistance than sufficient

assistance, with which he saw that they would be damned, because it is free to God to grant greater or lesser assistance. This is the mystery at which Paul marvels in Romans 11, saying: *O depth*, and so forth.

The arguments made at the beginning of the question must now be responded to. First, concerning the authority of Peter, *Strive*, and so forth, it is responded with St. Thomas in this article that Peter speaks there only of certainty as regards the one acting, so that the sense is: strive and act rightly inwardly and outwardly so that from your works you may be certain—with moral certainty, namely—that you are called to faith and elected to glory, so that hope may thus be increased more greatly in you, according to Paul: *But we also glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience, and patience hope.* But since these works are effects of predestination, no cause of all its effects is proved.

To the passage of Paul in Romans 8, Cajetan responds that although foreknowledge is placed by Paul before predestination, predestination is nevertheless prior to foreknowledge of our works, because foreknowledge of works presupposes the decree of predestination. Thus we are not predestined because we were seen as going to act rightly; rather, we are predestined and afterward seen as going to act. But although this solution of Cajetan is true when speaking of the knowledge of vision of our works, that passage must nevertheless be understood of conditional knowledge, which exists before predestination, so that the sense is: those whom he foreknew through conditional knowledge would act rightly and persevere, these he predestined or elected. He did not do so because he foreknew that they would persevere in grace under the condition, since many are seen as going to persevere under a condition who in reality are not elect, but because he predestined and elected no one whom he had not first seen through this conditional knowledge as going to persevere in grace.

To the third passage, it is responded that in the words *If anyone cleanses himself from these* our free cooperation with God's grace is signified. It is said, however, *he will become a vessel unto honor*, because to one preparing himself for grace through God's assistance, God infallibly grants habitual grace, through which he becomes a vessel unto honor sanctified for the Lord. Nevertheless, this operation is included among the effects of predestination and therefore cannot be the cause of all of them.

To the passage from Matthew, it is responded with Chrysostom, homily 53 in the incomplete work, that by the name "talent" at that place are understood graces freely given, which are often distributed by God according to each

person's natural ability, for which reason they are believed to have been distributed to Peter and Paul. Or it must be said with St. Thomas, Quest. 24, art. 3, reply to 1, that by the name "talent" habitual grace is understood, which is given to each according to his own ability, that is, according to his own disposition from God's assistance. Nevertheless, the operation and disposition are also included among the effects of predestination.

To the first argument made, it is responded that it is true that things occurring in time were preordained and willed by God, but it is not true that they were ordained and willed by God in the same order in which they occur in time, because the order of intention is opposite to the order of execution. Hence, although merits are prior to glory in time, and in execution glory is given through merits, nevertheless the will to give glory was prior in God to the will to give merits. Therefore, it does not follow that election to glory was made because of foreseen merits. For in the same way we first will health and then the potion, which is the means, although in execution the potion is prior to the attainment of health.

To the second argument, it is responded that, as St. Thomas teaches above in Quest. 21, justice is found in two ways in the works of God, always without any injustice. First, justice is found from a debt of some reason existing in the creature. In this way, once it is presupposed that God gave the human being that he is a human being, hands and powers are owed to him by justice; and in this way glory is owed by justice once merits performed through predestination are presupposed. In another way, justice is found not as founded upon something existing on the part of the creature, but only upon God's promise or ordination. Such justice exists in the creation of a human being once it is presupposed that God ordained to create him, although that work is more one of mercy than of justice. In this way justice is found in predestination, because with respect to the whole collection of effects there is no justice on the part of the human being, but justice is found only in relation to God's ordination and promise, whose ordination and promise are fulfilled by conferring the effects of predestination. This conferral is, simply speaking, a work of mercy.

To the third reasoning, it is responded that predestination is a work of mercy and not of justice except improperly, and therefore presupposes no works because of which God predestines a human being. Reprobation, however, is a work of justice and therefore presupposes sins because of which a human being is reprobated and punished. Hence this is the difference between works of justice and works of mercy: God does not will absolutely to manifest punitive justice, but only on the supposition of sin, because punishment is not good

unless guilt is presupposed. But God wills absolutely to manifest mercy, because a work of mercy is absolutely good without a presupposition. Nor does it avail against this that mercy presupposes need just as punishment presupposes guilt, because natural need belongs to the creature by the very fact that it is a creature, whereas guilt, which reprobation and punishment presuppose, does not.

To the final argument, the solution is evident from Matthew 20: *Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with what is mine?* And from Romans 9: *Does not the potter have power over the clay to make from the same mass one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor? Will the thing formed say to the one who formed it, "Why have you made me thus?"* Why God predestined this person and not that one, when they were seen by God as equal in natural things, it is not lawful to assign a reason. Rather, with Paul in Romans 11 one must exclaim: *O depth of the riches*, and so forth; and with Augustine one must say, in *Epistola 105 ad Sixtum* and *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 9: "Why he frees this person rather than that one, let him investigate who can investigate so great a depth of his judgments, provided that he guard himself from the precipice so that he does not err."

QUESTION 3
WHETHER CHRIST THE LORD IS THE CAUSE OF OUR PREDESTINATION

This question depends greatly upon what is said in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 1, art. 3, concerning Christ's coming, and in Quest. 24, arts. 3 and 4, concerning his predestination. Therefore, it must be treated briefly by us. This question must be understood, like the preceding one, of predestination taken as the collection of all its effects. The reasons for doubting are these. First, because Christ was an effect of our predestination, since from the end of giving us glory and redeeming us from sin, God sent Christ into the world for us, namely, for all, and for our salvation. Therefore, Christ is an effect of our predestination rather than its cause. Second, because if Christ were the cause of our predestination, it would follow that we are predestined not by God's gratuitous will, but from a debt of justice grounded in Christ's merits, contrary to Paul in Romans 3, who says: *Justified freely through his grace.* Third, because when a cause is removed, the effects of that cause are removed. Therefore, if Christ were the cause of our predestination, we would not be predestined without Christ, and thus no one would be saved if Christ did not come, which is false. Finally, because the angels and the first parents had their first grace without Christ's

merits, and yet through that grace they could persevere and attain glory. Therefore, they did not have glory or the effects of predestination through Christ. This is especially true of the blessed angels, who never departed from their first grace.

Because of these arguments and others commonly made both from Sacred Scripture and from the sacred Doctors, Ruard Tapper, art. 7 of *De Satisfactione*, vol. I, p. 243; Driedo, *De Redemptione et Captivitate*, treatise 2, ch. 2, Part III, art. 4; Capreolus, Book III, dist. 18, Quest. 1; and Adam in his commentaries on Romans 9 and Ephesians 1, assert that Christ was not a cause of our predestination, because these Doctors think that dispositions for grace, vocation, and faith were not given to us through Christ and his merits, but are given to us from God's liberality alone.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding these claims, let the first conclusion be that Christ the Lord was the cause of all the effects of our predestination, from the first vocation up to and including glorification, not only as exemplary cause, but also as final and meritorious cause. He was also the cause of the first grace and first glory both in the first parents and in the angels, so that whatever, whether natural or supernatural, is an effect of predestination was wholly given to us through Christ's merits. As regards its first part, this conclusion belongs to St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 24, art. 3, and is followed by Vega, Book IV, chs. 5 and 6, and by almost all Thomists with St. Thomas, especially Molina, Quest. 23, art. 4, and disputation 2. This same first part is gathered from many passages of the Fathers, some of which assert that we have every supernatural effect through Christ, others vocation, and others faith. First, from Ephesians 1: *Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in heavenly things in Christ, as he chose us in him*, and so forth; and it is added, *In whom we were called by lot.* Therefore, through Christ we are called and elected. And Philippians 1: *It has been given to us through Christ not only that you should believe in him*, and so forth. And Hebrews 12: *Looking to Jesus, the author and perfecter of faith.* It is then evident by reason because Christ is the head who pours every spiritual motion into us as his members, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 8, and Paul taught in Ephesians 4, saying: *Who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body, joined and knit together through every joint.* Innumerable passages of the Fathers show this truth. Bernard also teaches this truth, especially in sermon 13 of *In Cantica*, saying: "Whatever wisdom, whatever virtue you are confident that you possess, attribute it to Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Augustine taught the same in Book II of *De Bono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7, where he

says that through Christ a human being has both that he approaches God and that he does not depart from God; and in Book I of *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 3, he acknowledges that every grace is given to us through Christ. Celestine I teaches the same in the third and fourth epistles *Ad Episcopos Galliae*, where he asserts that through Christ we use free choice well. The Council of Milevis teaches the same, canon 4, saying: "It is a gift of God not only to know what we ought to do, but also to love so that we may do it; both are given to us through Christ." The Council of Trent also defines it in session 6, canon 5, saying: "The holy Synod declares that the beginning of justification itself must be taken from God's prevenient grace through Jesus Christ"; and in canon 6 it teaches that every disposition for grace is through Christ. Hence there is no doubt that the opinion of Driedo and the others is a manifest error in faith. Therefore, what Molina asserts at the cited place, canon 1, is false: that Christ was not the cause of our predestination as regards its integral effect because, he says, he was not the cause of the natural events that order one to eternal life. This is false, because through Christ's merits whatever assists us toward eternal life and every effect of predestination were given to us. But these natural things assist us and are effects of predestination, as was seen above. Therefore, they are given to us through Christ. It is also proved by reason because, as the Fathers often teach, just as through the Word in the divinity God produces all natural things, so through the Word in the humanity he produces all supernatural things as through a conjoined instrument, as theologians also acknowledge. Therefore, just as there is nothing natural that was not made through the Word in the divinity, so there is nothing supernatural that was not made through the Word in the humanity. Moreover, so that Christ may be Redeemer and Savior in the perfect sense, it is necessary that through him we have not only grace but also the dispositions for grace, such as faith and vocation. Therefore, all the effects of predestination are given to us through Christ.

You will object, however, that Christ's Incarnation was an effect of our predestination, since for us all and for our salvation he descended from heaven, and so forth. But Christ was not the cause of his own Incarnation, which was made with no preceding merits. Therefore, neither was he the cause of all the effects of our predestination.

Because of this argument, more recent theologians say that not all the effects of our predestination are conferred upon us through Christ, because they think that Christ is an effect of our predestination. But this principle is false, less consonant with Christ's dignity, and unworthy of God's providence. For how could Christ be the exemplar and end of our predestination if he is an effect of

that same predestination and a means for attaining our glory? This is openly evident to be false because the end is that for whose sake other things are made, while a means is that which is made for the sake of another, namely, the end. But according to their opinion Christ was made for the sake of the predestination of human beings and from the will to give glory to the human being. Therefore, our predestination would be the end of Christ's predestination, and not conversely. St. Thomas teaches the opposite in *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 24, art. 3, and it is gathered from Paul in Romans 8: *Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.* This passage at least explains the exemplary cause.

Nor is it satisfactory for some to respond that Christ is not an effect of our predestination because he was its exemplary cause. This solution cannot stand together with the principle posited above, because if Christ was made from the will to give glory to the human being, it necessarily follows that, just as grace and perseverance for the same reason are effects of our predestination and not its exemplary cause, so also is Christ.

Hence we must say, as above, that Christ was predestined before human beings, and that through him human beings and angels were predestined. This is for Christ to have been the first of the predestined and the meritorious, exemplary, and final cause of all the effects of our predestination. To prove this truth is not the task of this place, but belongs to Part III, Quest. 1, art. 3, and Quest. 24.

To the argument, it is responded by denying the major. For Christ is said to have descended for our salvation, not because our salvation was the first motive of his coming, but because it was the motive of his coming in passible and mortal flesh. How the principle that he would not have come unless sin existed can stand together with this point was briefly touched upon above.

From these points follows what we affirm in the second place, namely, that Christ was the cause of the grace of the angels and of the first parents that they lost by sinning. This is denied by those authors who think that Christ was predestined after original sin was seen. But if they once concede that he was predestined before original sin was seen, they also agree with us in this conclusion. It is proved by reason because we were predestined before original sin was foreseen, as we saw in article 4. But Christ was the final and exemplary cause of our predestination. Therefore, he was predestined before original sin. But the grace of innocence of the first parent was an effect of his predestination. Therefore, it was an effect of Christ already predestined. Moreover, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, Quest. 2, art. 7, and III, Quest. 1, art.

3, reply to 1, the first parents in the state of innocence had faith in the mystery of the Incarnation. But it must not be said that they were first justified and afterward had faith in Christ in that state, for this would be said without reason or foundation. Therefore, it was disposed from eternity that faith would be given to the first parent through Christ as a disposition for grace. Consequently, Christ's Incarnation was ordained by God before the grace of innocence of the first parent. Therefore, it must be said that faith and grace were given to him through Christ. It can also be proved concerning the angels because they similarly had faith in the Incarnation from the beginning of their creation, as Augustine teaches in Book IX of *Super Genesim*, ch. 19; St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 57, art. 1; and Rupert on John 8, *He was a murderer from the beginning*. Although neither the angels nor the first parents had from the beginning of their creation faith in the mystery of the Cross and all the circumstances of the Incarnation, they were not justified through this faith. Therefore, the first grace and faith were given through Christ to all the angels and were consequently an effect of Christ's predestination.

From these points it follows that this one point must be conceded to the authors of the opposite opinion: Christ the Lord was not the cause of the predestination of the entire mystical body including the angels and human beings as members and Christ the Lord as head. The reason is that Christ was in no way the cause of his own Incarnation, which is included in the mystical body. Nevertheless, if we exclude the head from the mystical body, Christ was truly the cause of the predestination of the whole body according to all the effects that predestination had both in human beings and in angels. He was the exemplary cause because we were predestined according to his exemplar. He was also the meritorious cause because he merited all the effects of predestination for us. He was also the final cause because we were predestined for his sake.

To the first, the solution is evident because, although Christ's being passible and mortal was an effect of our predestination, Christ considered in himself was not. In this latter way he was the cause of our predestination and not its effect.

To the second, it is responded that although our predestination, taken as its effects, has the character of a debt with respect to Christ, who merited it, nevertheless with respect to us it has only the character of a gift and not a debt, since nothing preceded in us before the effects of predestination by reason of which the whole collection of effects would be owed.

To the third, it is responded that it is indeed true that in fact we would not be predestined unless Christ were predestined. Nevertheless, God could very

well have predestined human beings in another way than through Christ. What he would have done if Christ had not come is not given to us to consider, since it depends upon God's free will.

To the final argument, the antecedent must be denied, as is evident.

QUESTION 4
WHETHER GOD PREDEFINED IN PARTICULAR A DEFINITE DEGREE OF GLORY AND THE MEANS TO GLORY

This question cannot be discussed by us with the fullness its dignity deserves, since we are aiming at brevity; for many matters necessarily depend upon Question 14, art. 13, Question 19, art. 8, and Question 22, art. 8. Nevertheless, it must be treated briefly.

It should be noted that by the name "means to glory" we understand degrees of grace, vocation, justification, perseverance, and finally our free acts with all their circumstances. The reasons for doubt are these. If God determined a definite degree of glory, it follows that a man cannot attain greater glory, however much he may merit, nor greater grace than that which is the means to that degree of glory. But if you say that the merits also were determined, a greater difficulty follows, namely, that it is not within man's power to merit more through grace; and it further follows that a man cannot fail to merit the glory to which he has been preordained, and indeed that he merits it of necessity, which is repugnant to the nature of merit. Second, whatever has been predefined by God will necessarily be, since predefinition includes God's efficacious will, which cannot fail to be fulfilled. Therefore, if God predefined each of our works with every circumstance belonging to it, it follows that each occurs necessarily in its species, with all its circumstances, and consequently no work of ours will be free. Nor does it help to object that God also knew our works infallibly by the knowledge of vision, and yet does not impose necessity upon them. Against this, first, it is also difficult to reconcile our freedom with God's knowledge of vision; and furthermore, the account of the knowledge of vision and of predefinition is not the same, since the knowledge of vision presupposes our works and therefore does not impose necessity upon them, whereas predefinition does not presuppose those works but rather causes them. Therefore, since it is a cause from which the effect necessarily follows, our works consequently occur necessarily by virtue of the predefinition. Nor again does it help to say that they occur necessarily in the composite sense, but not in the divided sense. Against this, God's predefinition is not within our power, since it precedes our will as a

cause precedes its effect. Therefore, our work, which necessarily follows from it, will likewise not be within our power, not only when it is supposed that it exists, but neither was it within our power whether the work would or would not occur, which is the same as not having been within our power in the divided sense.

Many arguments are commonly brought forward to prove that our works cannot be reconciled with God's predestination, predefinition, providence, and infallible knowledge, but these are sufficient for now. Because of these arguments and others like them, many affirm that there was in God no efficacious will to give glory before works had been foreseen by the knowledge of vision. We disputed against them in art. 4. Others, however, said that our works were not predefined by God in themselves but in their cause. Enough was said against that opinion in the same art. 4.

Besides these modern authors already cited, however, there have been various opinions among the doctors concerning the reconciliation of the freedom of our choice with God's predefinition. Some affirmed that God did not predefine a definite degree of glory, but only that he would give glory to man, as though in a confused way. Nor, they say, did he define our works and their intensity, but from eternity willed to assist man in time according to the determination of man's own will, and, once the works had been seen, thereafter to give the reward of glory in accordance with the quality of his merits.

This opinion, however, must be rejected as manifestly false, and against it let the first conclusion be established: From eternity God efficaciously willed and predefined for the elect a definite degree of glory, and also all their free works individually, with a definite intensity and with every circumstance and manner in which they occur in their species. The conclusion is common to all the doctors whom we shall cite below. As regards the degree of glory, the conclusion is gathered by an evident argument, because whatever occurs in time in the manner in which it occurs was not only foreknown by God but also predefined. For, as Damascene teaches in *De Fide Orthodoxa*, Book II, chap. 30, God foreknows evils but does not predefine them, whereas he both predefines and foreknows all goods. But in time God bestows upon men different and definite degrees of glory, according to John 14, *In my Father's house there are many dwelling places*, and according to the words, *To sit at my right hand or at my left is not mine to give to you*, and so forth, where a diversity of degrees of glory is signified. Therefore, those degrees of glory were predefined by God. The major is proved because whatever will occur does so from God's will as from a cause, not from a will exercised in time but from eternity. But if you say that the degree of

glory was indeed willed and predefined by God, though not by an efficacious will, against this stands the fact that the will to give glory to the predestined was an election, as has been seen. Therefore, the will to give so great a glory was likewise an election. But election is an efficacious will. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

As regards works, this can be proved at the same time as the degree of grace, by almost the same argument, because works and grace are means to glory, according to the proportion of which glory is conferred. Therefore, if so great a glory was efficaciously predefined and willed, it follows that so many works, with so great an intensity, and so great a grace were defined.

The only present difficulty is whether the freedom of our choice is preserved together with this predefinition of works. First, it must be presupposed according to faith that our choice remains free simply speaking, however much its works may have been predefined. This was taught by the Council of Trent, often cited above. It is also gathered from Ecclesiasticus 31, where it is said of a certain predestined man: *And he will have eternal glory, who could transgress and did not transgress, and could do evil and did not do it*; from Wisdom 4, *He was taken away lest wickedness*, and so forth; from 1 Corinthians 10, *Let him who thinks that he stands take care lest he fall*; and from 1 Corinthians 9, where Paul appears to fear for himself when he says, *I discipline my body and bring it into subjection, lest, after preaching to others, I myself should become disapproved.* And yet it is certain that Paul was predestined. Hence Psalm 2 says, *Embrace discipline*, and so forth. In all these passages the freedom of our choice and of the predestined is signified.

The whole difficulty consists in how the freedom of the elect can be preserved together with this determination and predefinition.

The first manner of speaking is that of Bonaventure, on *Sentences* I, distinction 40, art. 1, Quest. 1; Richard, distinction 38, Quest. 6; Scotus, distinction 40, sole question; Gabriel and Ockham, distinction 38, Quest. 1; Gregory, Quest. 2; Sylvester, in *Conflatum*, Quest. 12; Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, part II, chap. 2; Vega, Book II, chap. 17, and Book XII, chap. 22; and Córdoba, Book I, Quest. 55, doubt 11. All these assert that the freedom of choice is preserved together with divine predefinition and efficacious will because God predefined our free acts and all contingent things in no other way than as they will be. Hence, if a thing will be contingently, it was predefined and known as contingent; if it will be necessarily, it was predefined necessarily; and if it will not be future, it will not have been predefined by God or known as future. Hence, although in the composite sense it is necessary that, if our works

are future, they are known and predefined by God, nevertheless, because they can fail to be future, they can also absolutely fail to have been predefined. Thus predefinition does not remove our freedom concerning our works.

But this opinion is not defended in only one way. Some defend it by holding that there is a power over the past and that what has already been produced can absolutely not have been. Others, such as Córdoba and the Nominalists, defend it because they think that, according to the variation of our future act, which truly can fail to be, the relation of God's will and knowledge to the future thing is varied, and consequently what has been predefined can fail to have been predefined. Scotus and Bonaventure proceed differently, saying that God's predefinition, which is measured by an eternity that never flows, is always present to every thing and is never past or future. Therefore, if the thing or free operation occurs, they say that it will be predefined by God; but if it does not occur, it will not be predefined. In this way they say that our freedom is preserved together with God's predefinition. This opinion can be proved, first, because from the opposite it would follow that God did not create the world freely. The consequent is false. Therefore, the antecedent is false. The inference is proved because from eternity God decreed to produce the world at the instant at which he created it. Therefore, if it cannot be brought about that he had not decreed it, it follows that the world was necessarily future for the instant at which it existed. Second, future contingents were predefined by God and yet are contingently future, so that they truly can fail to be. Therefore, either it must be said that God's predefinition is not certain, and likewise that the knowledge of vision by which future things are seen is not certain, which is impious; or it must be said that they can necessarily fail to have been predefined or known by God. Third, at the same instant at which a man wills something he can fail to will it, since he acts freely. Therefore, at the same instant at which he wills, it can be brought about that he did not will. Why, then, shall we deny this same thing of God, whose act of willing is always present?

This opinion, however, is manifestly false, especially according to the first and second manners of defending it. For Jerome, in his letter to Eustochium, whose words are cited in causa 32, Quest. 5, and Augustine, Book XXVI, *Contra Manichaeum*, chap. 5, taught that there is no power over the past. St Thomas held the same in *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 25, art. 4; *Contra Gentiles* II, chap. 25; on *Sentences* I, distinction 42, Quest. 2, art. 2; *De Potentia*, Quest. 1, art. 3, reply to 9; and *Quodlibet* V, Quest. 2. Richard, on *Sentences* I, distinction 42, Quest. 1, art. 5, teaches the same, namely, that it is impossible for what God once willed not to have been willed. St Thomas expressly taught the same

concerning knowledge in *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 14, art. 13, reply to 1. This, however, is not the place to prove it, and therefore a single argument will suffice. If there were a power over the past, God could bring it about that the world had not existed after it had been made; and from the very fact that it existed, it is now true to say that the world existed. He would therefore make two contradictories true, namely, that the world existed and that the world did not exist, which is impossible.

Against the second manner, almost the same argument is taken. For God from eternity knows that Antichrist will be and predefined that he will be. Therefore, it is true to say that he predefined him. Yet, even on the supposition that he predefined him, it can be brought about that he did not predefine that Antichrist would be. Therefore, it can be brought about at the same time that he predefined and did not predefine, which are contradictories true at once. Second, if, because of the freedom of the divine will, it can be brought about that God did not predefine what he once predefined, it follows that the will by which he willed the world to be could now not have existed, since it always depends freely upon God. Consequently, there can be a power by which the world did not exist, which is to grant a power over a past thing, contrary to this same opinion, which denies that such a power can be given.

But against Scotus in particular there is the following argument. No act of ours can exist unless God predefined that it would be. Therefore, either he predefined from eternity this free act of mine, in which case it follows that it has been predefined and, in the composite sense, cannot fail to have been predefined; or he did not predefine it from eternity, in which case it follows that this same predefinition began in time, which must not be said. Second, although God's predefinition is always present, nevertheless, when it is posited, it infallibly follows that the effect exists. Whether from a necessary cause or from a past predefinition, the effect follows infallibly. Therefore, just as from a past cause and predestination it could rightly be inferred, according to Scotus, that our act will be, so it is also inferred from a present predefinition. Thus, if our act follows necessarily from the former, it also follows necessarily from the latter. Therefore, the act will never be within our power. Third, if a present cause that necessarily produces an effect is not within my power, neither will the present effect be within my power. But however much God's definition, which is the cause of our act, may be present, it is not within my power. Therefore, neither will my act be within my power. Thus this opinion avoids none of the difficulties.

Cajetan, therefore, in *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 22, art. 4, seeing that, once God's predefinition is posited, it cannot fail to have been posited, proceeds differently. He asserts that, if our actions and future contingents are considered in relation to their proper cause, they are contingent and free, just as the effects of a necessary cause are necessary from that same cause. But if they are considered in relation to the divine predefinition, from which the predefined act necessarily and infallibly follows, it must be said, according to him, that every effect will certainly and infallibly be, and will occur inevitably, because God's eternal predefinition is immutable. Since, therefore, from our own proper cause, namely, our will, it follows that the predefined action is avoidable, while from God's providence and predefinition it follows that it is unavoidable, and since these two cannot simultaneously belong to the same thing, he says that from both together there follows something intermediate between avoidable and unavoidable and higher than both, although what that thing is cannot be understood by us in this life. His basis is that God's providence and predefinition is a cause in a higher and more eminent manner than created causes and possesses beforehand in itself all the modes of causing belonging to created causes as one and the same thing in itself. But from a created necessary cause there follows the unavoidability of the effect, and from a free and contingent cause there follows avoidability. Therefore, from God's predefinition, which eminently contains both modes of causing, there should follow something higher than avoidability and unavoidability, so that neither of them can be inferred from God's predefinition, but rather something else, as though intermediate between avoidable and unavoidable.

This doctrine of Cajetan, however, is deservedly rejected by everyone as false and unintelligible, just as he himself admits that he does not clearly understand it. First, what he supposes is false, namely, that because God's predefinition is certain, our act will occur unavoidably. For just as these two stand together, that something is certain and contingent, so also do certainty and avoidability stand together, since avoidable and contingent are the same. It is also false that the intermediate imagined by Cajetan can be given, because avoidable and unavoidable are opposed contradictorily, as avoidable and not avoidable. Therefore, no intermediate can be given, but one of them must necessarily be verified of our acts.

This is confirmed because, although God eminently is man and plant, we do not say that in him there is an intermediate between man and non-man, plant and non-plant. Rather, one of these must necessarily be predicated of God. Therefore, although God's mode of causing is eminently the mode of causing of

both a necessary cause and a created free cause, it does not follow that in his effect there must be something intermediate between avoidable and unavoidable.

Leaving these opinions aside, therefore, the freedom of choice must be reconciled with divine foreknowledge and predestination in another way. It must be said, therefore, that God's foreknowledge does not impose necessity upon our will because our act is not future because it is known. Predestination and providence, however, do not impose necessity because God predefined our free act, which he saw would be future through conditional knowledge prior to the decree, in no other way than as proceeding from our free choice. For an understanding of this, it must be noted that in God there is a threefold knowledge of things. One is natural and necessary, by which he knows all things insofar as they are possible, and it is called simple intelligence. Another is the knowledge by which God knows with absolute knowledge all future things, whether as present in eternity or as future upon the supposition of the decree of his will and of predefinition concerning the created things themselves. This knowledge is called by theologians the knowledge of vision. The third knowledge is as though intermediate between these two, by which God knows before the decree of his will what things will be future in time if God should will at a later sign that they be. For a fuller understanding of this, it must be noted that through this middle knowledge, which until now we have called conditional, God knows, by penetrating the whole power of our will, that at this time and on this occasion, if this or that aid is offered to the will, it will do this, and, if a greater or lesser aid is offered, it will do something else. Thus, to infinity, he knows what the will will do if that greater aid is offered, with the will left to its own nature. Then, at another and later sign, God predefines and wills to bestow upon this man the aid with which he sees that the man will act, and upon another he wills to bestow an aid with which he sees that the man will not act. This is nothing other than to predefine the free act in the manner in which he saw at the prior sign that it would proceed freely from the will, and to predefine that another's act will not occur just as he saw at the prior sign that it would not proceed from the created will unless he offered it a greater aid than the one he in fact offered. Hence it follows that, since God first sees that our act will proceed freely under the condition that he bestows this or that sufficient aid, or an aid greater than sufficient, according as he wills it to be, and afterward, at another and later sign of reason, predefines our act in the manner in which he had seen it proceed freely from our will, no necessity is imposed upon our will.

In this opinion two things must be proved. The first is that, before the decree of the divine will, God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents and free acts. The second is that, on the supposition of this conditional knowledge, God's predefinition and efficacious will impose no necessity upon our will. The first of these does not properly belong to this place and therefore must be proved briefly. It is the opinion of Gregory, on *Sentences* I, distinction 38, Quest. 1; Gabriel, Quest. 1, art. 1; Peter of Ailly, on *Sentences* II, Quest. 11; Córdoba, Book I, Quest. 55, doubts 2 and 5; and Molina, on Question 14, art. 13, in several passages; and many modern doctors follow it. It is proved by reason because, concerning every future thing, it was true to say at every prior sign that it would be future. Therefore, whatever is understood as future once the decree of the divine will has been posited was future at every prior sign before the decree. Therefore, it could most fittingly be known by God before the decree, although under a certain condition and dependence upon the divine will as something future, if, once the decree has been posited, it is known without condition through the absolute knowledge of vision. Second, everything that is true is knowable by God in the manner in which it is true; otherwise God would know the thing otherwise than it is or would be ignorant of the mode in which it is. But every act of ours that is future through the decree was conditionally future at the prior sign before the decree. Therefore, it was infallibly known by God as conditionally future.

The second point, namely, that, on the supposition of this knowledge, God's predefinition does not derogate from our freedom, is taught by many doctors of the present time, especially Molina, on Question 14, art. 13, disputation 50; Question 19, art. 6, disputation 1; and Question 22, art. 4, sole disputation. It is proved because the divine knowledge of vision imposes no necessity upon our will precisely because it knows our free acts in no other way than as they will be future and proceed from our will. But the predefinition by which God predefines our acts concerns them in the manner in which they were seen to proceed from our will, namely, freely. Therefore, such a predefinition and efficacious will of God does not impose necessity upon our will. The major proposition is clear from Chrysostom: future scandals do not occur certainly because he foretold them, but because they were altogether going to occur, he therefore foretold them. It is also clear from Damascene, in the dialogue *Contra Manichaeos*, where he says that foreknowledge was not the cause why the devil became evil; and from Jerome, on Isaiah 16, *This is the word that the Lord spoke to Moab*, where he says that God's foreknowledge did not bring about the cause of the devastation, but because the devastation would occur, it was known

beforehand to the divine majesty. Augustine teaches the same in *De Civitate Dei*, chap. 10, and Leo I in Sermon 6. In these passages they teach that God's knowledge of vision imposes no necessity, and they give as the reason that future things do not occur because they are foreknown by God. The minor is clear from what has been said and from what we stated above, namely, that predestination presupposes this conditional foreknowledge as a condition without which there is no predestination. Second, it is proved as follows. Because Peter decreed to act and afterward acts in accordance with the manner in which he had decreed, he imposes no necessity upon himself, even if the operation follows necessarily from the prior volition. Therefore, God's predestination in accordance with the manner in which the creature had been seen to act can impose no necessity. Third, God imposes no greater necessity by predefining our human acts than if he had never predefined them from eternity but willed only in time to concur with the man at the very moment when the man acts, even though from eternity it was true that this act was future from God's will and predestination. The antecedent is clear because predefinition places nothing formally in man from eternity, but only places the operation in time, by reason of which it actually determines the man. But if he willed to concur with the man in this way, he would impose no necessity upon him. Therefore, neither does predefinition impose necessity.

All the arguments set down above prove only that our works will be necessary on the supposition that they have been predefined and are future, or that God necessarily willed them on the supposition that he willed them, namely, in the composite sense. Thus almost all those arguments must be resolved from the same principle.

To the arguments for the earlier opinion, it is easily responded. To the first, the inference is denied. It follows only that, on the supposition that God willed, he cannot fail to will, that is, in the composite sense, and that, on the supposition that he created, he could not fail to create. But this necessity from supposition is not opposed to freedom, just as, because I necessarily walk during the time in which I am walking, it does not follow that I walk necessarily simply speaking, but only in a qualified respect.

To the second, the antecedent is conceded but the consequence is denied, because contingency and freedom are not opposed to determination and certainty but to necessity. For the same reason, they are not opposed to the immutability of divine knowledge and predefinition. For although what has been predefined can absolutely fail to be, which is to be contingent, nevertheless, since together with this power for opposites, for being and not being, it will

possess only one of them, for example, being, it can most fittingly terminate an infallible cognition.

To the third, it is responded that it can indeed be so in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense. Nevertheless, the account is not the same in every respect in man and in God. For after a man has once willed, he can cease from the act of willing, not indeed at the instant at which he wills, but at a future time, because he can judge it more fitting to cease willing by reason of something newly known. But because God cannot think or judge anything new, on the supposition that he once wills, he cannot fail to will even for a future time.

Cajetan's argument proves nothing, because from no eminence can there follow an intermediate between two contradictories, as was seen above.

To the arguments at the beginning of the question, it is responded. To the first, it is true in the composite sense, namely, on the supposition that the works and degrees of grace have been defined. This is to say that, on the supposition that other works and other degrees of grace are not future, nevertheless the predestined man can absolutely attain more degrees of glory, although he will not in fact attain them. The confirmation and the second argument prove only necessity from supposition, which we concede. To the objection, I respond that God's predefinition is indeed the cause of our works, but in no other way than as the works were foreseen to proceed from the human will, and therefore it imposes no necessity. To the second objection, I concede that predestination is not within our power, but I deny the consequence, because, since predefinition is an ordering of a work proceeding from free choice, although it follows most fittingly, "The work is predefined; therefore, it will be," it does not follow, "Therefore, it will be necessarily with absolute necessity."

But if you ask what must be said of those confirmed in grace, namely, whether they act freely, it is responded that they are free not only as regards the substance of the act but also as regards its manner and intensity, and that they can absolutely sin. Both points are clear from Paul in 1 Corinthians 9, saying, *I discipline my body*, and so forth, *lest, after preaching to others, I myself should become disapproved*; and in 2 Corinthians 12, *Lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given to me an angel of Satan to strike me.* Yet Paul had been confirmed in grace. It is also clear by reason, because if those confirmed in grace did not act freely both as regards the substance of the work and as regards its conditions, it would follow that they could merit in none of these respects, and thus one confirmed in grace would be in a worse condition than one not confirmed. That they can absolutely sin is clear because one confirmed in grace

did not refrain from sinning with any greater necessity than a reprobate will be damned. Both presuppose predefinition and foreknowledge in God. But the reprobate can absolutely fail to be damned. Therefore, one confirmed in grace can sin.

But if you ask what confirmation produces in one who has been confirmed, it is responded that it produces the result that the person confirmed does not sin mortally, so that, on the supposition of the privilege of confirmation, it follows most fittingly that he will not sin mortally. It does not, however, follow that he cannot sin, because although God removes the occasions on which he knew that the confirmed person would sin, he does not remove occasions on which he can sin but will not. Hence, on the supposition that the occasions on which he was going to sin are removed, and only those on which he is certainly seen by God not to be going to sin, although he could, are left, it rightly follows that he will not sin, although he can sin.

QUESTION 5
WHETHER OUR PREDESTINATION IS WITHIN OUR POWER

The question does not concern the act of predestination existing in God, since it is certain that this is not within our power. Rather, the question concerns the effects of predestination. Nor does the question concern any effect in particular, since it is certain that some effects of predestination are within our power, at least justification, faith, and perseverance. Rather, the question is whether the whole collection of the effects of predestination is within our power, whether as within a principal cause or an instrumental cause.

Many Thomists assert that it is within our power. Some of them think that it is in the cause as in an instrument; others, as in a condition without which it cannot be. They prove this from 2 Peter 1, *Labor so that through your good works*, and so forth; and from Augustine, Book VI of *Hypognosticon*, at the end, and Tractate 6 on John, saying, "If you are not drawn, that is, called or predestined, bring it about that you are drawn"; and from Theophylact on Matthew 22, *Many are called*, and so forth, where he says that it belongs to God to call, but to will to be among the elect belongs to us. In these passages even vocation is signified as being within our power. They also urge the argument that all the effects are within the power of the one in whose power there is, first, efficacious vocation, which is the first effect and whose efficacy depends upon our consent, and then perseverance and justification. But once perseverance is posited, it necessarily follows that we are not predestined. Therefore, the

conclusion follows. Finally, if it were not within our power to be predestined, neither would it be within our power to be saved, and consequently we would be anxious about our salvation in vain, since, if we are predestined by God, we will be saved, while if we are not, we will infallibly be damned. All these consequences are false.

Nevertheless, despite these arguments, let the conclusion be that our predestination, taken as the collection of all its effects, is not within our power. This is gathered from Augustine, Book II, *Ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2, where he says that, although what a person wills is within his power, what he can do is not; and from Book II, *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chap. 8: "It is not," he says, "within the power of men but within the power of God that men should have the power to become children of God; for we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as though from ourselves." This opinion is proved by manifest reason because the first effect, which is vocation, is not within our power. Therefore, neither is predestination taken as the collection of effects. The antecedent is clear because the first vocation precedes our free consent and every act of our will. But it cannot be within our power except by reason of some act of free will. Therefore, it is not within our power. Second, natural events, motions, and illuminations, the fact that we were born of Christian parents, and the fact that we do not die before baptism are not within our power. Therefore, neither is the collection of all the effects within our power, since these natural events are effects of predestination, as we have said.

If you say that there is no effect of predestination toward which man does not behave actively, therefore no effect is not within our power, at least as within a physical cause, and consequently the whole collection of effects will be within our power, it is responded that to be within our power as within a physical cause is not truly to be within our power, but means that we concur actively toward the effects of predestination. What is within our power is what depends upon our will as upon a free cause. Since not every effect, at least not vocation, depends upon our will as upon a cause, not all the effects are within our power. This is especially so because we do not behave actively toward every effect of predestination, for the presentation of an object is not within our active power, even physically, although the apprehension of the object is actively from us. Hence it follows that it is false that predestination is within our power as in a condition without which it cannot be, as the opposing opinion said. For every effect that is within our power depends upon our will at least as upon an instrument, which is truly a cause and not a condition without which it cannot be. Augustine explained this in Book I of *Retractationes*, chap. 22, where he says

that what is within our power is what we do when we will and of which we are the cause.

To the authority of Peter, it is responded that the certainty of our predestination depends upon our free choice insofar as some effects depend upon it, without which predestination would not be certain. It does not, however, follow from this that all the effects, including vocation, are within our power.

To the authority of Augustine, it has already been responded that Augustine is speaking of the certainty of predestination as regards us, so that the sense is: if a man is not certain that he is predestined, let him bring it about that he is predestined, that is, that through his works he may become certain that he is predestined. Theophylact, however, in the passage cited, appears to be speaking of predestination as approval for glory on the supposition of merits. In this sense, as we said above, several of the saints, especially the Greeks, understood the name predestination.

To the argument, some concede that the first effect of predestination is vocation insofar as it is efficacious; and because this depends upon our consent, since it includes consent, they consequently affirm that it is within our power and therefore that the whole of predestination is within our power. But we rejected their opinion above in art. 2. Hence it is responded to the argument that before efficacious vocation there was another effect of predestination, namely, the first vocation, or vocation before the efficacy of consent, which truly was not within our power.

Nor does it help if one urges that every vocation of a predestined person will have its final effect, namely, glory. Therefore, every such vocation is efficacious and consequently within our power. It is responded that the antecedent may pass, but the consequence is denied. Vocation is not within our power because it will have the final effect, but because it already includes consent and presupposes free will. The vocation that will have the final effect does not possess this insofar as it is first and prior to our consent.

To what is objected concerning perseverance, it is responded that, although, once perseverance has been posited, it necessarily follows that we are predestined, it does not follow that, if perseverance is within our power, the whole of predestination is also within our power. For the first vocation, which is not within our power, is presupposed by perseverance.

To the final objection, it is responded that, although the first vocation is not within our power, it is nevertheless denied to no one, and it is more certain that we are called by God than it would be if vocation were within our power.

But because the certainty of our predestination depends upon every effect of predestination, including those that are within our power, it is therefore necessary for us to be concerned about our predestination and to strive as much as we can so that all the effects of predestination may be completed in us.

QUESTION 6
WHETHER THERE IS A CAUSE OF REPROBATION ON THE PART OF THE REPROBATE

In this question, which is no less difficult than the one disputed concerning the cause of predestination, it must first be presupposed that reprobation has several causes and reasons on God's part. The first is the manifestation of goodness through works of justice. The second is the manifestation of divine power, since he punishes the noblest creatures. The third is the manifestation of wisdom, because he provides for all things in accordance with their nature. The fourth is the manifestation of the grace of the elect, which shines more brightly from the punishment of the wicked. The fifth is the manifestation of God's freedom, according to the saying of Augustine: "Why he draws this man and does not draw that one, do not judge." Second, it must be presupposed that the question is not whether there is a cause of reprobation taken as the divine act, but of reprobation taken as the effects of that divine act. Nor is the question about any single effect, but about the whole collection of the effects of reprobation, if perhaps there are several: whether, I say, there is in us something outside the range of the effects of reprobation that is truly the cause of all the effects of reprobation and is, as it were, the motive of the divine will for reprobating these men and angels, whom he truly reprobated, rather than those others. In this difficulty three opinions can be reported. The first is that of St Thomas, art. 3; *Contra Gentiles* I and III, chaps. 161 and 163; on Romans 9, lecture 2; and on *Sentences* I, distinction 41, Quest. 1, art. 2; Marsilius, Quest. 41, art. 2; Durandus, Quest. 2, no. 14; Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, part I, chap. 4; Adam, on the Epistle to the Romans, chap. 9; Córdoba, Quest. 56; Cajetan and Francis of Ferrara in the places cited. They assert that on the part of the reprobate no cause of all the effects of reprobation is given. This opinion can be proved by the argument used by St Thomas in art. 3. It belongs to the same providence to direct things to an end and to permit them to fall short of the end. But through supernatural providence, which is reprobation, men are directed to an end, namely, punishment, and are excluded from glory. Therefore, through the same providence they are permitted to fall short of the end and of the

means, which is to reprobate. But no cause of this permission to fall short of grace or to fall into sin can be given in us, since it precedes every sin. Therefore, no cause of all the effects can be given. Second, just as God in predestining manifests his goodness through acts of mercy, so in reprobating he manifests it through acts of justice. Therefore, just as before sin God in predestining manifests his goodness through an act of mercy, so in reprobating he manifests it before sin through works of justice. Therefore, there will be no cause of reprobation on man's part. Third, at the same sign of reason at which one means is chosen and another means is left aside, that other means is repudiated and rejected. Therefore, at the same sign at which God chose some for glory, he repudiated others and excluded them from glory. But before merits were foreseen by the knowledge of vision, he chose some for glory. Therefore, before works and sins were foreseen, he excluded others from glory, and thus without any cause on their part. Fourth, from the fact that those who are not elected before the vision of works are not elected, it necessarily follows that they will be damned. But it cannot follow that they will be damned unless, at the same sign at which some were elected, those others were reprobated and ordained to punishment; for since God bestows sufficient aids upon all, many of them are saved. Therefore, God ordained them to punishment before the vision of works and sins. Finally, this is proved from Paul in Romans 9: *When they had not yet been born*, and so forth, where the Apostle shows that just as Jacob was predestined without merits, so Esau was hated and reprobated without demerits. Furthermore, Paul later adds the authority of Exodus 33: *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy*, as though he were saying: I will have mercy upon the one whom I will to predestine by my will, and I will not have mercy upon the one whom I will to reprobate by my will. Hence he concludes: *Therefore, he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens.* And to exclude the complaint that the reprobate might bring against God because he excluded him from glory without demerit, Paul adds: *O man, who are you to answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to the one who formed it, "Why have you made me thus?" Or does the potter not have power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?* From all these words, he appears to signify that men were reprobated by God without any cause on their part.

Another opinion is that of those who assert that there is on the part of the reprobate a cause of his reprobation, namely, sin. But this opinion is divided in two and proceeds by two paths. Hence there are two opinions among those who concede a cause of reprobation on our part. The first is the one Augustine most

tenaciously defends in Letter 105, volume II; the letter *Ad Optatum*; Book I, *Ad Simplicianum*, Quest. 2, volume IV; *Enchiridion*, chap. 90, volume III; *De Praedestinatione et Gratia*, chap. 3, volume VII; and *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chap. 8. He asserts that the cause of reprobation on our part is original sin. Augustine thinks that reprobation and predestination were made on the supposition of the foreknowledge of original sin, by which God saw the whole of nature infected as a certain mass of perdition. From that mass, in his mercy, he willed to take some, while in his justice he willed to leave others in the same mass. In this way, he says, God predestined some and reprobated others. He proves this in Letter 105, *Ad Sixtum*, explaining Malachi 1, *Jacob I loved*, and so forth: "For what did he love in Jacob before he was born and had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau before he had done anything evil, except original sin?" Likewise, in Book I, *Ad Simplicianum*, explaining Romans 9, *That the purpose of God according to election might stand*, he says: "It occurs to the mind to ask how Paul can speak of a just election where there is no distinction. For if Jacob, not yet born and having done nothing, was elected by no merit, and indeed could not at all have been elected when there was no difference by which he might be elected, and likewise if Esau was rejected by no demerit, because he too had not yet been born and had done nothing when it was said that the elder would serve the younger, how can his rejection be called just?" Augustine hands down many other things for this opinion in the passages cited.

This opinion can be proved by reason, because before original sin no effect of reprobation preceded, since the permission of original sin is not an effect of reprobation, because God does not permit it in order to punish it. But original sin is the cause of all the effects that can be conceived after it, such as the permission to fall into actual sin and eternal punishment. Therefore, original sin is the cause of all the effects of reprobation. Second, this is clear from Anselm, on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, who reduces the reason why some are saved to God's liberal will, but the reason why others are damned to their own iniquities and demerits, in which he agrees with the Fathers cited. The Council of Valence under Emperor Lothair favors this opinion, since, when speaking of the collection of the effects of predestination and reprobation, it concedes a cause on our part in reprobation which it denies in predestination. Nor is the difference between our present opinion and the first opinion cited sufficiently understood by certain theologians who say that the only distinction between them is that the first concedes that the permission to fall into sin is an effect of reprobation and therefore consequently asserts that no cause of all the effects of

reprobation is given in us. The difference is not sufficiently perceived because, although they truly differ in this, nevertheless, from the first opinion it follows that before the vision of sins there was in God an efficacious will to exclude the reprobate from glory, which is extremely harsh. From this true opinion of ours, there is conceded only an efficacious will to exclude men from glory once sin has already been seen, which is most worthy of God's clemency and mercy.

Second, this opinion can be proved by reason because God is not an avenger before man is a sinner, according to the common axiom of theologians, nor does he punish man except for guilt. Nor does God hate man in himself, but rather loves him. Therefore, God never willed to punish man with eternal punishment or to exact bitter vengeance except on account of foreseen guilt. Therefore, neither does he reprobate a man except on account of guilt.

Third, the act of punishing with eternal punishment is an act of punitive and vindicatory justice. Therefore, it presupposes guilt to be avenged and punished. Consequently, without foreseen guilt God did not will to punish man, which is to reprobate him. This is confirmed because the good of vindicatory and punitive justice is a conditional good, just as the good of penance is. Therefore, just as penance presupposes committed sins and would not otherwise be good, so too does punitive and vindicatory justice. Therefore, reprobation, which is an act of vindicatory and punitive justice, presupposes foreseen guilt as its cause.

Fourth, God does not permit sin with the intention of punishing it, which would be excessively cruel, as even the opposing authors admit. But if, with no sin foreseen as a motive for reprobating, God willed to exclude man from glory, he would, from that intention, be bound to will to permit sin, namely, so that he might punish it. Therefore, God does not reprobate man except on the supposition of foreseen sin as the cause of reprobation.

Fifth, with no sins foreseen, God wills all men to be saved. But this will is incompatible with a will to punish with eternal punishment when no sin has been foreseen; otherwise God of himself would will all men to be saved and efficaciously will some to be damned, which is impossible. Therefore, it follows that God does not reprobate a man except on the supposition of a cause on man's part, namely, guilt.

Sixth, if, before sin had been seen, God efficaciously willed to exclude man from glory, from this intention he would have to will efficaciously whatever was necessary for excluding man from glory. But sin would be necessarily required. Therefore, God would have to will sin. All the premises are clear, and the major

is proved because, while the intention of the end stands, there necessarily follows the election of those things that are necessary for the end.

Nor does it stand in the way if one responds that sin is not a means to reprobation but a prerequisite for it, and therefore it is not necessary that it was willed by God from the will to punish, but it is enough that it be presupposed by reprobation. Against this stands the fact that the efficacious will in God to exclude man from glory was by nature prior to his seeing sin. Therefore, sin was not presupposed by reprobation. It would therefore have to be brought about through reprobation, since it is necessary for punishment, just as permission was brought about because it was necessary for the same end; or else a reason must be assigned why permission is an effect of reprobation but sin is not. Nor does it stand in the way if you say that permission is good and therefore could be willed by God, whereas guilt, which is morally evil, could not. Against this stands the fact that, because guilt could not be willed by God and is necessary for punishment, I infer that there was in God no will to punish with eternal punishment except on the supposition of guilt already seen and committed without God's will. Otherwise, at least this difficulty must necessarily be conceded: that, on the supposition of the efficacious will to exclude man from glory, such a will is still dependent for its effect upon a future sin that is uncertain and not yet seen or predefined by God.

The second conclusion: Original sin is not the cause of reprobation insofar as it is original; that is, it is not the case that immediately after God saw men fallen in original sin, he reprobated them before seeing them die in original sin. This conclusion is followed by the doctors cited above and by almost all the saints cited above apart from Augustine, whom there is no need to report again. The strongest argument for this conclusion is that a remitted sin cannot be the cause of reprobation, because once sin is remitted, the guilt and debt of eternal punishment arising from that sin are consequently remitted. But many who are damned, both infants and adults, had original sin remitted in this life. Therefore, original sin could not be the cause why they were reprobated and punished with eternal punishment. Nor does the contrary follow, second, because reprobation was made at the same sign as predestination, while predestination was made immediately after original sin had been seen, for whose remedy Christ was preordained, through whom we are predestined. It was also made before actual sins were seen. Therefore, reprobation was likewise made at the same sign. But at that sign a sufficient cause of reprobation was already presupposed, namely, sin; not actual sin, because it had not yet been seen, and therefore only original sin was the cause of reprobation. Many arguments are commonly brought

forward for this opinion, but because they prove only that sin is the cause of reprobation, without determining whether it is actual or original, they must be presented below for our opinion.

In this controversy, which in a certain way remains decided by what we have said concerning the effects of reprobation, it must be noted that it is most certain among all theologians that no one is condemned unless he dies in actual or original sin, by reason of which the eternal punishment inflicted upon him is an act of the most equitable divine justice, whether men were reprobated before final sin was seen or after it had already been seen. Nor must it be said that God compels anyone to sin through reprobation, as the Council of Trent taught in Session VI, canon 6, where it is said: *If anyone says that evil works are from God, not only permissively but also properly and in themselves, let him be anathema.*

Hence, second, all agree that there is a demeritorious cause of this particular effect of reprobation, which is punishment, in all the reprobate, namely, the sin in which each person dies. The difficulty consists in whether there is on our part a cause not only of punishment but also of all the effects of reprobation.

Third, it must be noted that, as we saw above, not all the doctors assign the same effects of reprobation, and therefore they are consequently divided in assigning the cause. The authors of the first opinion think that every permission to fall into sin is an effect of reprobation. Since no guilt could precede the permission of the first sin as a cause of reprobation, they therefore deny that there is on our part a cause of all the effects of reprobation. Soto, however, on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, teaches that even the first guilt is the cause of the permission to fall into that same guilt, because, he says, man's refusal to consent is prior to God's permission of sin. This doctrine is false, because just as, with respect to the same operation, man's concurrence is not the cause of God's concurrence, nor conversely, because they are one and the same operation, so also man's deficiency from that same operation is not the cause of the deficiency of God's operation, since they are deficiencies concerning the same operation. Augustine, however, and those who follow him assert that the permission to fall into original sin is not an effect of reprobation and consequently assert that the cause of all the effects of reprobation is original sin, which was foreseen by God before every effect. But the authors who think that no permission to fall into sin is an effect of reprobation, as we said in art. 3, consequently affirm that final sin, whether actual or original, is the cause of all the effects of reprobation. Hence the doctrine handed down in art. 3 concerning the effects of reprobation must be applied to this disputation.

With these points presupposed, therefore, let the first conclusion be: A cause of all the effects of reprobation, both of men and of angels, is given on our part, namely, sin, whether original or actual. We defend this conclusion with Augustine against the authors of the first opinion. Augustine held it in the passages cited for his opinion; Scotus, on *Sentences* I, distinction 41, Quest. 1; Soto, on the Epistle to the Romans, chap. 9; Major, on *Sentences* I, distinction 41, Quest. 2; John of Bologna, in the work *De Praedestinatione*, part II; Contarini, in the treatise *De Praedestinatione*; Catharinus, in the work *De Praedestinatione*, chap. 9; Francis of Ferrara, *Contra Gentiles* III, chap. 161; Nicholas Grandis, on chapter 3 of the Epistle to the Hebrews; Sylvester, in the cited *Conflatum*; Hervaeus, distinction 40, Quest. 1; and it appears to be the opinion of the Master on *Sentences* I, distinction 41. Almost all the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, held the same with Augustine: Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, especially on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, Fulgentius, Book I, *De Praedestinatione et Monimo*, Prosper, Bishop of Reggio, and Hilary of Arles, who, in the name of the Massilians and Africans, objected to Augustine that it is not credible that God excluded some from the heavenly kingdom without foreseen demerits. Faustus the Bishop teaches the same in Book VI, *De Gratia*, chap. 6, saying that God, by the singular examination of the governor, loved some and hated others, because if without any distinction he assumed this one and damned that one, the whole reason for the future judgment would be taken away. Prosper of Aquitaine also teaches it in *Responsio ad Capitula Gallorum*, chap. 3, and Response 12 to the Vincentian Objections, where he says of the reprobate: "They are not predestined because they were foreknown as going to fall, but they would be predestined if they had been foreseen as going to return." Jerome also taught this truth in *In Terentium*, chap. 3: "It must not be thought," he says, "that the most merciful Creator was the cause of the predestination of wicked men"; for, according to Ambrose, Book I, *De Vocatione Gentium*, chap. 3, "Not every reprobate, not every elect: but blindness turned aside part of the will, and gratuitous illumination preserved a part for itself." Nor do the solutions applied to this argument stand in the way. The first is that man is ordained to punishment by justice on account of original sin and thereby remains ordained to it, not by justice, but as though he had been ordained before any sin was foreseen; nevertheless, in fact he is punished by God because of other sins that he commits. Against this stands the fact that, if, after original sin had been remitted, God still willed to punish a man with eternal punishment, original sin could no longer be called the cause, since after it has been remitted no eternal punishment is owed on its account, as the

Council of Trent defines. Therefore, such reprobation will be without any cause, according to the second opinion, which has already been attacked.

Nor does the second solution of others stand in the way, namely, that although original sin has been remitted in many reprobates, the same original sin nevertheless returns by reason of the ingratitude committed through a subsequent sin, because the reprobate was ungrateful for God's mercy in gratuitously remitting original sin. This solution is of little weight, because from it there would follow that the reprobate is not damned by reason of original sin but by reason of actual sin, which is contrary to the opinion itself. The inference is clear because the subsequent ingratitude is not original sin but a circumstance of actual sin. Therefore, if he is damned by reason of ingratitude, it follows that he is damned by reason of actual sin.

Nor, third, does the solution stand in the way of those who say that, although the liability to eternal punishment is remitted together with original sin, the tinder of concupiscence and the sensual appetite remain, which are a punishment of original sin inclining toward evil and resisting reason, according to the words of Paul, *I perceive another law*, and so forth. By reason of this tinder man falls into other sins for which he is damned, and because these sins took their origin from original sin, original sin is therefore called the cause of reprobation. But this solution is easily rejected, because the first rational man would be a reprobate by reason of original sin alone, and it therefore follows either that original sin is never remitted in him, or that he is damned by reason of a remitted sin, or, if he were not absolutely reprobate except according to present justice, it follows that he is absolutely reprobated by reason of the actual sin that follows and not by reason of original sin. This same point is clear because the same sensual appetite would exist in a state of pure nature, yet the cause of reprobation could not be referred to it, as is evident, because God does not hate it. Therefore, neither can reprobation be referred as to a cause to the tinder and sensual appetite proceeding from original sin as from a first root. Nor does it stand in the way if you say that Augustine intends only that God liberated some from the mass of perdition through grace and left others in that same mass, and that this abandonment is called reprobation. This solution is not in accordance with Augustine's mind, since by the reprobate he understands those who truly are damned, as is clear in Jacob and Esau, whom he adds as an example, and by the predestined he understands those who are saved. But it is clear that not all who are liberated from the mass of perdition are saved. Therefore, the solution fails.

Nor is the solution of others pleasing, who say that Augustine speaks of negative reprobation when he teaches that original sin is the cause of reprobation. That is, original sin foreseen was not the cause why God efficaciously ordained man to punishment, but it was the cause why glory was not given to him, or why God behaved negatively by not giving them glory, which out of mercy he willed to communicate to others. But this solution is even less pleasing, because, if this negative reprobation is admitted, its first effect is the permission of original sin. For from the fact that God does not will to give glory to a man, he does not will to prevent his sins, which is to permit them. But original sin into which he falls cannot be the cause of the permission to fall into original sin. Therefore, neither can original sin be the cause of all the effects of reprobation.

Finally, because the Most Blessed Virgin was not stained by original sin, predestination does not consist in liberation from the mass of perdition, nor reprobation in abandonment in that mass. Lastly, a cause of reprobation is that upon the positing of which it follows that a man is to be reprobated, and without the positing of which he is not to be reprobated. But when original sin is posited, many are saved, and when it is removed, many are damned. Therefore, original sin is not the cause of reprobation. Nor does it help if you say that original sin is an inadequate cause, as air is a cause of respiration wherever respiration exists, although wherever air exists there is not respiration. Against this stands the fact that at least in the damned it would be a cause of damnation, although it would not be so in the predestined. Yet this is false, since original sin was remitted in many of the damned, as has been seen.

Therefore, let the third conclusion now be: The adequate cause of all the effects of reprobation is final sin, whether original, as in infants who die, or actual, as in adults, or both together. The meaning of this conclusion is that there was in God no will to punish with eternal punishment except after the sin in which each person dies had been seen, and therefore no effect of reprobation preceded final sin, but all follow it. This opinion is followed by the doctors cited in the second opinion and follows from what we said in art. 3, because no effect of reprobation can exist before final sin, since no sin and no permission of sin is an effect of reprobation, as has been seen. Therefore, final sin is the cause of all the effects. This conclusion also follows from what was said in the two preceding conclusions, because there is a cause of all the effects of reprobation, which cause is sin, as we saw in the preceding conclusion. But it is not original sin, as was also seen. Therefore, it must be actual sin; not actual sin that is not final, because such sin is remitted in this life and, once it has been remitted, no

punishment is owed for it, as we said of original sin. Therefore, it remains that the cause of reprobation is final sin alone.

Third, if final sin were not the cause, this would be chiefly because some prior sins or the permission of sin would be an effect of reprobation. But none of these is an effect of reprobation, because on no opinion does God permit sin with the intention of punishing it. Therefore, no permission of sin presupposes the will to punish from which it would be brought about. But the effects of reprobation presuppose the will to punish with eternal punishment, as has been seen. Therefore, no permission of sin is an effect of reprobation. Consequently, final guilt is the cause of all the effects.

Fourth, if God reprobated a man before final sin was seen, since this will does not presuppose the final sin foreseen for which alone man is punished with eternal punishment, it follows that from that will he would be bound to will either the sin itself efficaciously or at least its permission with the intention of punishing it. The inference is clear, as we have said, because things that are necessary for an end, if they are not presupposed as accomplished before the intention of the end, must be efficaciously willed from that intention. Finally, eternal punishment is an act of justice. Therefore, the will to punish is likewise an act of justice. But the will to punish cannot be an act of justice because of non-final sins that are remitted in this life, together with which the eternal punishment owed for them is remitted. Therefore, punishment and the will to punish can be acts of justice only because of final sin, which is never remitted.

Finally, because God is more inclined to show mercy than to punish, and by his goodness wills to have mercy, while he punishes on account of our sins, he therefore conducts himself in the best manner both in showing mercy and in punishing. But he shows mercy to the predestined before all foreseen works. Therefore, he wills to punish the reprobate after all foreseen works. Consequently, final sin will always be the cause of reprobation.

To the arguments of the first opinion, it is responded that the major is certain concerning common providence over both the reprobate and the predestined, which, since it directs ineffectively to the end, permits some to fall short of the end. It is not true, however, when speaking of predestination, which, since it is efficacious, permits no predestined person to fall short of the end. Nor does it stand in the way if you object that predestination permits one to fall short of the means, since it is the cause of the passive permission of sin. Therefore, it permits one to fall short of the end. It is responded that predestination does not permit one to fall short of necessary means, because, although it permits the predestined person to fall from this grace, it nevertheless

permits this with the intention that the predestined person rise again in greater grace, or at least in another grace in which he perseveres until the end of life. Hence it does not permit him to fall from final grace, which is necessary for the attainment of glory.

To the second, I concede the antecedent but deny the consequence, because from the fact that God manifests his goodness through acts that are, as it were, supremely good, it follows that these acts must have supremely good causes. Therefore, the cause of all the effects of reprobation is something existing in us, whereas nothing in us is the cause of the effects of predestination, but their whole cause is on God's part.

To the third, the solution will be clear below when we assign the order of predestination among its causes. Nevertheless, it is denied that reprobation and predestination were made at the same sign, as Scotus, cited above, rightly denies. The reason is that God predestines from his goodness alone as the motive, without regard to consent, but he reprobates with regard to our works as the proximate motive for reprobating. Therefore, he did not at the same sign predestine some and reprobate others, but at different signs. Nor does it stand in the way if you say that predestination and reprobation are coordinate species and therefore must exist simultaneously. It is responded, conceding that they exist simultaneously according to reason, that is, that they are immediately contained under the same genus of providence according to their essences, as man and horse are under animal. It is not, however, necessary that they exist and be made simultaneously. For although man and horse are immediately contained according to their quiddities under animal, it does not follow that they exist simultaneously according to existence, but one could most fittingly have been made without the other.

To the fourth, the solution is clear from art. 4, Question 2. For those who are not elected are infallibly damned because they are already seen as not being saved under the condition that God at a later sign will bestow upon them only that aid which at that later sign he in fact wills to bestow and sees will not have its effect. They are not, however, damned because before sins were seen there was in God an efficacious will to exclude men from glory.

To the passage of Paul concerning Esau and Jacob, it is responded that by the name of hatred concerning Esau, Paul does not understand a positive will by which God willed the evil of punishment for him by reprobating him, but he understands the negation of love. Thus the sense is: before good and evil works were foreseen, *Jacob I loved*, that is, I efficaciously willed to bestow glory upon him; *but Esau I hated*, that is, I did not love Esau by electing him for glory. Thus

the fact that one was loved and the other not loved had no cause on their part, according to the saying of Augustine cited above: "Why he draws this man," and so forth. That Sacred Scripture by the name of hatred understands a lack of love, or not willing for someone the good willed for another, is clear from Matthew 6: *No one can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other*; Luke 14, *If anyone comes to me and does not hate father and mother, he cannot be my disciple*; John 12, *He who hates his soul in this world*; and Exodus 20, *God visits iniquity to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me.* In these passages, to hate is the same as not to love. But this is not to reprobate, since reprobation is an act of providence, as is predestination. The passages cited below from the same chapter 9 must be understood in the same way, because God is said to have mercy upon the one whom he loves for glory and not to have mercy upon the one whom he does not love.

The argument of Augustine must now be responded to, and to Paul's passage concerning Jacob and Esau it is responded that the love of Jacob was before original sin had been seen, indeed before the grace of innocence that existed in the first parent before original sin had been seen. Thus before original sin had been foreseen, Esau was hated, that is, not elected; but he was positively hated after final sin had been seen and not before. But if anyone asks how there could be an election between Jacob and Esau if they were found equal by God, it is responded that the same difficulty exists in Augustine's opinion, since he concedes that each was equally in the same mass of perdition. It is responded, however, that since God's election, insofar as it is love, causes good in the thing loved, it is not necessary that it presuppose the person whom it elects as unequal, but it is enough that through that love it makes him unequal by conferring a greater good upon him.

To the first argument, it is responded that, although original sin merits the eternal punishment of loss, which is an effect of reprobation, God nevertheless did not will, immediately upon being able in justice to reprobate man, to exclude him from glory. Rather, in his mercy, he waited until the foreseen end of his life, not excluding him from glory until he saw in him no further power of acting rightly, lest he appear to take away from him the power to die in grace.

To the second, the response is clear from what has been said, for both parts of the antecedent must be denied.

Many things commonly objected against our conclusion have already been resolved in art. 3, when we disputed concerning the effects of reprobation, and whatever new objections can be brought forward will be resolved from what was said there and in this article.

But for Augustine's opinion the following argument appears difficult. The order of nature was known by God before the order of grace. But sins belong to the order of nature, since they are committed by natural powers, while election and predestination belong to the order of grace. Therefore, original sin was known by God before election, predestination, and reprobation were made. Consequently, original sin is presupposed by reprobation and can therefore be the cause of reprobation. This argument raises the difficulty whether predestination and reprobation presuppose the foreknowledge of future things. Hence let the following question be established.

QUESTION 7
WHETHER PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION PRESUPPOSE THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE THINGS

Since we have already said many things that pertain to this question, it must now be treated briefly.

Some say that predestination presupposes only the foreknowledge of future things under possible being, but not under future being in time. They prove this by the argument that before things are ordained by God to come about, they have only possible being. But predestination and reprobation are the ordering of future things. Therefore, only the foreknowledge of future things under possible being precedes. This opinion, however, is manifestly false insofar as it denies all foreknowledge of future things as future before predestination. For it is contrary to St Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, Quest. 1, art. 3, reply to 3, asserting that predestination is not of the future insofar as it is future. It is certain that he is not speaking of the same thing insofar as it has only possible being.

Hence let the first conclusion be: Predestination presupposes the conditional foreknowledge of all future things as future, by which foreknowledge God knows that things will be future on the supposition that at a certain later sign he wills to decree that they occur. This is what St Thomas teaches in the passage just cited, and Molina teaches on Question 23, arts. 4 and 5, disputation 1, member 7. It is proved by reason because this knowledge does not presuppose a decree of God's will determining that things occur, since the knowledge that follows the decree is absolute, just as the thing is absolutely future through the decree. Therefore, it follows that this knowledge precedes the decree and predestination, since there is no repugnance in a future contingent being known as future under a condition, as was seen above. Furthermore, practical cognition of a thing necessarily presupposes speculative cognition of

the same thing, because through practical knowledge that is ordained to be done which has been speculatively known as future if this is done. But concerning future things as such, namely, before they are ordained through practical knowledge, there can be no other cognition than conditional cognition. Therefore, this cognition precedes predestination and reprobation.

The whole difficulty is whether the knowledge of vision of future things precedes predestination and reprobation. Cajetan, moved by certain words of St Thomas in the passage cited, teaches that there are three orders of things. The first, he says, is the order of nature; the second, of grace; and the third, of hypostatic union. To the first order, he says, natural things belong insofar as they are ordained to a natural end, and likewise sins, because they are done by natural powers, and also monsters, which are natural defects. To the second belong grace and the works of grace, predestination, and reprobation. To the third belongs the hypostatic union. Of these orders, he says that the second is more excellent than the first and the third than the second; and likewise the second presupposes knowledge of the first, and the third of the second. Having posited these points, he therefore asserts that predestination does not presuppose the knowledge of vision of future things that belong to the third order, nor of those that belong to the order of predestination, since things belonging to the order of union are understood as not yet made, whereas things belonging to the order of predestination are made through predestination itself. Nevertheless, he says that predestination presupposes the knowledge of vision of the things that belong to the first order and consequently the knowledge of vision of sins, which belong to the first order. Thus he thinks it can be preserved that original sin was seen before Christ was predestined as its remedy and before the election and predestination of men was made.

But this opinion is rejected by all as false. Therefore, let the second conclusion be: All the sins of the reprobate were seen before reprobation. This conclusion is clear because the cause of reprobation was seen before its effect, namely, reprobation. But final sins are the cause of reprobation, and remitted sins are prior to final sins. Therefore, all sins were seen before reprobation was made.

The third conclusion: The Incarnation was seen as future before our predestination was made and before the things brought about through predestination were seen as future. This is clearly true because Christ's predestination was the exemplar and final cause of our predestination, as we said above. Therefore, Christ was predestined to the union and Incarnation before we were elected to glory. Consequently, the knowledge of vision of the

future Incarnation preceded the vision of the effects of our predestination, namely, glory, grace, and perseverance. Hence Cajetan falsely teaches that the order of grace was seen by reason before the order of the hypostatic union.

From these points it follows that the knowledge of the Incarnation is prior to the knowledge even of original sin. This is shown as follows. The Incarnation was seen before our election, and our election to glory was made before the vision of works. Therefore, it was made before the vision of original sin. Consequently, from first to last, the Incarnation was seen before original sin, the opposite of which Cajetan teaches without justification. From these points it follows, second, that the election of the predestined was made before the knowledge of vision of any sin, the opposite of which Cajetan also falsely teaches. This is clear because we are elected before the vision of works. Therefore, we are elected before the vision of sin.

The fourth conclusion: Our election presupposes the foreknowledge of future natural things that occur through natural providence, but it does not presuppose the foreknowledge of the things brought about through our predestination. The first part is proved because natural providence is prior to supernatural providence, just as nature is prior to grace. Therefore, things ordained through natural providence are prior to those ordained through supernatural providence, such as predestination. Second, predestination is the ordering of man to glory. Therefore, it presupposes the man who is ordained, or it makes him. But it does not make him, as is clear. Therefore, it presupposes him as made through natural providence.

From these points it follows that those things were prior in the divine mind and will which are the cause, occasion, or subject of others. Hence natural things, because they stand as the subject of supernatural things, were prior to supernatural things. Among supernatural things, however, Christ was first seen and ordained as the cause of our predestination; then came our predestination; and afterward the future things brought about through predestination were seen. Among the effects of predestination, one was foreseen before another according as it is its cause. Many sins and permissions of sins, which are occasions for a predestined person to attain greater grace, are also prior to the grace or effects of which they are occasions. From these points it follows how many falsehoods Cajetan mixes together when he assigns an order among sins, the effects of predestination, and the Incarnation. I judged it irrelevant to pursue each of them individually.

To the argument for the first opinion, the consequence is denied because before predestination there preceded the ordination of the Christ who was to come, and before both there was conditional knowledge of future things.

QUESTION 8
WHAT WAS THE ORDER OF THE SIGNS IN PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION

It is not our intention to report the various opinions concerning the order of divine predestination, but to hand down a certain rule gathered from what has been said until now, in which the whole business of predestination can be collected in a brief sequence and easily kept before the eyes. First, therefore, God Most Good and Most Great knew the various ways in which he could manifest his goodness, wisdom, power, and mercy. He also knew by conditional knowledge what would occur if he willed this or that, and at this sign he ordained to create a universe perfect as regards natural things, with the order of the parts among themselves preserved. Second, he willed to create a universe whose less perfect parts he willed to exist for the sake of the more perfect: inanimate things for the sake of animate things, vegetative things for the sake of sentient things, and these for the sake of man, and so forth. Third, knowing that men and angels were capable of his beatitude and that the universe could be perfected according to supernatural things, he ordained to send Christ in the best manner in which this could be done, for the manifestation of his goodness, power, wisdom, mercy, and justice, so that Christ would be the author of grace. Therefore, he willed Christ to come as the head of men and angels in the manner in which he had ordained. Fourth, knowing that through Christ, in whom he was supremely well pleased, he could communicate his glory to angels and men, he decreed to give glory to all through Christ and sufficient means for attaining glory, not indeed by an efficacious will, but by an antecedent and inefficacious will, although unequally according to his free and gratuitous liberty. Fifth, seeing by conditional knowledge that with this lesser aid one person would not be saved and with that greater aid another would be saved, and universally seeing with what aid each person would be saved and with what aid he would not be saved, he willed, according to his freedom, to communicate his glory to certain men and angels, each according to a definite degree, if he should will to communicate to them his glory and those aids that he knew would be efficacious. With respect to other men and angels, however, he behaved merely negatively. This will by which he willed glory to some is called

election. Sixth, he willed to give to all whom he had elected the means that he saw would be efficacious in them. Hence he willed to call, justify, and bestow perseverance. With respect to the reprobate, however, he behaved merely negatively by permitting their sins, or by not preventing them. Seventh, seeing that certain men and angels had persevered in grace until the end, he willed to give them glory as the reward of their merits and in accordance with their quantity. Seeing, however, that the reprobate died in final sin, whether original or actual, he willed to exclude them from the kingdom of heaven and to punish them with the punishment of their demerits. In this manner he completed the whole of predestination and reprobation.

Many other intermediate signs could be divided further, but those proposed appear sufficient for grasping the order of predestination. Although, according to our manner of understanding, it is necessary that they be multiplied in order to know the order of predestination, nevertheless in God all things were simultaneous in time and nature, without succession and priority.

This doubt, however, appears to remain: Men are predestined only to make up for the fall of the angels and to occupy the seats of the angels who fell. Therefore, the angels were seen to fall before men were predestined. Consequently, men and angels were not predestined simultaneously and at the same sign. It is responded that men are not assumed to glory for the end of making up the deficiency of those who fell, since those angels who fell occupied no seats and had not attained the divine vision. Nor was man created or predestined on the occasion of the sin of the angels, but he was created and predestined for his own sake and not on an occasion, because by his nature man is capable of glory just as angels are. Gregory teaches this in Homily 14 *In Lucam*; and Rupert, Book III, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, chap. 21. The common and popular saying that men are assumed to occupy the seats of the angels appears to have arisen because it is popularly thought that the angels fell from glory, as is commonly said. But that assertion is metaphorical and rests upon a false principle. Hence what St Thomas says in *De Veritate*, Quest. 6, art. 3, namely, that men are assumed into glory to complete the number of the predestined, can be justified in this way: God formally predestined a definite number, and since it was not completed from the angels, it had to be completed from men. But we shall speak of this more fully below.

ARTICLE 6
WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS CERTAIN

The first conclusion is affirmative.

The second conclusion: Although predestination is certain and infallibly attains its effect, predestination does not impose necessity upon our will.

There is commonly a disputation concerning the agreement of our choice with predestination in connection with this article, but enough has already been disputed concerning it in art. 5. Concerning the first conclusion, however, let the following question be established.

QUESTION 1
WHETHER PREDESTINATION HAS ITS CERTAINTY FROM FOREKNOWLEDGE OR FROM PREDEFINITION

We presuppose in this question that predestination is certain, because the argument of St Thomas sufficiently proves this, namely, because predestination is a subjective part of providence. But God's providence always attains the end, understand, the end intended by God; for it does not always attain the end of the thing itself, which often does not attain its own proper end. Therefore, predestination always attains the end and consequently is most certain.

The difficulty, however, is whether predestination has certainty from foreknowledge, that is, whether the effect of predestination occurs infallibly because it is foreknown by God, whose knowledge is infallible, or whether it has certainty from predefinition, that is, from the practical ordering as from the cause of what occurs in time.

Let the first conclusion be: Predestination has certainty from foreknowledge. This conclusion is clear from Question 14, where St Thomas proved that the certainty of God's knowledge stands most fittingly together with the contingency of things. It is also clear by natural reason because the divine intellect cannot be deceived. Therefore, whatever is known occurs infallibly. Consequently, from the very fact that something is foreknown by God as future, it will occur infallibly. But the effect of predestination is foreknown by God. Therefore, it will occur infallibly. Thus predestination is certain by the certainty of foreknowledge, or from foreknowledge.

The second conclusion: Predestination is certain from God's predefinition and will, which is the same as saying that it is certain in causing. Augustine demonstrates this conclusion as a matter of faith in *De Correptione et Gratia*, from the words of Paul in Romans 8: *We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, for those whom he foreknew and predestined*, and so forth; and from the words of 2 Timothy 2: *The firm foundation of God stands, having this seal: the Lord knows those who are his*; and in *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chap. 8, from the words of 1 John 2: *They were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would certainly have remained with us.* It is then proved by reason because God's will is not of less power than the certainty of his knowledge. Indeed, because something would occur from the divine decree and efficacious will, it was therefore known by God as future. Consequently, just as God's knowledge cannot fail to be certain in representing a thing, so predefinition and the divine will cannot fail to be certain in causing that same thing. Indeed, it follows a priori that, if divine predestination were not certain, the knowledge of vision, which presupposes the thing as future, would not be certain.

You will nevertheless say that, once God's predestination concerning both our glory and our acts is posited, our will remains free. Therefore, we can act and not act, and thus render predestination fallible and uncertain. Furthermore, it is within the power of the predestined person to die in sin and not to make God's aid efficacious. Therefore, it is within his power to remove the certainty of predestination. To these and similar arguments, which conclude something against the certainty of predestination, it is responded, I say, that everything they infer is possible in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense, namely, on the supposition that someone is predestined. For once predestination is presupposed, it is also presupposed that the man will finish his course in grace, that he will not resist it, and thus that the aid predestined by God will be efficacious. What we say concerning predestination must be understood similarly of reprobation, in which the same difficulty is found.

From all these things it follows that the propositions "A predestined person can be damned," "He can fail to be predestined," and "He can be reprobate," and similar propositions, "A reprobate can fail to be reprobate," "He can be saved," or "He can fail to be damned," must be conceded and denied under a distinction. Absolutely, namely, and in the divided sense they are true, but in the composite sense they are false. St Thomas teaches this in this article, *De Veritate*, Quest. 6, art. 3, and *Quodlibet* XI, art. 3. Theologians admit it with the Master on *Sentences* I, distinction 40. In the same sense, they say that these propositions must be conceded: "A predestined person will necessarily be saved," and "A

reprobate will necessarily be damned." They are true in the composite sense, but false in the divided sense, and therefore absolutely false. Hence the opinion of Catharinus in Book III, *De Praedestinatione*, final chapter, is false, when he asserts that these propositions, "A predestined person will necessarily be saved" and "A predestined person cannot be damned," are absolutely true and that their opposites are false. Lest anyone should think that he is speaking on the supposition that the man is predestined and in the composite sense, he asserts in Book I that the predestined person's being saved is not necessary from supposition but simply and absolutely. This opinion is plainly false, and from it there openly follows that it is in no way within the power of a predestined person to be damned and that his will does not remain free. How great a difficulty this is can easily be seen.

ARTICLE 7
WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED IS CERTAIN

The first conclusion is affirmative.

The second conclusion: The number of the reprobate is not certain in the same manner as the number of the predestined.

QUESTION 1
WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED IS CERTAIN FORMALLY AND MATERIALLY

For the number of the predestined to be formally certain is certainly to know how many will be saved. For it to be materially certain is certainly to know who will be saved.

In this question Gregory, on *Sentences* I, distinction 40, sole question, art. 3; Driedo, *De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, part II; and Bonaventure, on *Sentences* I, distinction 40, art. 2, Quest. 2, in the solution to a certain argument, think that the number of the predestined that now exists can be increased and diminished. They prove this, first, because absolutely a person who is not predestined can be predestined, and a predestined person can be reprobated. Therefore, the number can be greater or less than it now is. The antecedent is proved because any reprobate can persevere by sufficient aids and any predestined person can die in sin, since this is free to him. Therefore, the conclusion follows. Second, God can make more things than he has made. Therefore, he can create more men than he created and newly predestine or reprobate them. Consequently, the number of

the predestined or of the reprobate will be increased. This is confirmed from St Thomas in the body of the article, saying that the number of the reprobate is not certain in the same manner as the number of the predestined. Therefore, at least the number of the reprobate is not formally or materially certain. It is confirmed, second, from Revelation 3: *Hold fast what you have, lest another receive your crown.* Therefore, someone can lose the crown of glory to which he had been predestined, and another can recover it. Consequently, the number of the predestined and the reprobate will be uncertain, at least formally.

Another is the opinion defended by Catharinus in the cited Book III, *De Praedestinatione*, asserting that the number of the predestined and reprobate is certain, but that the number of those who will be saved and damned is not certain. For Catharinus establishes three orders of men. The first is of those who are predestined, in which order he says are the Apostles, the Most Blessed Virgin, and others who are necessarily saved. The second is of the reprobate, who infallibly and necessarily will be damned, in which order were Judas, Saul, and others. He establishes a third and intermediate order of those whom he calls "those who may be saved," some of whom will be saved by their freedom and others damned. He therefore asserts that the number of the first and second orders is certain in God's predefinition and foreknowledge, but that the third is certain only in foreknowledge and not in predefinition. He gives as the reason that the first were elected to glory before works were foreseen, the second were efficaciously excluded from it, while the third were left to their own nature with general supernatural providence. Thus it is not certain who among them will be saved or damned except through the foreknowledge by which, once their works have been seen, some are known to persevere and others to die in sin. Catharinus thinks that this opinion conforms to Sacred Scripture and that the opposing opinion is contrary to that same Sacred Scripture.

Nevertheless, despite these arguments, the opposite must be held. Hence let the first conclusion against the first opinion be: The number of the predestined and the reprobate is formally and materially certain to God, not only in foreknowledge but also in the predefinition and predestination of the predestined and in the reprobation of the reprobate. St Thomas teaches this in art. 7, and it is the opinion of Cajetan and of almost all the Scholastics with the Master. Augustine taught it in *De Correptione et Gratia*, chaps. 7 and 13. It is gathered from 2 Timothy 2: *The Lord knows those who are his.* The first part of the conclusion, that the number is formally and materially certain in foreknowledge, is proved because whatever things are future are, from the very fact that they are future, certainly known by God in the manner in which they

are future, as is sufficiently clear from Question 14, art. 13. But each of the predestined will most certainly be in glory, and all the reprobate will be excluded from it, since predestination and reprobation are most certain, as has been seen. Therefore, the whole number of the predestined and the reprobate is formally and materially certain to God. The consequence is clear because not only will so many be future, but these and those particular persons will be future. Second, if the number of the predestined and reprobate were not certain to God, it would follow that someone is saved or damned who is not known by God, or who was not known from eternity, or at least was known doubtfully and uncertainly, which no one says. The inference is clear because nothing can be opposed to the certainty of cognition except uncertainty and mutability on the part of knowledge, each of which is repugnant to God, just as it is repugnant that God should be deceived or ignorant. Therefore, God most certainly knows who and how many are to be saved and damned. The second part of the conclusion, that the number is certain in election and in the predefinition of the predestined and in the reprobation of the reprobate, is proved because God predefines and elects all the elect individually, and all their degrees of grace and glory and all their works, and knows that his efficacious will will infallibly have its effect, although our freedom is preserved. Therefore, in predefinition, election, and reprobation, he certainly knows the whole number of the predestined and the reprobate. But concerning reprobation in particular, this is proved because reprobation was made after final sin had already been seen, when reprobation depends upon no future work of ours. Therefore, there is nothing from which it could have contingency and uncertainty. Consequently, in reprobation itself God knows what number and which men or angels are to be damned, and in predefinition he knows how many and which persons are to be saved.

The second conclusion against Catharinus: There is no man or angel who is not either predestined or reprobate, and thus there is none concerning whom God is not certain in predefinition that he will be saved or in reprobation that he will be damned. Both parts of the conclusion are gathered from what has been said. The first follows from what we proved in art. 4, that all who are saved were elected before their works, and then from what we proved in art. 5, that all who die in final mortal or original sin are reprobated. Once this is presupposed, the second part of the conclusion necessarily follows, namely, that the number of the predestined and the reprobate is certain, because all who are excluded from the kingdom and all who are efficaciously admitted are certainly known by God in his predefinition, as Catharinus himself wills. But all are efficaciously

excluded or admitted, because all are either reprobate or predestined. Therefore, all are certainly known by God.

Many reject this opinion of Catharinus as erroneous because he asserts, contrary to express Sacred Scripture, that some are neither predestined nor reprobate. But it appears to me that there is nothing new in this except a manner of speaking. For he asserts, first, that some are predestined, that is, elected before works were foreseen, in which he agrees with us. Second, he asserts that others are reprobate, that is, excluded before works were foreseen, in which he agrees with the opinion of St Thomas and others. Third, he asserts that others are neither reprobate nor predestined, that is, neither elected nor excluded from glory before works were foreseen; but that some of these are efficaciously excluded after their final sins have already been seen, in which he also agrees with us, whereas others are efficaciously assumed to glory after their perseverance has been seen, in which Catharinus agrees with many modern Catholic doctors, although it is less probable. The only point deserving of censure in Catharinus is that he asserts that the reprobate are damned necessarily and the predestined saved necessarily with absolute necessity, which we proved above to be false.

The third conclusion: The number of the predestined can neither be diminished nor increased. This conclusion belongs to St Thomas and Augustine in the passages cited. It is proved by reason because, if the number of the predestined could be increased, it would follow that someone who was not predestined could be predestined. But everyone who was not predestined was reprobate, as has been seen. Therefore, someone who was reprobate from eternity would now be predestined. But this cannot happen without a change in God's will, which is altogether incapable of change. Therefore, it is impossible that the number of the predestined be increased. By the same argument it can be proved that the number of the predestined cannot be diminished, and by the same argument it is likewise proved that the number of the reprobate can neither be increased nor diminished.

The fourth conclusion: From eternity God could have predestined more than he predestined and reprobated more than he reprobated; indeed, he could have elected all to glory or condemned all to punishment. Nor is this opinion contrary to Anselm, who in Book I, *Cur Deus Homo*, chap. 16, does not assert, as some think, that God could not have predestined more. That must be understood not simply but in relation to the end intended by God. This conclusion is clear because these persons, and no more, were freely predestined by God; for *all things are subject to him when he wills to have the power*, as is said

in Wisdom 12. Therefore, he could have predestined more men, but Anselm asserted only that it would not have been fitting to predestine or reprobate more than he predestined and reprobated. From these points it follows that more persons cannot now be predestined or reprobated than are predestined and reprobate, on the supposition of the predestination that was made from eternity together with the reprobation of others. St Thomas also holds this in *De Veritate*, Quest. 2, art. 5, reply to 5, and Quest. 6, art. 4, reply to 8. He teaches the same concerning foreknowledge in *Summa Theologiae* I, Quest. 14, art. 15, reply to 2, namely, that in the composite sense God cannot foreknow more things than he knows, the opposite of which Bonaventure teaches without justification on *Sentences* I, distinction 39, art. 1, Quest. 3, reply to the final objection. This is clear because the number cannot be greater. Therefore, more cannot be predestined. Nor can the number be less, as has been seen. Therefore, fewer cannot be predestined or more reprobated.

To the first argument, it is responded that in the divided sense a predestined person can fail to be predestined, but not in the composite sense. Hence, although in the divided sense the number can be greater, it cannot be greater in the composite sense.

To the second, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence, because, since creation is a transient action received in the thing made, there is no repugnance in more things being created. Predestination and reprobation, however, are immanent actions and are in God, according to our manner of understanding, as in their subject. Since it is repugnant for God to receive anything new, it is repugnant that he should newly predestine or reprobate. To the confirmation, it is responded with St Thomas in the same place that the number of the reprobate is not certain in the same manner as the number of the predestined, not because it is not formally and materially certain, but because it is not intended first and for its own sake as the number of the predestined is intended. For God reprobated as many men and angels as were sufficient for manifesting the riches of his glory concerning the predestined, according to Paul in Romans 9: *He endured with great patience*, and so forth. This is what Augustine says: Every wicked man lives either in order that he may be converted or that through him a good man may be exercised. Or it must be said that the number is not certain in the same way because the number of the predestined is certain by the knowledge of approval, whereas the number of the reprobate is not. In this sense are understood the words cited above, *Amen I say to you, I do not know you*, namely, by practical knowledge joined with election and approval for glory. Thus too is understood 2 Timothy 2: *The Lord knows those who are his.*

To the passage from Revelation, it is responded that those words were spoken to manifest our freedom, upon which the effect of predestination depends, not to manifest uncertainty in predestination. Or it must be said with St Thomas in the cited passage that a crown is said to belong to someone in two ways. In one way, by reason of predestination, and thus no one can lose his crown. In another way, by reason of merit or present grace, and in this way someone can lose the crown owed to him, according to Job 34: *He will crush many and cause others to stand in their place.* Thus the Gentiles were substituted in the place of the Jews, and men in the place of the angels who fell, as regards the state of grace. The passage from 2 Peter 1, *Labor all the more*, and so forth, has already been explained above.

QUESTION 2
WHETHER THE MULTITUDE OF THE PREDESTINED IS GREATER THAN THAT OF THE REPROBATE

There can be a difficulty, first, when a comparison is made among all peoples; second, between the Church and the Synagogue; third, among the faithful themselves; fourth, between men and angels. We shall briefly report concerning all of these what can be gathered from the holy Fathers and Sacred Scripture.

Let the first conclusion be, speaking of all peoples and nations: Fewer are predestined than reprobate. This is held as a matter of faith from Matthew 7: *Narrow is the way that leads to life, and few enter by it*, and so forth; and in the parable of the sower into every kind of ground in Luke 8, where only the fourth part of the seed fell upon good ground. The same is signified in Isaiah 17 and 24 and in Matthew 7 by the few clusters of grapes and ears of grain gathered after the vintage and harvest; by the few who were saved in Noah's ark; by only two who entered the Promised Land out of so many thousands; and by 4 Esdras 8, where it is said that, just as many earthen vessels but few golden vessels are made from the earth, so many are created but few are saved. This is what Paul signifies in 1 Corinthians 9 by the words, *Many indeed run, but one receives the prize.* The reason for this truth can be assigned as follows: the portion of the Gentiles is much greater than that of the faithful.

The second conclusion: More are predestined from the Church than from the Synagogue. This is signified in Isaiah 54 by the words, *Many are the children of the desolate woman*, that is, of the Gentiles, *more than of her who has a husband*, that is, the Synagogue; and in Revelation 7, after the one hundred and

forty-four thousand sealed persons, that is, the predestined, have been numbered, John says that he saw a great multitude which no one could number. The reason for this truth can be assigned as follows: grace is much more abundant in the Christian Church, in which it is conferred through the sacraments of Christ, than it was in the Synagogue under the old sacraments, and there are many more faithful persons now than there were in the Synagogue. Therefore, more are predestined from the Church.

The third conclusion: Although the matter is doubtful, it must be said with the saints that fewer of the faithful are predestined than reprobate. Gregory holds this in Homily 19 *Super Evangelia*, on Matthew 20, *Few are chosen*, where he says that many receive faith but few receive the kingdom. Chrysostom, Homily 69 on Matthew 22, on the words *Many are called*, says: "It seems to me that this discourse touches the Jews and those among the faithful who shone with virtue and were then cast down into the depths through negligence, and again those who, being received in wickedness, return to their former ways." In Homily 4 *Ad Populum*, he asserts that scarcely one hundred out of a thousand faithful persons are saved. Augustine, Book IX, *Contra Cresconium*, chap. 33, compares the reprobate to chaff and the predestined to grains, which are far fewer than the chaff. St Thomas also teaches this in reply to 3, when he says that fewer are saved than are damned, in which God's mercy especially appears, because he raises more into that salvation from which very many fall short. Cajetan also taught it in his commentary on Luke 17, when he explains the parable of the ten virgins.

Someone will nevertheless object with the parable in Matthew 22 concerning those invited to the wedding, among whom only one was found without a wedding garment and cast into the outer darkness. It is responded that in that parable Christ does not signify the number of the damned in comparison with those who are saved, but signifies that not even one of the faithful will enter the kingdom of heaven without the wedding garment, that is, charity. Jerome, however, on that passage teaches that the invited persons signify the number of the faithful, while by the one not having the garment the whole multitude of the damned is signified, who, since they are equal, are signified by the name of one. Anselm and Origen teach the same there.

Let the fourth conclusion be: The number of angels who are saved and predestined is greater than the number of those who are damned; among men, however, the contrary is true, and the number of those who are damned is greater than the number of those who are saved. As regards the first point concerning angels, theologians concede it with St Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I,

Quest. 63, art. 9, and Alexander, Quest. 110, member 4. It is signified in 4 Kings 6 by the words, *There are more with us*, and in Revelation 12, *He drew the third part of the stars*, which Cyril also teaches in Book I *In Genesim*. The reason is that sin is contrary to nature and natural inclination, while things contrary to nature occur in the minority of cases. Furthermore, angels existed without the opposition of appetites, which in men is for the most part the cause of sinning. Therefore, it must be believed that there were more angels who did not sin. Because man is often overcome by internal temptations, with the tinder of concupiscence inclining him toward them and toward what is contrary to reason, it follows that more men die in sin and are damned than are saved. For the argument that nature fails in fewer cases is true of a sound and integral nature. It is compatible with this that wounded nature, whose infirmity has not been wholly healed through grace and in which many penal conditions remain for the struggle, should fail in the greater number of cases.

ARTICLE 8
WHETHER PREDESTINATION CAN BE ASSISTED BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS

The first conclusion: If predestination is taken for the divine preordination, it cannot be assisted by the prayers of the saints; but if it is taken for its effects, it can be assisted by the prayers of the saints.

QUESTION 1
WHETHER PREDESTINATION CAN BE ASSISTED BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS

In this question two points appear certain. The first is that, if predestination is taken for the act of ordering existing in the divine intellect, it can in no way be assisted by the prayers of the saints. Thus St Thomas teaches here, on *Sentences* I, distinction 41, Quest. 1, art. 4, and *De Veritate*, Quest. 6, art. 6. His argument is that to assist is nothing other than to obtain or merit another's predestination. But no works of a creature could obtain predestination taken as ordering, since election and preordination were made from eternity before the vision of all future works. Therefore, the conclusion follows. The difficulty, then, concerns only predestination taken as its effects. Concerning this, it is also certain, second, that the prayers of the saints can assist another's predestination as regards some effect. The reason is that one effect of

predestination can be the cause of another. Therefore, the prayers of the saints can be the cause of some effect of another's predestination, especially since one person can merit the first grace for another by congruous merit.

Gregory taught this in Book I of the *Dialogues*, chap. 8, which he shows by the example of Abraham, to whom a promise had been made concerning the multiplication of his seed, which was predestined through Isaac, as Genesis 21 says in the words, *In Isaac your seed will be called*; and yet Isaac obtained through his prayers from God that Rebecca, who was barren, should give birth. Augustine taught the same in Book I, *De Bono Perseverantiae*, chap. 22, saying: "If there are some who have not yet been called, let us pray for them that they may be called." St Thomas taught it in this article and in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, Quest. 83, saying that divine providence disposes not only what effects are to occur, but through what causes they are to occur; and because human acts can be causes, it disposed that some effects occur through human acts, namely, through prayers and petitions. Hence Paul frequently commands us to pray, as in 1 Thessalonians 5, *Pray without ceasing*; Luke 18, *It is necessary always to pray and not to lose heart*; and Matthew 7, *Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find.* Third, it is certain that Christ the Lord merited for us the whole collection of the effects of predestination, because, as we saw above, we are predestined and elected through the merits of Christ. Therefore, whatever is an effect of our predestination is an effect of the merits of Christ. All these points are sufficiently clear on the supposition that Christ was predestined before original sin had been seen and before the election of the predestined. The whole difficulty consists in this: whether any mere man or angel can be a meritorious or impetratory cause of all the effects of another's predestination.

Certain Thomists think that the prayers of one saint can be the meritorious cause of all the effects of another's predestination. They prove this because Christ is the cause of all the effects of our predestination only because he merited the first vocation and its justification, in which the other effects are contained radically. But one man can merit for another the first vocation and justification, at least by congruous merit. Therefore, he can merit all the effects of another's predestination.

Nevertheless, let the conclusion be: No man can merit for another all the effects of predestination, both intrinsic and extrinsic. This conclusion is proved because the merits and prayers through which someone merits or obtains for another all the effects of predestination are themselves effects of the predestination of the person for whom he obtains or merits them, since from eternity God ordained to give glory to that man through another's prayers. But

no one can merit his own prayers or merits. Therefore, he cannot merit for another all the effects of predestination, including the extrinsic effects.

The second conclusion: One person can most fittingly merit for another all the intrinsic effects of predestination. The doctors commonly hold this, and Durandus expressly teaches it on *Sentences* I, distinction 41, Quest. 3. It is most certain because Stephen is believed to have merited for Paul all the effects of his predestination. Furthermore, someone can merit another's vocation, which is the first effect, and in it the other effects are contained. Therefore, he can merit all the intrinsic effects of another's predestination.

Hence, to the argument, it is responded that the account of Christ is far different from that of other men, because neither Christ nor his merits are effects of our predestination. Therefore, Christ's prayers and merits, as something existing outside the whole range of the effects of a man's predestination, can merit all the effects. The prayers of one man through which things are merited for another, however, are within the range of the effects of the other's predestination. Therefore, a mere man cannot merit all the extrinsic and intrinsic effects, because he cannot merit his own prayers or merits. But if you ask whether one person can merit or demerit another's reprobation, it is responded that no one can merit it in such a way as to be the proximate cause of another's reprobation, because this proximate cause must be the final sin proper to the one who is reprobated. Nevertheless, he can be a remote cause insofar as he can lead another into final sin. If you ask whether one person's predestination can be impeded by his own or another's demerits, it is responded that it can in no way be impeded in the composite sense, namely, on the supposition that he is predestined. The reason is that through predestination all things necessary for the attainment of glory were predefined and were seen as going to have their effect. But predestination is efficacious and cannot be impeded, nor can things occur otherwise than they have been predefined or known by God. Therefore, once predestination has already been posited, it can be impeded neither by one's own demerits nor by those of another.

PRAISE BE TO GOD

THE END

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